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Two Patterns of Democratization

On November 9, 1918, after weeks of violent confrontations with armed internal security forces in German cities, thousands of protestors – on factory floors, in naval shipyards, and in city centers – heard the rumor that Kaiser Wilhelm was abdicating. Workers abandoned their factories, flowing into the streets of Berlin; troops disobeyed orders prohibiting fraternizing with protestors; and a red republican flag was hoisted on the Royal Palace. As socialist leader Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the republic from the Reichstag balcony later that afternoon, the fragile coalition of democratic opposition, which included socialists, Catholics, and communists, could be excused for thinking that these were the first unstoppable steps on the road to political democracy.¹

The sequence of events immediately leading up to Scheidemann's speech – the protests, the negotiations, the scrambling concessions by the regime – was reminiscent of many democratic transitions. So were the events immediately following: the flight of the Kaiser, the forming of a constitutional assembly, the writing of electoral rules, and the first elections. Seventy years earlier in Vienna, in the spring of 1848, during Europe's first wildfire diffusion of revolution, intense protests against the Austrian monarch Ferdinand I led the conservative Chancellor Prince Metternich to flee, ending the Hapsburg Empire's absolutist regime. In Moscow, 143 years later, in the summer of 1991, at the high point of the European "third wave" of democratization, Boris Yeltsin seized the moment, bolstered by a massive groundswell of protest against Soviet rule, and climbed atop a tank to deliver a speech that helped bring the previously imposing regime to its knees. Twenty years after that, in Cairo, Egypt, on February 11, 2011, after days of violent confrontation, protestors in Tahrir Square triggered President Mubarak's resignation.

¹ See Sebastian Haffner, *Die verrätene Revolution: Deutschland 1918/1919* (Bern: Scherz Verlag, 1969), 73–86.

Historic showdowns and the upsetting of authoritarian regimes capture our political imagination. But despite the appeal of these scenes, democracy is not built in the dramatic but fleeting moments of authoritarian collapse. In all of these instances, what seemed to be a democratic transformation was actually short-lived. In Austria in 1848, the “springtime of the people” famously collapsed in the “counterrevolutionary autumn.” In Germany after 1918, the exhilaration of democratic optimism soon began to wane, as it also did in Russia after 1991 and Egypt even more quickly after 2011. Events occurring both long *before* and *after* any jubilant episode of transition can derail a process of democratization, despite the genuine hopes and aspirations of citizens who believe they have taken history into their own hands. But not every democratic breakthrough ends in disappointment; there are also examples of sustained democratic breakthroughs.

To gain a better understanding of these unexpected twists in history, we must shift our perspective and place the thresholds of a country’s democratic transition within a longer time frame. If we analyze breakthrough moments within the context of a particular long trajectory of democratization, two important and revealing patterns come into view. We see that in some countries, a flash of democratic breakthrough is actually part of a relatively settled path of democratization. Punctuated moments of democratic change, once unleashed, accumulate over time and become self-reinforcing, making *and* meeting the demand for further such moments. In the process, democratization becomes harder and harder to dislodge.

In other countries, however, these breakthrough moments, if they occur at all, are part of what can best be characterized as unsettled paths of democratization: paths marked by a “failure to institutionalize.” Breakthroughs are frequently preceded and followed by either outright democratic breakdown or subtle authoritarian backsliding, regime oscillations that make enduring democratic change both unstable and elusive. In the past and today, these two recognizable patterns of long-run democratization – settled and unsettled – reappear again and again. But we know little about what leads to these patterns. Why do some countries, in the long run, find themselves on one path and other countries on the other? What can we say about the causes of settled and unsettled democratization?

A BEGINNING: THE CASE FOR A LONG-RUN VIEW

In the dry farming plains of northern Mesopotamia, for millennia, patches of weeds and slight indentations in the ground hardly ever attracted notice from passersby, let alone the archaeologists who frequently traveled through the region. However, aerial photography, beginning in the 1930s, and, more recently, sophisticated satellite imagery have allowed archaeologists to discover that these barely noticeable indentations were more than just

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accidental, or merely part of the natural landscape.² Images taken from above – in what archaeologists dubbed “remote sensing projects” – demonstrated conclusively that these shallow linear depressions were in fact at the heart of an intricate and sophisticated 6,000 km roadway system from the Early Bronze Age (2600–2000 BC), providing the outlines of civilizational settlements previously undetectable to archaeologists working on the ground.³

Greater physical distance can expose patterns that were once invisible, or simply mysterious. In analogous fashion, *temporal* distance – moving out from single events and placing them within a longer time frame – can also expose previously undetectable social patterns. The study of how countries become democratic illustrates the advantages of a long-run view. Like archaeologists working too close to the ground, scholars of democratization have often failed to take sufficient temporal distance from their subject.⁴ The consequence is a type of deeply disjointed short-run analysis that fails to discern important patterns. Scholars often try to identify all the factors that make a particular case of democratization – for example, Russia or Egypt *before* their transitions in 1991 and 2011 – “impossible”; then, once democratic change occurs, why such changes were “inevitable”; then later, as democracy derails, why enduring democracy must have been “implausible” all along.

