

Introduction: Before a Vast Ocean

*Navigating world history is an ambitious but limited goal, one quite distinct from the unattainable aim of “mastering” the topic. No one can learn all of world history. Anyone who pursues such a goal is sure to become lost.*¹

– Patrick Manning, 2003

*It is now high time for us, Filipinos, to be convinced that in the years to come it is not American and European influence emanating from the other side of the globe ten thousand and more miles away that is destined to play in important role in the development of our national independent life; it is the conduct of and the contact with our neighbors of the Orient that will ultimately be the decisive factor in shaping the future national policies of the Philippine Islands.*²

– Pio Duran, 1935

Getting Lost

In some ways, the goal of this book, drawing subversive inspiration from the epigraph from famous world historian Patrick Manning above, is to become lost. Not in a vain or vein effort to find mastery, mind you, but in an effort to uncover new veins of inquiry and contact as well as new vanes that might point the way.³ This book mostly takes place in the spaces now widely considered China and the Philippines in the era now widely recognized as the early twentieth century under the Gregorian calendar, but when historians or historical figures wander elsewhere, it follows them for a spell.⁴

¹ Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), x.

² Pio Duran, “Philippine Independence and Asiatic Monroeism,” *The Far Eastern Review* 31 (February 1935): 50.

³ David A. Bell cautions against “turning” endlessly and thoughtlessly like weathervanes. See David A. Bell, “Questioning the Global Turn: The Case of the French Revolution,” *French Historical Studies* 37, no. 1 (2014): 1.

⁴ This book follows scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty’s lead in treating “China” and “the Philippines” as “hyperreal terms” that refer to “figures of imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat indeterminate.” See Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” *Representations* no. 37 (1992): 1.

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However, as much as possible, this monograph observes Pio Duran's prescriptions by privileging interactions within and actors from Asia.

This book explores an understudied nexus of interaction. It shows how, in the first half of the twentieth century, leading Chinese educators toured the Philippines to learn about and replicate its vocational education system, Chinese pundits debated the ideal feminine form at Manila Carnival pageants, and Chinese merchants navigated innovative exclusionist legislation in the Philippines. At the same time, it shows how Filipino musicians populated jazz cabarets and exemplified classical music in Shanghai, Chinese from the Philippines fashioned themselves as superheroes destined to save their ailing hometowns and China, and Filipino athletes put their bodies on display, competing with Chinese peers in regional athletic competitions. These intrepid travelers and thinkers weaved extensive and durable connections across Asia, exemplifying a rich but nearly unknown history of Sino–Philippine entanglement.

Yet this history has largely lived in obscurity despite its depth and significance. The aim of this book, therefore, is twofold. In addition to uncovering and restoring the entangled history of an important subregion of Asia, this book explores how methodological and disciplinary blinders have limited such research in the past, and how new ideas and approaches can help readjust research agendas for the future. The title of the introduction, “Before a Vast Ocean (曾经沧海),” which comes from a liberal translation of a famous Tang dynasty poem-turned-idiom by Yuan Zhen (元稹), invokes a nostalgic vision of a past trip to the “blue sea,” or vast ocean. In the same way that Filipinos and Chinese stood before and navigated this literal vast ocean, creating improbable new lives for themselves and their families in the early twentieth century, this monograph stands before the metaphorical vast ocean of historiography, charting a course through the seas of world, global, and transnational history to craft a connected history of the Philippines and China.

This introduction starts with a brief visit to the historical ocean in an introductory scene-setting anecdote and a walk-through of the Sino–Philippine link. It then steers toward the oceans of historiography, first observing world, global, and transnational methodologies from a distance before approaching and untangling those methodologies. It concludes by casting a new framework that helps bring the Sino–Philippine link into focus.

Act 1, Scene 1

The following is a brief introductory anecdote designed to bring our attention to key themes in this monograph. It is the year 1936 and we find ourselves in the middle of two commemorative volumes celebrating the anniversaries of important

Chinese institutions in the Philippines. Standing at center stage is a statement from the former Chinese Consul General to the Philippines, K. L. Kwong (Kuang Guanglin 鄺光林). In the background stands a contrasting statement from Lin Yu (Lin You 林幽), lead editor for the China Critic, who carries a grim look on his face.

