Introduction: An 'East Asian Casablanca'

In 1938, the British poet W. H. Auden wrote a poem about Macau after visiting the Portuguese-administered enclave during his journey, alongside Christopher Isherwood, through wartime China. Auden described the South China territory as a city of contradictions where 'churches alongside brothels testify / That faith can pardon natural behaviour'. Despite being surrounded by conflict, Macau's seemingly sheltered isolation led Auden to conclude that 'nothing serious can happen here'.[1] Yet very serious things did take place in neutral Macau, as this book will show. Taking the territory as a case study, it explores neutrality and collaboration in South China and how they were framed by multiple connections not only to Europe and to Japan, but also to other parts of the world.

Like some of his contemporaries, Auden was quick to notice that the war unfolding in East Asia was profoundly connected to the 1930s conflicts in Europe. Although no one referred to the war as such at the time, it was the opening salvo of the global Second World War. The global connections of the small enclave that Auden deemed of little consequence remain one of the great untold stories of World War II. The only foreign-ruled territory in China to escape formal occupation by Japan, between 1937 and 1945, Macau saw its population rise almost threefold, reaching around half a million people. The territory, at the time comprising a peninsula and two islands with a combined land area of only 15 km^2, became a refugee city, where the number of newcomers dwarfed that of pre-existing residents. Refugees in Macau shaped the social, economic, cultural, political and diplomatic experience of a globally connected South China. Chinese, Portuguese, British and other refugees filled Macau's streets, intelligence agents for several powers operated in the territory, and activities of resistance, humanitarian relief and smuggling were conducted under the protective shadows of Portuguese neutrality (see Figure I.1). The history of this small enclave shows how, even in the unlikeliest of places, the war was global and those who lived through it were profoundly interconnected.

[1] W. H. Auden and C. Isherwood, *Journey to a War* (London, 1939, repr. 1973), pp. 13–14.

Figure I.1 Aerial view of Macau city centre, late 1930s. Source: Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford, *Anuário de Macau*, 1939. Per. 20659 e.92.

This book explores the lived experience of neutrality during the Second World War in East Asia, detailing the ambiguities of its practice in Macau and surrounding areas. Concomitantly, it explores how neutrality was marked by many layers of collaboration involving Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, British and other actors. These layers were often overlapping and even contradictory, but, intended or not, they contributed to keep Macau under Portuguese administration during and after the war.

Despite the frequent assurances Portuguese officials gave of their 'strict neutrality', the uses and abuses of neutrality in China make evident that it was far more flexible than strict. Portuguese neutrality in Macau created a space of freedom for actors with antagonistic interests that coexisted and intersected in the territory. The opportunities Portuguese neutrality offered extended beyond the enclave. In mainland China, neutrality allowed for a range of ambiguous practices, from Portuguese diplomats operating in occupied cities whilst not recognising the collaborationist authorities, to the registration of Chinese ships as Portuguese to straddle wartime restrictions on transportation.

Collaboration was at the heart of Macau's wartime experience. There were various and sometimes competing layers of collaboration. Several of these did not involve Japan. On the part of the Portuguese authorities,

imperial collaboration with the British prevailed in a clear example of how the centuries-old Anglo–Portuguese alliance worked on the ground.[2] On some level, the nature of Anglo–Portuguese interactions in South China is better captured by the term *cooperation* than by the notion of *collaboration* with an invading and occupying power. However, as will be addressed later, the term *collaboration* is not entirely unhelpful when considering the imperial dimension that underpinned Portugal's ties to the United Kingdom, and the fact that, despite the two European countries' different positioning vis-à-vis China during the war, they were both implicated in forms of colonial occupation in the region that predated Japan's invasion.

Although diplomacy is paramount to understanding neutrality and collaboration in Macau, practical everyday constraints and opportunities went beyond decisions made in distant capital city bureaux. The territory's global connections vividly come to light when considering the ramifications of the social impact of the war in Macau. Its society suffered the effects of the conflict in ways similar to other areas in China. The case of this peripheral enclave sheds new light on the connected histories of neutral territories in the country, such as the Shanghai International Settlement and French Concession and Hong Kong before Japan occupied them from late 1941 onwards. Indeed, these foreign-ruled territories were not sealed off; in their nominal 'peace', they were very much part of the war.