Chasing ever-changing facts with ever-changing explanations is an ad hoc and ultimately unsatisfactory method of understanding the world. Adopting a long-run view is a corrective in two ways. First, like contemporary archaeologists looking down from above, we can also detect previously invisible or underappreciated patterns that matter *more* for specific outcomes than any democracy “score” in a single given year. Second, we can identify and elaborate new explanations for those patterns. If we only analyze democracy’s causes and consequences, as scholars sometimes do, in terms of the level of democracy or authoritarianism at a single moment in time, then we miss the critical patterns that unfold over time.⁵ Since democracies, like most institutions, require time to develop, it is important to study the cumulative

² See Jason A. Ur, “CORONA Satellite Photography and Ancient Road Networks: A Northern Mesopotamian Case Study,” *Antiquity* 77 (2003): 102–15; Jason A. Ur, “Spying on the Past: Declassified Intelligence Satellite Photographs and Near Eastern Landscapes,” *Near Eastern Archaeology* 76 (2013): 28–36.

³ Ur, “Spying on the Past” (2013): 31.

⁴ For an alternative elaboration of the benefits of “long-run” analysis in history, see Jo Guldi and David Armitage, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁵ In addition to the gripping nature of regime transitions, long-term dynamics often get missed because analysts have not taken full advantage of the available systematic cross-national datasets that social scientists typically use in their cross-national analyses (e.g., Polity IV, Freedom House). Usually, analysts conduct time series cross-sectional analyses of countries, estimating probabilities of democratic transitions; for example, within a given year or, at the most, a decade-long time frame.

stock of democracy over longer periods.⁶ Just as economists have discovered that the causes of short-run business cycles and long-run patterns of economic growth do not automatically coincide, political scientists face an analogous paradox: that the determinants of year-to-year fluctuations in annual democracy scores are not necessarily the same as the determinants of long-term patterns of democratization.

As democracy itself becomes a widely proclaimed value, the puzzling bimodal clustering of long-term patterns into settled and unsettled democratization has significant consequences. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that the accumulated stock of democratic experience may have even greater consequences for economic growth and global social welfare than annual levels of democracy.⁷ Further, the cumulative history of democracy is a better predictor of a democracy's chances of surviving at any given moment in time than many contemporary correlates.⁸

This shift in perspective also provides an opportunity to rethink the dominant modes of social scientific explanations for regime outcomes in the modern world. Consider again two of our descriptions from the outset: neither Germany's apparent 1918 democratic breakthrough nor Egypt's in 2011 endured as settled pathways of democratization. Why? International factors certainly were important for both. Yet, that democracy failed so vividly in these particular instances but not in many of their neighboring countries in the same periods – Sweden in the 1930s or Tunisia immediately after 2011 – indicates that domestic sources of regime development loom large. Thus, we ask, was the problem for both, economic backwardness? Or, was the ultimate source of democratic weakness in Egypt and Germany an unassertive and disorganized civil society? Is it possible that an overly quiescent middle class or absent liberal force is chiefly to blame? Or was the problem in Egypt in 2011 or Germany after 1918 that old regime elites in both countries had insufficient safeguards to guarantee their interests, leading them to embrace counterrevolution?

While economic and class-based explanations (e.g., the role of the middle class, the role of the working class) for democratic development have been the object of decades of research, the last idea that incumbent elites “must feel secure” and “buy-in” to democracy for it be created and to endure is a more

⁶ The concept “cumulative stock of democracy” draws on John Gerring, Phillip J. Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno, “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective,” *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (2005): 323–64.

⁷ Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno, “Democracy and Economic Growth” (2005): 356. These authors have illustrated this point by demonstrating that a country's level of democracy in a single year has no measurable impact on its rate of economic growth in the subsequent year, while its democratic experience over the course of the twentieth century is positively associated with growth in subsequent years.

⁸ Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1, no. 2 (2009): 88–126.