K. L. KWONG: Today the Philippines stands on the threshold of a new era – ready to play its important role in the drama of the Far East. And China, her nearest neighbor, cannot but look upon her aims and aspirations with understanding and sympathy.⁵

LIN YU: Facts tell us that the Sino–Filipino relationship has been excellent in the past, but lately there appear some disturbing signs, which, like “a little cloud out of the sea like a man’s hand,” if not checked in time, will develop into storms.⁶

Visibly flustered, the short statement of the Consul General to the Philippines exits on the left as a new, extended statement by Dr. Candido M. Africa, head of the Department of Parasitology at the University of the Philippines, flips onto the stage from the right. Lin Yu remains behind Dr. Africa. The lights focus on the third-person anecdote of the spectacled professor, as his words leap off the page, but Lin Yu’s remarks remain on guard.

DR. AFRICA: While attending the London School of Tropical Medicine he was once mistaken for a Chinese by a friend. Desiring to rectify his true nationality, he immediately corrected that he was a Filipino and not a Chinese. “What the hell is the difference anyway,” retorted his friend in a twinkle While it is good and honorable to be a Filipino, it is just as good and honorable to be a Chinese for theirs is a great and admirable race that has built up a civilization which reaches far back to the earliest historical record. The writer would be pleased if he were mistaken again for a Chinese abroad.⁷

LIN YU: I am aware that many of your public men, with the best of intentions, are saying that there is no such thing as an anti-Chinese movement [But] as you look around, you see the Chinese carrying on the greater part of the retail and wholesale business in your land. You want to control your own business just as you like to take the political destiny of your country into your own hands.⁸

⁵ K. L. Kwong (Kuang Guanglin), in *Feilübin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui sanshi zhounian jiniankan* 菲律賓岷里拉中華商會三十周年紀念刊 [*Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce Thirty Year Anniversary Publication*], ed. Zhonghua shanghui chuban weiyuanhui 中華商會出版委員會 (Manila: Minli yinshuguan 馬尼拉：民立印書館, 1936), 20.

⁶ Lin You (林幽), “An Open Letter to the Filipino People,” in *The Fookien Times Tenth Anniversary Number: 1926–1936* [*Xinmin ribao* 新聞日報] (Manila: Fookien Times Co., 1936), 55.

⁷ Candido M. Africa, “Future Sino–Philippine Relationship,” in *Feilübin Minlila Zhonghua shanghui sanshi zhounian jiniankan* 菲律賓岷里拉中華商會三十周年紀念刊 [*Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce Thirty Year Anniversary Publication*], ed. Zhonghua shanghui chuban weiyuanhui 中華商會出版委員會 (Manila: Minli yinshuguan 馬尼拉：民立印書館, 1936), 29.

⁸ Lin You, “An Open Letter,” 55–56.

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The professor pauses before striking a different tone.

DR. AFRICA: Before closing the writer who is without doubt voicing also the sentiments of his many colleagues in the Philippines, wishes to take this rare opportunity of extending to their many Chinese friends their sincere greetings and good wishes. May they succeed in their very laudable common ambition of ultimately rescuing their Motherland from so many forces that tend to cause her disintegration.⁹

LIN YU: I have been unusually frank in the above, I hope you will not take it as an offence, for I am speaking from the very bottom of my heart. I hope I am not mistaken in pleading for a frank discussion of the Sino-Filipino relations, for a true understanding and genuine cooperations [*sic*] between our peoples.¹⁰

The lights fade as the narrator closes the two commemorative volumes and turns to his keyboard in quiet contemplation. End scene.

Some documents read like the scene of a play. The drama seeps through the letters from the past, bringing to life the animosities, anxieties, and anticipations of historical actors.¹¹ In this instance, the passages come from two commemorative volumes published in 1936. The first, which featured Consul General K. L. Kwong and Dr. Candido M. Africa, commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of the Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce – a critical organizational and advocatory institution for Chinese in the Philippines. The latter, which featured Shanghai-based editor Lin Yu, who stood in the background to represent his distance from Manila, commemorated the tenth anniversary of the *Fookien Times* – a leading Chinese newspaper in the Philippines.

Dr. Africa adopted an optimistic tone, overlooking recent violent events and discriminatory legislation targeting Chinese residents in the Philippines, as well as the underlying racial tensions, while Lin Yu kept those issues front and center. Together, they help us set the scene for the “drama of the Far East,” as the Consul General called it, that unfolds in the chapters that follow. They channel the complicated relationship between China and the Philippines, which was fraught with racialized animosities and legislative gatekeeping, yet filled with camaraderie, modeling, collaborations, and even romances. These figures help open our eyes to the complexity of and contradictions within the Sino-Philippine link.

⁹ Africa, “Future Sino-Philippine Relationship,” 29.

¹⁰ Lin Yu, “An Open Letter,” 56.

¹¹ For an instructive conversation on the “theatricality” of history, see Greg Denning, *Performances* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1996), 104–105.

