CHAPTER 1

Exempla *and Exemplarity*

This chapter – and indeed ultimately this whole book – sets out to take declamation's classicism seriously. After rejecting as tendentious ancient and modern accounts of declamation that stress the difference between classical past and imperial present, I explore the resources the genre offered to authors and audiences for reflecting deeply on their lives – not simply by providing examples (*exempla*) to follow or avoid, but also by helping them to get a sense of the distinctive qualities of a contemporary situation, to appreciate correctly a situation's true scale, and to recognise abiding truths about human character, motivation, and decision-making. (This chapter is concerned with the modes by which the past could be processed; a full survey of the particular spheres of interaction between declamation and life is postponed until Chapter 2.) Some of this the genre has in common with other imperial genres, but I also consider the distinctive flavour of the reflections that declamation could trigger, implicit, and open-ended.

'As If They Were Some Great Good'

Scholars have traditionally stressed the gap between the classical history that declamation explores and the context in which it was composed, with the practice of declamation seen as constituting an interaction with that past no more sophisticated than a sort of general nostalgic longing for lost political and military freedoms. Marrou declared that declamation 'turned its back on the real'; Bowie spoke of an 'attempt to pretend that the past is still present'.[1] This modern idea is not without ancient antecedents. There are *some* sources that appear to talk of the irrelevance of declamation in the high Roman empire; some of these, indeed, have become almost clichés of

[1] 'tournait . . . le dos au réel' (Marrou (1965) 304); Bowie (1970) 36.

declamation scholarship. In Lucian's *Rhetorum praeceptor*, an admittedly unsympathetic character attacks conventional teachers of rhetoric as:

> νεκροὺς εἰς μίμησιν παλαιοὺς προτιθεὶς καὶ ἀνορύττειν ἀξιῶν λόγους πάλαι κατορωρυγμένους ὥς τι μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, μαχαιροποιοῦ υἱὸν καὶ ἄλλον Ἀτρομήτου τινὸς γραμματιστοῦ ζηλοῦν ἀξιῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν εἰρήνῃ μήτε Φιλίππου ἐπιόντος μήτε Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιτάττοντος, ὅπου τὰ ἐκείνων ἴσως ἐδόκει χρήσιμα. (Luc. *Rh. pr.* 10)
>
> presenting for imitation dead men from ancient history, and expecting you to dig up speeches that have been long buried as if they were some great good, and to vie with the son of a sword-maker [Demosthenes] and some other fellow [Aeschines], the son of one Atrometus, a primary school teacher, and that too in peace time, when there's no Philip invading nor Alexander issuing commands – times when their speeches perhaps seemed useful.

Meanwhile, in a much less well-known but perhaps more straightforward passage Maximus of Tyre criticises declamation for concerning itself with subjects long dead or fictitious:

> οὐ περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους μόνον τοῦ μηκέτι ὄντος, οὐδ' ἐπ' Ἀθηναίοις τοῖς τότε, οὐδ' ὑπὲρ ἀριστέως τοῦ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ κατὰ μοιχοῦ λέγοντα μοιχὸν ὄντα, οὐδὲ κατὰ ὑβριστοῦ ὑβριστὴν ὄντα. (Max. Tyr. *Or.* 25.6)[2]
>
> [He should] not speak only about the long-dead Themistocles, nor in praise of Athenians of that era, nor about a hero who doesn't exist, nor in condemnation of an adulterer when he is an adulterer himself, nor against a rapist when he is a rapist himself.

These are the only two sources that allude to declamation specifically,[3] but this sense of the difference between the classical history so beloved of the genre and the changed circumstances of Roman Greece can be found more widely in the literature of this period. Dio Chrysostom, for example, haranguing the Nicomedians on concord, discourses at length on the difference between the stakes in the present quarrel and those in the quarrels of Sparta and classical Athens (*Or.* 38). The present quarrel, he says, is not a fight for land and sea (22), or empire (25, 38), or liberty (27), nor over the right to impose taxes (22, 25, 26), nor even over where legal cases would be heard (25–6). The primacy that the Athenians and Spartans

[2] The references to the stock characters of the ἀριστεύς and the μοιχός make it certain that it is declamation that is in view here. For the ἀριστεύς, see p. 63 n. 58; for the μοιχός, see e.g. Hermog. *Stat.* III 2, IV 9, *VS* 542, 619.

