Introduction

*Activists, Alliances, and the Politics of Overseas U.S. Bases*

Step along the paved village path lining a South Korean rice field at dawn. Stare out into the vast expanse of land under a reddish-orange sky. The distant hills behind the fog will certainly conjure an image befitting the nation known as the “land of the morning calm.” This was my last image of Daechuri village on a brisk February morning as I said farewell to a group of activists over breakfast.

After a three-month research stint in the Philippines, I returned in May 2006 to a strikingly different scene. The South Korean government had cordoned off all roads into Daechuri. Unable to access the village via public transportation, I made my way by foot. I passed through the first three police checkpoints with a U.S. passport, and the final checkpoint only after revealing my A-level semi-diplomatic visa status and berating the checkpoint supervisor for obstructing “official business.” Inside the village, thousands of riot police, complete with helmet, face mask, and shield, stood in front of a trench bordered by a double layer of barbed wire surrounding rice fields.

Only a week earlier, anti-base activists had clashed with South Korean soldiers and riot police to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys, the future headquarters of United States Forces, Korea (USFK). The South Korean government had acquired the land through eminent domain by the end of 2005 but faced fierce resistance from activists and local residents. Wedded to their farmland, local residents had joined hands with South Korean nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists in a national effort to stop the expansion of a U.S. base. On May 4–5, 2006, riot police used brute force to remove activists from the designated land expropriated for the base, bulldozing their headquarters and partitioning the expansion area with barbed wire. At the end of the violent melee, over one hundred protestors, police, and soldiers were injured, and 524 protestors were taken into custody.

Witnessing the violent clashes from a rooftop, South Korean National Assembly member Lim Jong-in noted the tragic irony of events: South Korean security forces battled fellow Korean citizens for control of land to be given to USFK as U.S. soldiers observed the drama outside from the safety of their base. Why did the South Korean government resort to coercion to remove activists?
For Seoul, the future of the U.S.–South Korean alliance rested on base expansion at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. Seoul and Washington had already signed an agreement to relocate USFK headquarters and the 2nd Infantry Division to the Pyeongtaek area. Thus, fearing further delays by local residents and activists, the government resorted to strategies of co-optation and coercion to destroy anti-base opposition.

If the movement episode in Daechuri were a single, isolated incident, the story of activists, alliances, and overseas military bases would likely have faded into the annals of activist lore and newspaper archives. However, similar anti-base movements have erupted in different parts of the world. In July 2009, Italian riot police blocked roads, fired tear gas, and scuffled with anti-base activists opposed to base expansion and the consolidation of the 173rd U.S. Airborne Brigade in Vicenza. Like the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement, the No Dal Molin campaign in Vicenza began as a local initiative, but with support from national and transnational actors, it eventually erupted onto the national scene. During President Barack Obama’s visit to Prague in March 2009, anti-base activists in the Czech Republic staged mass protests in objection to Washington’s plan to build a radar base as part of a U.S. missile defense system for Europe. A month later, activists declared a tactical victory when the Czech government withdrew its proposal to ratify a U.S.–Czech agreement regarding the radar station, fearing its likely rejection in the lower house of the Czech Parliament.

Anti-base movement outcomes vary. On more than one occasion, anti-base activists were able to claim movement victory by shutting down U.S. bases. In other cases, movement episodes concluded with government forces quashing anti-base opposition. Still other episodes fizzled as a mixture of carrots and sticks presented by host governments split anti-base movements into different factions.

Why do some movements succeed whereas others fail? When and how do social movement actors abroad thwart the strategic basing preferences of the most powerful military in the world? In the wake of massive anti-base protests, how do host governments balance between domestic tension and international pressure from the United States on foreign policy issues? How do international security relations affect host-government responses to anti-base pressure? This book examines these questions in an effort to understand the impact of social movements on base politics and the important role bilateral alliance relationships play in shaping movement outcomes.

