One of the greatest paradoxes of contemporary culture is that at a time when the image reigns supreme the very notion of a creative human imagination seems under mounting threat. We no longer appear to know who exactly produces or controls the images which condition our consciousness. We are at an impasse where the very rapport between imagination and reality seems not only inverted but subverted altogether. We cannot be sure which is which. And this very undecidability lends weight to the deepening suspicion that we may well be assisting at a wake of imagination.

Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination

The image, the imagined, the imaginary – these are all terms that direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: the imagination as a social practice. No longer mere fantasy (opium for the masses whose real work is elsewhere), no longer simple escape (from a world defined principally by more concrete purposes and structures), no longer elite pastime (thus not relevant to the lives of ordinary people), and no longer mere contemplation (irrelevant for new forms of desire and subjectivity), the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labor and culturally organized practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility. This unleashing of the imagination links the play of pastiche (in some settings) to the terror and coercion of states and their competitors. The imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order.

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large

The emergence of modern notions of imagination was inseparable from a longing to effect radical social change. Friedrich Schiller and Samuel Taylor Coleridge both argued that the rise of capitalism and the modern nation-state dissolved an essential bond of human nature, and they looked to the imagination to provide the basis for a more egalitarian
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state. Even as the European colonial powers subsumed ever greater spheres within their orbit, William Wordsworth and William Blake saw in the imagination the possibility of identifying and preserving images of what Saree Makdisi has called “sites of difference and otherness,” thereby forestalling the worldwide assimilation of all cultures and histories within a single dominant narrative of modernity. Such responses were often less a radical critique of capitalism than efforts to provide a tragic consolation for it, but well into the twentieth century artists including T. S. Eliot, E. M. Forster, D. H. Lawrence, and Pablo Picasso saw what they took to be vestigial remnants of alternatives to modernity in the far-flung reaches of the European empires. Eliot, in particular, held out hope that the preservation of such remnants within the aesthetic sphere of art might lead one day to a “mass-conversion” that would fundamentally redefine social and political institutions.

The apparent consolidation of capitalism as the dominant world-system in the final decades of the twentieth century has led to significant anxieties about the capacity of the imagination to aid utopian thinking. Russell Jacoby’s *Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age* (2005), for example, ponders whether the relentless barrage of electronic media images has not finally overwhelmed our capacity to imagine. Reiterating a line of thinking tracing through Fredric Jameson and Richard Kearney back to Herbert Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), Jacoby reads the imagination as a final frontier on the verge of incorporation. His distinction between a now outdated “blue print tradition” and a still vital “iconoclastic tradition” of utopian thinking implies that the imagination – historically understood as an image-producing faculty – is no longer to be trusted. In an “age of extreme visualization,” the imagination itself has in large measure become unimaginative, reproducing commercial fantasies of limitless consumption.

Intriguingly, the imagination reemerged as subject of explicit interest and meditation in a wide variety of contemporary Anglophone literatures written during the same era. It figures prominently in texts that have been categorized as postmodern, such as John Fowles’s *Daniel Martin* (1977); it also figures in texts that have been categorized as postcolonial, such as Amitav Ghosh’s *The Glass Palace* (2001). Indeed, despite their different backgrounds and social locations, both Fowles and Ghosh portray multinational capitalism as the dominant social, political, and economic formation in terms of which all conditions of life must be understood. Both Fowles and Ghosh claim that the novel enables its readers to engage in a unique form of imagining that is crucial to recovering
and communicating alternative systems of knowledge. Their narratives repeatedly turn to questions of what can be known or not known, what can be verified, and what is considered authentic knowledge. To the extent that they posit spaces beyond the reach of global capital, Daniel Martin and The Glass Palace have a utopian quality. Neither seeks to provide a blueprint for the future, but they both explore the extent to which imagining enables individuals to recognize the current conditions in which they live, and the nature of the exploitation they endure and often promote.

