

NO. I

Introduction
Periodic Religion and the Psychoanalytic Movement

**The Special Conditions of the Psychoanalytic
Disputes on Religion**

Psychoanalytic circles tend to view debates over religion either as an unfortunate diversion from their primary goals or as a fundament to the endeavor to define what it means to be human.¹ The historiography of the early psychoanalytic relationship to religion often duplicates these opposing attitudes through its prioritization of the schism between Sigmund Freud, the movement's Jewish founder in Vienna, and his first designated heir apparent, the Protestant Carl G. Jung in Zurich, on the eve of the First World War.² Like countless readers, I too am drawn to the seven-year impassioned saga between Freud and Jung – half in love with each and completely exasperated by both – as one of the great tragedies of modern literary history. Yet, while the encounter was undeniably formative to both men and their work, I question the underlying assumption of the dramatic arc, repeatedly proclaimed by both Freud and Jung, that their breakup was somehow inevitable from the beginning. Few friendships that begin at that high level of intensity are destined to endure forever, and we should be wary of the tendency to project the inevitability of rupture to psychoanalytic discussions on religion. The tendency to implicate religion strikes me primarily as a literary trope, one that retrospectively imputes a relational failure onto two thousand years of Jewish-Christian disputation, though this same discourse arguably brought Freud and Jung together in the first place.

Disentangling the subject of religion from the relational dynamics of its first interlocutors is especially challenging because both Freud and Jung sacralized their bond on the forces of religion and mapped their rift onto ethno-confessional lines. After Jung's second visit to Freud in Vienna in March 1909, Freud wrote, "I formally adopted you as eldest son and anointed you – *in partibus infidelium* ('in the lands of unbelievers') – as

my successor and crown prince.”³ The voluminous record of their correspondence suggests that Freud and Jung met, most intimately, on the playground of the established claims of religion. Moreover, it seems clear that their common fascination with the subject strengthened their connection to one another. Jung was somewhat embarrassed when he recognized that his boundless admiration of Freud as a man and a researcher may have projected erotic overtones that he readily admitted had “something of the character of a ‘religious’ crush.”⁴ Five years later, Freud described his faltering friendship with Jung to the Swiss-Jewish psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger as a reenactment of historic Jewish-Christian confrontations: “Semites and Aryans (or antisemites), whom I wanted to unite in the service of psychoanalysis, have separated once again like oil and water.”⁵ Jung elaborated this essentializing view of the split between Christian and Jewish perspectives at the decisive 1913 International Psychoanalytic Congress, portraying Freud and his “type” as that of the atheist whose materialism was a defining feature of their “thinking,” in contrast to the psycho-spiritual character of the Zurich school.⁶

A vast bibliography continues to attribute the split to irreconcilable differences in attitudes toward religion, referencing binaries such as Freud’s atheism and Jung’s deism, Freud’s “Semitism” and Jung’s “Aryanism,” Freud’s scientism and Jung’s spiritualism, Freud’s Jewishness and Jung’s antisemitism, and Freud’s father-religion and Jung’s son-religion.⁷ The Freud-Jung break, what we might justifiably describe as the originary Oedipal legend of the psychoanalytic movement, continues to reverberate in contemporary discourse on religion with Freudians and Jungians generally operating in separate academic spheres and rarely engaging one another in productive conversation.⁸

Given that Freud was all too happy to abandon any belief in external psychic communications, which Jung so passionately endorsed over the course of their collaboration, as a regression to a pre-analytic era, the atheism that Freud touted after his break with Jung became standard fare in psychoanalytic historiography.⁹ The rebuttal to Freud’s atheism therefore came primarily from his own circle of Jewish analysts and continues to fascinate primarily Freudians and Jewish studies scholars rather than Jungians.

Even as the two protagonists shaped a narrative of an elemental clash between conflicting worldviews, Freud’s one-time collaborator Wilhelm Stekel, who wanted to situate himself above the bifurcating science/religion disputations in the Freud/Jung contest, characterized their respective attitudes as the product of mutually neurotic constellations. In his

polemical article, “Masks of Religiosity,” Stekel portrayed Freud’s alleged atheism as the inverse expression of compulsive religious ritualism. In other words, Stekel professed that Freud and Jung represented two sides of the same coin. Stekel advanced his thesis that every neurotic harbors a “secret religiosity” with examples that combined personal details that could be ascribed to both Freud and Jung. For example, Stekel invoked generic but nonetheless identifiable constructs, such as the man who “kept his children’s prayer book in good condition” and the man who, like Nietzsche “the pastor’s son,” intended to write sacrilege but instead penned a new Bible.¹⁰ An impassioned lover of God and a passionate denier essentially pull the same train, Stekel concluded, indicting both Freud (the keeper of his childhood Bible) and Jung (the pastor’s son) as projecting their own guilty consciences into their theories of universal psychic mechanisms.¹¹