BASE POLITICS

Two Boards, Three Players

Base politics is analogous to a two-level board game with three players. The two boards are the domestic and international arenas. The three actors are the sending state, the receiving state, and the domestic constituents within the receiving state (or civil society).
The sending state projects power beyond its own territory by establishing bases overseas. The United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China are contemporary examples. With close to 900 overseas bases in 45 countries, the United States is by far the largest sending state. The receiving state hosts foreign military bases. In 2010, Afghanistan hosted over one hundred foreign bases as U.S.-led coalition forces battled Taliban insurgents to stabilize the country. Germany and Japan, two countries at peace, host the largest number of U.S. bases in the world, at 235 and 123 sites, respectively. In addition to more well-known countries hosting U.S. bases, overseas bases exist in some of the most remote parts of the world, including Djibouti, Diego Garcia, Antigua, Tajikistan, and Greenland.

Civil society includes a diverse cross section of the host-state polity. Local communities, activists, and various interest groups have a stake in either keeping open or shutting down foreign bases. On the one hand, overseas bases provide public goods in the form of security or economic stability. Bases also provide jobs and boost the local economy. On the other hand, bases present externalities, such as noise or environmental pollution, crime, accidents, and prostitution. Some also view foreign military bases as the basis for violence and insecurity, and a violation of host-nation sovereignty. Often lacking formal government channels to address overseas U.S. base issues, civil societal actors resort to informal, contentious politics—including protests, social movements, and other forms of collective action—to influence basing policy decisions.

The common assumption in international politics is that the rules of the game are determined by the first two players. After all, basing agreements are bilateral agreements signed between the sending and receiving states. Moreover, from a legal, diplomatic standpoint, foreign governments cannot negotiate basing agreements with members of civil society. Sending and receiving states may also prefer isolating civil societal actors from the base decision-making process. Given the sensitive nature of “high politics,” government and military officials are often insulated from civil society when making decisions concerning national security.


2 Civil societal actors in favor of U.S. bases, as part of the status quo, are often tied to the political establishment. Therefore, pro-base actors are likely to engage in base politics through formal channels. However, they are less prevalent and not as well organized. Driven by economic profit, they often mobilize in reaction to anti-base protests.

Yet, social movements,\textsuperscript{4} as a subset of civil society, challenge several well-established assumptions underpinning dominant international relations paradigms. The nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s and the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines in the 1990s are two of the better-known examples highlighting the impact domestic and transnational activists place on security issues.\textsuperscript{5} Despite the autonomous nature of security policy decisionmaking, intense anti-base protests in different corners of the world have also produced a range of policy shifts and outcomes on military matters. Thus one might question whether security politics is really devoid of societal influence. Given certain political opportunities, social movements have the power to induce change in basing policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{6} The assumption that civil society bears little impact on security politics needs to be reexamined.

## Why Base Politics Matters

### Grand Strategy and Alliances

Why should anyone care about U.S. military bases and anti-base movements? The network of overseas military bases is intimately linked to U.S. national security strategy. The presence of forward-deployed troops, equipment, and supplies, and the portfolio of bilateral arrangements permitting a global U.S. military presence, are not mere policy choices but an extension of strategy itself.\textsuperscript{7} Overseas bases exist as “the skeleton upon which the flesh and muscle of operational capability will be molded.”\textsuperscript{8} More specifically, bases provide strategic deterrence, territorial control, logistics and transportation capabilities, and alliance support.\textsuperscript{9} They facilitate communication, command, and control, and

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\textsuperscript{4} Social movements are defined as “sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents.” See Sidney G. Tarrow, \textit{Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics}, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

Intelligence-gathering. Overseas bases are the physical units generating the basic structure of the U.S. global defense posture. However, global defense posture is more than the sum of U.S. bases and troops. It encompasses cooperation with key strategic partners who provide logistical and diplomatic support for forward-deployed troops. Therefore, an overhaul in global force posture reflects not only operational changes, such as greater flexibility and enhanced rapid-deployment capabilities, but an expanded role for alliance partners.\textsuperscript{10}