The crucial role these authors assign to the imagination in recognizing and interpreting reality is one that it historically has not often had. The mystification of everyday life effected by capitalism and imperialism means that conceptions of the imagination as a mimetic faculty tracing back to Aristotle or a creative faculty tracing back to European Romantics have little purchase. Rather, the imagination is required to engage in what André Brink calls a “transgression” of the senses. Imagining is not seen as a withdrawal from the world but an effort to interpret it more accurately, and thereby to enable a clearer recognition of the possible shared horizons for the future. In other words, the relevance of the novel depends on a new attention to the epistemological significance of the imagination.

The epistemology of the imagination

As a field of philosophical inquiry into questions of how knowledge is acquired and verified, epistemology has tended to be understood in terms of the preoccupations established by René Descartes and developed by Immanuel Kant. Despite their differences, both philosophers understood the resolution to epistemological problems to lie in the pursuit of what has been called a “God’s eye view” notion of objectivity. According to this idea, the cultural contexts, personal identifications, and philosophical commitments of an individual necessarily introduce distortions in perspective, the resolution to which demands temporarily bracketing these impediments to rational deliberation. This preoccupation with a transcendental point of view or transcendental self was rejected by both Hegel and Marx for its lack of historicity. Similar critiques were echoed throughout the twentieth century. In the Anglo-American academy, Richard Rorty provides perhaps the most well-known critique, declaring the impossibility and irrelevance of epistemology; critiques can also be found among thinkers influenced by hermeneutic traditions, including philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer and historian F. R. Ankersmit.
This study does not attempt to revive epistemology in its modern sense; however, I will argue that the conditions associated with late capitalism demand attention to epistemology of a certain kind. If Kearney is correct that capitalism has managed to effect a basic subversion of reality, such that it has become difficult to distinguish between reality and advertisement, then questions about where a person acquires knowledge and how he or she verifies truth become important. Such questions are central foci for the literary texts in this study. Ghosh, for example, explicitly addresses the importance of epistemology, declaring in an interview that “one of the essential topics of my writing is, what is it to know? … In a world where everything is known, how do you become what is not known, how do you escape the omniscient gaze?” Taking my lead from feminist philosophers Linda Martín Alcoff, Donna Haraway, and Sandra Harding, I argue that epistemology needs to be revised rather than rejected outright: to address questions of knowledge with respect to subjects who are located in history rather than universalized, whose biases are shaped by both the identities ascribed to them and those they fashion for themselves, and whose inescapable historicity is not only an impediment to but also a precondition of knowledge. Thought of in this way, epistemology – that often belittled field of inquiry – becomes vital to understanding the limits of ideology and the possibilities for experience to be communicated.

I will argue that one of the primary conditions of the post-1960s era is the extent to which the epistemological colonization, to borrow Gaurav Desai’s term, of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America is increasingly the fate of populations in the former colonial centers as well. In contrast to theorists of postmodernism such as Brian McHale, who read postmodern literature in terms of ontology rather than epistemology, I will suggest throughout this study that authors who perceive capitalism to be a hegemonic world order tend to be preoccupied with epistemological issues. To anticipate later claims, the “free play” that is characteristic of the imagination in Western thinking since Kant – and the withdrawal or disengagement from the world of perception or action that it characterizes – becomes a necessary precondition for acquiring more objective knowledge about the world. If ideology involves conditioning the empirical senses to take certain images as more real than others, then the imagination’s unique status as a mediator between the senses and cognition makes it crucial to recognition and understanding.

This argument runs counter to the dominant strain of thinking in literary studies, within which the imagination is characterized as possessing minimal epistemological significance except insofar as the critical
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analysis of it yields knowledge of the workings of ideology. Since the pioneering work of Jerome McGann, Paul de Man, and others, the imagination has been read as inseparably bound to ideology. As Deborah Elise White more recently put it, “the imagination posits a structure of recognition that authorizes claims of interiority, autonomy, and subjectivity, but it does so in the service of an exteriority, heteronomy, and objectivity that it denies.”13 Implicated for ignoring or mystifying social inequities, the imagination cannot be rehabilitated according to this argument. At best, for Forest Pyle, it can help to identify how ideology conceals dissent and difference in the name of promoting social consensus. “The poetic failure of the imagination,” Pyle writes, “like a sort of photographic negative, leaves an image of the ‘nontotalizability’ of the social.”14 His explicit rejection of Paul Ricoeur’s optimistic reading of the imagination suggests that any genuine utopian project requires rejecting all efforts to envision utopia in a direct manner.15

