

CONTENTS

Detailed table of contents page vii
Acknowledgments xiii
Table of cases xvi
Table of legislation xxiv

1 Introduction: aims and methods 1

Part I The case for constitutional social rights 15

2 The case for social rights 17
3 The value of courts in light of the alternatives 59
4 A basic interpretive approach 97

Part II A theory of judicial restraint 119

5 Institutional approaches to judicial restraint 121
6 Democratic legitimacy 152
7 Polycentricity 189
8 Expertise 211
9 Flexibility 250

Part III Incrementalism 287

10 Incrementalism as a general theme 289

Appendix 1: The scope of economic and social rights under international law 326
Bibliography 328
Index 356

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Table of Contents
[More information](#)

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction: aims and methods 1

 I Introduction 1

 II Why does it matter? 2

 III Arguments against constitutional social rights 3

 A The bad arguments 4

 B The good arguments 5

 C The best argument – the risky enterprise 7

 IV The case for incrementalism in a nutshell 8

 V Background political conditions – when the argument applies 10

 A The background political conditions 10

 B When the conditions do not apply 12

 VI Conclusion 13

Part I The case for constitutional social rights 15

2 The case for social rights 17

 I Introduction 17

 II Different senses of ‘social rights’ 18

 III Social rights, human rights, and the welfare state 20

 A Social rights as human rights: form and justification 20

 B The basic content of social human rights 28

 1 The social minimum 29

 2 The basic duties in respect of the social minimum 35

 C State responsibility and the welfare state 39

 IV Multi-institutional protection of social rights 41

 A Legislative 41

 B Executive/administrative 44

 C Adjudicative 48

 D Constitutional 51

 V Conclusion 57

vii

3	The value of courts in light of the alternatives	59
I	Introduction	59
II	The prima facie benefits of legal accountability	60
III	The courts and social change	63
A	Significant social change	63
B	Impact and administrative justice	70
C	A pathology of legalism?	76
D	A hollow hope for the poor?	79
IV	Alternatives to courts: partner or substitute?	85
A	Specialised adjudication – tribunals	86
B	Ombudsmen	90
C	Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)	93
V	Conclusion: the role of law in an incrementalist approach	95
4	A basic interpretive approach	97
I	Introduction	97
II	Constitutional social rights: a basic interpretive approach	97
A	The structure of rights: scope of interest and nature of obligation	98
B	Constitutional text: absolute and qualified obligations	100
C	Judicial interpretation: the inescapability of vagueness	105
III	The need for an approach to judicial restraint	108
A	Social rights in the shadow of <i>Lochner</i> and Dicey	108
B	The allure and limits of existing interpretive approaches	111
1	Interpretivism	111
2	Principles, balancing, and proportionality	112
3	Deliberative democracy	113
4	The minimum-core approach	114
5	Institutional reform approach	116
6	South African reasonableness	116
IV	Conclusion	117
	Part II A theory of judicial restraint	119
5	Institutional approaches to judicial restraint	121
I	Introduction	121
II	Formalist approaches	122

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

A	The distinction between law and politics	123
B	The principle/policy distinction	125
C	Justiciability	129
III	Institutional approaches	132
A	The rising tide of institutionalism	133
B	General features of institutional approaches	136
C	Two paths diverge: restrictive vs. contextual institutionalism	141
D	Measuring the success of institutional approaches	142
IV	Developing the contextual institutional approach	143
A	The nature of legal reasoning under a ‘principled approach’	143
B	Pragmatics: how should judges apply an institutional approach?	148
V	Conclusion	150
6	Democratic legitimacy	152
I	Introduction	152
II	The dignity of legislation	153
A	The argument from political equality	154
B	Limits	156
1	The gap between preferences and outcomes	156
2	Equality or outcome-based departures from formal voting equality	159
III	Two pressing problems with the finality of legislation	163
A	Absence of legislative focus	164
B	Marginalisation	165
IV	Giving weight to democratic legitimacy	169
A	Executive action: not pre-empting legislative focus	169
B	Primary legislation: ensuring legislative focus	171
C	Primary legislation: weak democratic restraint	173
1	Absolute obligations	173
2	Procedural rights	174
3	Clear or core cases	175
4	Marginalised groups	176
D	Primary legislation: strong democratic restraint	185
V	Conclusion	187
7	Polycentricity	189
I	Introduction	189
II	The idea and importance of polycentricity	190

X	DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS	
III	The pervasiveness of polycentricity	192
IV	Refinement of Fuller’s idea	193
	A A property of issues, not areas	193
	B When a legal issue is polycentric	194
V	Giving weight to polycentricity: attenuating factors	198
	A Judicial mandate	198
	B Degree	202
	C Access to information: case management and interventions	203
	D Relative competency	208
	E Flexibility: remedies and revisitation	209
VI	Conclusion	209
8	Expertise	211
I	Introduction	211
II	Law and expertise in historical context	212
	A Lesson from America	212
	B Expertise in British law and administration	215
III	Types of expertise	220
	A Front-line expertise	221
	B Managerial expertise	223
	C Professional expertise	225
	D Specialised adjudicative expertise	228
IV	Giving weight to expertise	229
	A Expertise–accountability trade-offs	229
	1 Expert intuition and accountability	230
	2 Expertise and democratic accountability	231
	3 Expertise–accountability trade-offs and cost–benefit	233
	B Expertise types and variation of scrutiny	233
	C Failures of expertise	235
	1 Refusal to apply expertise	235
	2 Distinctive facts	238
	3 Contradiction of established scientific or social science evidence	240
V	Conclusion	248
9	Flexibility	250
I	Introduction	250
II	Forms of inflexibility	251
	A Legal forms	251
	1 Agenda control	251

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS xi

- 2 Delay 253
- 3 Cost 257
- B Bureaucratic and political forms 258
 - 1 Conscious forms: fettering, ideology, and stereotype 259
 - 2 Bounded rationality, path-dependence, and heuristics 259
- III Giving weight to flexibility 264
 - A The perils of procedural rights 264
 - 1 Interest representation in administrative policy-making 264
 - 2 Trial-like rights in administrative decision-making 268
 - 3 Structural injunctions and supervisory jurisdiction 271
 - B Mandating flexibility 275
 - 1 Procedural rights 275
 - 2 Non-fettering and mandatory consideration 277
 - C Remedies: respecting flexibility 281
 - 1 Constitutional avoidance 281
 - 2 Vague legal standards 282
 - 3 Flexible remedies and the virtue of silence 283
- IV Conclusion 285

Part III Incrementalism 287

- 10 Incrementalism as a general theme 289**
 - I Introduction 289
 - II Incrementalism and public administration 290
 - III Applying judicial incrementalism 293
 - A The techniques of incrementalism 294
 - 1 Particularisation 294
 - 2 Cautious expansion, analogical reasoning 296
 - 3 Vague legal standards 296
 - 4 Procedural rights 298
 - 5 Constitutional avoidance 299
 - 6 Non-intrusive remedies 300
 - 7 Revisitation 301
 - IV Incrementalism and its cousins 303
 - A Sunstein’s judicial minimalism 303
 - B Democratic experimentalism 306
 - V Criticisms of incrementalism 311
 - A Inert incrementalism 311
 - B Insidious incrementalism 313
 - C Impossible incrementalism 314

VI Incrementalist answers to familiar social rights problems 315

A Enforcement of positive obligations 316

B Evaluation of resource scarcity 316

VII Incrementalism and the principles of restraint 320

VIII Conclusion 322

Appendix 1: The scope of economic and social rights under international law 326

Bibliography 328

Index 356