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Ethnic Protest, Moderation, and Democratization

This book is about democratization under difficult circumstances.

Decisions in democracies tend to be made on the principle of majority rule. But ethnic or religious minorities often hold strong views that differ from those of majorities. No matter how intense their political desires, minorities will remain outnumbered. And where such divisions are codified into ethnic or religious parties,[1] these minority ethnic or religious parties will consistently lose majoritarian elections, creating "permanent" minorities and majorities. For these reasons, ethnic or religious divisions in society can hinder governance and decision making in even long-standing democracies, as minorities are expected to support institutions that rarely advance their interests.[2]

These potentially unstable conditions for democracy in divided polities are magnified in *democratizing* states, where the institutions and rules of democracy are under construction. The process of creating new democratic institutions is

[1] Ethnic or religious parties are those in which the platforms are defined in terms of an ethnic or religious principle. See Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 116; Kathleen Dowley and Brian Silver, "Social Capital, Ethnicity, and Support for Democracy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (2002), pp. 505–27, who note that minorities tend to register less polling support for democracy than do majorities; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), Chapter 2; Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, 1972); Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972); Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970), pp. 337–63; and Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

like "rebuilding a ship at sea"[3] – before institutions exist to channel disputes between groups, there are strident debates between them regarding the sort of institutions that should be constructed in the first place.[4] Politically mobilized ethnic or religious groups often support institutions that can maximize their own powers, bringing them into disagreement with other such groups.

During democratic transitions, debates over institutions often take place simultaneously with the "regular" disputes that are common to divided societies[5] regarding separate visions of how the state should interact with groups. Controversies often emerge regarding the extent of state control over minorities, the languages or religions that should be endorsed in the public sphere, and the national symbols that should be on public display. Heated disagreements on these matters played a strong role in ethnic mobilization and policy formation during the 1990s in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. In these states, ethnic Hungarian minorities and titular[6] majorities engaged in turbulent contention over these issues throughout the decade. There was even an instance of violence between groups – in 1990, a riot between Romanians and Hungarians took place in the city of Târgu Mureş.

But even after this instance of violence, and in spite of strong disagreements between minority Hungarians and Romanians, Romania was able to establish common institutions and policies to regulate minority affairs during the 1990s. Similar successes took place in Slovakia and Ukraine. How did this process take place, given the potential troubles for divided democracies and democratizing states?

I make two primary arguments in this book.

First, in spite of their small numbers, ethnic Hungarian minorities in these states managed to gain political concessions through protest and contention during the 1990s. Hungarians maintain ethnic parties in these states,[7] but demographic realities produce only a small number of seats for them in parliaments. Through mass protests, Hungarians were able to push for policy

[3] Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[4] Elster, Offe, and Preuss, *Institutional Design*; and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). On the dangers of democratization, see Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); and Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21 (1996), pp. 5–40.

[5] Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in Eastern Europe," *Social Research* 58 (1991), pp. 865–92.

[6] Romanian, Slovak, or Ukrainian. Terminology from David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). A justification of the use of these collective terms appears in the preface.

[7] Politically organized Hungarians also reside in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and to some extent in Austria. These communities are not examined in this book.

concessions that they could not achieve through the formal channel of the ballot box. Protest and contention thus produced policy results that legitimized democracy for Hungarians, in spite of their small political representation.[8]

Ethnic Hungarians and titular majorities did not engage in protests only as expressions of identity, nationalism, or irredentism, contrary to much of the literature on nationalism. Rather, protest was a specific driver of and response to policy change and formation during the democratization process. Romania and Slovakia both experienced high levels of Hungarian protest and mobilization throughout the first transition decade of the 1990s. Because ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia are 7 and 10 percent of their respective state populations, they could not easily achieve political goals through their voting numbers. Instead, it was through protest that Hungarians in these states were able to influence institutional design and policy. And as this informal strategy of protest achieved policy concessions from majorities, Hungarians willingly acceded to formal democratic institutions in spite of the fact that they became codified as permanent minorities.