[3] I consider the much-discussed passage from Plutarch's *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae* (*Mor.* 814A–C) below (pp. 22–23).

fought over and the primacy that Nicomedia and Nicaea are fighting over (24–5) are quite different things, he insists: 'in proposing this struggle of yours do they speak of it as similar to that of the Athenians and Spartans?' (trans. Crosby (1946); τοῦτο ὡς ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ προβαλλόμενοι λέγουσιν; 25). Aristides pursues a very similar line of argument when speaking to the *koinon* of Asia in his *Concerning Concord* (*Or.* 23). The Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans, he argues, fought over autonomy and tribute (59); the present-day cities of Asia, by contrast, are fighting over none of these things (60) but rather are 'dreaming' (ὀνειρώττομεν) and fighting over a 'shadow' (σκιᾶς) of the past (63).

The Uses of History

This view is well-enough attested that it cannot be dismissed out of hand. But whenever an argument is made for the relevance of the past, it is always possible for critics to place the emphasis on differences between past and present: if there were not differences of some kind, there would be mere identity. As Goldhill puts it, while the gap between example and generality is potentially damaging, it is also constitutive of the whole process of exemplarity.[4]

In truth, to focus on these few sources constitutes special pleading of the most extraordinary kind. For beside Lucian or Maximus of Tyre denouncing the irrelevance of the classical history that declamation relives must be set the pervasive view, still very much current in this period, that history was *useful*. As Millar put it, 'it was the universal assumption of Antiquity that historical *exempla* were not mere verbal adornment, but that their perusal was both an essential element in character training and a primary means of acquiring the political and military skills necessary for public life'.[5] The use of history was thought to consist most fundamentally in exemplarity:[6] history offered examples of virtue to imitate and vice to avoid.[7] In our period, explicit affirmations of history's exemplary function can be found in Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, and even Lucian himself, and Aristides and Lucian are of course the authors of some of

[4] Thus, Goldhill (2017) 416, summarising Goldhill (1994).
[5] Millar (1969) 13.
[6] Exemplarity is now big business in Classical Studies, particularly on the Roman side. A full bibliography would be impossible, but I have profited particularly from Roller (2004), Roller (2018), Langlands (2008), Langlands (2011), and Langlands (2018). Work on Renaissance literature stole a march on Classics in this area: see particularly Hampton (1990).
[7] Maximus of Tyre grants only the first of these propositions, worrying that recounting evil actions will inspire fresh evils in our own time (*Or.* 22.6).

our extant declamations.[8] Plutarch in his *Vita Demetrii* compares himself to the *aulos* player Ismenias, who exhibited both good and bad musicians to his students, in order that they might learn whom to imitate and whose style to avoid (1.6); in his *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus*, he likens the great men of the past to a mirror before which readers can arrange and remodel themselves (85B).[9] Such an approach is ultimately grounded in the belief that history to a greater or lesser degree repeats itself. This view finds explicit and canonical formulation in Thucydides (1.22) and is echoed ever after (e.g. Polyb. 9.2.5–6).[10] Furthermore, there is no reason to think the past was only viewed in this way in formal history writing. Aristides himself says in his non-declamatory oratory that 'there is this benefit to be gained from a knowledge of the past – using the most well-known examples for the present' (ἔστι δὲ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τοῦτ' ἀπολαύειν, παραδείγμασι τοῖς γνωριμωτάτοις χρωμένους εἰς τὰ παρόντα, Aristid. *Or.* 24.23). Indeed, writers recruit classical history to their side with such regularity in so many Greek imperial genres that for every isolated attack on the relevance of this material, one could readily cite 10 or 100 Greek imperial authors simply getting on and using it, usually so secure in such a procedure as to not feel the need for justification. For moderns, this may be uncomfortable. Centuries of historicism have trained us to look as much for discontinuity between the classical world and the present as continuity, while attacks on the canon and postmodernism's scepticism towards any grand narratives have made the exemplary status of the classical past suspect.[11] Yet our subjects (who had not read Koselleck) were classicists in the radical sense, men deeply committed to the idea of a great exemplary stream flowing down from the fifth and fourth centuries to their own time.