Pyle’s categorical rejection of the imagination as a “positive faculty” highlights the extent to which critiques of the imagination have been guided by anxieties similar to those that led contemporary Anglophone authors to appropriate it.16 Both the deconstruction and Frankfurt School Critical Theory that undergird Pyle’s argument for the “nontotalizability” of the social” are themselves responses to the increasingly totalizing grip of capitalism. Emerging out of particular crises in European modernisms, these theories do not provide a neutral, disinterested backdrop against which to evaluate literary texts. Indeed, their guiding philosophical assumptions warrant scrutiny in light of the anti-imperial struggles that emerged across the globe in the decades since their initial formulations. Nontotalizability is an assertion, not a given, though it is often taken as such in Anglo-American academic discourses. Even were it to be true, its implications for utopian thinking are by no means a foregone conclusion. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the novelists in this study are keenly aware of the historical culpability of many utopian fantasies and Western conceptions of the imagination underlying them. What is striking is that authors from so many different cultural, ethnic, and social contexts would perceive the dominance of ideology to require them nonetheless to turn to the imagination as a resource to be critically appropriated and revised.

The argument in Imagination and the Contemporary Novel does not understand the imagination as a universal and unchanging phenomenon, but as something that is historically produced. From their emergence in the eighteenth century, modern notions of imagination took the forms
that they did in Germany and Great Britain because of contemporaneous developments in modes of production, and the shift toward capitalist forms of industrialization. The idea of an individual, creative imagination could not have emerged without it. Yet the fundamental connection to the economic system it critiques does not inherently mean that the imagination reproduces the ideology of capitalism. Distinct from a notion of fantasy as an escape from reality, distinct from a notion of a creative imagination that depends on partitioning reality and art into distinct and autonomous spheres, and distinct even from a notion of a utopian imagination that constructs an idealized alternative world, the notion of the imagination proposed here understands it to be an epistemological faculty for interpreting reality – a task that is inseparable from the creation of a horizon of expectations that emerges from an individual’s social location, cultural identity, and idiosyncratic aspirations.

The definition of imagination as an epistemological faculty for interpreting reality separate from rational reasoning has historical precedents, of course, but rarely has its epistemological significance been tied so directly to the demystification of everyday life. Prior to Kant, the imagination was considered crucial to the production of knowledge to the extent that it plays a mediating role between sensory perception and rational reasoning. Aristotle declares in *De Anima*, for example, that “Imagination is different from both perception and thought; imagination does not occur without perception and without imagination there can be no belief.” The imagination is indispensable, in other words, if only as a medium. Kant grants a more significant role to the imagination in the first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), arguing that it is “an indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.” Yet Kant’s significant diminishment of the power of the imagination in his second, revised edition (1787) represents a signal moment in the modern history of the imagination – a history in which the opposition between reason and imagination tends to limit the purview of imagination to aesthetic appreciation and artistic creativity. This partitioning of the realms of mental experience, which was largely adopted by Western European Romantics, meant that the knowledge purportedly produced by the imagination historically did not concern the specific economic, social, and political conditions of a person’s life. As Nigel Leask and many others have shown, Coleridge understood the imagination to provide a model for civil society; however, the model itself emerges from a highly abstract notion of an “organic” synthesis of soul and nature, subject and society, not from a
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sense that the imagination enables individuals to interpret the observable features of their world more accurately, as will consistently be the case for the authors in this study. The definition of the imagination used in this study is not meant to preclude or to minimize the considerable variations in how the word imagination is employed by the authors to be examined. Indeed, the variations in how the imagination is characterized in the following chapters provide a key to understanding the distinctive features of various localized responses to an apparently stable world-system. In other words, the differences between J. M. Coetzee’s and N. Scott Momaday’s conceptions (or even Coetzee’s and fellow South African Nadine Gordimer’s) illuminate the cultural contexts in which their ideas emerged and the different forms modernity has taken in their lives. And exploring how the imagination has been critically appropriated and translated to the specific situations in which authors write will be a core concern of this study.