A contrasting example is Ukraine, where initial strong state concessions to minorities early in the 1990s made protest a less necessary strategy for Hungarian minorities in the region of Transcarpathia. Hungarians there were certainly capable of mobilization, as shown in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet state and with a later push for local autonomy. But they mobilized only as a means to obtain policy change, and thus less often in Ukraine than in Romania and Slovakia during the 1990s.

Second, ethnic contention helped to moderate group demands on each side during the democratization process. As Hungarians engaged in debate and political contention with titular majorities, each group became accustomed to the stances of the other group – and the degree to which they could push their own claims. In this way, ethnic contention produced a public de facto deliberative process through which democratic transition incrementally took root. Contention and protest made each group familiar with the claims of the other over time, routinizing disputes with each iteration and moderating policy outcomes. The evidence in this book demonstrates that even when ethnic politics is particularly contentious, these debates can provide the foundations for regular patterns of inter-ethnic interaction and organically establish common institutions. Ethnic claims are not intractable, as argued by much of the literature on nationalism. Instead, like other political claims, they can be moderated through debate.

This process of moderation, in which repeated interaction routinized group exchanges and changed the parameters of group goals, incrementally changed the nature of ethnic politics. With time and interaction, the uncertain conditions of early 1990, in which the Târgu Mureş riot emerged in Romania, were never

[8] A useful empirical study of these issues appears in Sonia Alonso and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, "Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict in New Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research* 42, no. 2 (2007), pp. 237–67.

reproduced. The riot, examined in detail in Chapter 4, took place just a few months into the transition phase and in a context of strident initial demands by each group – as well as high uncertainty about the other group's demands. Local power relations between groups were also uncertain, given the city's 50–50 ethnic demographic and the fact that neither local nor national elections had yet been held in Romania. But with iterated ethnic contention, groups moved further away from these uncertain conditions and initially inflexible policy positions. Through interaction, uncertainty between groups was slowly erased.

Although there is an engaging literature on the increasing importance of national identity and ample literature on transitions to democracy, few studies link the two.[9] This book examines how ethnic mobilization, policy formation, and democratization processes unfolded simultaneously during the first democratic decade of the 1990s in these states. Policy formation on policies relating to ethnic minorities was driven by domestic mobilization along ethnic lines. Democratization, or the institutionalization of rules to regulate disputes between groups, emerged through the course of these interactions, as groups hammered out their differences in a public process of de facto deliberation via contention.

1. APPROACHES TO EVIDENCE

In a study of ethnic politics, an understanding of the dynamic interactions among groups is crucial. Moreover, explaining how processes unfold requires attention to time, sequence, and incrementalism. This study is grounded in two theoretical perspectives that can incorporate both of these aspects into analysis and explanation.

First, the *relational* approach to the study of social life, outlined in this chapter, focuses on ties and interactions as primary units of analysis rather than emphasizing individual entities or actors. Prioritizing the dynamics of *interaction* among the elites and masses of each group reveals the general causal mechanisms that drive these processes.

Second, the *historical institutionalist* approach to time, sequence, and processes provides a framework for an understanding of how events at one stage strongly affected those that followed. The evidence in his book shows how group learning and changes in group demands were *endogenous* to mobilization, policy formation, and democratization processes. These simultaneous and inherent feedback aspects of these processes must be incorporated directly into any viable explanation of what happened in these states during the 1990s. To put these theoretical insights to practical use, I use the technique of event analysis to approach the evidence. A discussion of the historical institutionalist approach and event analysis appears in Chapter 2, but a few points are worth noting here.

[9] One exception to this point is Elise Giuliano, "Secessionism from the Bottom Up: Democratization, Nationalism, and Local Accountability in the Russian Transition," *World Politics* 58, no. 2 (2006), pp. 276–310.