Nor is it clear that we should attach much weight to the evidence of Lucian's *Rhetorum praeceptor* or of Maximus of Tyre in the first place. As Whitmarsh has argued, drawing on work on satire in Latin and English literature, the voice of Lucian's works is often self-deconstructing, and the humour very often at its own expense as much as at the expense of the

[8] 'For history has one job, and one end: what is useful' (ἓν γὰρ ἔργον ἱστορίας καὶ τέλος, τὸ χρήσιμον, Luc. *Hist. consr.* 9). Cf. D. Chyrs. *Or.* 18.9.

[9] For exemplarity in Plutarch, see Pelling (1995) and Duff (1999), esp. 52–71. I make frequent use of Plutarch's *Vitae* as a suggestive model for the reading of declamation in this chapter, not only because the Greek lives often treat the same characters as regularly feature in declamation, nor simply because of the existence of excellent recent studies, but also because they seem to have been much read in this period (Duff (1999) 3), something which both reflects and likely would have furthered the popularity of the modes by which they relate to the past.

[10] In our period the idea is found (with Stoic flavouring) in the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius (10.27).

[11] Goldhill (2017).

subject satirised.[12] So too in the *Rhetorum praeceptor*: while part of the joke must indeed be the potential absurdity of studying speeches that were hundreds of years old, in view of the widespread belief in the usefulness of the history they contained, the joke seems to be on the character, the 'bad teacher of rhetoric', too literal-minded possibly to comprehend how one could draw inspiration from classical history; the joke surely derives much of its force precisely from flying in the face of this deep-seated cultural assumption. Maximus of Tyre, meanwhile, was a philosopher; as such, his self-definition was bound up with *not* being a sophist, the figure to whom the philosopher was opposed in the cultural economy of imperial Greece.[13] It is natural therefore for him to reject declamation, the characteristic rhetoric of the sophist, and it is in such a context of rivalry that our quotation is found. For Maximus is considering 'what sort of thing beauty in words is' (ποῖον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ ἐν λόγοις καλόν, 25.4). His answer will ultimately be (in Trapp's words) 'morally improving philosophical oratory'.[14] Such a bold argument, going against the common understanding of eloquence, necessarily requires Maximus to reject the most obvious rival candidate, rhetoric, and to do so in the strongest terms. The accusation of irrelevance levelled against declamation, therefore, is clearly instrumental. Being instrumental does not stop an argument from being sincere, of course, but the following accusation – that declaimers are adulterers and rapists – suggests that we are dealing here with partisan slander from an opponent of sophists, rather than considered reflection.

Another passage that has attracted much attention in this regard is to be found in Plutarch's *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*. Contemporary Greek politicians, Plutarch complains, 'foolishly stir up the masses by urging them to imitate the deeds, purposes, and actions of their forefathers, though they are unsuited to the present times and circumstances' (ἀνοήτως τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔργα καὶ φρονήματα καὶ πράξεις ἀσυμμέτρους τοῖς παροῦσι καιροῖς καὶ πράγμασιν οὔσας μιμεῖσθαι κελεύοντες ἐξαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη, 814A), and as instances of such unsuitable *exempla*, he cites the battles of Marathon, Eurymedon, and Plataea, all topics of declamation. It is precisely because such history is unsuited to the present times that it should be 'left to the schools of the sophists' (ἀπολιπόντας ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν, 814C), Plutarch thinks.

It is important, however, to be precise about what Plutarch is objecting to here. He certainly does not think that all classical history is irrelevant. On the contrary, the *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* take for granted the idea of

[12] Whitmarsh (2001) 252–3. [13] Sidebottom (2009). [14] Trapp (1997) 206.

learning from history; in this very work, Plutarch gives examples of the sorts of lessons that he thinks *can* be learned, and his own *Lives*, the majority of which cover figures from classical history, are in large part motivated by such a possibility.[15] What distinguishes the lessons that Plutarch would prefer readers took from history – the Athenian amnesty after the overthrow of the thirty tyrants, or the fining of Phrynichus for producing a tragedy on the capture of Miletus (814B) – from the alleged declamatory clichés that he criticises appears to be the hackneyed and demagogic character of the latter. What Plutarch seems to be doing then, is not rejecting the relevance of classical history, but rather merely arguing for its more nuanced application – and at the same time confirming his calm philosophical temperament through his rejection of rabble-rousing clichés and parading his own comprehensive knowledge of that classical history.[16]

Finally, Dio Chrysostom's and Aristides' scepticism about declamation is clearly strategic. It makes sense when urging concord between rival cities to play down the significance of what is at dispute, and pointing out the differences between past and present is a rhetorically effective way of doing so. This does not prove that this is what these authors or anyone else 'really' thought about the similarity of past and present, and indeed in other contexts we shall soon see the same authors adopting quite the opposite position.