After the war, Stekel reiterated his diagnosis of Jung’s shame-driven externalization of his religious feelings and Freud’s shame-driven secrecy in the case of a “Blushing Zionist” that he appended to his republication of the case histories of a rabbi and a priest that he originally wrote under Freud’s heavy editorial supervision.¹² I have argued elsewhere that Stekel disguised an autobiographical narrative in his exposition of a so-called “Jew-complex,” in which Mrs. I. L. (i.e., the phonetic Israel to connote Freud) dismisses Stekel out of a sense of “contempt” for her co-religionists rooted in her “shame of being defeated” by her Christian husband (i.e., Jung) in the “Christian town where she mixes only with the Christian families” (i.e., Zurich).¹³ The characterization of Freud as a “Jewess” paid implicit tribute to Freud’s first major dissident, the Viennese analyst Alfred Adler, who theorized that feminine coded feelings of inferiority drove a compensatory impulse to masculine coded power.¹⁴ Fearful of interacting with other Jews in public “because she had continually denied her Jewish descent,” I. L. simultaneously denies her ethnic roots and wishes “to be revenged” on a husband who destroyed her self-respect by insisting “that any little peculiarity of hers is Jewish.”¹⁵

Such Jewish reclamations of Freud’s religiosity have provoked endless historical confusions over what Freud published on the subject of psycho-spiritualism before the First World War. If Freud secretly harbored ambivalent feelings towards his own religion – and that is a matter of psycho-analytic interpretation – Freud certainly meant to communicate a completely different point to his readers. Before delving into interpretations of Freud’s unconscious motivations, we should at least understand and acknowledge the manifest points that Freud sought to directly convey

in his published work at the time. That is, Freud publicly disavowed not his own religious feelings but those he attributed to Jung and that Jung imputed to universal mechanisms in psychoanalytic periodicals.

The unfortunate result of this confusion is that Stekel's characterization of Freud as the Jew who "wishes to keep this secret even from herself and betrays it to all the world" became the conventional characterization of Freud's relationship to Jewishness, rather than Freud's stated disavowal of Jung's emotional relationship to the putative truths of Christianity.¹⁶ Scholars have replicated Stekel's thesis, often without attribution because of a different albeit not unrelated relational drama that led to Stekel's exclusion from postwar reprinting projects by both Freud and Jung. The result is a considerable bibliography that identifies Freud's putative submerged Jewishness in the stories he records of his father being ordered off the pavement by a Christian and the sexual education of his Catholic nanny, as well as his covert knowledge of Hebrew and Yiddish and unconscious integration of Kabbalistic mysticism from his father's Hasidic roots.¹⁷

The interrogation of Freud's internal world has been somewhat tempered by historical accounts of the realities of antisemitism in early twentieth-century German-language culture, which situate Freud's anxious self-representations in the context of real danger.¹⁸ Sander Gilman and Jay Geller, among others, have enriched our understanding of Freud's focus on psychogenesis through their attunement to the widespread racialization of phenomenological research in German-language psychopathology and the embeddedness of antisemitic rhetoric in the texts with which Freud engaged.¹⁹ Coming from a religious studies angle, Pamela Cooper-White has likewise found the rise of medical racialization highly relevant to the early Freudian discourse on religious themes.²⁰

Attention to historical realities mitigates characterizations of Freud as a paranoiac but often wrestles psychoanalytic writings on religion into meanings as far from their own discursivity as investigations into Freud's unconscious motivations. If prioritizing intrapsychic fragments provides too narrow a view for Freud's explicit account of scientific discoveries he claimed existed in the real world, extending the analysis of what he wrote to the broad historical contexts of when he wrote runs the risk of rendering psychoanalytic exposition altogether meaningless. Broad historical realities of Jewish experience shed light on specific psychoanalytic writings on religion in the general sense that all theoretical systems reflect subjective views, a premise that no longer draws serious dispute in any academic field. Applying unconscious artifacts or historical realities of antisemitism to what Freud published on cultural phenomena strips the author either

down to the fragments of primary process thinking or to the unrecognized effects of historical forces. In the end, both approaches prioritize unknown and unavoidable forces over the author's manifest intentions in the text and, at the same time, particularize scientific claims published for public consumption.