The book's arguments are based on evidence from a large event database on ethnic actions and interactions in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine between 1990 and 1999. The event data were collected in sequence from local newspapers in these states and supplemented with interviews and other materials. In addition, the divergent views of each group on policy matters required some ethnographic research. During approximately two years of fieldwork between 1997 and 1999, I lived with both Hungarian and titular families and conducted more than 160 in-depth interviews to discern the parameters of group perspectives on policy matters. I used the four local languages for this research and did not require a translator. I have also made frequent trips to the region since the initial fieldwork and have continued to discuss ethnic politics informally with locals.

Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine were examined in this study because they contain significant numbers of politically active Hungarians with ethnic parties.[10] In Ukraine, Hungarian activities are concentrated in the Transcarpathian region, where they are 12 percent of the local population. Hungarians were chosen as the group of focus because they have strong ethnic parties and are thus politically distinct from other groups. In addition, the selection of one ethnic group allows for the actions of the kin-state, Hungary, to be standardized. The cities of study for this project all lie on territories that were annexed by Hungary during World War II; such cities were chosen to control for local memories of occupation. Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia were not included in the study, in spite of the fact that they also have Hungarian ethnic parties. This omission standardizes exposure to the European Union, as Austria became a member in 1995, and removes the disruptive effects of the war in the former Yugoslavia on political processes there.

Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine are all examples of moderating processes at work, and this study is one of most similar systems analysis. In this approach, a few cases, chosen for maximum comparability, are examined for the purposes of revealing similar causal mechanisms that can then be tested in other settings[11] – often by other researchers and as part of other projects. This study does not compare explicit trajectories of violence and nonviolence, as would be the case with a comparison to the former Yugoslavia. However, with 1990 as the starting point for analysis, the detailed examination of Romania produces an explanation of how even violent events might later transform into moderating processes.

[10] The Hungarian TUKZ and TUKB in Ukraine, while officially just cultural organizations due to Ukrainian party laws, typically run candidates for office and thus function as ethnic parties.

[11] This approach, in the form of paired comparisons, is used in Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and also produces the causal mechanisms and processes in Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

In this study, cases are not treated as block entities as countries but rather as trajectories *that unfold over time*.[12] Slovakia exhibited an oscillating minority policy trajectory similar to that in Romania in the 1990s, in which policies alternated between minority-friendly and titular-friendly policies and slowly converged toward solutions that could be acceptable for both groups. Ukraine provides a contrasting case, as initial minority-friendly policies there rendered Hungarians relatively quiescent. The Ukrainian trajectory illustrates how Hungarian ethnic protest was not a product of general nationalism but rather was targeted toward specific policy goals and thus unlikely to emerge when goals were not being pursued. The evidence and arguments on these policy trajectories are summarized in Chapter 2.

An examination of the causal mechanisms that produced moderating processes produces general causal statements that other researchers may test in other settings or on other case trajectories – including in nonmoderating ones. Moderation can occur only under conditions in which the causal mechanisms outlined in this chapter are not hindered by military or external intervention. Aside from this scope condition, the mechanisms should be plausible across a number of different settings. As illustrated by the Romanian case, groups need not be friendly toward each other and can even recover from an instance of violence. This example has positive implications for other democratizing places that have experienced local group violence.

The remainder of this chapter outlines the primary elements of my argument on ethnic protest, moderation, and democratization. I first discuss protest and democratization and then outline how it is that this contention took a form of de facto public deliberation in these states, producing moderation via incremental interaction. There were two primary components of this deliberation: the transformation of group stances and goals over time, resulting in moderation; and an active role for ordinary people in extra-institutional politics. I then outline the mechanisms behind this moderating process in terms of a relational model of interaction between elites and masses of majority and minority groups in a bi-ethnic context. The general mechanisms and dynamics outlined in this model can be explored across a variety of settings with politically mobilizing ethnic or religious groups, and I discuss some of the social structure influences on mobilization. I then consider five alternative arguments to those I propose here: (1) the probability of group conflict, rather than moderation; (2) ethnofederalism and mobilization; (3) economic factors; (4) international influences; and (5) a potential role for elites, rather than masses, in mobilization. The chapter concludes with a summary of the book chapters that follow this one.

[12] Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, and Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); and Charles Tilly, *Explaining Social Processes* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008), pp. 83–92.