While it has long been a truism within literary studies that the cultural institution of the novel endured well after the official end of European colonialism, how postcolonial authors inherited European notions of a creative imagination as the basis for literary production is less well recognized. As Simon Gikandi notes, after World War II, institutions of higher learning in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and elsewhere throughout the British Empire systematized the study of English literature according to the Leavisite model of the “Great Tradition” of English literature. The moral significance of imaginative literature was central to the education of early postcolonial writers such as Chinua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and is apparent throughout their nonfictional writings. Ngugi declares in Decolonising the Mind (1986) that “these great three [Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot, and F. R. Leavis] dominated our daily essays” in school. Both Achebe and Ngugi also discuss European Romantics and I. A. Richards, whose Coleridge on Imagination (1934) helped to reestablish the category of imagining as a central concern of literary studies. Perhaps Achebe’s most famous pronouncement on the imagination occurs in an essay in which he discusses both Richards and Coleridge: “art is man’s constant effort to create for himself a different order of reality from that which is given to him; an aspiration to provide himself with a second handle on existence through his imagination.”

The idea of a creative imagination was crucial to Achebe’s project of validating African cultures and traditions as sources of genuine knowledge. His declaration that imagining enables individuals to acquire a “second handle on existence” implies that the conditions of everyday life are not
immediately apparent, and may be obfuscated by what he calls the “malignant fictions” of racism and colonialism (143). To accomplish his oft-cited goal of “teach[ing] my readers that their past – with all its imperfections – was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God’s behalf delivered them” (45), then, requires readers to engage in a mental activity that would require more than simply interpreting what they read based on their current standpoint, fitting unfamiliar stories and traditions in terms of their pre-existing categories of knowledge. The language of “imaginative sympathy” – and Leavis’s insistence on aligning it with “moral discrimination” – provided Achebe with the vocabulary for describing such a process and the rationale for why readers should feel an imperative to engage in it. Achebe characterizes the moral dimension of art in terms of its capacity to elicit “imaginative identification” (144) through which readers develop a vicarious experience of the world through literature. The terminology of imagining is consistently invoked by Achebe when he asks his readers to engage in a hypothetical exercise of viewing the world through an alien standpoint. By reminding his readers of the European tradition of characterizing Africa as its alien other, Achebe not only makes the representation of Africa a central criterion for artistic achievement but also redefines the moral imperative of art: to engage with cultural traditions that have been demeaned and effaced by the colonial system of education. The imagination is invoked, in other words, to resolve problems introduced by European colonialism, which actively sought to attenuate sympathetic identifications with colonized populations. Recognizing that “it is even arguable whether we can truly know anything which we have not personally experienced,” Achebe argues that the imagination gives us “the closest approximation to experience that we are ever likely to get” (145).

The conception of imagining as a mental activity directed toward sympathetic understanding helps to explain the relative unimportance attributed to it in literary scholarship on Achebe, which has tended to view him as an embodiment of what Abdul R. JanMohamed has called the “generation of realism.” According to this argument, African writers during the 1950s and 1960s countered a history of colonialist representations by recourse to a kind of Lukácsian critical realism; as JanMohamed puts it, “they overc[a]me the colonialist ‘romance’ of Africa by using metropolitan ‘realism.’” The opposition between romance and realism presupposes a set of aesthetic dichotomies that devalue imagination as fantasy, opposed to reality. Thus, the preoccupation among literary scholars with realism combined with the tendency toward anthropological readings of
postcolonial literatures has meant that questions of aesthetics have been seen as tertiary, and the imagination has been relegated to a curiously minor role: the basis of artistic production, but not itself meriting significant analysis.