If we take Freud at his published word at the time of the split, neither personal nor cultural forces dictated his decision to withdraw from the disputations on religion with Jung. Freud took the time to note that mainstream antisemitic rhetoric, even when directed at his sexual theory of neurosis, posed little personal challenge for him. Rather, Freud contended, it was “the special conditions of the dispute” (*den besonderen Bedingungen des Streits*) that made him “very doubtful whether either public or written discussion would avail anything.”²¹ Freud claimed that his decision “to abstain completely” lay not in defending himself against Jung’s “interesting” explanation of psychoanalysis as a product of the “Vienna milieu,” a locution Freud sardonically exposed as an implicit euphemism for Jewishness, but his own inability to render the underlying emotions in “a form suitable for publication.”²² Freud’s observation may appear so minor or so obvious that it requires no further elaboration, but it is has been so uniformly elided over that it has led to distortion. Freud’s erstwhile colleague, the Jewish-Hungarian psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi, likewise characterized the predicament of playing disputant to Jung as a problem of venue, arguing that Jung’s “ethical evaluation” of religious feeling “no longer belongs to pure psychology, but to ethics or theology.”²³ Echoing Freud, Ferenczi rejected further dialogue as ecumenical and unfit for psychoanalytic publication: “On the same grounds – certainly also from a lack of competence – we cannot engage in the discussion stimulated by Jung on this occasion, on the greater or lesser worth of Christian religion.”²⁴

It is easy to write off such prosaic sentiments as excuses to dodge the engagement with the putative truth of religion – some would say Christianity – but further investigation into how the “dispute” rendered Freud incapable of expressing himself points to the peculiar conditions brought about by the enterprise of publication. Notably, Freud did not portray Jung as unique in this vein, giving a similar, albeit more mean-spirited explanation for his break with Stekel (author of Freud’s “Jew Complex”) in the same account of his break with Jung. “It is not easy to publish an account” of Stekel’s behavior, wrote Freud in a sentiment that seemingly encourages untoward associations to Stekel’s private life, but Freud again directly refers to a limitation in his own discursive toolbox. As

it turns out, Stekel's "behavior," like that of Jung's, concerned his editorship of one of the specialized psychoanalytic journals that "compelled" Freud to resign his post as director "and hurriedly to establish a new organ for psycho-analysis."²⁵ Indeed, even though the Jung-Freud affair draws the most dramatic interest in Freud's chronicle of the psychoanalytic movement, Freud dedicates most of his attention in that essay to explicating the establishment of specialized periodicals and the rifts in its founding editorial networks.

Freud's stated interest in the significance and challenges that publication plays on the substance of content predated his disputes with Jung. These instances have likewise been neglected in favor of interpretations of his unstated anxieties about his Jewishness. Scholars have mined *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) for Freud's self-identifications with Jewishness in an effort to explain the subjective nature of Freud's theoretical system. Yet, scholars often overlook Freud's formidable focus on publishing in the same volume, which, at least in theory, may also reveal the presence of subjectivities in his approach to universal psychic mechanisms. Throughout Freud's early conceptual organization and vocabulary, he drew exacting parallels to publication. Some of Freud's most fundamental concepts rely on descriptors associated with publishing processes, such as the regulatory means (*Regulierungsmittel*) that determine the production (*Produktion*), reproduction (*Reproduktion*), and distribution (*Verteilung*) of psychic energy, its quantity (*Quantität*) and quality (*Qualität*), its representation in words (*Wortvorstellung*) and things (*Objektvorstellung*; *Dingsvorstellung*), its translation (*Übersetzung*) and registration of signs (*Niederschriften*). Freud specifically leaned on terminology associated with serial publication, describing the imprinting of the psychic apparatus in the unconscious as assuming a sequential form (*Reihenfolge*) replete with supplements (*Ergänzungenreihe*). As Freud saw it, the serial nature of imprinting tasks the analyst to excavate the exact sequence of imprints in reverse chronological order without skipping any numbers in the series. Freud saw this serial psychic production as vulnerable to suppression (*Unterdrückung*) and repression (*Verdrängung*) by the Censor (*Zensor*) through misprinting (*Verdrucken*) and revision (*Bearbeitung*). To outwit the strict regulatory principles of the censor, the dreamer submits the dream manuscript to a secondary revision (*sekundäre Bearbeitung*), which Freud compares to the challenge that the political writer faces when he tells disagreeable truths to those in authority.²⁶ Freud analogizes some of the strategies that disguise can take, such as softening (*Ermäßigung*) and distortion (*Enstellung*), to a writer who "must soften and distort the expression of his opinion" to avoid censure.²⁷