This book speaks directly to the last category – the role of alliance partners. The global force posture of the United States both “presupposes and determines” the network of political relations forged between the United States and alliance partners.\textsuperscript{11} The ability to build or share facilities, place troops, store munitions, or pre-position equipment implies a bilateral relationship between the host nation and the United States. Bases not only fulfill a military function; they represent a political arrangement with “bilateral, international, cultural, and economic consequences.”\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, U.S. strategic needs and the political realities presented by host-nation politics are not always congruent, resulting in bilateral and internal domestic friction. As Kent Calder argues, bases are “embattled garrisons”: strategically important but politically vulnerable.\textsuperscript{13}

Resistance and Blowback

For much of the Cold War era, U.S. allies provided diplomatic and logistical support to the United States in exchange for open markets, regime legitimacy, and security. Overseas military bases played a central part in this postwar global security bargain as states ceded a part of their sovereignty to the hegemonic patron. The system of alliances and bases critical to U.S. power projection was originally established to meet the exigencies of the Cold War. While old Cold War alliances have remained remarkably intact, changes in the international environment and the evolution of domestic politics in several countries have challenged the political bargain struck between host-nation polities and the United States.

Although global force posture requires security cooperation with allies through different legal arrangements, U.S. power projection, most visibly manifest in overseas bases, has heightened the domestic political sensitivity of U.S. military activity in several host nations. In Turkey, U.S. officials expressed frustration after Ankara’s month-long vacillation and eventual denial of basing access for U.S. aircraft prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion. In the Czech Republic, peace activists in 2008 demanded a national referendum in hopes of blocking plans to construct a U.S. missile defense radar base on Czech soil. In Ecuador, anti-base activists applauded President Rafael Correa’s pledge not to renew a

\textsuperscript{10} Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 9.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{13} Calder, \textit{Embattled Garrisons}, 9.
base agreement, denying the U.S. access to a key air base in the war on drugs. And on June 30, 2009, Iraqis declared a new holiday, National Sovereignty Day, to celebrate the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraqi cities.

An analysis of base politics sheds light on these issues while challenging two conventional understandings of world politics. First, the political contestation against U.S. military bases, played out in parliaments and the streets of host nations, blurs the distinction between high and low politics. Host nations and the United States must face different trade-offs between security, sovereignty, and social issues. Thus, overseas military bases, although used to project power, fight wars, house nuclear weapons, and maintain a global defense posture, are no longer just an issue of high politics in the twenty-first century. Second, overseas military bases constitute the most important form of extraterritoriality in the modern world of sovereign states. In the formative Cold War years, the breach in sovereignty remained relatively unproblematic. However, the recent surge of anti-base and anti-American protests, even among alliance partners, may be indicative of fundamental changes and resistance to a U.S.-led political order. If U.S. power projection rests on stable alliance relationships with host nations, a clear understanding of anti-base movements and their impact on security policy is imperative.

No other country maintains, or has ever maintained, a global military presence comparable to that of the United States. Yet outside the United States there is considerable dispute about what this presence is about and how well it serves national or global interests. To some, the U.S. forward presence acts as an “offshore” balance that provides stability and security to different regions. Others, however, question the necessity of maintaining such a vast network of bases and point out the potential “blowback” associated with U.S. military activity abroad. Regardless of which side of the debate one falls on, policymakers and the general public are too often unaware of the unintended consequences generated by overseas U.S. bases and the conflict that erupts between ordinary people and governments. Those generally supportive of U.S. global leadership indignantly wonder why protestors are shouting “Yankee go home!” These chants cannot simply be dismissed as a form of blanket anti-Americanism. Behind each protest movement lies a narrative filled with politics and drama, and more poignantly, hope and despair. This story must also be told.

14 I thank an anonymous reviewer at Cambridge University Press for this point.
A SECURITY CONSENSUS FRAMEWORK

Several recent volumes on base politics have already provided rich analyses on the subject. Yet, to date, few studies have attempted to systematically explore base politics through the lens of social movements. This lacuna partially stems from a lack of fit between questions germane to social movements and answers found at the level of international politics, and vice versa. Outside the transnational movement literature, there is a general lack of theoretically informed scholarship linking international relations with social movement approaches. The bias toward systemic international relations theorizing often marginalizes the roles civil society and social movements play in security politics. Likewise, social movement theories generally look inward at movement dynamics or domestic political structures, thereby neglecting important implications social movements may have on international relations.

