PART I

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
In 1932, the Dutch physician Gerrit Arie Lindeboom (1905–1986) observed in an obscure journal that the “moderne mensch” now found it within his reach to bring the old dream of human autonomy into actual practice. That is why Lindeboom wrote:

Life now must be well-regulated; every disturbance, every roughness must be eliminated, and the course of human life must be characterized by eugenese [a good beginning], eubiose [a good life] and euthanasie [a good death].

And euthanasia seeks death in order to bring a worthy end to a worthy human life, and wishes at every cost to spare it from the frightful aspects of struggle and suffering.¹

Lindeboom, himself a Calvinist, urged his coreligionists to resist this trend toward embracing euthanasia. He urged Christian doctors to help their patients to fully face the death that awaited them through a palliative approach, directed at both body and soul, instead.

Lindeboom’s article is interesting in several respects. It reveals the ethical interests of a physician who in the 1950s would write the ethical guidelines for the Dutch medical profession. More specifically, it shows a man interested early on in a subject that would command his attention only in his later years: In the 1970s, this Free University professor emerged as a leading opponent of the rapidly ascendant support for euthanasia. Quite in contrast with the situation in the seventies, however, four decades earlier Lindeboom had found no serious public opponents in the Netherlands to contest his Christian vision of a good death. As Aldous Huxley did in his own way in Brave New World (1931), Lindeboom noticed the cultural shifts in Western society: a new relationship to technology and the emergence of a new morality that was changing the way people thought about life itself. But the shift signaled by Lindeboom made almost no impression on Dutch public or medical discourse until the 1960s, when the thrust of the discussion quickly moved in a direction that appalled Lindeboom and the dwindling number of like-minded souls.

¹ The Lateness of the Dutch Euthanasia Debate and Its Consequences

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It is striking, then, that a country whose public debate and policies on euthanasia exhibited – for good or for ill – such a degree of openness since roughly 1970 should have been so silent about the subject prior to the changes brought about by the 1960s. That says little, of course, about actual practice, only the debate. This silence can be partly attributed to an international pattern: In many countries, the 1960s served as the starting point for sustained public discussion about such matters. Only then and in subsequent years did the convergence of the “rights revolution” and critique of the medical establishment and its power provide important stimuli for public debate – though of course this debate has been livelier in some countries than in others.

Nevertheless, in several countries there was public debate about the permissibility of euthanasia (both voluntary and involuntary). Germany is perhaps the most infamous example, but in fact it was primarily in Great Britain and the United States (where it was known as “mercy killing”) that such discussions took place throughout much of the twentieth century. Although they did not succeed, the first legislative attempts to sanction active, voluntary euthanasia took place in the American Midwest in states such as Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio shortly after the turn of the century.

During the 1930s, pro-euthanasia societies came into being in both the UK and the United States. These early societies emphasized the voluntary nature of euthanasia, for example, as the Euthanasia Society of America did in its 1938 publication Merciful Release.\(^5\) Polls in 1939 suggested high rates of support among the American population; according to one source, 90% of New York doctors who were surveyed supported legalization of voluntary euthanasia.\(^4\) Ten years later, in 1949, Hermann Sander, a doctor in New Hampshire was acquitted of murder after he injected air into a vein of an unconscious and dying woman – but not before impassioned defenders and detractors wielded many pens against each other.\(^5\)

Britain led Europe in efforts to legalize euthanasia.\(^6\) In the mid-1930s, Lord Ponsonby introduced legislation in Parliament supporting voluntary euthanasia, gaining the support of a third of the House of Lords.\(^7\) After the Second World War, too, the British Parliament strenuously debated euthanasia in 1952 and again in 1969 before ultimately rejecting legalization.\(^6,8,9\)

By the early twentieth century, various countries elsewhere in Europe – for example, Norway – had made allowance in their penal codes for doctors performing euthanasia, reducing the penalty for conviction. In Germany, there was substantial discussion about euthanasia as early as the late nineteenth century, which reached its greatest intensity in the 1920s. Although much of this debate advocated the involuntary euthanasia of “useless mouths” on the grounds of social utility, some of it also was concerned with honoring the requests of those who wished to die. National socialism played little, if any, direct role in these debates.\(^10\)

\(^3\) For a Dutch-language summary, see 3. Jongsma 1968.
Debate continued on both sides of the Atlantic into the 1950s and 1960s in both the popular press and more academic forums. But it picked up in the last half of the 1960s, and the 1970s was dubbed “the age of thanatology” – ostensibly following the sexual revolution. Humane treatment of the dying became a concern where people were living longer – sometimes longer than they wanted – and expecting better treatment for themselves and their loved ones. By 1972, the U.S. Senate was holding hearings on “death with dignity.”