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recent discovery.⁹ The importance of upper-class *opponents* of democratization, as paradoxically both facilitating as well as opposing it, has rarely been elaborated theoretically, much less evaluated empirically. That task will be a central preoccupation of this book. To study these issues over the long run, we turn to the past and to Europe, a region with both “settled” and “unsettled” experiences of democratization.

THE ERA OF MODERN DEMOCRACY'S BIRTH?

The years 1848 to 1950 represent a critical window in the history of democracy. The “long nineteenth century” has been described by political scientist Samuel Huntington as “democracy's first wave,” when Europe, Latin America, and North America began to converge upon a common set of modern democratic institutions, including universal male suffrage, civil liberties, and constrained executives.¹⁰ While the concept of political democracy itself is constantly evolving, during this period these institutions that occupy our attention first appeared in the modern world, sometimes in conjunction with each other and sometimes separately, but always transforming the structure of political rule.¹¹ Though its precise dates and main contours are easily disputed, this era's shared experiences and connections surely qualify it as an age defined not only by democratization but also by organized conservative countermovements. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, steamships, underwater ocean telegraph wires, and railroads provided new “lines of force” that knit Europe, Latin America, and North America into one increasingly integrated socioeconomic space.¹² And, within the Atlantic world, increasingly crisscrossed with trade routes and new lines of communication, a variety of progressive political ideas and doctrines – including the rise of modern social policy, economic regulation, city planning, progressive income taxation, and

⁹ Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013 [1986]).

¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

¹¹ For the purposes of this book, these three institutional domains – an expanded suffrage, civil liberties, and an executive accountable to elections via parliamentary rule or direct election – constituted the core arena of democratization. Any movement that expanded the scope of these institutions counts as democratization; de-democratization entails movement that undermined them. For elaboration, see Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

¹² Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 807–31; Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999); Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2006).

democracy – made “Atlantic crossings,” profoundly reshaping domestic politics.¹³

However, this period was not marked by only a single unidirectional “rise of democracy.” There was no straight line, no single wave of democracy but rather two waves: one of democracy, the other of authoritarianism, moving in opposite directions and frequently colliding. In fact, it is precisely the coexistence of these two contradictory trends that make this era such rich terrain for contemporary scholars. Like today, the world was rocked by highly kinetic transnational political bursts of democratic opening but also by regressive retrenchments in which old autocratic regimes were reinstated, new forms of authoritarianism were invented, and efforts to democratize were defeated. Many political regimes experienced many openings and contractions, often in short succession.

For example, beginning in the two decades before 1848, a short first modest burst of democratization spread across the North Atlantic world. The states of the United States began a step-by-step process of eliminating property requirements to vote for white males in places such as Massachusetts in 1821, against the opposition of prominent figures such as John Adams and Daniel Webster, yet spreading to nearly all states by the 1850s.¹⁴ In France, in the summer of 1830, after Charles X’s restrictive July Ordinances prompted protests and barricades in the streets of Paris, the king was unseated and French democrats demanded universal suffrage.¹⁵ And, in Britain, the Reform Act of 1832 was in part a response to social unrest while the radical Chartist movement in the late 1830s began its push for universal male suffrage.¹⁶

¹³ Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 29; Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2005). Though other very significant restrictions that deserve not to be underestimated continued to exist and were newly implemented, property requirements for voting for white males had been eliminated in nearly every state by the 1850s.

¹⁵ Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992).

¹⁶ The most recent literature on the 1832 Reform Act is summarized in Matthew Roberts, *Political Movements in Urban England, 1832–1914* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). It was incidentally the unfolding of all of these events before the perceptive eyes of Alexis de Tocqueville in 1830 that in large part prompted his trip to America, and his increasingly firm belief that the central tendency of the age was egalitarianism and democracy. Also undoubtedly informing this view was de Tocqueville’s attendance of regular lectures by a leading *Doctrinaire* of the time, Professor Guizot, between April 11, 1829 and May 29, 1830. Guizot’s lectures are summarized in Francois Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*, trans. William Hazlitt (London: Penguin Books, [1832] 1997). The lectures were animated by the idea that history was governed by inexorable laws of progress and an

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But, another convulsion, this time larger, soon reverberated across the transatlantic world. Sparked by global economic turmoil, the Revolutions of 1848 ended King Louis Philippe's rule in France, triggered the short-run demise of autocratic regimes in central and southern Europe, prompted major reforms in Belgium and Scandinavia, and, across the Atlantic, led to rebellions in northeastern Brazil and in Chile.¹⁷ In this instance, however, hopeful moments of democratization were quickly followed in 1849 and 1850 by the reinstating of many repressive regimes, giving rise to a newly robust authoritarianism that persisted for decades.