Due to its strategic geographical position in the Pearl River Delta and the relative weakness of the colonial power administering it (which was not perceived as a threat by any of the major belligerents), Macau was at the crossroads of different forces. Its wartime years illustrate the regime competition between the Chinese central government of Chiang Kai-shek resisting Japan – with which Portugal maintained diplomatic relations – and Wang Jingwei's Reorganised National Government (RNG), the main collaborationist regime in China. After 1941, with the swift Japanese occupation of British colonial territories in East and Southeast Asia, Macau also regained a crucial importance for the United Kingdom that had been unprecedented since the founding of Hong Kong a century earlier. Neutral Macau also appealed to Japanese forces, which exerted a significant degree of economic control over the enclave although a formal occupation never occurred, unlike in the Portuguese colony of Timor (today East Timor), which was under Japanese occupation from 1942 until the end of the war.[3]

[2] The Anglo–Portuguese Alliance, established in 1373 and ratified by the Treaty of Windsor in 1386, is considered the oldest alliance in the world still in place.

[3] G. C. Gunn, *Wartime Portuguese Timor: The Azores Connection* (Clayton, 1988); L. Cunha, 'Timor: A Guerra Esquecida' ('Timor: The Forgotten War'), *Macau*, 45 (1996), pp. 32–46; J. D. Santa, *Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941–1945*

Several locales in China were sites of intense interaction between occupied and unoccupied areas, experiencing periods of prosperity fuelled by wartime human and material circulations. For example, Keith Schoppa has noted the impact of the trade and smuggling boom in Ningbo and Wenzhou between 1938 and 1941, and the pragmatic choices of local entrepreneurs able to capitalise on wartime opportunities.[4] Mark Baker has observed similar dynamics of temporary wartime vibrancy and a smuggling boom in the inland city of Zhengzhou in specific periods of the war.[5] Parallels with Macau are even more striking when considering territories under foreign rule. Shanghai's foreign concessions and Hong Kong eclipsed Macau, not only in terms of scale – from the number of residents to their economic clout – but also in terms of their importance to Chinese actors. Their exceptionalism has merited much scholarly attention. Histories of Shanghai in particular have highlighted the ambiguities of relief practices, political mobilisation, cultural production and economic prosperity. Almost invariably, they portray the experience of the International Settlement and the French Concession before the Japanese occupation as distinctive, something well captured by the term 孤島 *gudao*, often translated as 'lone island', 'solitary island' or 'orphan island'.[6] Despite the isolationist connotations of this term, scholars of the period in Shanghai – for *gudao* is a temporal descriptor as much as a geographic one – stress the wide array of connections to wartime dynamics. Instead of keeping war completely at bay, neutrality generated different forms of engagements with the conflict, both overt and covert, including different forms of violence.[7] As will be seen in the case of Macau, significant human and material circulations also connected *gudao* Shanghai to the hinterland.[8]

(*Australians and Japanese in Timor in World War II, 1941–1945*) (Lisbon, 1997); K. Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Athens, OH, 2003), pp. 24–38; B. d'Água, *Le Timor Oriental face à la Seconde Guerra Mondiale (1941–1945)* (*East Timor in the Second World War (1941–1945)*) (Lisbon, 2007); P. Cleary, *The Men Who Came Out of the Ground* (Sydney, 2010).

[4] R. K. Schoppa, *In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees during the Sino–Japanese War* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), pp. 261–84.

[5] M. Baker, 'City Limits on China's Central Plains: Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, and the Making of Spatial Inequality, 1900–1960' (PhD thesis, Yale University, 2017), pp. 170–1, 200–8.

[6] P. Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–1945* (Stanford, CA, 1993), p. xiii; W. H. Yeh, 'Prologue: Shanghai Besieged, 1937–45', in W. H. Yeh (ed.), *Wartime Shanghai* (London, 1998), pp. 1–15; C. Henriot and W. H. Yeh, 'Introduction', in C. Henriot and W. H. Yeh (eds.), *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1–14; M. Blair, *Gudao, Lone Islet: The War Years in Shanghai* (Victoria, 2007).