II. PROTEST AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization, or the construction of institutions and mass acceptance of these new rules in a democratic transition, is a process that can take several years.[13] It is an especially complex process, as governance must continue even while a state is undergoing serious renovations.[14] Many studies of democratization have tended to emphasize the role of elites over those of the masses, partly due to the fact that elite actions can be easier to observe. Several works on transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s have emphasized the role of elites in brokering pacts, "agreements to disagree," to bring about democratization.[15] This emphasis on elites dovetails with a view that institutions such as constitutions can be "crafted" externally, and that if they are precise and well designed, such institutions should be able to operate smoothly in any setting.[16] Although such optimism is a welcome deviation from notions that culture or history condemns some states to a nondemocratic status, it overlooks the fact that ordinary people must also accept these pacts or new

[13] Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and Anna Seleny, "Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies," *World Politics* 51 (1999), pp. 484–519. Another view of consolidation is that it has taken place by the second successful election; Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and Political Participation," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 40–65, especially p. 43.

[14] Elster, Offe, and Preuss, *Institutional Design*.

[15] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 37–40; and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 39. See also Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 165, 205. Some observers even argued that states with elite-dominated transitions would be more successful at consolidating rules than states in which transitions were led by the masses – a premise that has not passed the test of time. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (October 1990), pp. 1–21; and Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern, and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 43, no. 2 (May 1991), pp. 269–84. This bias is noted by other transitologists who offer a corrective, with an emphasis on ordinary people: Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*; Jan Kubik, "Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe," in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); and Wayne Te Brake, *Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). An examination of the interactive nature of mass–elite relations appears in Elise Giuliano, *Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[16] Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and Giuseppe Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 257–67.

institutions as legitimate. Mass protests in Eastern Europe drove the democratization processes far more than predicted by the elite pacts literature, a fact that has forced several analysts to reevaluate the centrality of elites in transition processes.[17]

Observers of social movements, however, have long recognized the power of ordinary people to push for increased rights, equality, and democracy.[18] In Eastern Europe, mass mobilizations were intrinsic to the downfall of Communist Party rule in 1989 in Romania and Czechoslovakia and in 1991 in Ukraine.[19] Images of demonstrations, strikes, and human chains are some of the most potent of this period, both in media coverage of these events and in the minds of their participants. It is not surprising that these were the same forms of contention that were later adopted by ethnic Hungarian minorities in their resistance to (or advocacy of) particular policies. These strategies were used by Hungarians to influence policy and institutional design on particularly contentious issues such as language use in the public sphere and education,

[17] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, especially pp. 253–4; Michael Bernhard, "Institutional Choice after Communism: A Critique of Theory-building in an Empirical Wasteland," *East European Politics and Societies* 14 (2000), pp. 316–47; Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6/7 (September 2000), pp. 703–34; Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization," *World Politics* 55 (January 2003), pp. 167–92; Jorge Cadena-Roa, "State Pacts, Elites, and Social Movements in Mexico's Transition to Democracy," in Jack Goldstone, ed., *States, Parties, and Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 107–43; Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*; M. Steven Fish, "Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and Eurasia," *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (1999), pp. 794–823; John K. Glenn, *Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship," *World Politics* 54 (January 2002), pp. 212–44; Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Deborah Yashar, *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s–1950s* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). The sincerity of the grievances of ordinary people is examined in Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[18] Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization*; Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*; Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*; Doug McAdam, *Freedom Summer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*; George Rudé, *The Face of the Crowd: Studies in Revolution, Ideology and Popular Protest*, Harvey J. Kaye, ed. (New York: Harvester, 1988); Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe*; and Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[19] Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*; Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York: Random House, 1990); Glenn, *Framing Democracy*; and Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

decentralization of state government, and the display of national symbols. The notion of "people power" as an instrument against tyranny continued as part of the dominant rhetoric later used by Hungarians in their claims for more open minority policies during the democratization and institutional consolidation phase of the 1990s.

