# Introduction

Before identifying, in this introduction, the specific gap regarding Strauss's scholarship on Islamic thought in the secondary literature, it is worth presenting, briefly, Strauss's intellectual biography in its connection with his interest in Islamic political thought. To this end, this introduction will provide a brief, panoramic discussion of the major questions at the heart of Strauss's intellectual odyssey by focusing on what one might call the four pillars of Strauss's philosophical project: (1) Reason and Revelation, (2) Ancients and Moderns, (3) The Theologico-Political Problem, and (4) Esotericism. This will be done while emphasizing the Islamic aspect of Strauss's thought, of course, by relying on the vast existing literature on Strauss's thought, to which I owe much. One obvious point which must nonetheless be articulated explicitly is that this presentation does *not* presume to be an exhaustive introduction to the work of Leo Strauss. Such introductions have been attempted by other scholars, to which I invite curious readers to turn by consulting the footnotes.

## STRAUSS'S TURN TOWARD THE FALĀSIFA

Leo Strauss was born to an observant Jewish family in Kirchhain, Hessen, Germany on September 20, 1899. After graduating from gymnasium in 1917, he served briefly in the First World War in the German army; after the war, he began his studies at the University of Hamburg, where he conducted his doctoral dissertation under the direction of Ernst Cassirer on *The Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophical Teaching*

*of F.H. Jacobi* (1921).[1] It is worthwhile to pause to examine this early scholarly effort. Although the dissertation was never published in full by Strauss, one would expect to hear much about Jacobi in Strauss's later writings.[2] But this is precisely what does not happen. Particularly significant, however, is that one can identify some of the key components of the whole of Strauss's thought, in a nascent state, already present in his doctoral dissertation. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819), a German philosopher whose name is closely bound with the coining of the term "nihilism" and his role in the famous controversy on pantheism (*Pantheismusstreit*), played an important role in the formation of German philosophy through his attack on the pedigree of Spinoza's philosophy and the figure of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. The story begins with the controversial reception of Spinoza in Germany as an atheistic philosopher, but it took a 1785 publication by Jacobi to transform the debate on the reception of Spinoza in Germany into a full-fledged intellectual crisis, to which luminaries like Kant, Goethe, and Herder, among many others, contributed.[3] The controversy concerned above all the status of the Enlightenment as a project founded on the authority of reason, which claimed to provide an effective foundation for moral and religious

[1] The German original is available in GS II:237–93. For the extract of the dissertation in English see Leo Strauss, "The Dissertation (1921)," in *Leo Strauss: The Early Writings (1921–32)*, trans. Michael Zank (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 53–61. For the French translation see Leo Strauss, "Le problème de la connaissance dans la doctrine philosophique de Fr. H. Jacobi (I)," trans. Hans Hartje and Pierre Guglielmina, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 99, no. 3 (1994): 291–311; Leo Strauss, "Le problème de la connaissance dans la doctrine philosophique de Fr. H. Jacobi (II) b) Les formes données de la connaissance," trans. Hans Hartje and Pierre Guglielmina, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 99, no. 4 (1994): 505–32.

[2] If I am not mistaken, Jacobi is only mentioned twice in Strauss's later writings: once in Spinoza's *Critique of Religion* and once in the 1964 Preface to the English translation of the same book: Leo Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 16, 204 (GS I:31, 260). One should, of course, also mention the prominent place occupied by Jacobi in Strauss's introductions to the writings of Mendelssohn. See Leo Strauss, *On Moses Mendelssohn*, ed. Martin D. Yaffe (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2012), (GS II:467–605). See also Leo Strauss, "Notes on Philosophy and Revelation," in *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem*, ed. Heinrich Meier, trans. Marcus Brainard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 178.