None of this led, however, to legislation legalizing euthanasia. The failure of the Anglo-American world to develop a euthanasia regime has to do with several different factors, including, at the very least, different understandings of law, the substantially different position of general practitioners in contrast with the Dutch huisarts, different systems of political regulation of medical practice, and, perhaps most fundamentally, the ways in which these different societies think about power, specifically in regard to the patient–physician relationship and the extent to which the physician can be trusted to act in the interests of patients. But as I shall argue in the remainder of this chapter, it also has something to do with the distinct relationship of the Netherlands to the broader history of the twentieth century and the unique lessons the Dutch drew from it.

WHY THE DUTCH NEVER TALKED ABOUT EUTHANASIA BEFORE THE 1960S

Dutch physicians shortened the lives of suffering patients in the decades prior to the 1960s, but public debate in the Netherlands over this topic barely existed. In contrast, “euthanasia” became a topic of public discussion in the early twentieth century in some Western countries, most notably Germany, Britain, and the United States. This was particularly noticeable after the First World War.

In the first place, the carnage of the First World War encouraged the “reappraising [of] ethical precepts concerning the sanctity of life and the extent to which it was deemed acceptable to interfere with divine providence,” inasmuch as traditional understandings of Christian death and burial, for instance, were weakened by the wartime experience. Moral outlook was often consciously shaped by Darwinian thought, and more particularly an interest in eugenics, including, in the years after the war, an interest in “negative eugenics” programs that through sterilization – or mercy killing – might reduce the social and economic burdens of society. These influences were weaker in the Netherlands. Of course this country, too, had witnessed a sharp process of “dechristianization” in the early twentieth century, as large numbers of socialists and freethinkers formally broke with the church. But if the First World War left its mark on Dutch intellectual life, the moral world of the Dutch had not been as radically shaken by a war in which the Netherlands managed to remain neutral. More important, in contrast to Germany and Britain, the decline of a once-dominant Christian moral
world had been checked for the time being by powerful religious movements, Catholic and Protestant, that opposed the new ethical outlook (as Lindeboom illustrates).

The social scientist Dick Meerman has shown how euthanasia (variously defined) generated much English and German literature after 1870, but very little within the Netherlands itself. In 1923 the freethinker and writer Max Greeve made a case for euthanasia in a pamphlet, but no one followed him in championing this cause. Meerman suggests that discussions about euthanasia were subsumed under discussions about abortion, but a more obvious explanation is that the power of orthodox Christianity in the Netherlands discouraged open discussion. Dutch eugenicists, in contrast to their German, American, and English counterparts, never made much headway in prewar Holland because of the strength of the country's religious subcultures, which may explain why euthanasia – often associated in the early days with other eugenicist concerns – seldom was discussed. Moreover, regardless of religious belief, the Dutch medical profession remained hostile to euthanasia.

In the second place, research-driven, state-directed medicine was weaker in the Netherlands than in Germany or the United States. The rise of the research universities, which were far more extensively developed in those countries than anywhere else, sometimes went hand in hand with initiatives at social engineering. Although the United States never did legalize euthanasia, and although Hitler waited until the Second World War to implement mass murder under the guise of mercy killing, some of the proponents of mercy killing envisaged an important role for the medical profession and the state in achieving their aims. In the Netherlands, however, political commitment to a strong, assertive nation-state was weaker, and government was seen as facilitating private (and often religious) initiative. Indeed, many of the asylums were created and run by various religious organizations, which showed little interest in eugenics generally or euthanasia more particularly.

Finally, it should be noted that in the United States and Great Britain, the calls for euthanasia (again, in both its voluntary and nonvoluntary forms) were often made by what might be called the radical dissenting tradition: liberal Protestants, including Unitarians, and those associated with humanist organizations. (The Episcopalian priest-cum-atheist Joseph Fletcher, the famous father of “situation ethics,” is a striking American example of this pattern.) In the United States, some of these religious progressives were closely tied to the Progressive political movement of the early twentieth century. These groups, more than others, determined both the membership and orientation of the voluntary euthanasia associations that sprang up in both countries in the 1930s. Although limited in number, their members were generally well educated and articulate, enjoying access to the cultural and political establishments of their respective countries.