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Freud explicates both psychic mechanisms and the analytic excavation of imprinted content in the unconscious with reference to contemporary experiences with serial publishing, leading Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis to deduce that whenever Freud employs the term censorship (*Zensur*) “its literal sense is always present.”²⁸ In describing the slick facility that secondary revision plays on the unsuspecting conscious mind, Freud offers an anecdote of an “editor of a popular French periodical” who inserted the words ‘in front’ or ‘behind’ into every sentence of a long article, which went unnoticed by every single reader.²⁹ In explicating the gaps that make dreams unintelligible to the conscious mind upon waking, Freud draws upon another contemporary reality in which a more ruthless censorship simply deletes the objectionable, leaving only disconnected fragments: “This censorship acts exactly like the censorship of newspapers at the Russian frontier, which allows foreign journals to fall into the hands of the readers whom it is its business to protect only after a quantity of passages have been blacked out.”³⁰

With so concrete a contemporary publishing landscape in his use of analogies to describe universal psychic mechanisms, it would be reasonable to wonder how Freud might have described the scenario that made the “art” of defending himself against Jung’s discursive treatment of religion inaccessible in those “forms.” If the repetitive insertions of an editor of a French periodical and the flagrant deletions of Russian censorship provide Freud with apt analogies for the neurotic-level mechanism of secondary revision and psychotic-level symbolic organizations, what concrete historical scenario would explicate Freud’s predicament of inexpressibility as the director of his own periodicals?

This volume takes this question seriously, first seeking to recover the concrete historical processes and practices of psychoanalytic publication during the seven-year relationship between Freud and Jung. As I think through the periodicals that Freud founded in collaboration with Jung, Adler, Stekel, and others, I also take seriously Freud’s description that he lacked the ability to give literary expression to his underlying emotions. I ask what this complex line of defense may have meant to Freud in his relational disputes and in his religious disputations. At the same time, I recognize the possibility that Freud’s theoretical framework had not yet adequately theorized his subjective experience. Freud had not yet conceptualized collective phenomena in the history of religion in psychoanalytic terms (as he would after the war) nor the unconscious mechanisms of ego-defenses.³¹ Yet, while Freud himself did not fully embrace the dyadic hold of the preoedipal stages of development in the psyche, I have grown

acutely aware that the pioneers of psychoanalysis conceived the intrapsychic approach in media that itself mobilized intersubjective modes of communication.³²

In giving sustained attention to what Freud called “the special conditions of the dispute,” this book returns to the original site of the psychoanalytic debate on religion, quite literally so, by focusing on the periodicals in which the first psychoanalytic writers first established themselves as specialists of a new field. As such, I am not submitting the psychoanalytic corpus on religion to a fresh encounter but recovering an original one, perhaps a bolder claim in a field predicated on the desire for the lost object.

In the tangible spaces in which the discourse on religion first saw print, we see that Freud’s fantasy to unite “Semites and Aryans” began and ended in a seven-year campaign (1907–1914) to establish, sustain, and control the first psychoanalytic periodicals. In turning our attention to the “special conditions of the dispute” – a phrase whose meaning exceeds the notion of general circumstances to suggest the terms on which resolution of a formal dispute hinges – we can better evaluate what Freud meant and why he chose to withdraw from the public discussion on religion in the psychoanalytic periodicals. This shift to the conditions, terms, and demands of publication provides much-needed micro-historical context for the overdetermined story line in the Freud-Jung split that left Freud, in his own words, “a godless Jew,” and Jung the heir of religion in psychoanalytic historiography.

