

Introduction

Peter Hayes

This book consists of chapters that Gerald Feldman wrote as a member of the Independent Historical Commission of Bank Austria Creditanstalt. That entity came into being as a result of a judicial settlement “*in re* Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation” agreed to by plaintiffs and defendants and codified in the order of Judge Shirley Wohl Kram of the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York on January 6, 2000. She directed Bank Austria Creditanstalt, as the legal successor of the two Nazi-era banks discussed in this volume, the Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein and the Länderbank Wien AG, to assemble and support a team of historians charged with “among other things, investigating the activities of Austrian banks during the National Socialist era, publishing the results, and attempting to identify by name those who were harmed.” The heading “activities” referred not only to the general banking business, but also to the banks’ roles in discriminating against and dispossessing Jews inside and outside of Austria, in helping to incorporate Austria into the German Reich, and in seeking to benefit from German expansionism. Feldman and the three Austrian members

of the commission – Oliver Rathkolb, Theodor Venus, and Ulrike Zimmerl – met to lay the foundations for the project on June 30, 2000, and the group presented its findings to Judge Kram in English almost exactly six years later, on June 15, 2006. A German version appeared later that year under the title *Österreichische Banken und Sparkassen im Nationalsozialismus und in der Nachkriegszeit*.¹ The book before you is the English text of Feldman’s contributions to the German volume.

When Feldman and his Austrian colleagues agreed to serve on the Commission, they took up a daunting challenge. The Bank had neither an organized archive, nor finding aids to the documents it possessed. Its predecessor firms’ extensive former ties to both the German entities that acquired controlling interests in them in 1938 and to firms in the Nazi empire that they sought to control entailed a wide-ranging search for source material in multiple corporate and state archives in several countries. Identifying, pulling together, and assimilating all this material was the sort of task on which Gerry Feldman thrived, but even with assistance and considerable institutional support, it took time. Fortunately, no one will have to do the job again, as the documents cited in this book are now collected in the Historical

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¹ Gerald D. Feldman, Oliver Rathkolb, Theodor Venus, and Ulrike Zimmerl, *Österreichische Banken und Sparkassen im Nationalsozialismus und in der Nachkriegszeit*, 2 vols. (Munich 2006).

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A second dimension of the challenge Feldman and his colleagues faced was the highly charged context in which they worked. Not only did the Commission emerge from adversarial legal proceedings, but its mission was defined, only in part yet explicitly, as laying the basis for compensation and restitution to identifiable victims. But assessing guilt is neither the only, nor even the primary activity of historians. Moreover, in Austria doing so has an awkward history, bound up with the nation's exculpatory self-image after 1945 as "Hitler's first victim." Finally, there was the residue in many minds of the exaggerated image of corporate power in Nazi Germany bequeathed by the 1940s, notably by Franz Neumann's *Behemoth* and the reports on the Deutsche and Dresdner Banks produced by the Office of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) in Germany.² All of these circumstances created preconceptions or expectations that a dispassionate historical analysis was bound to disappoint.

Of course, Feldman was no stranger to these challenges, which overlapped with those he encountered while producing his monumental study of *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945*.³ Neither was he unfamiliar

with the history of banks in the Third Reich, having participated in the historical commission that delivered *The Deutsche Bank 1870–1995*.⁴ This background, along with the mastery of narrative and analysis demonstrated in his first path-breaking book, *Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany 1914–1918*, and in his three brilliant and prodigious studies of the German economy after World War I, *Iron and Steel in the German Inflation 1916–1923*, *The Great Disorder*, and *Hugo Stinnes*, explain why Bank Austria Creditanstalt sought out his expertise in 2000 and accepted without question the conclusions he presents in this book.⁵ It represents the culmination of an extraordinary body of work by a scholar who was indefatigable, irrepressible, fair-minded, sharp-eyed, fearless, and, especially in person but also occasionally to devastating effect in print, mordantly funny.

Gerry Feldman was a master of the long form: few of his books weigh in at less than the substantial size of this one. He loved to show the intricacy of human action and the manifold nature of causation. He reveled in unraveling corporate maneuvers and financial legerdemain, and he delighted in revealing what his protagonists were really up to. He believed with all his heart that, contrary to the oft-quoted artistic dictum, more is more. These passions and convictions, along with the personal qualities and intellectual skills mentioned in the preceding paragraph, are all on display in this book.