[3] Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel "Atwill,"* trans. George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 173–251. A lively and authoritative account of the controversy is Frederick C. Besier, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 44–109. See also Steven B. Smith, *Reading Leo Strauss. Politics, Philosophy, Judaism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 67–71.

judgments and beliefs. In his explosive writing, Jacobi gives the account of his dialogue with Lessing and claimed that Lessing was a follower of Spinoza – a controversial claim because of the atheistic connotations attached to Spinoza's name. Jacobi saw the association with Spinoza as the convincing evidence for the rejection of *Aufklärung* and its rational basis. He claimed that the rationalist Enlightenment, represented in the philosophy of Spinoza, undermines the foundations of religion, morality, and thought, and inevitably leads to atheism, immorality, denial of the existence of God, relativism, and skepticism regarding the basic premises of every system of thought; or, in one word, to nihilism. Facing the impotence of reason for establishing the foundations of thought, morality, and religion, Jacobi saw only one solution: a leap of faith out of nihilism brought about by the rationalism of the Enlightenment and instead founding one's life and thought on faith through a return to orthodoxy and Christianity. Strauss wrote his dissertation on this controversial figure with all the concomitant issues related to this early interest, such as his later concern with the crisis of modern rationality and the conflict between Reason and Revelation.

After his doctoral dissertation, Strauss spent some time in Freiburg, Giessen, and Marburg. At the University of Freiburg, he came under the influence of Edmund Husserl and the young Martin Heidegger, before being employed from 1925 to 1932 at the Academy of Jewish Research in Berlin (Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums) as a research assistant, where he worked (1925–28) on his first book, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* (1930). What precise role Jacobi's ideas play in Strauss's mature philosophical approach has been an object of controversy which cannot be dealt with here in detail.[4] Two things, however, are rather clear. First, his doctoral dissertation on Jacobi led Strauss to Spinoza, and his study

[4] John G. Gunnell, "Strauss before Straussianism. Reason, Revelation, and Nature," *The Review of Politics* 53, no. 1 (1991): 53–74; Susan Meld Shell, "Taking Evil Seriously: Schmitt's 'Concept of the Political' and Strauss's 'True Politics,'" in *Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker*, eds. Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Nicgorski (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp. 175–93; David Janssens, "The Problem of the Enlightenment: Strauss, Jacobi, and the Pantheism Controversy," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56, no. 3 (2003): 605–31; Smith, *Reading Leo Strauss*, 65–83; Rodrigo Chacón, "On a Forgotten Kind of Grounding: Strauss, Jacobi, and the Phenomenological Critique of Modern Rationalism," *The Review of Politics* 76, no. 4 (2014): 589–617; Corine Pelluchon, *Leo Strauss and the Crisis of Rationalism: Another Reason, Another Enlightenment*, trans. Robert Howse (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), 31–57; Benjamin Lazier, *God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 73–139.

on Spinoza already manifests two pillars of Strauss's thought – to which I shall turn shortly. Second, as we shall see, it is not difficult to see at least a certain "family resemblance" between Strauss's major intellectual concerns and issues at the heart of Jacobi's controversy, although one should be careful not to take Jacobi's rather radical positions for Strauss's complex views, which seem to elude any kind of simple identification. In our discussion of Strauss's pillars of thought, the reader is strongly advised to remain vigilant of remaining satisfied with these short descriptions; there is much debate and many contradictory ideas about Strauss's final thoughts on any of the four following issues, the debates which are well represented in the more general studies.[5]