In truth, the ready modern acceptance and foregrounding of ancient sources disparaging declamation's relevance may in truth owe something to the fact that this idea aligns neatly with colonial discourses familiar in the modern world, for the idea that Greek culture could only replay classical history while the world moved on around it looks suspiciously like another instance of the notion of a timeless Orient, albeit one geographically further west than normal.[17] Furthermore, this view probably also owes something to the greater number of such voices on the Latin side, though here the complaint is in fact somewhat different, focusing not so much on the gap between past and present as on improbable scenarios, which were more common in Latin declamation on account of its much higher proportion of *plasmata*.[18]

[15] Duff (1999) 295 notes the contrast. Plutarchean biographies of figures from classical history: *Them.*, *Per.*, *Alc.*, *Tim.*, *Pel.*, *Arist.*, *Phil.*, *Lys.*, *Cim.*, *Nic.*, *Ages.*, *Alex.*, *Phoc.*, *Dem.*, *Dion*, *Art.*

[16] For Plutarch's remark on leaving such clichés to the schools of the sophists, see below p. 27.

[17] 'Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient' (Said (1978) 96).

[18] Thus, Petronius claims that declamation addresses 'none of the things which we are familiar with' (*nihil ex his, quae in usu habemus*, 1.1), while Tacitus speaks of 'subject matter shrinking back from truth' (*materiae abhorrenti a veritate*, *Dial.* 35). See also Sen. *Controv.* 3 pref. 12–14, 9 pref. 5, 10 pref. 12 and Quint. 2.10, 8.3.23, 10.5.14–21, 12.11.15–16. The closest we get to this sentiment on the Greek

Declamatory Exemplarity

In his speech *Concerning Concord*, in which Aristides tries to calm the famous rivalry that existed between the three leading cities of the province of Asia, namely Smyrna, Pergamum, and Ephesus, Aristides directs his audience to the example, commonly treated in declamation, of Athens and Sparta. When the two leading cities of Greece were at peace with one another, we hear, they and indeed all Greece benefited, but when they were divided, all of Greece suffered (23.42–51). What is notable about this *exemplum* is that not only does it use the same history that declamation regularly evokes to make a point about contemporary politics (that is common enough), but that even the language that Aristides uses in evoking the classical past resembles that used in declamations on the same topic. Consider the following:

> καὶ συστάντων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἁπάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τὴν μὲν θάλατταν ἐμπλησθῆναι τριήρων, τὴν δὲ γῆν πεζῶν, εἶναι δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν κακῶν ἐν κέρδους μέρει τῷ μὴ αὐτά γέ πω παρεῖναι, οὐκ ἠπόρησαν ὅ τι χρήσονται, ἀλλὰ ἀκούοντες μὲν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀκούοντες δὲ ἥλιον κρυπτόμενον τοῖς τοξεύμασιν, καὶ ποταμοὺς ἐπιλείποντας πίνουσι τοῖς ἐπιοῦσι, καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις ὅλας ἀναλισκομένας εἰς δείπνου λόγον τῷ βασιλεῖ . . . (*Or.* 23.43)
>
> And when all mankind, more or less, combined against the Greeks, so that the sea was filled with triremes, and the land with infantry, and the anticipation of suffering was regarded as a gain, because the sufferings themselves were not yet present, they were not at a loss about what to do, but though they were hearing that the land and the sea had changed into one another, and though they heard that the sun was being concealed by arrows, and that the rivers were failing as the invaders drank them, and whole nations and cities were being used up for the reckoning of the King's dinner . . .

Rivers drunk dry, land and sea mixed together, the sun's light blocked by the mass of Persian arrows – this is precisely the hyperbolic language of surviving declamations on Marathon, from those of Polemo to Himerius' declamation *Themistocles against the Persian King* (*Or.* 5).[19] There could

side is perhaps Plutarch's talk of 'the dramatic subject matter . . . of the drones . . . who practise sophistic' (τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δραματικὰ . . . κηφήνων . . . σοφιστιώντων, *De recta ratione audiendi* 42A).