Above all, Feldman is determined here to help readers see the past whole, in all its complexity, without recourse to simplifying shortcuts. Neither Austrians nor banks were

² See my introduction to Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (Chicago 2009), especially pp. xv–xvi; and my review of Christopher Simpson (ed.), *War Crimes of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank* (New York 2002), in *German Studies Review* 26 (2003), pp. 65–66.

³ (New York 2001). He was not alone in facing these challenges. Other individual historians and historical commissions given privileged access to long withheld corporate archives encountered considerable mistrust and criticism in the 1990s and the first decade of this century and then, like Feldman, produced works that stood up to close analysis. A few prominent examples are Johannes Bähr, Ralf Banken, and Thomas Flemming, *MAN: The History of a German Industrial Enterprise* (Munich 2009); Saul Friedländer, Norbert Frei, Trutz Rendtorff, and Reinhard Wittmann, *Bertelsmann im Dritten Reich* (Munich 2002); Lothar Gall (ed.), *Krupp im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin 2002); Peter Hayes, *From Cooperation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich* (New York 2004); Stephan H. Lindner, *Inside IG Farben: Hoechst during the Third*

Reich (New York 2008); Joachim Scholtyseck, *Der Aufstieg der Quandts* (Munich 2011); and Henry Ashby Turner Jr., *General Motors and the Nazis* (New Haven 2005). Feldman spoke and wrote eloquently about the difficulties of practicing responsible history in a highly politicized and litigious context; see his "The Business History of the 'Third Reich' and the Responsibilities of the Historian," Occasional Paper, Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, January 1999.

⁴ (London 1995).

⁵ Respectively (Princeton 1966), (Princeton 1977), (New York 1997), and (Munich 1998).

mere victims or cowed agents of the Nazi regime; they were instead active participants in it, seeking advantage within the prevailing parameters of policy, sometimes succeeding and sometimes not. Hermann Göring's desire to mobilize the Austrian economy for the Four Year Plan and thus to acquire important industrial assets, sometimes from the Viennese banks under examination, did not prove incompatible with the desires of the Ostmark's Nazi leaders to improve the local economy, protect its business from being bought up by Germans, and thus to gain popularity. In fact, the dispossession of the Jews could and did serve as the point at which the two programs intersected. Similarly, integration with the Reich and an expanded economic role for Vienna could go hand in hand, as Berlin fostered leading and semiautonomous roles for the Creditanstalt and the Länderbank in binding the economies of Southeastern Europe to Germany's.

All of this Feldman traces with characteristic grace and clarity. His deft pen portraits convey the characters and aspirations of the protagonists; his accounts of business deals lay bare the stakes and negotiating strategies of the parties; and his sure grasp of the direction of political and economic policy at any given moment makes his depiction of the links between developments at the micro and macro levels authoritative. There is much here to admire, and each reader will come away with personal-favorite aperçus, anecdotes, and aha moments. To read Feldman's work is always to be struck by his phenomenal command of the sources and his fluency in weaving them together.

Chapter 1 is particularly instructive on the interaction of publicly traded and state-owned banks in the Third Reich and on the importance of an enterprise's political patrons in navigating the competitive minefield that the regime planted. Chapter 2 tells in dispiriting detail how readily the Creditanstalt took advantage of Nazi racism while throwing Jewish clients to the wolves. Although many aspects of corporate complicity in discrimination against Jews have become familiar through recent research, one still winces upon reading that the Creditanstalt directed all its Jewish

customers in October 1941 to do their bank business henceforth in the basement of the main office and only between 2 and 3 P.M. at the branches, so that their presence would not offend the senses of "Aryan" clients.⁶

Chapter 3 shows how seductive the temptations of Nazi expansionism proved, especially to bankers nostalgic for Vienna's former economic importance to Southeastern Europe. More specifically, the chapter documents the Creditanstalt's zeal in (a) persuading companies doing business with its subsidiaries in Germany's Eastern European client states to dismiss Jewish managers, even before the respective governments so required, and (b) serving the banking needs of Nazi agencies that plundered occupied Poland and of companies that exploited slave labor. Chapter 4 tallies the Creditanstalt's enormous financial services to the buildup of German armaments production in Austria, especially in providing loans to the Steyr-Daimler-Puchwerke AG (SDPAG) and other firms associated after 1938 with the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. Here, as in the activities of the construction companies the bank owned, its pronounced implication in the Nazi regime's murderous slave labor program becomes unmistakable.⁷

Part II of this volume tells an even more distasteful tale because it deals with the Austrian involvements of the Dresdner Bank, an institution less scrupulous about enabling Nazi crimes than the Deutsche Bank that figured more prominently in Part I as the principal shareholder in the Creditanstalt.⁸ The Dresdner

⁶ Notable other works on banks' involvement in the persecution of the Jews are Harold James, *The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews* (New York 2001); Ludolf Herbst and Thomas Weihe (eds.), *Die Commerzbank und die Juden 1933–1945* (Munich 2004); and Dieter Ziegler, *Die Dresdner Bank und die deutschen Juden* (Munich 2006).