In the case of Ngũgĩ, the concept of a creative imagination was crucial to his theory of how art could intervene in ideological struggles against capitalism. As early as his first collection of nonfictional essays, _Homecoming_ (1972), Ngũgĩ describes the mind of the writer as broken up into territories of rationality and imagination: “In a novel the writer is totally immersed in a world of imagination which is other than his conscious self. At his most intense and creative the writer is transfigured, he is possessed, he becomes a medium.”28 To assert that the creative imagination represents a territory separate from other faculties of the mind simultaneously situates Ngũgĩ with respect to a tradition of European writing whose cultural capital depended on a notion of an autonomous imagination and highlights the capacity of capitalism to penetrate all spheres of existence. “There is no area of our lives which has not been affected by the social, political and expansionist needs of European capitalism,” Ngũgĩ declares only two paragraphs after his assertion of imaginative autonomy.29 In subsequent collections of essays including _Writers in Politics_ (1981; revised edition 1997), _Decolonising the Mind_ (1986), _Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams_ (1998), and _Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance_ (2009), Ngũgĩ continues to emphasize both points: the autonomy of the imagination and the limits placed on it by the social, political, and economic conditions in which writers are born and raised. The tension between the two points is highlighted in a lecture entitled “Art War with the State: Writers and Guardians of Post-colonial Society.” On the one hand, Ngũgĩ insists on the imagination’s autonomy and agency, declaring that writers simply follow the direction toward which their imaginations point: “In indulging and following their imagination wherever it leads them, even to the realms of what could be, writers do often stumble upon truths, to which they give the bodily form of words.”30 Later in the same lecture, however, Ngũgĩ suggests that the forms imagining takes are limited by ideological biases of which authors are not necessarily even aware: “Artists, after all, are products of social classes and ranks, and their imagination takes flight weighed down by ideological moorings consciously or unconsciously held” (28).

Ngũgĩ largely retains Achebe’s conception of the imagination as a faculty for sympathetic identification even as he shifts focus toward an African bourgeoisie who sought to retain colonial structures of economic
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exploitation after independence. In “The Allegory of the Cave: Language, Democracy, and the New World Order,” for example, Ngũgĩ follow Achebe’s practice of explicitly invoking the imagination when he invites readers to engage in an exercise of hypothesizing how others might view the world: “Here we all need a leap of imagination to comprehend the enormity of a situation which we can’t otherwise feel because we can all talk among ourselves. I want you to imagine a peasant or worker in a court of law accused, say, of murder” (Penpoints, 90). Ngũgĩ’s point is that language shapes how individuals view the world, and that the continued usage of English among the African middle class in Kenya prevents them from identifying with their fellow countrymen. On this understanding, the idea of the imagination as a faculty of the mind possessing a certain degree of autonomy becomes the necessary precondition for overcoming the ideological biases associated with a particular language. Without the imagination, in other words, middle-class Africans would continue to endorse the economics of free market capitalism inherited from Europe and the United States: “For in its wilful narcissism, to use Fanon’s phrase, this class sees itself as constituting the nation” (93).

Fanon’s influence on Ngũgĩ’s thought is crucial to understanding the latter’s vision of the often antagonistic relationship between rational cognition and imagining – an antagonism that will figure centrally in the writings of so many contemporary Anglophone authors in this study. Whatever else narcissism involves, it short-circuits sympathy in such a way that the issues and concerns of other classes are understood to mirror those of the middle class. If this is genuinely the case, then the shift toward social realism that Gikandi and others have observed in Ngũgĩ’s writing risks reaffirming rather than challenging middle-class ideological biases. In Ngũgĩ’s first novel written in Gikũyũ rather than English, Caitaani Mũtharaba-inĩ (1980; English translation Devil on the Cross, 1982), he seeks to overcome the problem by shifting language. Yet the plot of the novel seems to imply that a language shift is insufficient, requiring a kind of mental activity often characterized in terms of the imagination. The transformation of the novel’s protagonist, Waũĩnga, from a self-loathing victim to a revolutionary is certainly facilitated by the workers and university students she encounters, but her most significant discovery occurs during a dream in which she converses with the Devil, the embodiment of capitalism. Only he can finally explain why so many Kenyans willingly embrace their own exploitation:

warũĩnga: But won’t the workers refuse to let their bodies be exploited like that? Won’t they refuse to be robbed of their lives?