[19] Mixing land and sea: Polem. *Decl.* A 36 ('a sea battle on land for the first time' (πρῶτον . . . ναυμαχίαν ἐν γῇ)); Luc. *Rh. pr.* 18; Him. *Or.* 5.3, 5.4. Innumerable arrows: the fate of Callimachus in Polem. *Decl.* B, propped up even in death by the mass of arrows with which he had been hit; Luc. *Rh.*

hardly be a clearer example of the potential contemporary resonance of declamatory history.

It is fundamental to the argument of this book that this potential was realised, and that classical history as presented in declamation was variously applied – by authors and audiences, consciously, semi-consciously, and unconsciously – to the circumstances of life in the Greek east of the Roman empire. To deploy history in this way would have been particularly natural in an oratorical genre, and for authors and audiences whose education had been largely rhetorical, given how fundamental the example (παράδειγμα) – frequently though not always historical – was to Greek rhetoric.[20]

The sceptic might object that this is not how contemporary audiences read declamation in our sources, where our texts most commonly seem to be read through the lens of rhetoric. In the glamorous world of public declamations by the most famous declaimers, the world of Philostratus' *Vitae sophistarum*, the emphasis is on style,[21] and in another source, we hear of audience members leaping to their feet when a performer managed his third figure in the same sentence (*Inv.* IV 4.25.3–8). The various paratexts (prefaces, *prolegomena*, hypotheses, commentaries) that are found along with declamations in our manuscripts are similarly focused on technical aspects of rhetoric, albeit with a slightly more sober tone.[22] In view of this, Plutarch's characterisation of schools of rhetoric as a less political space where emotive topics like the Persian wars can be discussed without danger (*PGR* 814A) looks telling.

In truth, we should expect there to have been a range of audience responses. Here, the evidence of Plutarch's *De recta ratione audiendi* is important. (While Plutarch is principally writing about listening to philosophical lectures, oratory enters the work several times.)[23] In this work, Plutarch draws an opposition between his ideal audience, which pays attention to and therefore profits from the speaker's words (47A), and a range of less attentive listeners who immediately raise objections (4), are distracted by their envy of the speaker (5), or are blinded by the reputation (7), the appearance (7), or above all the style of the discourse (7–9). 'It is necessary therefore to remove the excess and emptiness of the language and

pr. 18; Him. *Or.* 5.3, 5.4. Drinking rivers dry: Him. *Or.* 5.4, Covering the land with soldiers: Him. *Or.* 5.6. Generally resource-hungry: Him. *Or.* 5.6.

[20] Arist. *Rh.* 2.20, Ps.-Arist. *Rh. Al.* 8, and, in our period, Aps. *Rh.* 6, Anon. Seg. *Rh.* 154–6, Ps.-Hermog. *Inv.* III 7, and Minuc. 341.10–343.3.

[21] Heath (2004) 307–8. [22] Guast (2016) 30–112.

[23] Note the references to *prolaliai* and declamations (7–9). For *prolaliai*, see below, pp. 74–5.

to pursue the fruit itself' (διὸ δεῖ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κενὸν ἀφαιροῦντα τῆς λέξεως αὐτὸν διώκειν τὸν καρπόν, 8), Plutarch concludes. Here is a promising candidate for a more engaged audience member who pays attention to aspects of a performance other than style.[24] Furthermore, he later goes on to concede that it is after all permissible to take pleasure in a work's style, providing that content remains uppermost in the audience's mind (9). How widespread was such an attitude? Plutarch positions himself as a voice crying in the wilderness against popular practice (3), but we may suspect that it suited Plutarch's own philosophical self-fashioning to exaggerate the extent to which he was in a minority.