⁷ The fundamental works on some of the installations financed are Bertrand Perz, *Projekt Quarz: Steyr-Daimler-Puch und das Konzentrationslager Melk* (Vienna 1991), and Florian Freund, *Arbeitslager Zement: Das Konzentrationslager Ebensee und die Raketenrüstung* (Vienna 1989).

⁸ The Dresdner Bank also has been the subject of an extraordinarily thorough four-volume study by

had acquired the Mercurbank of Vienna in 1931 as part of the takeover of the German Darmstädter und Nationalbank. One learns in Chapter 5 that the Mercurbank, with the support of its new parent, began “Aryanizing” its senior management in 1932, even before Hitler came to power in Berlin, but that it nonetheless was reproached constantly by National Socialists in Austria during the 1930s for insufficient support of their cause. The result, after the Anschluss, the acquisition of the formerly French-owned Länderbank Wien, and the taking of its name, was a policy on the part of the now expanded bank of bending over backward to serve the Third Reich’s wishes, especially in expediting the “dejewification” (*Entjudung*) of the Austrian economy. The climactic Chapter 6 details the continuous efforts of Nazi leaders in Vienna to dictate the Länderbank’s leading personnel during the war; the bank’s attempts to expand its presence in Eastern Europe, both in partnership with the Dresdner and on its own; the bank’s functioning as the “repository for the liquidation of Jewish assets” via the accounts of the emigration agencies for Austria and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and as the nexus for the Dresdner’s sale of plundered gold to Turkish buyers in 1942–1944; and, finally, the bank’s role in consortia that financed increased

aircraft production in the Ostmark and in handling the account of the *Sonderkommando Eichmann*, into which payments flowed for the concentration camp inmates who labored at many of the new factories.⁹

Gerald Feldman was a profoundly serious scholar. He never lost sight of the fact that he was investigating and trying to account for one of the great tragedies in world history, Germany’s *Amoklauf* in the first half of the twentieth century. To write long stretches of this and others of his books, he had to sift through heartbreakingly poignant accounts of chicanery and callousness. Yet he was also always the happiest of intellectual warriors, a man truly thrilled to be involved in the process of discovery, utterly engaged in it, ever ready to challenge the “terrible simplifiers” sometimes drawn to it, and yet consistently capable of finding moments of wry amusement in the sorrowful actions and thoughts of some of his historical subjects and, yes, some of his contemporaries, too. *Austrian Banks in the Period of National Socialism* is a fitting capstone to an extraordinarily fruitful and luminous career. In it, one of the great historians of Germany of this or any other era displays all his remarkable gifts and performs his final nonpareil service to knowledge.

a historical commission; see Klaus-Dietmar Henke et al., *Die Dresdner Bank im Dritten Reich* (Munich 2006).

⁹ On the gold trade, see Johannes Bähr, *Der Goldhandel der Dresdner Bank im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Leipzig 1999), and Jonathan Steinberg, *Die Deutsche Bank und ihre Goldtransaktionen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Munich 1999).

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PART I

THE CREDITANSTALT-WIENER
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CHAPTER ONE

Ownership, Organization, and Personnel of the
Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein, 1938–1945

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CREDITANSTALT-
WIENER BANKVEREIN AS A UNIVERSAL
BANK AND INDUSTRIAL HOLDING
COMPANY