By the 1970s and 1980s, Dutch humanists and liberal Protestants would take an important public role in championing euthanasia (the Protestant ethicist-theologian Harry Kuitert’s life and role in the euthanasia debate in
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The absence of a debate over euthanasia in the Netherlands prior to the 1960s was important for the quality of the debate that began with the cultural changes of that decade. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to outline three historical dimensions of the euthanasia debate in the Netherlands that help explain why the Dutch came to see euthanasia as morally acceptable. These considerations cannot, of course, offer a complete explanation for why the Dutch developed the practice as they did, which has much to do with how the political and social system tries to channel potentially disruptive practices rather than to forbid them. The Dutch legal system played an important part in the changes. But these historical dimensions do help shed light on how the Dutch were able to conceive of euthanasia in terms that rendered them open to the practice.

In the first place, the Dutch debate was relatively free of arguments that underscored the social, in addition to the individual, benefits of legalized euthanasia – arguments that would have made it vulnerable to the charge that proponents were insufficiently interested in the voluntary nature of euthanasia. Social arguments were certainly present in the Netherlands, but they appeared briefly around 1970, only to disappear shortly thereafter. In this respect, and unlike their American and British counterparts, the late arrival of the Dutch euthanasia movement spared the movement from having to face a past of less-than-cautious discussion of the terms under which the recipients of compassion might be released from this life.
In the second place, the absence of a powerful eugenicist movement, a coercive medical establishment, and totalitarian dictatorship allowed the Dutch, after some discussion, to perceive euthanasia as they sought to regulate it as completely disanalogous to the Nazi situation.

Finally, and most importantly, the Dutch saw the allowance of euthanasia not at all as a return to a dark past but as a break with the narrowness of their past: The proponents of liberalization had the sense that they were dealing with an issue that, before their own pioneering role, had not yet been openly discussed. That sense of breaking with a history of silence gave additional energy to the Dutch euthanasia movement. In a word, the Dutch felt that the excesses and missteps of the past were not theirs and not particularly relevant for the present. Rather, by opening debate, the Dutch understood themselves to be drawing quite a different lesson from their own past, criticizing the shortcomings of a religious and moral system that seemed now, to many of them, hypocritical and untruthful.

The Social Utility of Euthanasia

It is, of course, important to ask: Was there really no nexus between the debates held by the British and Americans prior to the 1960s and the Dutch debate thereafter? The arguments made for voluntary euthanasia were much the same. But one notable feature of the Dutch debate has been its emphasis on the right to die as a voluntary act, and the focus of their discussion in the 1970s and 1980s on the rights of mentally capable patients to choose their own death. In contrast to the United States, where much of the debate centered on the fate of comatose patients like Karen Ann Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan, the Dutch focused on patients who possessed decision-making capacities. More broadly, the Dutch debate has conceived of euthanasia as an individual decision that, in theory, has nothing to do with the interests of society, unlike the position of the early Anglo-American euthanasia societies.

The early years of the Dutch euthanasia debate – from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s – do, however, show some signs of the older concern for the social value of euthanasia – not in eugenicist terms, but in respect to the challenge of allocating scarce resources that would only grow worse in the future. There was perhaps no Western country more consumed with the overpopulation “problem” than the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s. Warnings about high birth rates were both frequent and dire. It is not surprising, therefore, that a concern about overpopulation would play some role not only in the abortion debate but in the euthanasia debate as well.

For a rather militant example of this, see, for instance, 19. Drogendijk 1974. Scholars investigating the history of the modern abortion debate are divided on how great a role these neo-Malthusian concerns played, with Joyce Outshoorn realizing the significance that Jan de Bruijn attaches to it (see 20. Outshoorn 1984, and 21. de Bruijn 1979).
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The issues of euthanasia and overpopulation met each other most clearly in what was sometimes called the bejaardenvraagstuk, the problem of the elderly. By the 1960s, the growing number of older people, and the challenge of providing and funding care for them, had come to be seen as a social problem. By the early 1970s, the growing problem of too many old people in the future was a topic of considerable debate, and that debate also included “euthanasia” (variously defined). The Dutch weekly Haagse Post had noted: “In 1970 increasing numbers of people in overpopulated Holland are seeing that ending purposeless human life can be done out of compassion.” In 1975 the recently established Voluntary Euthanasia Foundation noted with concern that Dutch society was showing an active interest in “euthanizing” people who experienced, in the eyes of many, “a life without purpose,” whose “large number constitute a heavy burden on society.”