A Walk-Through of the Sino-Philippine Link

This book started from a simplistic notion that geographical proximity implied close collaboration and intense interaction, but it became clear in the early stages of research that histories of Asia tended to point in a different direction. It is a common adage in Southeast Asian studies, for instance, that colonialism disrupted many long-standing local networks as imperial imperatives redirected the economic, educational, and religious routes of Southeast Asians away from close neighbors toward the imperial metropole and other colonies of the empire.¹² In other words, according to the standard formula, this era of international business conglomerations and global empires featured connections mostly between and within those businesses and empires.

This formulation only tells part of the story, however, as it turns out that empires, in the end, “were never fully self-contained or hermetically sealed systems.”¹³ New steamship networks might have encouraged intraimperial travel, but unexpected connections also formed between close neighbors.¹⁴ In other words, despite changing historical circumstances and a historiography that suggests otherwise, China and the Philippines remained intertwined in the twentieth century. This book takes us to this rich and largely unexplored theater of interaction that starred athletes and educators, carnival queens and pundits, jazz musicians and lawyers, and politicians and poets. It brings to life a colorful and dynamic world full of passion and hubris, engagement and disintegration, and cooperation and catastrophe.

The Sino-Philippine link of the twentieth century built on a long history. Some of the islands now collectively recognized as the Philippines appeared in Chinese written records as early as the Tang dynasty (618–907).¹⁵ Later, during the Spanish colonial period (1571–1898), traders from southeastern China, leveraging kinship, hometown, and business networks, began to move to the Philippines in large numbers, filling crucial roles in the colonial society. The Chinese population

¹² For one summary of this imperial division of Southeast Asia, see Norman G. Owen, ed., *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), 78.

¹³ Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, *Empires and the Reach of the Global, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 12.

¹⁴ In my dissertation, I called these “Accidental Connections of Empires.” See Phillip B. Guingona, “Crafted Links and Accidental Connections of Empires: A History of Early Twentieth Century Sino-Philippine Interaction” (PhD diss., University at Buffalo, 2015).

¹⁵ For early Chinese references to the Philippines, see Ching-hong Wu, “A Study of References to the Philippines in Chinese Sources from Earliest Times to the Ming Dynasty,” *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review* 26, nos. 1–2 (1959): 1–182.

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in the Philippines blossomed from an estimated 150 people in 1570, when Spaniards first established an outpost in Manila, to as many as 30,000 by 1603.¹⁶ The population fluctuated through most of the Spanish colonial era as colonial officials alternatively encouraged migration and choreographed pogroms, but turmoil in China beginning in the 1850s and Spanish need for labor led to steadier migration patterns in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the American colonial period, which began in the early 1900s, the Chinese community in the Philippines remained relatively stable despite the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the islands.

China, for its part, had welcomed delegates from what is now considered the Philippines as early as the Song dynasty (960–1279).¹⁷ Most early travelers from the archipelago came as merchants or diplomatic representatives who performed their parts in the tributary “system.”¹⁸ Because “Filipino” is a recent term forged by sojourning Propagandists in the crucible of early Bourbon–Restoration-era Spain, however, it is hard to speak of a parallel “Filipino” population in China before the nineteenth century.¹⁹ However, by the midway point of that century, people from the archipelago had found work around the world, including China, in seafaring industries, which helped them form a sense of shared identity and affinity for the home islands.²⁰

Two episodes have garnered outsized attention in the history of Sino–Philippine entanglement: the Manila galleon trade and the revolutionary era of the Philippines. In the galleon trade, Spanish ships labored across the Pacific from Acapulco to Manila and back, while Chinese junks completed the circuit by meeting them in Manila.²¹ Years later, Filipino revolutionaries launched three successive but ultimately unsuccessful revolutions at the turn of the twentieth century, restructuring the Sino–Philippine relationship

¹⁶ Huang Zisheng 黄滋生 and He Sibing 何思兵, *Feilübin Huaqiao shi* 菲律宾华侨史 [History of Huaqiao in the Philippines] (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe 广州: 广东高等教育出版社, 1987), 2.

¹⁷ Henry William Scott and Go Bon Juan, *Filipinos in China before 1500* (Manila: De La Salle University, 1989), 1–3.

¹⁸ Ibid., 14; and Roderich Ptak, “From Quanzhou to the Sulu Zone and Beyond: Questions Related to the Early Fourteenth Century,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 29, no. 2 (September 1998): 289.

¹⁹ For more on Filipino nationalism and the propagandist movement, see John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880–1895: The Creators of a Filipino Consciousness, the Makers of Revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997).