*(1) Reason and Revelation*. In his study on Spinoza, Strauss is concerned with the truth of Spinoza's critique of revealed religion and its defensibility from the philosophical point of view; he shows that Spinoza in particular and the Enlightenment's rationalist critique of religion in general did not succeed in presenting a definitive refutation of the claims of Biblical religion and revelation. Strauss claims that Spinoza's critique of religion is based on presuppositions which are vulnerable to the religious position which consistently founds itself on faith and questions the availability of its religious knowledge to human reason. Spinoza's efforts, therefore, in showing the contradictory character of the Scripture, are vulnerable to an orthodox counterattack which relies on the idea of an unfathomable, omnipotent God who is not bound as such to the rules and limitations of nature. Strauss claimed that the victory of modern rationalism over the revealed religion is more the effect of propaganda and rhetoric, "laughter and mockery," than real philosophic and rational arguments. Spinoza and his followers, Strauss concluded, instead of relying on real rational refutation, overcame revealed religion without meeting its most unassailable defenses: all they did was "to 'laugh' orthodoxy out of a position from which it could not be dislodged by any proofs supplied by Scripture or by reason."[6] The idea, according to which the claims of revealed religion are not as weak as its rationalist modern opponents have pretended them to be, and that one cannot easily imagine an

[5] For a good overview of the major debates on Strauss's legacy and thought and bibliography see Michael Zuckert and Catherine Zuckert, *The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 58–80, 228–69; Michael Zuckert and Catherine Zuckert, *Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 311–38.

[6] Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, 28–29 (GS I:50–51).

effective refutation of a coherent religious perspective founded on faith in an omnipotent and unfathomable god, occupies a special place in Strauss's intellectual biography. It is reflected in the idea of an irreconcilable opposition between reason and faith, also represented by the conflict of Reason and Revelation, philosophy and religion, or Athens and Jerusalem. Strauss often claimed that this opposition cannot be overcome by any "Thomistic" synthesis of Reason and Revelation. He did not tire of repeating that in every synthesis of this kind, "however impressive, one of the two opposed elements is sacrificed, more or less subtly but in any event surely to the other." He also stated that neither of these two antagonists "has ever succeeded in really refuting the other" and they both remain contending representatives of two opposed camps.[7]

*(2) Ancients and Moderns*. Strauss's dissatisfaction with Spinoza's philosophy and his modern successors was only the first step in his journey from modern philosophy toward premodern thinkers. This is reflected in his lifelong enterprise of renewing what he, imitating the language of the seventeenth-century literary debate, sometimes calls "the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns," the debate which seemed to have been undoubtedly decided in the favor of the moderns.[8] The idea of the superiority of the moderns to the ancients as reflected in the concept of progress is one of the most cherished ideas of modern thought and modern man: the belief in the gradual advance in all fields of human life, from technology and politics to arts and philosophy. The fact that even today, what is considered "new" automatically acquires a positive connotation manifests the still-living universal attachment to the idea of progress. Strauss was, however, skeptical of the superiority of our thought to that of the premodern thinkers or ancients, and he shows this in many of his writings.[9] In his *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, for instance, his major writing

[7] Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 74–75; Leo Strauss, "Progress or Return?," in *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss*, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 270.

[8] Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes' Political Philosophy," in *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 172; Leo Strauss and Karl Löwith, "Correspondence between Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss Concerning Modernity," *The Independent Journal of Philosophy* 4 (1988): 106 (Letter to Karl Löwith on August 15, 1946, GS III:661); Susan Meld Shell, ed., *The Strauss-Krüger Correspondence: Returning to Plato through Kant* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 47 (Letter to Gerhard Krüger on December 12, 1932, GS III:414).

[9] Strauss, "Progress or Return?"; Leo Strauss, "How to Study Medieval Philosophy," *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 23, no. 3 (1996): 321–38.

on the one he considered to be the originator of modern political philosophy, Strauss investigates the legitimacy of Machiavelli's break with the premodern "Great Tradition" and his founding of "the Enlightenment" and inquires whether the Enlightenment deserves its name or "whether its true name is Obfuscation."[10] Elsewhere, he goes even so far as to claim that "the perfect political order, as Plato and Aristotle have sketched it, *is* the perfect political order" and that it is "*morally-politically* the most reasonable and most pleasing."[11]