The costs of health care in the Netherlands rose some 450% from 1963 to 1972. In general, this seemed to put into question by the early 1970s whether the Dutch could afford to keep alive everyone for whom that was technologically possible. The Protestant ethicist at the University of Groningen, P. J. Roscam Abbing, argued that keeping people alive at any cost would mean that the whole national budget would have to be spent on health. In particular, expensive technology that would not be available for everyone meant, at the very least, that “passive euthanasia” was unavoidable. Medical decisions would have to be made – indeed, were already being made – that consigned some people to this kind of euthanasia, and this trend would only become more pronounced in the future.

Two early and prominent proponents of euthanasia in the Netherlands had themselves been vocal and active in combating overpopulation. Hendrik Jan van den Berg’s objections to the “power” of medicine (medische macht) stemmed in part from the fact that this power enabled too many people to live too long and too badly. His hugely popular Medische macht en medische ethiek (Medical power and medical ethics), published in 1969 and continually reprinted in the 1970s, articulated at the same time the right of the patient to end his or her own life and the duty of doctors to end the lives of those who were suffering unjustifiably. In 1969, van den Berg added that medical power had doomed “countless people” to further existence who otherwise would have died much earlier, with “calamitous” results, including a rising suicide rate among older people and “the quickly increasing overpopulation of our country.” Under these conditions, he maintained, a change in medical ethics was unavoidable.

The other key figure was Pieter Muntendam, who became the chairman of the Dutch Association for Voluntary Euthanasia (NVVE) in early 1976 at the age of 74, and who would play an essential role in giving the new organization a

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4 The views of state secretary A. J. H. Bartels in 1968, quoted in 28. van Berkestijn and Treffers 1971, are particularly interesting.
respectable and moderate face. A medical doctor and longtime public servant, Muntendam had been a driving force in the 1960s to reduce world population and in the early 1970s would chair a government commission charged with examining the issue.\textsuperscript{29} It was perhaps natural for Muntendam, as an expert in what at the time was called “social medicine,” to be interested in the “social” aspects of euthanasia, including its economic aspects. For Muntendam in particular and the NVVE in general, it was clear “that voluntary euthanasia must constitute a natural part of the question [of how to treat the] elderly.”\textsuperscript{30} For Muntendam, this meant that debate about euthanasia must necessarily take on the economic challenge of an aging population. For him, the primacy of the individual’s right to choose when to die did not preclude discussion of wider economic and social issues.\textsuperscript{31,32}

We can draw two conclusions from this evidence. First, the early years of the Dutch euthanasia movement showed some of the same interest in the macro-level, societal dimensions of euthanasia that had long characterized the Anglo-American euthanasia movements. The individual’s right to die and society’s welfare were conceived as moving in the same direction, though how the interests of the two were related was seldom articulated.

Second, it is striking how quickly this discourse declined, even though it did not entirely disappear. One reason (there are several) is that various leaders of the euthanasia movement acted decisively to interpret euthanasia purely as an individual choice. Later proponents of euthanasia would drop discussion of the socioeconomic aspects of euthanasia altogether. In 1976, pro-euthanasia advocates Andries and Truus Postma-Van Boven said that economic motives should never be used as an argument for letting people die, and by the end of the decade this had become the movement’s standard response to the issue.\textsuperscript{33} Henk Leenen, a highly influential professor of health law, stressed voluntary euthanasia when he took a leading role in the campaign for legalization in the late 1970s, a very conscious effort to excise the pro-euthanasia camp of socioeconomic motivations.\textsuperscript{34} During the last half of the 1970s, social and economic arguments for euthanasia were fast disappearing, and before long euthanasia discourse was almost wholly defined in terms of an individual decision that had nothing to do with society per se. John R. Blad, a scholar in the field of legal change and member of the Dutch Association for Voluntary Euthanasia, wrote in 1996 that none of the “social” arguments for euthanasia had “survived the critical test of democratic discussion.”\textsuperscript{35}

Dutch Euthanasia versus Nazi “Euthanasia”

The Dutch debate over euthanasia showed little interest in the British and American experience, but it was forced to confront the most negative legacy of