²⁰ See, for example, Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., “Manilamen and Seafaring: Engaging the Maritime World beyond the Spanish Realm,” *Journal of Global History* 7 (2012): 366.

²¹ See, for instance, Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).

by “teaching China the meaning and viability of revolution as a solution to its national problems.”²² However, while these episodes are important, they have commanded outsized attention in our history books, obscuring equally important episodes and actors.

As outlined earlier, the proliferation of empires and the rapid expansion of transportation networks in the nineteenth century enhanced existing Sino–Philippine ties and fostered new connections by the twentieth century. These connections led Filipino musicians, veterinarians, and clerks to move to China’s booming port cities to carve out new lives for themselves while Chinese businesspeople, students, and lawyers traveled to the Philippines to live and learn. Meanwhile, wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and self-styled heroes from the Philippines leveraged their significant assets and networks of powerful acquaintances to fund infrastructure projects and steer political organizations in the archipelago and China. At the same time, Chinese and Filipino athletes and diplomats turned basketball courts and banquet halls into proxies for progress, while pundits transformed their columns into arenas for politicking.

Chinese people lived in the Philippines and married Filipinos, they discussed the archipelago and its people in the pages of popular newspapers and journals, and they copied Philippine innovations in governance and education. For many Chinese people, the Philippines represented progress and opportunity, while for many others it represented tyranny, especially after Filipino lawmakers legislated limits on Chinese freedoms. Either way, the Philippines loomed large. And China filled the same role for Filipinos who moved north for work, wrote about China in dailies and reviews, or traced their heritage there. In many ways, China became a crucial benchmark and strawperson that Filipinos used to measure themselves in all facets of life and governance.

This monograph argues that in the early twentieth century the Philippines and Filipinos played a significant role in Chinese history, and China and Chinese people likewise played a significant role in Philippine history. Their histories were connected. This straightforward argument, however, sails against the flow of existing scholarship, which largely overlooks the depth and significance of Sino–Philippine contact and mutual influence during this period. So, before we can move on to the connected history of China and the Philippines itself, we must first explore the web of historiography to devise strategies to tease out and recover lost voices, which will lead us to the second argument of this book. The next section asks why histories such as this one

²² Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place: Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887–1912* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 151. See also Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 83–113.

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have remained hidden, and it experiments with ways to leverage global, world, and transnational history approaches to bring them to light.

Observing and Untangling the Human Web

World history is a metaphor. Or, rather, one of its most significant contributions to the study of history comes in its metaphors.²³ Practitioners of global, transnational, and world history regularly employ vivid and imaginative terms such as circulations, flows, links, circuits, and networks to compel readers to think critically and see and know in new ways.²⁴ In his call for researchers to explore “connected histories,” for instance, Sanjay Subrahmanyam touts the use of “intrepid analytical machetes.”²⁵ Transnational historian Pierre-Yves Saunier, meanwhile, asks us to set “our historical butterfly net” to “transnational mode.”²⁶ Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J. T. Way, opting for a different but equally incisive metaphor, describe transnationalism as “the conceptual acid that denaturalizes” the nation.²⁷ Whether it is with machetes, butterfly nets, or acid, historians of the global have a way of cutting through complex topics, burning through old paradigms, and capturing historical butterflies with potent metaphors.

One metaphor that has successfully ensnared many world, global, and transnational historians is the web. The web captures the complexity and breadth of global interactions, the longevity and stickiness of its exchanges, and the interconnectedness of it all.²⁸ This metaphor has

²³ For an interesting take on “metaphorical suggestiveness” in history, see Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 811. For critiques of the abuse of metaphors in academic writing, see Ann Curthoys and John Docker, “The Two Histories: Metaphor in English Historiographical Writing,” *Rethinking History* 1, no. 3 (1997): 259–273; Stefanie Gänger, “Circulation: Reflections on Circularity, Entity, and Liquidity in the Language of Global History,” *Journal of Global History* 12, no. 3 (2017): 303–318; and Stuart Alexander Rockefeller, “Flow,” *Current Anthropology* 52, no. 4 (2011): 557–578.

²⁴ C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1454.

²⁵ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 762.

²⁶ Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Transnational History – Introduction,” in *Transnational History*, HAL Archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, January 6, 2014, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00922207>. Saunier adjusted the wording to “camera set” in the published version; see Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 10.

²⁷ Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J. T. Way, “Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis,” *American Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (2008): 627.