The late 1860s and early 1870s found a new twist in the transatlantic history of democracy. First, in the wake of many civil wars that led to the building of modern nation-states, it was not revolutionaries but rather statesmen, such as Lincoln and his successors, Bismarck, Napoleon III, and Disraeli, who reformed their societies by carrying out dramatic suffrage reforms. By granting manhood or near-universal manhood suffrage, these politicians facilitated the national integration of fragile nation-states wracked by sectional divisions.¹⁸ In some instances, such as in France and Germany, such moves were intended quite explicitly to bolster nondemocratic regimes, not to weaken them. Unintentionally, such "top-down" maneuvers nonetheless helped launch the age of mass politics.¹⁹

Beginning in the 1870s, just as Emile Vandervelde and his embryonic socialist party gave rise to reform movements in Belgium that culminated in universal male suffrage in 1893, and left-liberals pushed for universal male suffrage in Sweden (where it was achieved after 1906), old commercial elites moved to *restrict* the franchise. In global cities such as New York, Dresden, and Hamburg, business leaders reacted to urbanization, immigration, and the perception that universal male suffrage and "machine politics" were corrupting influences.²⁰ The *New York Times*' editors viewed the Paris Commune of 1871,

inevitable forward march. See George Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 23.

¹⁷ Michael Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2009); Kurt Weyland, "The Diffusion of Revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America," *International Organization* 63 (2009): 391–423.

¹⁸ Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History" (2000); Robert C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852–1871* (New York: Harper & Row, 1935).

¹⁹ These reforms coincided with parallel Conservative-led suffrage expansion in Chile in 1874. See J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: La expansión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985).

²⁰ On Belgium, see Claude Renard, *La Conquête du suffrage universel en Belgique* (Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation J. Jacquemotte, 1966). On Sweden, Leif Lewin, *Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On this episode in New York, see Sven Beckert, "Democracy and Its Discontents: Contesting Suffrage Rights in Gilded Age New York," *Past and Present* 174, no. 1 (2002): 116–57. On Dresden, and Saxony more broadly, see Simone Lässig, *Wahlrechtskampf und Wahlreform in Sachsen, 1895–1909* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1996). On Hamburg, see

led by Parisian workers and the Paris National Guard, as an attack on civilization. This reflected the widespread upper-class sentiment of prominent New Yorkers such as railroad attorney Simon Sterne, who organized a movement for New York's Governor Tilden to restrict voting rights in New York City to property holders only.²¹ After the end of Reconstruction in 1876, but even more so beginning in the 1880s and 1890s, there were even more pernicious and successful efforts to roll back the suffrage on racial grounds. Figures such as South Carolina Governor Ben Tillman initiated a series of statutory changes and state constitutional conventions that transformed the political landscape of the U.S. South, creating single-party rule for the next sixty years.²²

Finally, into the twentieth century, just as some moves were being made to restrict democracy, other reformers were also pushing ahead with limited democratic reforms in the last days before the First World War. For example, universal male suffrage did come to Sweden between 1907 and 1909, though its parliament remained weak; the House of Lords' veto power was diminished in Britain in 1911 but suffrage was still restricted; and in Argentina in 1912, the passage of Sáenz Peña Law assured universal and secret voting, but only for *men*.²³

It was not until the end of the First World War and the simultaneous collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires that the fully transformative breakthroughs of mass democracy took hold. Before 1918, there had been only three republics in Europe and now were thirteen. In 1922, the influential British observer James Bryce, counting the number of new democracies in the world, concluded that he was witnessing "the universal acceptance of democracy as the normal and natural form of government."²⁴ In the wake of the Soviet Revolution and the Versailles Peace Treaty, it suddenly appeared the choice everywhere was, in the words of Weimar-era German jurist Hugo Preuss, a stark one — "Wilson or Lenin."²⁵ However, very quickly, as

Richard Evans, "Red Wednesday" in Hamburg: Social Democrats, Police and Lumpenproletariat in the Suffrage Disturbances of January 17, 1906," *Social History* 4, no. 1 (1979): 1–31.

²¹ Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 180.

²² J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Robert G. Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944–1972* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

²³ On each, see Lewin, *Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics* (1988); Philip Norton, "Resisting the Inevitable? The Parliament Act of 1911," *Parliamentary History* 31, no. 3 (2012): 444–59; Ruth Berins Collier, *Paths Towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 46.

²⁴ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), 4.

²⁵ Ellen Kennedy, *Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 111.

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economic crisis wracked the globe, democracies quickly unraveled; parliaments became the object of derision; vitriolic right-wing and left-wing critiques of parliaments diffused; and democracies fell, first in Poland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, and then, after 1928, even in one of the world's richest countries, Germany, and across the globe.