When the Germans marched into Austria on March 12, 1938, the Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein (CA), Austria’s largest and most important bank, was recovering from a crisis that had earned it the embarrassing appellation of “Debit Anstalt” in international banking circles.¹ Its fall had been both tortuous and sensational. Founded in 1855 as the k.k.privilegierte österreichische Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe under the leadership of the Rothschilds, the CA was indispensable to Vienna’s role as the financial center of the Austro-Hungarian empire and also to its position as a major financial center for Central and Southeast Europe. It had been founded on the model of the *Crédit Mobilier*, the Rothschilds adopting the banking methods of the rival Pereires to secure their position in railroad construction and reestablish their somewhat shaken position in Vienna in the process. The Rothschilds remained a strong force in the bank, although the Viennese branch’s engagement

with the Creditanstalt was a source of tension with the family’s other European branches.² In the decades before the war, however, what distinguished the Creditanstalt was its industrial engagement that took the form not only of granting operating credits and floating shares and bond issues for major industrial enterprises but also of acquiring extensive holdings in industrial enterprises. It certainly was appropriate that it was an Austro-Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, who coined the term “Finanzkapital.” But if his famous book of the same name had ideological and predictive analytical intentions that went well beyond the description of the interpenetration of banking and industry and the dominant influence of the banks, the description itself was probably even more relevant to the Austrian banks and especially the Creditanstalt than it was to the German universal banks with which it has become associated. The Creditanstalt was not only a universal bank but also a giant concern that, in 1913, encompassed 102 enterprises, including five banks and four insurance companies but also no fewer than

¹ Kennedy Library, Boston. James Warburg Papers, Box 2, James Warburg to Max Warburg, Aug. 13, 1931. The name of the bank was changed at the general shareholders’ meeting of June 16, 1939, to Creditanstalt-Bankverein. For purposes of convenience, it will generally be referred to here as the “Creditanstalt” or “CA.”

² Niall Ferguson, *The World’s Banker. The History of the House of Rothschild* (London 1998), pp. 597–598. A useful survey of the history of the bank is to be found in the history it published to celebrate its centenary, *Ein Jahrhundert Creditanstalt-Bankverein* (Vienna 1957). This has now been significantly supplemented by Oliver Rathkolb/Theodor Venus/Ulrike Zimmerl (eds.), *Bank Austria Creditanstalt. 150 Jahre österreichische Bankengeschichte im Zentrum Europas* (Vienna 2005).

twenty machine construction and metalworking companies and six timber and woodworking enterprises. It was significantly involved in mining and smelting, in the sugar industry, and in the wholesale business of sugar, paper, and coal. Directors of the CA sat on no fewer than 121 administrative boards of various enterprises. At the same time, a complex system of networks developed in which industrialists sat on the administrative board of the CA, and the leading personalities of banking and industry were personally, socially, and financially interconnected. The CA was particularly engaged in providing current account credits to the companies with which it was associated and acted as a center of intelligence and information for the enterprises with which it worked. The special quality of the CA, therefore, was that it was at once a universal bank and also a concern with stakes in major industrial enterprises and holding companies, a significant number of which were located outside of what was to become the post-1918 Austrian state.³

The breakup of the empire and the creation of the First Austrian Republic was to have catastrophic consequences for the Creditanstalt, and most historians agree that the bank failed to adjust appropriately to the new and much

more difficult circumstances. On the one hand, the bank refused to accept the implications of the loss of empire and continued to pursue a “Danubian” international strategy and become genuinely multinational despite the “nostrification” policies of the successor states and the dramatic loss of business due to the shrinkage of available capital and reduction of regional trade and commerce. Encouraged by both the domestic political and economic elite and international interests to play a role for which it was no longer suited, the CA and other Austrian banks proved inefficient intermediaries in the granting of credits, increased the costs of industrial financing, and even became dependent on foreign shareholders. This was especially the case under the indifferent presidency (1920–1933) of Louis de Rothschild, whose name, until the crisis of 1931, earned the CA international confidence that it in no way deserved. In 1931, foreign creditors owned one-third of the shares of the CA. On the other hand, the vulnerability of the Creditanstalt was increased by inflation and hyperinflation in the early years of the Republic, the high costs and interest rates of the subsequent period, and the growing dependence on short-term foreign capital. Most importantly, it took over increasing amounts of industrial shares and financed more and more unprofitable industrial enterprises. The endemic bank failures of the 1920s led to major amalgamations in the banking sector, and the CA became the repository for banks that either sold out or failed. Indeed, it went so far as to take over not only these banks but also their industrial holdings, as was the case with the Anglo-Austrian bank in 1926 and, most disastrously, the Boden-Credit-Anstalt in 1929, which the CA acquired to satisfy political pressures.⁴

³ Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a.M. 1974). For an excellent discussion of the problem of “Finanzkapital,” see Dieter Stiefel, *Finanzdiplomatie und Weltwirtschaftskrise. Die Krise der Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe* (= Schriftenreihe des Instituts für bankhistorische Forschung e.V., Frankfurt a.M. 1989), pp. 87–105. See also the seminal work of Eduard März, *Österreichische Bankpolitik in der Zeit der Wende 1913–1923* (Munich 1981), p. 537. Hilferding, the son of a Viennese Jewish businessman, became a German citizen in 1919 and had an important political career in Germany during the Weimar Republic, serving as the spokesman for the SPD on financial matters and as finance minister in the Stresemann Cabinet in 1923 and the Hermann Müller government in 1928–1929. He fled the National Socialist regime in 1933 but was delivered over to the Gestapo in 1941 by the Vichy regime and died under undetermined circumstances in a Paris prison. See William Smaldone/Rudolf Hilferding, *The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat* (Illinois 1998).

⁴ In addition to the works of Stiefel and März cited earlier, there is a substantial literature on the origins and outcome of the Creditanstalt Crisis of 1931; see Peter Eigner, *Die Konzentration der Entscheidungsmacht. Die personellen Verflechtungen zwischen den Wiener Großbanken und Industriegesellschaften, 1895–1940*, Diss. (Vienna 1997); Fritz Weber, *Vor dem großen Krach*, unpublished Habilitation (Salzburg 1991); Hans Rutkowski, *Der*

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The losses of the CA were hidden from the public view by accounting techniques involving the systematic overestimation of the industrial shares in its portfolio, thus making the payment of dividends possible as well as the underestimation of holdings that were of questionable value. Such practices could not, of course, continue forever, and in May 1931 the CA announced a loss of 140 million Schilling. This rapidly proved to be an underestimation. In the end, the total losses amounted to 1 billion Schilling, the equivalent of half the Austrian budget and 10 percent of Austria's national income in 1930.⁵ The protracted revelation of the bank's problems, which were in part a legacy of the Boden-Credit-Anstalt but also of depreciated assets and bad loans that had been given to a limited group of very large companies, required a piecemeal process of reconstruction that fundamentally transformed the Austrian banking system and the CA with it. The first reconstruction plan of May 1931 was motivated, on the one hand, by the belief, propagated by the bank and basically untrue, that Austrian industry depended on the CA, and, on the other hand, by the desire to preserve the Austrian government's liberal economic policy

by limiting state intervention to the rescue of the bank itself. The reality was that while 68.75 percent of Austrian corporations did business with the bank, 13.75 percent actually would have gone under if the bank had been allowed to collapse. The government, however, did not want to permanently invest and thus intervene in industrial activity and therefore opted for what it hoped would be a temporary intervention to aid the CA in collaboration with the National Bank, the Rothschilds, and the other shareholders. It anticipated that the international committee of 130 banks set up to deal with the CA crisis would be a source of new capital, whereas the actual intention of the committee members was to withdraw with as little loss as possible. The international committee compelled the economically weak Austrian government to guarantee the CA's liabilities and, in the process, had to make a large loan to the Austrian government to shore up its currency. At the same time, French pressure forced the Austrians to abandon participation in a projected Austro-German customs union proposed by the Brüning government in Germany.

The result was a second reorganization plan of January 1933 that was mandated by the League of Nations-mediated loan to Austria of July 1932. Under its terms, the CA's shares were devalued, the Austrian government assumed 51 percent ownership of the bank, and half the foreign debts were turned over for sale by a new company in Monaco, the Société Continentale de Gestion (Gesco), while the other half were reduced and to be paid off over seven years. A special nine-person reorganization committee composed of six Austrians and three representatives of foreign creditors had been set up in September 1931. It operated between September and late December 1931 and was then succeeded by an eleven-man executive committee to oversee the completion of the bank's reorganization. This executive committee was composed of nine prominent Austrians and representatives of two of the CA's principal creditors. A new general director had been designated in the summer of 1931 in the person of Adrianus van Hengel, a

Zusammenbruch der Oesterreichischen Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe und ihre Rekonstruktion. Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Bankenkrise (Bottrop 1934); Eduard März/Fritz Weber, "The Antecedents of the Austrian Financial Crash of 1931," in: *Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften* 103/5 (1983), pp. 497–519; Aurel Schubert, *The Creditanstalt Crisis of 1931* (Cambridge 1991). See also Monika Ebner, *Der Bankenzusammenbruch des Jahres 1931 in Österreich*, Diss. (Vienna 1969); Peter Eybl, *Die Wirtschafts- und Bankenkrise des Jahres 1931 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sanierung der Credit Anstalt*, D.A. (Linz 1993); Walther Federn, *Der Zusammenbruch der österreichischen Kreditanstalt* (Tübingen 1932); Carl H. Geng, *Der Zusammenbruch der Kreditanstalt und die Sanierungsmaßnahmen der Bundesregierung*, D.A. (Vienna 1970); Andreas Lackner, *Der Zusammenbruch der Credit-Anstalt 1931. Eine Literaturübersicht*, D.A. (Vienna 1993).