During this period, the institutional conditions for successful Hungarian contention, known as political opportunity structures,[20] were quite favorable. Much of the literature on protest and contentious politics emphasizes the reaction of the state as an important feature of potential movement success.[21] State crackdowns on protests can remove them from the menu of viable political options for minorities. State repression of the Hungarians would surely have harmed their ability to pursue goals successfully through protest – but such repression did not appear. Given the history of communist repression and the rhetoric of people power from 1989 and 1991, these newly democratic states could not actively repress Hungarian protests without serious damage to their legitimacy.

However, the state does not provide the only source of response to protest, particularly in ethnically mixed settings. Hungarian protests sometimes produced subsequent or simultaneous protests by ethnic majority Romanians, Slovaks, or Ukrainians. Majority counterprotests were an especially a strong feature of contention in Romania, and the riot in Târgu Mureş erupted from a set of concurrent ethnic protests by Hungarians and Romanians in the town's central square.

Because bilateral protests are fraught with the potential for violence between groups, local and international media in the early 1990s tended to regard Hungarian protests in these states as a harbinger of potential ethnic conflict, similar to the neighboring example of the former Yugoslavia. It can indeed be the case that ethnic mobilization in mixed states might foster group conflict, but as examined in this book, it will do so only under specific conditions, such as the uncertainty that fostered the Târgu Mureş riot. Protests and even bilateral mobilizations are far more common than is violence. However, much of the literature on democratization tends to view ethnic mobilization in diverse states in negative terms, in spite of the obvious diversity of many of the world's democracies and democratizing states. Even Dankwart Rustow, who took the optimistic view that democratic transitions could occur in nearly any context, drew the line at divided societies – his single prerequisite for potential democracies was "national unity."[22] Others have noted that divided societies might be

[20] McAdam, *Political Process*, pp. 40–3; and Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, pp. 19–20.

[21] McAdam, *Political Process*; Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*; and Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973), pp. 425–47.

[22] Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," p. 350. The possible link between democracy and nationalist violence is discussed in depth in Mann, *Dark Side of Democracy*, and Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*.

predisposed to nondemocracy.[23] When democratic transitions *do* take place, many theorists have argued that elites should take a strong role in ethnically mixed states, with the masses preferably remaining more quiescent to reduce the potential for conflict.[24]

In contrast, the evidence in this book demonstrates how ethnic protest served to incorporate Hungarians into polities in which they are permanent minorities, by providing an extra-institutional means for them to influence policies successfully on matters on which they hold strong sentiments, such as language use in the public sphere. I argue that the propensity for intergroup violence decreased over time, as ethnic Hungarian contention slowly became understood by each group in these states as a routine means to conduct politics. As Hungarians continually engaged in protest to push for goals they could not attain through elections, ethnic majorities became accustomed to these protests, rather than afraid of them, as had been the case early in the transition. Although Hungarians and titular majorities hold vastly different sentiments on policy issues and normative visions regarding what decisions the state should pursue, repeated contention made each group acutely aware of the desires of the other group, as well as the parameters to which they could possibly push their own. It was through this contentious process that each group learned what could be achieved in the constrained context of mixed states and pragmatically modified their stances accordingly.

These successful stories of democratization in conditions of mobilized ethnic diversity can tell us much about the potential for democratization in other divided places. There are several lessons from this evidence. Even the most heated group debates can provide the foundations for regular patterns of interethnic interaction – and thus the establishment of common institutions. Democratic routines, as institutionalized conflict,[25] can become strengthened with each iteration. These stories show that rules to regulate controversial issues are best developed organically and are less likely to be durable when imposed from outside. Even established democracies experience contention and protest, as an extra-institutional means for groups to express desires that are not being advanced through formal democratic channels. Ethnic contention in these states provided Hungarian minorities with an extra-institutional means to achieve policy goals and encouraged (1) their support for formal democratic institutions, in spite of their permanent minority status in them; and (2) a moderation process, in the form of de facto public deliberation.

[23] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; and Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (April 1979), pp. 325–44.

[24] Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, pp. 40, 79. It should be noted that consociational structures also require a rather quiet role for the masses. Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

[25] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*.