Strauss's dissatisfaction with the modern critique of revelation, and his doubts about the legitimacy of the modern project as a whole, did not immediately lead him to what he later on called classical political philosophy, as it is found primarily in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. If seen primarily through his publications, Strauss's interest in the ancients appears relatively late, as his first publication on a classical philosopher is the 1939 essay "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon."[12] Strauss seems to have initially entertained the idea of a return to premodern thought through Maimonides, one of Spinoza's antagonists discussed in *Spinoza's Critique of Religion,* as well as through other Jewish medieval thinkers. In this period, the premodern thought of Greek philosophers appears more as a resource for understanding medieval Jewish thought. Apart from this Jewish orientation in Strauss's research, his writings after his book on Spinoza also have a modern component, reflected in his studies on Thomas Hobbes.[13] Even in these studies, Greek philosophy occupies a marginal place as a probable source of some of Hobbes's ideas. In a letter, Strauss depicts his dual research program during this period in the following way:

> My studies of Spinoza's *Theological and Political Treatise* have shown me a connection between the theological and political problem. These studies have led me to Spinoza's Jewish medieval predecessors, especially Maimonides, on the one hand, and Hobbes' political science on the other hand. During the pursuit of these sources, I formed the plan to make 1. the political science of Hobbes and

[10] Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), 173.
[11] Strauss and Löwith, "Correspondence between Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss Concerning Modernity," 107 (Letter to Karl Löwith on August 15, 1946, GS III:662), 113 (Letter to Karl Löwith on August 20, 1946, GS III:669).
[12] Leo Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6, no. 4 (1939): 502–36; Brague, "Athens, Jerusalem, Mecca," 238.
[13] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Leo Strauss, *Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings*, trans. Svetozar Minkov and Gabriel Bartlett (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

2. the theory of prophecy in Jewish and Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages the subject of my future studies .... After finishing my book on Spinoza, I was charged by the Akademie [für die Wissenschaft des Judentums] to analyze Gersonides' *Wars of the Lord*. I started with an analysis of Gersonides' teaching on prophecy. The research on his sources led me from Maimonides to Islamic philosophers, of whom I studied several in Arabic manuscripts – and made me realize that the connection between medieval Jewish and Islamic teaching on prophecy and Plato's *Statesman* and *Laws* had not yet been thoroughly evaluated.[14]

In this remarkable passage, apart from the double research program, what is particularly significant is the last remark about "the connection between medieval Jewish and Islamic teaching on prophecy and Plato's *Statesman* and *Laws*," because it points to what seems to have been the key moment in Strauss's engagement with Islamic political philosophy, as well as his whole intellectual project: Strauss's encounter, in 1929 or 1930, with a passage in Avicenna's treatise *On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences* to the effect that the treatment of prophecy and divine law is contained in Plato's *Laws*.[15] This statement of Avicenna was first mentioned in the essay entitled "Maimonides's Doctrine of Prophecy and Its Sources" which was originally written in 1931 and was later included in the 1935 *Philosophy and Law*.[16] Interestingly for understanding Strauss's particular interest in this passage and his knowledge of Arabic, he claims that he has also checked the Arabic original of Avicenna's treatise.[17] It therefore seems that it was Avicenna primarily who among the Muslim philosophers first caught Strauss's attention.[18] But it is also significant that after mentioning this statement of Avicenna, and interpreting it as a hint toward a unique way of looking at the phenomenon of

[14] Harvey, "Leo Strauss' Early Interest in the Islamic Falāsifa," 222 (Letter to Cecil Adler on November 30, 1933); Tamer, *Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne*, 59–60; Leo Strauss, "A Giving of Accounts," in *Leo Strauss, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 462–63; Shell, *The Strauss-Krüger Correspondence*, 18–19 (Letter to Gerhard Krüger on June 26, 1930, GS III:382–83).

[15] Heinrich Meier, "How Strauss Became Strauss," in *Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s*, eds. Martin D. Yaffe and Richard S. Ruderman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014), 17–18; Harvey, "Leo Strauss' Early Interest in the Islamic Falāsifa," 221. I will discuss Avicenna's statement in more detail below (pp. 33–35, 163–64).