⁵ Unpublished paper by Fritz Weber, "The Failure of the Austrian Creditanstalt and Its Consequences," delivered at the conference "Krise und Erneuerung des Bankwesens im 20. Jh." (Crisis and Renewal in 20th Century Banking), European Association for Banking History (Ljubljana, May 2001).

Dutch banker who had the confidence of the international committee. A parallel appointment of great significance was that of Viktor Kienböck, a former finance minister who became president of the Austrian National Bank in February 1932 and who, like van Hengel, favored a restrictive and deflationary policy. Kienböck was especially anxious to rationalize what remained of the Viennese banks, especially the Niederösterreichische Escompte-Gesellschaft, which had been even more derelict in its accounting duties than the CA, and the Wiener Bankverein, the behavior of which had been much better but which also had difficulties standing on its own feet. In March 1933, he developed a reconstruction plan that resulted, at the end of the year, in an arrangement whereby the banking business of the Escompte-Gesellschaft was turned over to the CA, which raised its capital by 25 million Schilling to 167 million Schilling, while the Escompte-Gesellschaft itself was transformed into an industrial holding company under the sole ownership of the Nationalbank and with the name Industriekredit Aktiengesellschaft. The concentration process that made the CA the only Austrian Major bank left in Vienna was completed in May 1934 when the Wiener Bankverein was merged with the CA, effective December 31, 1933, under the name Oesterreichische Credit-Anstalt-Wiener Bankverein. Finally, in January 1936, the Austrian government, claiming inability to cover its obligations with respect to the CA's international debts, reached an agreement with the Creditanstalt International Committee under which the debts were reduced from 140 million Schilling to 77.8 million Schilling.⁶

But if the CA had now emerged as Austria's super bank, it was a far cry from the pretensions of 1919. First, it had been "Austriified," that is, with the exception of some banking interests in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, it was a purely Austrian bank servicing the Austrian economy and Austrian industry.

Second, majority ownership was now in the hands of the Austrian state, and while the government avoided interference in the day-to-day activities of the bank, the CA was very much in tune with the economic policies of Kienböck and the corporatist *Ständestaat* presided over by Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg. It was a measure of the "Austrification" that had taken place that van Hengel, who was killed in a plane crash in 1936, was replaced by Josef Joham (1889–1959), a native Austrian banker from Carinthia who had distinguished himself in the Tyrol. Joham became general director on June 15, 1936, thus beginning a tenure as leading director of the CA that was, despite varying titles and the briefest of interruptions, to last through four political regimes until his death.

The streamlining and a significant "Austrification" of the administrative council of the CA became especially evident in the course of 1933–1934. In 1933, thirty-six of the old members of the council, thirteen of them non-Austrians, departed, two of them having passed away. Seven of the nine new members were non-Austrians, but the old leadership of the council changed. Former finance minister Emanuel Weidenhoffer replaced Louis Rothschild as president; timber industrialist Franz Hasslacher replaced Hans Mauthner as first vice-president; Dutch banker C. E. ter Meulen replaced Siegmund Brosche as second vice-president. In 1934, the administrative council had twenty-one members, eight of whom were non-Austrians, while by 1937 the number of members stood at nineteen, eight of whom were non-Austrians. There were no non-Austrian executives on the administrative council; however, ter Meulen left in 1936, and Alexander Weiner, who came on the Council in 1934, served as vice-president along with Hasslacher. The executive committee increased slightly in size but also was dominated by its prominent Austrian members. In 1934, it was composed of fifteen members, four of whom were non-Austrian. In 1937, it had thirteen members, three of whom were non-Austrian. Hasslacher had been a member since 1933 and acted as a link between

⁶ Stiefel, *Finanzdiplomatie und Weltwirtschaftskrise*, pp. 214–233.