Using case examples from the Philippines, Japan (Okinawa), Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea, I develop a theoretical framework explaining when and how anti-base movements matter and how host governments respond to activist pressure at the domestic and international levels. The framework takes on a novel, multidisciplinary approach by synthesizing various strands of international relations theory with social movement perspectives.

Within the context of U.S. alliance relations, I explore the process of interaction between host governments and anti-base movements that leads to varying base policy outcomes. Elite ideas or perceptions regarding the security relationship with the United States – what I refer to as the security consensus – play a key role in determining anti-base movement effectiveness and the type of response elicited by host governments when faced with anti-base opposition.

When host-government elites are ambivalent or divided over the role of bilateral security relations with the United States – a condition of “weak security consensus” – anti-base movements are more likely to impact base policy decisions. Under a weak security consensus, political elites remain unwedded to any particular ideas or beliefs about U.S. alliance relations, enabling activists to reframe the public debate regarding U.S. bases. By taking advantage of this political opportunity, anti-base activists “penetrate” the state and form ties

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19 One notable exception is the volume by Lutz. However, the author focuses on the problem of U.S. bases and anti-base resistance rather than offering a comparative analysis examining the impact of anti-base movements on base politics. See Lutz, Bases of Empire.
with sympathetic elites, providing these elites with a domestic support base and greater political leverage at the domestic and international levels. Moreover, activists influence base policy outcomes by pressuring and altering the political calculations of elites who, in the absence of significant base opposition, would otherwise tolerate the status quo on basing issues. In short, a weak security consensus, coupled with effective movement mobilization strategies, leads to significant shifts in base policy outcomes.

Conversely, when a powerful collective consensus regarding security relations with the United States exists among domestic political elites, anti-base movements are unable to bring about major changes in basing policy outcomes. Dominant ideas and beliefs favoring positive relations with the United States permeate the foreign policy and security establishments, creating obstacles for anti-base voices. With a dominant consensus crowding out alternative ideas, activists find it difficult to gain elite access, form ties with political allies, or reframe the broader bases debate. Instead, political elites, in an effort to maintain positive alliance relations with the United States, employ various strategies and tactics to coerce, co-opt, and weaken anti-base movements. The government will unleash its own public media campaign, drag out negotiations with activists until the movement loses steam, or make minimal concessions to mitigate any potential crisis between the state and civil society. The confrontation between activists and government officials leads at best to token concessions amounting to marginal changes in basing policies and, at worst, movement defeat and the status quo. As a result, base policy outcomes are decided between the host government and the United States, with little influence from anti-base movements. Social movements therefore have little effect on base policy outcomes under conditions of a strong security consensus. Movements may use all the right frames, exhibit a high degree of cohesion, and rally hundreds of thousands of protestors in a broad coalition but still end up empty-handed.

In sum, I find that the level of security consensus among host-state political elites, particularly those within the foreign policy and security establishments, influences (1) how host states respond to domestic pressure against bases and (2) the relative success of anti-base movements in gaining significant concessions from the host state and the United States on base policy decisions. Thus, the degree of security consensus shapes or constrains the strategies employed by movement and government actors, thereby affecting policy outcomes.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

By synthesizing social movement analysis and international relations theory into a single framework, the arguments in this book differ from standard variants of realism, liberalism, or constructivism found in international relations theory, or from social movement explanations offered by sociologists. But what advantages does the security consensus framework have over existing accounts of base politics? Are there alternative explanations that challenge or refute the arguments offered here?
Power and interest-based arguments offer the simplest and most appealing account for base politics. Rooted in the realist perspective of international relations, U.S. geopolitical interests largely determine basing policy outcomes. Focusing on strategic objectives and the distribution of power in the international system, realists explain the closure of bases as a result of declining threats or a shift in the strategic environment. Social movements, for the most part, are irrelevant.