[7] For example, F. Wakeman Jr, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, 1996); Yeh, *Wartime Shanghai*.

[8] P. M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937–1945* (Berkeley, CA, 2003); T. Lincoln, *Urbanizing China in War and Peace: The Case of Wuxi County* (Honolulu, HI, 2015), especially chapters 6–8.

A few scholars have probed the experience of other foreign concessions in China, notably those under French administration such as the French Concession of Hankou.[9] Their findings show striking similarities to Shanghai – and to Macau. French territories in China remained grey areas of neutrality until they were taken over by Japanese forces, mostly in 1943. One of these was the French-leased territory of Guangzhouwan, which was only formally occupied in March 1945. Chuning Xie called it 'China's Casablanca'.[10] The analogy is similar to the one Philip Snow used to refer to Macau in his study of occupied Hong Kong: 'East Asian Casablanca'.[11] The 1942 Hollywood film *Casablanca* is indeed a compelling reference. It fictionalises the dangers and opportunities that a strategic neutral territory – in that case, French-controlled Casablanca – offered different belligerents, refugees and very unneutral neutrals, showing the North African city as a place of transit, of waiting, of opportunity and of unlikely friendships. That was very much applicable to Macau during the war years. Considering the enclave as one amongst several 'East Asian Casablancas', one amongst several 'lone islands', opens new possibilities for assessing the connections that framed these territories' complex experiences of neutrality and collaboration, experiences whose ambivalence was linked to their colonial status during China's War of Resistance against Japanese imperialism. Whilst the epithet *gudao* does transmit the peculiarities of these neutral territories' experience, this book argues against a characterisation of them as completely isolated, putting their connections – through the movement of people, things and information – at the centre.

Neutrality and Collaboration

Neutrality is a legal status that exists only if there is a war. The idea of neutrality can be traced back to antiquity and it began to be theorised and codified in international law in Europe in the early modern period, especially from the eighteenth century onwards.[12] Specific definitions of neutrality abound, but a generally accepted notion is that a neutral state

[9] D. Rihal, 'The French Concession in Hankou 1938–43: The Life and Death of a Solitary Enclave in an Occupied City', in R. Bickers and I. Jackson (eds.), *Treaty Ports in Modern China* (Milton Park, 2016), pp. 220–42. On the end of the French Concession in Shanghai, see C. Cornet, 'The Bumpy End of the French Concession and French Influence in Shanghai, 1937–1946', in *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, pp. 257–76.

[10] C. Xie, 'China's Casablanca: Refugees, Outlaws, and Smugglers in France's Guangzhouwan Enclave', in J. S. Esherick and M. T. Combs (eds.), *1943: China at the Crossroads* (Ithaca, NY, 2015), pp. 391–425.

[11] P. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven, CT, 2003), p. 180.

[12] E. Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States* (London, 1988), pp. 13–19.

'is required not only to abstain from all warlike action, but also to treat the belligerents impartially'.[13] If refraining from military intervention is relatively straightforward, an impartial treatment of the belligerents is more difficult to respect in practice than in theory. Indeed, questionable practices of neutrality during World War II are often alluded to in works about neutral countries.[14] Their reasons for neutrality varied, but its maintenance required concessions that might not have been compatible with a neutral status. Scholarship on neutrality tends to be dominated by a Eurocentric perspective, either downplaying or ignoring relevant connections with belligerents in Asia.[15] Amongst the few exceptions are the works by Pascal Lottaz and Florentino Rodao, who have analysed in depth Japan's relations with some European neutrals, namely Sweden, Switzerland and Spain.[16]