²⁸ For the most famous use of this metaphor, see J. R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, *The Human Web: A Bird’s-Eye View of World History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003). See also Tony Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire: Locating New Zealand’s Colonial Past*

also proven helpful because it hints at the difficulty historians face should they desire to untangle, chart, or even just observe the overlapping strings of global history. If researchers bypass the web and focus solely on the aciniform silk cocoon that happens to contain an embalmed national history, to extend the metaphor, they will likely miss much of the story of human history contained in the broader web, such as the extensive contacts between China and the Philippines in the early twentieth century that are the subject of this book.

This book leverages transnational methods to observe, untangle, and rebuild the web of Sino–Philippine connectivity in the early twentieth century, with implications for exploring other such webs around the world. In her book on the connected histories of Rangoon, Penang, and Bangkok, historian Su Lin Lewis begins by plotting the routes of the “inter-connected web of mobility and exchange,” and this monograph starts much the same way with the previous section.²⁹ The current section, in turn, conducts an audit of global, transnational, and world histories, exposing their limitations and blinders with the goal of designing a path toward renewal.

This section focuses on two major issues that weigh on the approaches: disciplinary and methodological siloing, which is caused in part by the vastness of the fields themselves, and Eurocentrism and coloniality, which are lingering legacies of two centuries of imperial historiography and the funnel web of the archives. The section after recasts a more open and expansive orb web by highlighting and expanding upon key innovations of global historians that inform and inspire this book. It focuses on sub-global regions and scales in history, interactions among people of the Global South, selective silences, and disintegration in transnational inquiry.

World historians have long embraced new approaches to enhance their research. For example, proponents of what some have called “new world history,” “new global history,” and the “transnational turn,” among many other things, have, over the past couple of decades, weaved a more balanced and interdisciplinary approach to history that takes seriously “peripheral” influence on the “metropole” rather than just the other way around, cultural and material cultural flows in addition to capital flows, global feminisms and subaltern studies in addition to elite machinations, and public health and environmental histories and their place in the human web.³⁰ These scholars cast transnational history as

(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012); and J. R. McNeill, *The Webs of Humankind: A World History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020).

²⁹ Su Lin Lewis, *Cities in Motion: Urban Life and Cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asia, 1920–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1.

³⁰ For an overview of some of these changes, see Maxine Berg, ed., *Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);

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a way of seeing that embraces “methodological diversity,” and many of them have inspired this research on the Philippines and China.³¹

However, while the critical and necessary adjustments these scholars have made have breathed new life into world, global, and transnational history, the scholars making those changes, myself included, remain consciously or unconsciously influenced by universalist and stadialist baggage that continues to shape agendas, steer funding, and damage the reputation and utility of the approaches.³² Leading world historians have admitted that the field can be prescriptive and totalizing and that it often privileges the perspective of its loudest and most endowed acolytes, who happen to mostly hail from North America and Europe for the time being.³³ Ultimately, historians of the global have reached a point where, while we can name the problems of the approach and recognize the impact of historical baggage, actually applying research to counterbalance or offset those issues remains difficult.³⁴

This book and this introduction are designed to address some of the questions surrounding global, transnational, and world history while highlighting ways to leverage the strengths of these approaches. But what are global, transnational, and world history? After fumbling through several formulas, Patrick Manning flippantly writes, “At the most expansive level, I could claim that all historical studies have now become world

Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Ross E. Dunn, Laura Jane Mitchell, and Kerry Ward, eds., *The New World History: A Field Guide to Teachers and Researchers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016); Bruce Mazlish, *The New Global History* (London: Routledge, 2006); and Douglas Northrop, ed., *A Companion to World History* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

³¹ Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” 1454.

³² For a brief summary of that baggage, see Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

³³ See, for instance, Frederick Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian’s Perspective,” *African Affairs* 100, no. 399 (2001): 189–213; Richard Drayton and David Motadel, “Discussion: The Futures of Global History,” *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018): 1–21; Gabriela De Lima Grecco and Sven Schuster, “Decolonizing Global History? A Latin American Perspective,” *Journal of World History* 31, no. 2 (2020): 425–446; Roxann Prazniak, “Is World History Possible? An Inquiry,” in *History after the Three Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies*, ed. Arif Dirlik, Vinay Bahl, and Peter Gran (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 221–239; Heather Sutherland, “The Problematic Authority of (World) History,” *Journal of World History* 18, no. 4 (2007): 491–522. For the growth and potential of global, world, and transnational history, see Sven Beckert and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., *Global History, Globally: Research and Practice Around the World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

³⁴ There are signs that this era is coming to an end. Jürgen Osterhammel, for instance, argues that the time when reflections on global history “outnumbered attempts to put all those ambitious recipes into historiographical practice” seems to be ending. See Jürgen Osterhammel, “Global History,” in *Debating New Approaches to History*, ed. Marek Tamm and Peter Burke (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 21.