The *De recta ratione audiendi* then provides suggestive evidence for more thoughtful audience responses to declamation, and further considerations speak in favour of those thoughtful responses. For instance, a hard-and-fast distinction between reading for rhetoric and reading for content is untenable. Here, perhaps, we have been misled slightly by modern pejorative conceptions of rhetoric, which tend to see it as an art concerned with mere verbal adornment. In truth, style was only one part of ancient rhetoric. Also very important was invention (the discovery of arguments), an area of rhetoric that was indeed the subject of significant theoretical debate and change in this period, with the notion of 'stasis' (στάσις), the key 'issue' at the heart of any dispute, moving to the centre of the system.[25] Furthermore, style cannot be divorced from content. An antithesis, for instance, may be brought out by the style with which it is expressed, but it requires an underlying antithesis of ideas. One of the most sophisticated theorists of style in our period, Hermogenes, himself a declaimer, considered that his different types of style were created not only by formal linguistic features but also by content, and he placed what he regarded as the characteristic thoughts of each style at the head of his account of that

[24] It is true that Plutarch at points denounces the works of the sophists as nothing but style (7–8). But such attacks are almost de rigueur for the philosopher, to whom the image of the sophist was opposed in the cultural system of imperial Greece. Furthermore, his description of these sophists' style reveals that not all sophists are in view. He complains about 'softness' (μαλακότησι), 'balanced clauses' (παρισώσεσιν), and ἐμμελείαις, a difficult term that nonetheless seems to refer to some sort of musical quality. These reference to some of the more showy rhetorical figures, together with the reference to 'softness', make it certain that Plutarch is referring to what scholarship has called the 'Asian' style (for which, see Kim (2017) 53–60). But such a style was far from ubiquitous in declamation. The twelve extant declamations of Aristides are certainly not captured by such a description, nor those of Herodes and Lesbonax, nor Hadrian of Tyre's first declamation; it fits Lucian, but only in parts. Only Polemo's two surviving declamations, and Hadrian's second, are really in this style. Plutarch's claim to be attacking 'the majority of the sophists' (τῶν πολλῶν . . . σοφιστῶν, 7) therefore seems exaggerated.

[25] Heath (1995).

style (*Id.*). Intense engagement with rhetoric, therefore, and even intense engagement with style, necessarily means intense engagement with content too.

The evidence from Plutarch's *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, too, needs to be considered carefully. For Plutarch is telling us about something that did *not*, in his view, happen in the schools of the sophists: the masses were *not* foolishly stirred up there, as they could be in more public venues (ἀνοήτως . . . ἐξαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη, 814A). But this leaves open the possibility of other sorts of engagement with declamation's contents in the schools – not the foolish stirring up of the masses, but perhaps the sober reflection of the sons of the elite. And in fact there is good reason to think that declamation was the scene of such reflection. Scholars have already shown how the early stages of rhetorical training were designed to impart non-rhetorical content, such as ethics, alongside technical skills. Teresa Morgan has shown that gnomic texts were common in education from the earliest levels.[26] Craig Gibson has brought out clearly the moral dimension of the *progymnasmata* exercises that preceded declamation.[27] Not only were three of the four first exercises explicitly moral in focus (the fable, *chreia* (anecdote), and maxim), but, as Gibson shows, the rhetoricians were uncomfortable with the exercises that had no obvious moral content, such as narration, and sought to bring out what they saw as their latent moral focus; even the very sequence of exercises, he argues, was determined with moral pedagogy in mind.[28] As Gibson says, 'the good composition exercise will thus be good in both a stylistic and a moral sense, each aspect serving to reinforce the other, with both simultaneously contributing to the development of the stylistically and morally good writer and speaker'.[29] Similarly, Webb sees in the *progymnasmata* variously 'concern for the preservation of the social order', 'the symbolic representation of overbearing power and ambition', and 'an ideal of self-control'.[30] Rhetoricians frequently describe the benefits of their exercises in terms of exemplarity. For example, Nicolaus remarks of the *chreia* that 'it always either directs us towards something good or keeps us from something base' (πάντως γὰρ <ἢ> ἐπί τι ἀγαθὸν προτρέπει ἢ πονηροῦ τινος εἴργει, *Prog.* 23.12–13).

[26] Morgan (1998) 120–51 (though see also Cribiore (1999)).
[27] The exercises were fable, narrative, *chreia* (anecdote), maxim, refutation, confirmation, commonplace, encomium, invective, *syncrisis* (comparison), *ethopoeia* (speech in character), *ecphrasis*, thesis (general question), and introduction of a law. See Clark (1957) 177–212; Kennedy (1983) 54–73; Lausberg (1998) 485–99; Webb (2001). The four surviving treatises are translated by Kennedy (2003).
[28] Gibson (2014). [29] Gibson (2014) 7. [30] Webb (2001) 303.