Roderick Ogley distinguished four kinds of neutral states: neutralised, traditional neutrals, ad hoc neutrals and non-aligned. Portugal fits into the third category, a small power which sought to 'keep out of a particular war'.[17] In her study of European powers in the nineteenth century, Maartje Abbenhuis proposes instead the term 'occasional neutrals' to emphasise certain governments' tactical choice to opt for neutrality as they were 'well aware of the value of staying out' of a particular conflict.[18] Her observations regarding the use of neutrality as a way of safeguarding imperial interests can easily be applicable to Portugal's situation in the Second World War.[19]

[13] W. Hofer, *Neutrality As the Principle of Swiss Foreign Policy* (Zurich, 1957), p. 5.
[14] R. Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1970); D. J. Fodor, *The Neutrals* (Alexandria, VA, 1983); H. R. Reginbogin, *Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality of Switzerland and Other Neutral Nations during WWII* (Bern, 2006).
[15] For example, C. Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during the Second World War* (Manchester, 2000); N. Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001); M. af Malmborg, *Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden* (Hampshire, 2001); N. Wylie, *Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World War* (Oxford, 2003); R. Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War* (Oxford, 2006); E. O'Halpin, *Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War* (Oxford, 2008); B. Evans, *Ireland during the Second World War: Farewell to Plato's Cave* (Manchester, 2014).
[16] F. Rodao, *Franco y el Emperio Japonés: Imágenes y Propaganda en Tiempos de Guerra* (*Franco and the Japanese Empire: Images and Propaganda in Wartime*) (Barcelona, 2002); P. Lottaz, 'Neutral States and Wartime Japan: The Diplomacy of Sweden, Spain and Switzerland toward the Empire' (PhD thesis, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2018); P. Lottaz and I. Ottosson, *Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War 1931–1945* (London, 2021).
[17] Ogley, *Theory and Practice of Neutrality*, p. 3.
[18] M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815–1915* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 16.
[19] Ibid., p. 19.

Portugal's neutrality during the Second World War was not formally declared, but it was often presented as framed and conditioned by the Anglo–Portuguese alliance.[20] Portugal neither had a tradition of neutrality in European conflicts nor was strong enough militarily to deter a foreign invasion, although there were precedents for neutrality in Macau, as we shall see. In continental Europe, Portugal largely escaped occupation during the Second World War because Germany was unable to mount a naval strategy against the United Kingdom and eventually abandoned plans for entering the Iberian Peninsula, which would have led to a Nazi-backed Spanish invasion of Portugal. In 1943 and 1944, Portugal agreed to British and American requests for basing rights in the Azores and even proposed entering the war in the Pacific to participate in the liberation of Timor from the occupying Japanese forces. The Joint Planning Staff studied the potential consequences of a Portuguese declaration of war on Japan, but these were not believed to be favourable.[21] It would be a burden to train and equip the Portuguese forces and the likely occupation of Macau was something Prime Minister Winston Churchill deemed particularly undesirable. However, the offer alone ended up being enough to guarantee British and American support for the re-establishment of Portuguese administration over Timor and to spare it a military occupation by Australia.[22] A leading Portuguese historian of the war thus concluded that the country remained neutral because both Germany and the Allies got what they wanted from Portugal without it becoming a belligerent.[23] Japan should also be added as a prominent actor in this consideration, for it too attained what it wanted from Portuguese colonial territories in Asia without Portugal entering the war. In the particular case of Macau, the territory served – like Lisbon – as an intelligence collection post, as a smuggling and currency exchange hub, as well as a de facto 'R & R' station for Japanese officers and agents.[24]

In Macau, however, there were precedents for neutrality that had started in the nineteenth century and that made Macau's stance in World War II not totally surprising. The territory remained neutral during the Opium

[20] A. J. Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa e o Ouro Nazi* (*Portuguese Neutrality and Nazi Gold*) (Lisbon, 2000), pp. 19, 38.
[21] See files in the UK National Archives (hereafter TNA), CAB 121/508.
[22] A. J. Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra: 1941–1945* (*Portugal in the Second World War: 1941–1945*), 2 vols. (Lisbon, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 209–18; Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, pp. 74–5.
[23] Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, p. 360.
[24] On the importance of Macau and Lisbon for Japanese intelligence, see G. C. Gunn, 'Wartime Macau in the Wider Diplomatic Sphere', in G. C. Gunn (ed.), *Wartime Macau: Under the Japanese Shadow* (Hong Kong, 2016), pp. 25–54; F. Rodao, 'Japanese Relations with Neutrals, 1944–1945: The Shift to Pragmatism', in W. P. Brecher and M. W. Myers (eds.), *Defamiliarizing Japan's Asia–Pacific War* (Honolulu, HI, 2019), pp. 104–36.