[16] Leo Strauss, "Maimunis Lehre von der Prophetie und ihre Quellen," *Le Monde Oriental* 28 (1934): 99–139; Leo Strauss, *Philosophy and Law. Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His Predecessors*, trans. Eve Adler (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 122 (GS II:112). The former was actually published in 1935.

[17] Strauss, *Philosophy and Law*, 152n57 (GS II:112n57); Harvey, "Leo Strauss' Early Interest in the Islamic Falāsifa," 221n7.

[18] Harvey, "Leo Strauss' Early Interest in the Islamic Falāsifa," 220.

prophecy, Strauss traces the idea not to Avicenna himself, but rather to Alfarabi, and explicitly mentions Alfarabi's summary of Plato's *Laws* as the key writing for establishing this fact.[19] In any event, we seem to have a very precise piece of evidence on Strauss's first contact with Islamic political philosophy.

*(3) The Theologico-Political Problem.* Avicenna's statement, and Strauss's concern with it, opens the way for introducing another pillar of Strauss's thought: the theologico-political problem. This aspect of Strauss's thought, which one can describe as the problem or question which in a way envelopes all other parts of Strauss's intellectual biography, has many different aspects with different degrees of complexities; it will therefore be discussed in different contexts in this book and each time, by considering it through the lens of different texts under discussion, it will be seen in a different light. Here I shall only discuss this theme by pointing to the break brought about by Strauss's turn toward Islamic political philosophy. As was shown above (pp. 4–5), in his dissertation on Jacobi and his first book on Spinoza, Strauss tends to study the question of the relationship between Reason and Revelation through epistemological-philosophical lenses. Avicenna's statement, however, led Strauss to a very different view of this relationship, which can be described precisely as theologico-political, that is, looking at religion through a *political* lens: "the science that deals thematically with prophecy is *politics*" because "the aim of prophecy is political."[20] This view approaches the relationship between Reason and Revelation as akin to the relationship between "Philosophy and Law," the title of Strauss's important book in this period. What "Law" is here meant is of course torah in Judaism and sharīʿa in Islam, but this does not help us understand what Strauss found particularly worthy of attention in them. The significance of law in Strauss's work can be understood by a look at a rather obscure dialogue of Plato, entitled *Minos*, the dialogue which Strauss describes as the introduction to Plato's *Laws*.[21] *Minos* deals with the question "What is Law?" and there Socrates gives a perplexing answer to this question: "Law … wishes to be the discovery of what is."[22] Now, it is rather clear that what law means here is not what we usually mean; therefore, Strauss interprets this statement by Socrates as "law is philosophy," or that it

[19] Strauss, *Philosophy and Law*, 125 (GS II:115).
[20] Strauss, *Philosophy and Law*, 122 (GS II:111).
[21] Leo Strauss, "On the Minos," in *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 65.
[22] Plato, *Minos* 315a.

pretends to be something akin to philosophy.[23] This view of the law is explained in *Philosophy and Law* as follows:

> [The] Islamic and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages are … guided … by the *primary*, *ancient* idea of *law* as a unified, total regimen of human life … they are pupils of *Plato*.[24]

To put it differently, through Avicenna's statement, Strauss has found a way to recover the classical understanding of the law as a theologico-political whole, which is *the* alternative to philosophy. This law has a claim to being the complete knowledge of the whole, the knowledge also desired by philosophers, and by making a claim to this knowledge, the law intends to organize human life as a whole on the basis of that knowledge. It is political in the most fundamental sense of the term, as the "total regimen of life." It is also significant that in this statement of Strauss, one sees the justification of Strauss's return to the ancients and the crucial importance of Plato for understanding theologico-political problem.[25]