In many instances, power-based theories are correct, and I certainly do not ignore the role of power. Nor are realist explanations entirely antithetical to my own argument. My theoretical framework draws from realist insights that take into account domestic factors and the role of perceptions. If an elite security consensus is partially based on threat perceptions, we could address “balance of threat” within the security consensus framework. Differences in the distribution of material capabilities would lead to higher or lower threat perceptions. Under low threat perceptions, the host government may feel ambivalent about its security relationship with the United States, enabling activists to form ties with elites in bringing down U.S. bases.

However, an understanding of an elite security consensus focused solely on threat perceptions is misleading at best, and in some cases inaccurate. Taking a more eclectic approach, I argue that an elite consensus is shaped not only by material-based threat perceptions but by existing ideology, norms, and institutions. More importantly, power-based theories, particularly the systemic variant, do not provide the proper theoretical tools to assess the role of social movements in cases where they seemed to make a difference in base politics. Civil societal actors are simply ignored. Even statist realists, when acknowledging civil societal pressure, will treat social movements as a domestic interest group without revealing interactive effects between mobilization strategies and other international relations variables such as alliances.

Moving past power-based explanations, more recent studies in base politics have treated the tension, dilemma, and conflict faced by both the United States and host-nation actors with greater nuance. In these studies, regime type appears as an important variable explaining base politics. For instance, Alexander Cooley contends that the stability of basing agreements, and hence base policy outcomes, is shaped by the contractual environment (i.e., the credibility of

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22 *Calder, Embattled Garrisons; Cooley, Base Politics; and Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2005): 79–92.
democratic institutions) and the host regime’s level of political dependence on U.S. bases. Cooley finds that basing agreements are most stable under consolidated democracies. Overseas bases are less contested in solidly democratic countries where credible political institutions legitimize bilateral basing agreements. However, when host governments are relatively independent from U.S. security arrangements and transitioning from an autocratic to a democratic regime – conditions where the contractual environment is most unstable – U.S. bases become much more politicized. We expect to find greater anti-base activity and the possibility of major base policy shifts during democratization.

Although regime type explanations offer a compelling account of base politics, they deemphasize the role of bilateral security alliances when accounting for basing outcomes. Host-government elites, particularly those operating under a strong security consensus, are under constant pressure to maintain positive alliance relations as they attempt to address domestic criticism against bases. A focus on regime type skirts this important dilemma faced by host governments, one where elites are tied to international obligations but challenged from below by civil societal actors. How this dilemma is resolved requires closer investigation of both bilateral security relations and social movements.

To counter regime type explanations, I must demonstrate that the security consensus affects elite response to domestic base opposition irrespective of regime type. For example, under conditions of strong security consensus, regardless of regime type or orientation, anti-base movements should remain ineffective, with basing policies remaining relatively unchanged. For the security consensus framework to hold up against Cooley’s argument, the empirical cases need to demonstrate that major domestic opposition to bases and base policy changes were determined by anti-base movement pressure under conditions of weak security consensus rather than weak domestic political institutions. Conversely, the stability of base agreements should derive from the security consensus rather than the contractual credibility of political institutions under democracies. While recognizing that both approaches have something unique to offer in the analysis of base politics, I contend that, on the whole, the security consensus subsumes regime type explanations. I return to this point in the concluding chapter.

24 Ibid., 9; and Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 69–70.
25 As I will argue, anti-base movements are largely a post-democratization phenomenon, making this argument harder to test. Movement episodes in Ecuador and Italy in Chapter 4, however, help clarify this issue.
26 Rather than pitting regime type and security consensus as competing arguments, some scholars may find it more constructive to explore parallels and avenues for synthesis. Regime type may actually help inform whether a security consensus exists among host-government elites. For instance, one might argue ceteris paribus that the security consensus shared by host-state elites appears stronger in autocratic rather than democratic regimes given the decentralized domestic structure of democracies. As the following chapters demonstrate, many of the predictions found in the regime type analysis of base politics correspond with my own theoretical framework. However, the mechanisms that explain or predict base policy outcomes differ.