Wars (1839–42, 1856–60) and the Taiping Civil War (1850–64).[25] Portugal was also neutral during the Russo–Japanese War (1904–5), with fear of Japanese reprisals on Macau listed as one of the reasons for neutrality in that conflict.[26]

Portuguese neutrality in World War II was neither static nor strict. It was 'a pragmatic process of adaptation to the different phases of the war' that 'leaned more to one side or the other depending on the circumstances'.[27] Portugal's neutrality has been analysed by different historians as overall pro-Allies, or, arguably more correctly, as pro-British, especially after 1943, despite the ideological affinities of Portugal's Estado Novo (New State) regime with other fascist dictatorships. Closer ties with Britain had a clear imperial dimension. Regarding the future Cold War superpowers, the Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar had a deep suspicion of the liberal, democratic and anti-colonial United States, whilst the regime he led, ferociously anti-communist, did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.[28] This is certainly a key difference between Salazar's Portugal and Chiang Kai-shek's China during the Second World War. Despite Chiang's opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), both the Soviets and the Americans were crucial allies of Nationalist China, even before 1941.[29] Anti-imperialism informed both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists' stance in the war. They fought to overcome their nation's encroachment by imperialist powers that had begun in the nineteenth century and reached the apex in the war with Japan, a conflict global historian Jürgen Osterhammel has labelled 'the most atrocious war for colonial subjugation fought in modern history'.[30]

The study of Portuguese neutrality in Asia is of particular importance because Portugal was the only colonial power with territorial interests in China to remain neutral for the duration of the war with Japan. Furthermore, it was precisely in Asia that the most serious violation of Portugal's neutrality occurred: the Japanese occupation of Timor, which followed an unauthorised Allied landing in the territory and

[25] R. Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang: Oceans and Routes, Regions and Trade (c. 1000–1600)* (Aldershot, 2004), p. 69.
[26] J. Milhazes, *Rússia e Europa: Uma Parte do Todo* (*Russia and Europe: Part of the Whole*) (Lisbon, 2016), p. 96.
[27] Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, pp. 78, 359.
[28] António de Oliveira Salazar was president of the council of ministers (prime minister) from 1932 to 1968, minister of finance from 1928 to 1940 and minister of foreign affairs from 1936 to 1947.
[29] J. W. Garver, 'China's Wartime Diplomacy', in J. C. Hsiung and S. I. Levine (eds.), *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937–1945* (Armonk, NY 1992), pp. 3–32.
[30] J. Osterhammel, 'Semi-colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in W. J. Mommsen (ed.), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities* (London, 1986), pp. 290–314, at p. 291.

lasted from early 1942 until the end of the war in 1945. Therefore, Portugal remained neutral even after flagrant disrespects of its neutrality in Asia, including invasion and occupation – acts that usually dictate a change from neutrality to belligerence. The reasons for that are inextricably linked with the Portuguese regime's conception of its colonial empire, as well as with the usefulness of Macau's neutrality to all the belligerents in the region.

The uses of Portuguese neutrality in Macau reveal a multitude of connections, not only to Timor and to Japan, but also, and most particularly, to China as well as to the country's oldest ally, Britain, notably to its colony of Hong Kong. Ultimately, the history of neutral Macau reveals a multilayered web of collaboration whose reach and relevance went far beyond the small country that lent its neutral status to the South China enclave.