Thus, though democracy may have been *the* theme of the age, this era attracts our attention because it followed cycles of rapid expansion and contraction that mark all democratic ages, including our own. Just as the economic world became increasingly integrated and interconnected, so too did politics. Fluctuations in the price of grain at the Chicago futures market could increasingly affect the economic fate of East Prussian Junkers; consumption patterns of new middle-class citizens in locations as distant as Chile and Romania were set in their breathless emulation of the British and French middle classes.²⁶ Politics too were now more interlinked and the dual forces of democratization and de-democratization sat side by side, making this period a critical one not only for understanding the birth of modern democracy in Europe but also for analysts trying to comprehend the causes of long-run democratic development more generally.

INSIDE EUROPE: TWO PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Western Europe offers a particularly revealing vantage point. First, in Europe, there was a layer of historical burden that makes it a useful empirical subject for the contemporary study of democratization. Sociologist John Markoff has noted that it was ironically not in the world economy's "core" (i.e., Europe) where democracy came easiest. Rather, small-scale democratic experiments went furthest earliest (in the early nineteenth century) in egalitarian agrarian settler societies on the global "periphery," far from the seat of global power, in such distant locations as New Zealand, Australia, and North America.²⁷ The idea of democratizing Europe's often repressive states, usually sitting atop concentrated landholding structures and highly stratified societies, bolstered by nondemocratic church institutions, represented a different and more challenging prospect altogether. What Arno Mayer calls Europe's "old regime" in this sense actually resembled contemporary authoritarian regimes more than one might first imagine.²⁸ In light of the contemporary durability of authoritarianism across the globe, the question of how Europe's democracies

²⁶ Andrew C. Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945," *World Politics* 41, no. 3 (1989), 332.

²⁷ John Markoff, "Where and When Was Democracy Invented?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 4 (1999): 660–90. The situation of democracy in the United States, in Markoff's view, was challenged only after the United States increasingly became a global power in the 1890s.

²⁸ Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

themselves democratized, when placed in a historical context, becomes even more puzzling.

But more than this, we must consider the bewildering divergence that characterized democracy's development within Europe during this hundred-year window between 1848 and 1950: a trait that also mirrors broader patterns in other places and historical periods. For example, scholars often note that suffrage reform came *early* to France, Germany, and Spain, but *late* to Britain, Belgium, and Sweden, while parliamentary sovereignty came *early* to Britain and Belgium, but *late* to Sweden, Germany, and only unevenly to France.²⁹ Despite the difficulty of disentangling the sequencing, timing, and coalitions underpinning these reforms, by taking a long-run view – the *temporal* equivalent of the archeologist's "remote sensing project" – we can clearly decipher two broad patterns of settled and unsettled democratization in Europe.

The first path of *settled democratization* was found in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Between 1848 and 1950, democracy in these countries was gradually constructed via a relatively direct path, absent high-profile moments of backsliding, authoritarian detours, or disruptive coups. Though democratization inevitably faced resistance and was always precarious, in these countries, political rights and institutional constraints on executives expanded over time *without* confronting complete constitutional breakdown or any serious retrenchment.

The second pattern, the mode of *unsettled democratization*, was apparent during the same period in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and in France before 1879. In these countries, democratic development was stalled for longer periods in time (as in Germany before 1918) and, once initiated, often subject to more severe antidemocratic threats and actual coups. This particular pattern of regime cycling revealed itself in these countries not only infamously in the years between the two world wars, but in the late nineteenth century as well.³⁰ Democracy was eventually achieved in these "unsettled" cases after the Second World War, and still later in Spain and Portugal, but most striking was that the pathway was marked by far greater institutional volatility.³¹ At key moments, constitutional instability, regime breakdown, and even military coups marked these countries' unsettled histories. Thus, analyzing these two

²⁹ Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development* (New York: McKay, 1970); Collier, *Paths Towards Democracy* (1999); Dahl, *Polyarchy* (1971).

³⁰ For an incisive elaboration of the theoretical problems this type of "chronic instability" poses for traditional institutional analysis, see Michael Bernhard, "Chronic Instability and the Limits of Path Dependence," *Perspectives on Politics* 13, no. 4 (2015): 1–16.

³¹ Giving us further confidence in the clustering of these countries into these two groups, it is worth noting that the only country in the *settled democratizers* with a single year of "backsliding" over the entire period, where the Polity IV score declined from the previous year, was Denmark in the 1860s. In the second cluster (*unsettled democratizers*), every single country experienced multiple years of democratic backsliding in which the Polity IV score declined over a previous year.