After the publication of *Philosophy and Law* in 1935, Strauss's study on Thomas Hobbes appeared in 1936,[26] but it was only more than ten years later that he published another book, a substantial study on Xenophon in 1948.[27] In the period from 1935 to 1945 – when he published his major study on an exclusively Islamic subject, "Fârâbî's *Plato*"[28] – apart from occasional book reviews, Strauss published eight studies of different lengths in journals and collective volumes: Three of these texts discuss mainly medieval Jewish thought,[29] one of them is

[23] Leo Strauss, *1959 Course on Plato's Laws Offered at the University of Chicago*, ed. Lorraine Smith Pangle (Chicago: Leo Strauss Center, 2016), 30 (Session 2, January 8, 1959).
[24] Strauss, *Philosophy and Law*, 73 (GS II:61).
[25] See also Leo Strauss, "Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi," in *Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 277 (GS II:126).
[26] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, 1952, (GS III:3–193).
[27] Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny: Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence. Corrected and Expanded Edition*, eds. Victor Gourevitch and Michael Roth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
[28] Strauss, "Fârâbî's Plato."
[29] Leo Strauss, "On Abravanel's Philosophical Tendency and Political Teaching," in *Isaac Abravanel: Six Lectures*, eds. John Brande Trend and Herbert Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 95–129; Leo Strauss, "On Abravanel's Philosophical Tendency and Political Teaching," in *Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 579–615

dedicated prominently to Maimonides as well as to Alfarabi,[30] a short article is mainly on Alfarabi,[31] one other discusses the question of esotericism in general,[32] and two studies are dedicated to classical Greek political philosophy.[33] Significantly, it is only in one of these publications, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," in which there is no trace of Islamic political thought. That Islamic political thought is foremost in Strauss's mind can be seen also in what he says as a justification for putting aside his project on Hobbes's critique of religion which, judging from the surviving material, was in its advanced stages.[34] Strauss writes that he has "placed Hobbes on the back burner for now, in order to first gain clarity about the history of Platonism in the Islamic and Jewish middle ages." He then calls Alfarabi an "astounding" figure and describes him as a key figure for opening a new perspective on Platonism in general and for understanding Plato himself.[35]

*(4) Esotericism.* Contemporaneous with Strauss's deeper engagement with Islamic political thought as a way toward classical Greek philosophy, we can also observe a further fundamental change in his thought brought about by his discovery of esotericism, the fourth pillar and one

(GS II:195–233); Leo Strauss, "The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed," in *Essays on Maimonides*, ed. S. W. Baron (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 37–91; Leo Strauss, "Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed," in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), 38–95; Leo Strauss, "The Law of Reason in the Kuzari," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 13 (1943): 47–96; Leo Strauss, "The Law of Reason in the Kuzari," in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), 95–142.

30 Leo Strauss, "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maïmonide et de Fârâbî," *Revue des Etudes Juives* 100 (1936): 1–37; Strauss, "Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi," 275–314 (GS II:125–67).

31 Leo Strauss, "Eine vermißte Schrift Farâbîs," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* 80, no. 1 (1936): 90–106; Leo Strauss, "A Lost Writing of Farâbî's (1936)," in *Reorientation. Leo Strauss in the 1930s*, trans. Martin D. Yaffe and Gabriel Bartlett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 255–65 (GS II:167–79).

32 Leo Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing," *Social Research* 8, no. 4 (1941): 488–504; Leo Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing," in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), 22–38.

33 Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon"; Leo Strauss, "On Classical Political Philosophy," *Social Research* 12, no. 1 (1945): 98–117; Leo Strauss, "On Classical Political Philosophy," in *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 78–95.

34 These were published posthumously. See Strauss, *Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings*, (GS III:263–74).

35 Shell, *The Strauss-Krüger Correspondence*, 78–79 (Letter to Gerhard Krüger on December 25, 1935, GS III:450); Strauss, *Hobbes's Critique of Religion and Related Writings*, 14.