Religion and Serialization

In many ways, the periodicals are the story of psychoanalysis. Before the appearance of the first serial specializing in psychoanalysis, Freud introduced himself as a proponent of a radical new science in the veteran form of full-volume publishing coauthored with his mentor Josef Breuer. When he struck out on his own, Freud published his work both in monographs whose production and distribution cycles were necessarily longer than periodical publications by an average of two years and in established journals and compilation volumes whose editors he did not choose.³³ Freud often complained that publication in established medical journals necessitated repetitive summaries of his most basic concepts, which ignorant critics in resistant periodicals then distorted.³⁴ Although Freud tended to exaggerate his obscurity before the founding of his own journals, we have no reason to doubt his sense that mainstream journals resisted nonconformist theories.³⁵ Before having secured a publisher for their joint

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periodical, Freud wrote to Jung in frustration about a reference that he found to Jung's article "The Freudian Theory of Hysteria" in the table of contents of a new journal, but that contained only a single line on the subject inside. "After this traumatic experience," Freud wrote to Jung in allegiance, "I decided not to subscribe to this new 'central organ.'"³⁶

The birth of psychoanalytic serials transformed the depressing landscape Freud painted for psychoanalytic publication. In all the ways in which psychoanalysis may be defined, it was first a literary movement. The new science captured its first public audience through its own biannual, quarterly, bimonthly, and monthly serials in a variety of forms, such as the monograph series, research yearbook, multi-contributor single-topic proceedings, correspondence bulletin, monthly popular magazine, and bimonthly professional journal. The periodicals that Freud and his circle founded introduced "psychoanalysis" as a system of thought and as a "movement" before anything else.³⁷ The early issues of periodicals functioned as manifestos of the disciplinary aims of their editors and paved the way for the internationalization of a field in which the first generation of psychoanalysts would participate.³⁸ These periodicals established the reputation of Freud as the founder of a radically new science and cast its contributors as specialists of a new field. The establishment of and contribution to their own serialized periodicals was the central endeavor of the men, and later the occasional woman, who gathered around Freud in Vienna and Jung in Zurich.³⁹ Beginning in 1907 and culminating in their publishing divestments in 1914, the vast majority of what Freud and Jung wrote first appeared in those periodicals founded, directed, and edited by the two men and their handpicked associates.⁴⁰ Freud often spoke of the journals from a position of paternity in a growing and thriving family, calling the forthcoming *Imago* "the new-born child," a familial sentiment echoed by other members of the first publishing network.

The role of serials in the development and popularization of psychoanalysis is difficult to overstate if only because specialized periodicals were essential for the legitimization of any new discipline at the time. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the scholarly periodical, whose modest proportions distinguished it from newspapers and magazines, had become a medium explicitly meant to position its contributors as specialists of a new field among veteran disciplines. The debut of a specialized periodical announced the parallel debut of a new cultural contender who had already secured a robust list of contributors and the backing of a publisher invested in the promise that the new field could sustain serial issues.

The periodical gave radical science a place and a public beyond the walls of the university, the laboratory, and the clinic. Freud had observed the celebrated rise to fame of his former mentor, the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, which was due, in no small part, to the journals that he founded, whose sensational patient photographs in the *Archives de Neurologie* (1870–1907), *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière* (1888–1918), and the *L'Année Psychologique* (1895–present) garnered attention from both medical and lay publics. In contrast to Charcot's postgraduate student Pierre Janet, who published his research in established journals and never claimed disciplinary independence, Freud sought to achieve autonomous status for psychoanalysis as a new science and school of thought. As he advised Jung in 1907, the “first thing to do would be to start a journal (*eine Zeitschrift*).”⁴¹

Freud drew readers not through titillating images, but with ancient myth and the archaic powers of religion. The subject of religion played a critical role in the establishment of psychoanalytic periodical publication in very pragmatic terms. Freud's position in the medical world could not be compared to that of Charcot, his far more established mentor, and religion helped Freud to steer the campaign to secure a publisher's contract and recruit contributors from outside Vienna's disproportionately Jewish psychiatric and neurological circles. After years of campaigning for a publisher's contract for his own periodical, Freud finally succeeded when he championed the “application of psychological knowledge to subjects in art and literature, in the history of civilizations and religions.”⁴² That is, Freud centered the cultural products of religion as the purview of the first periodical dedicated to psychoanalysis, *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde* (Papers on Applied Psychology, 1907–1938).

Freud's periodical debut joined a new trend percolating in periodical publication in America. The psychology of religion was a hot new area for academic publication, a subject born of the late-nineteenth-century notion that the interpretive frameworks of psychology could be systematically applied to the domain of religion. With titles in the psychology of religion drawing profit in the first years of the twentieth century, enterprising publishers took the chance that the subject would sustain professional journals.⁴³ The distinguished American psychiatrist G. Stanley Hall, president of Clark University in Massachusetts, successfully launched the first such periodical with his *Journal of Religious Psychology* (1904–1915), observing that “psychology is slowly taking the place once held by theology as the intellectual expression of the religious instinct.”⁴⁴