Collaboration(s)

Collaboration is another key idea framing this book. Although the term has largely kept the negative connotation associated with occupied France during the Second World War, it has also been the object of path-breaking enquiries applied to China's War with Japan and Japanese imperialism in Asia more generally. The historiography of collaboration in China has explored, amongst other topics, cases of 'collaborationist nationalism', local adaptation to occupation in Manchuria, attitudes of Shanghai capitalists and intellectuals, revisionist accounts of the Wang Jingwei regime, contacts between pro-Chiang and pro-Wang factions and the visual culture of the RNG.[31] Margherita Zanasi has alerted scholars to the need to problematise the '"resistentialist" postwar narrative' in China with attention to the global context in which it emerged, drawing attention to the parallels, differences and interactions with the Vichy case in France.[32]

[31] J. H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford, CA, 1972); G. E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, MA, 1972); Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*; T. Brook, 'Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied Wartime China', in T. Brook and A. Schmid (eds.), *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2000), pp. 159–90; R. Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, CA, 2000); D. P. Barrett and L. N. Shyu (eds.), *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford, CA, 2001); Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order*; B. G. Martin, 'Collaboration within Collaboration: Zhou Fohai's Relations with the Chongqing Government, 1942–1945', *Twentieth-Century China*, 34/2 (2008), pp. 55–88; J. E. Taylor, *Iconographies of Occupation: Visual Cultures in Wang Jingwei's China, 1939–1945* (Honolulu, HI, 2020).

[32] M. Zanasi, 'New Perspectives on Chinese Collaboration', *Asia-Pacific Journal*, 6/7 (2008): apjjf.org/-Margherita-Zanasi/2828/article.html; M. Zanasi, 'Globalizing *Hanjian*: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-War II Discourse on Collaboration', *American Historical Review*, 113/3 (2008), pp. 731–51.

The need to historicise the experience of collaboration as a process of 'state making' has also been addressed by David Serfass, who noted the relative fragmentation of both Japanese and Chinese actors and synthesised the dynamics of collaboration in the case of the RNG as 'a dialectical tension between autonomy and control'.[33] If we look beyond the Sino–Japanese relationship and consider how foreign authorities engaged with Japanese forces in Shanghai, for example, we see iterations of that tension, but with an element of European colonialism added to the mix of overlapping nationalist and imperialist interests.[34] The different experiences of collaboration in China detailed in Timothy Brook's book, including how local elites and intermediaries were forced to deal with the exceptional circumstances of war and occupation that 'Japan imposed from above' – notably how 'collaboration dealt with more mundane problems' such as food provision – provide useful parallels to understanding wartime Macau, even without a formal occupation.[35]

Keeping in mind the concept of 'collaboration' even when discussing a formally neutral territory such as Macau is feasible. Contemporary observers remarked upon and resented the increasing Japanese interference in Macau and, indeed, perceptions of Portuguese and Chinese collaboration with Japan in Macau existed during and after the conflict, much as they did in other 'lone islands'. Similarly, comparing events and actions in neutral Macau with areas in occupied China lends itself to recognising the similarities and differences of this case study. A narrow dictionary definition of collaboration links it to 'traitorous cooperation with the enemy'.[36] However, for a territory that, considering the literal translation of the Chinese term for 'neutral' (中立 *zhongli*), was 'standing in the middle', who the 'enemy' was depended on the beholder. Frequent Japanese complaints that pro-Chongqing and pro-British activities were taking place in wartime Macau are a case in point. I do not wish to underplay the strength of wartime resistance to Japan – evidence suggests that the vast majority of Macau's wartime residents supported the Allies – but merely to point out that, in a neutral territory, resistance itself was marked by collaboration, a point that other historians have made regarding occupied territories in China.[37] I argue that instances of collaboration

[33] D. Serfass, 'Collaboration and State Making in China: Defining the Occupation State, 1937–1945', *Twentieth-Century China*, 47/1 (2022), pp. 71–80, at p. 77.
[34] Henriot and Yeh, 'Introduction', p. 8; I. Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City* (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 159–62.
[35] T. Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA, 2005), pp. 26, 7.
[36] B. Wasserstein, 'Ambiguities of Occupation: Foreign Resisters and Collaborators in Wartime Shanghai', in *Wartime Shanghai*, p. 24.
[37] For example, ibid., p. 38; Brook, *Collaboration*, p. 29.