Introduction

THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ AND MATTHIAS SCHULZ

Angry recriminations from political leaders fly across the Atlantic. A crisis builds within NATO. Street protests take place in European cities against an unpopular American war. Western countries face shortages of oil and sharp price increases for energy. The United States and Europe disagree strongly about policy in the Middle East. The threat of terrorism plagues the West.

One might guess that this would be a description of recent events, especially those concerning the American and European conflict over the Iraq War in 2003. Actually, those features are meant to characterize the 1970s. As Mark Twain is reputed to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot.” In many respects, the era of the “long 1970s,” that period from 1969 to 1983, seems like a not-so-distant mirror of our own time, with many of the same problems, phenomena, and protests. Indeed, the 1970s era in transatlantic relations offers us many rhymes for today, and the essays in this volume demonstrate the degree to which today’s events have influenced our perspective on this recent past.

From an American point of view, the historiography of this time period is still in the shadow of the Vietnam War. The slow release of the larger documentary record has resulted in very few serious historical studies of the latter 1970s and early 1980s, and this latter period is still largely dominated by the memoir literature.1 Vietnam remains central to the serious studies of the earlier years of the 1970s. Even Henry Kissinger’s attempt to define this history with his monumental, if problematic, memoirs, was largely seen

as an attempt to explain and justify American policies in Southeast Asia, although Kissinger provided many arguments and much raw material for historians interested in other regions of the world. In recent years, most historical writing on the early 1970s continues to concern America’s slow exit from the war in Indochina and the Nixon administration’s fruitless search for a “peace with honor.” Most of these books have been highly critical of Nixon’s policies, either for extending the war, temporally and geographically, or from a different political perspective, for the cynical search for a decent interval before abandoning the South Vietnamese. Indeed, some of this literature accuses American leaders like Kissinger with war crimes and calls for their trial before international tribunals. Only slowly and fitfully have other foreign policy issues of this era received anywhere near the same attention.

The dominant book in dealing with non-Vietnam issues, which received fulsome praise when it was first published in the Reagan era, was Raymond Garthoff’s *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Garthoff, a foreign service officer with more than two decades of experience in Soviet affairs, provided both a historian’s and an insider’s perspective on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1969 to the Reagan era. He took a highly nuanced view of Nixon and Kissinger’s approach to foreign policy, praising their efforts to achieve détente but critical of their inability to root détente firmly enough in American domestic politics so that it could survive the challenges faced in the Carter and Reagan years. Highly critical of Reagan’s confrontational policy toward the Soviets in the early 1980s, Garthoff’s history of the period tended to fault more heavily American diplomacy and American leaders for their failures. He praised European leaders for the degree to which détente in Europe “became much more of an organic process” and revived “the conception of Europe rather than the distinction between Western and Eastern Europe.” He also saw in this period the beginning of a certain “American estrangement” from Europe because of the different attitudes toward détente. Garthoff’s book captured the prevailing orthodoxy among most scholars, an orthodoxy that remained dominant until the sudden end of the Cold War shook its foundations.

2 Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979); *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, 1982); and *Years of Renewal* (New York, 1999). Kissinger’s book *Crisis* (New York, 2003) provides important materials on both the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the fall of Saigon in 1975.


Garthoff’s magisterial volume set the tone for many subsequent treatments of the era. In 1998, shortly before his death, William Bundy, another foreign policy official from the Kennedy and Johnson era and the brother of National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, published *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*. Bundy’s very title captured one of his principal themes, namely that the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, which frequently employed secrecy and deception, was ultimately undermined by those methods, especially when it misled the American people and Congress. Echoing Garthoff’s conclusions, Bundy argued that secrecy and deception were major reasons why Nixon’s détente policy ultimately foundered. On other European issues, however, Bundy was less critical. Although hesitant with any praise for Nixon, Bundy concluded that, “during the Nixon era, the Alliance was strained but in the end came back together.” He tended to credit other officials, like Treasury Secretary George Shultz, for this success with Europe, seeing them as having brought relations back from “an all-time low.” He did acknowledge that the Nixon years pioneered new structures for consultation, and that President Gerald Ford, with Kissinger’s help, was able to build on those to mend alliance relations after Nixon’s resignation.

Other historians also engaged in this debate, which had overtones at times of a referendum on the Kissinger style. John Lewis Gaddis, one of the preeminent American diplomatic historians, provided a more positive assessment of the Nixon–Kissinger foreign policy. Both in his still-seminal *Strategies of Containment* published originally in 1982 and in an essay on Kissinger more than a decade later for the collection *The Diplomats, 1939–1979*, Gaddis gave high marks to Nixon and Kissinger for “impacting intellectual coherence to the conduct of American foreign policy.” Although critical of Kissinger for his lack of appreciation for the role of ideas in foreign policy and for his inadequate understanding of economics and such developments as the information revolution, Gaddis was nevertheless sympathetic to Kissinger’s attempts to educate the American public to the limits of American power. More critical assessments of Nixon, Kissinger, and détente were contained in the works of Robert Schulzinger and Keith Nelson. Schulzinger’s short biography of Kissinger criticized the degree to which Kissinger’s personal style, the celebrity image he created and cultivated, undermined his own effectiveness over time. “Jealous of sharing power with

others, it became nearly impossible for him to bequeath a legacy to successors,” Schulzinger concluded, and “his diplomacy represented an end of an era more than it heralded a new beginning in American foreign relations.”

For his part, Nelson criticized Nixon and Kissinger’s conservative approach and continuing adherence to Cold War formulations, and he called the “detente of the 1970s . . . one of the truly great missed opportunities for reforming international relations in recent history.”

Jussi Hahnimäki’s richly documented, full-scale study of Kissinger as a policy maker, *The Flawed Architect*, echoes this criticism, seeing Kissinger’s unwillingness to “grasp the intrinsic significance of local and regional circumstances to the unfolding of the Cold War,” as the central weakness in his approach to foreign policy.

The most recent innovative, yet highly controversial treatment of this era comes from a student of Gaddis at Yale. Jeremi Suri’s *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* is a provocative book, seeking to link the changes in diplomacy of this period with larger social and domestic forces. Suri examines developments in five countries – the United States, France, West Germany, the Soviet Union, and China – during the 1960s and early 1970s, and argues that, as a result of similar social problems, they all contended with widespread dissent and the global revolution of their young people in 1968. In response, the governments sought to construct a détente to reestablish a conservative world order to control their citizens and contain these revolutions. Détente, in Suri’s view was a counterrevolution from elites when faced with mass public protest. “The promise of detente became a stick with which to beat domestic critics,” he concludes. The result of this has been widespread public apathy and a loss of interest in politics, a “cynical environment,” where “we are still living with the dissent and détente of a previous generation.”

Critics have pointed out that Suri’s sweeping and ambitious argument makes little room for the enormous differences between the types of protest that developed within liberal industrialized and developed Western countries, and the movements of small groups of dissidents in the Soviet Union or government-instigated Red Guards in China. Nevertheless, Suri’s daring approach to international history has provided a new paradigm for historians of the period to consider. Many of the articles in this collection take


his account into consideration but find it lacking in explanatory power. The transatlantic relationship of the 1970s reflects the similar social and economic problems that Western democracies confronted, but the foreign policy changes that occurred do not seem directly connected to the issue that Suri isolates.

Until archival records from the 1970s started recently to become available for research, historians interested in the inner workings of Western European policy making during that decade were heavily dependent on the memoirs and published writings of leading political and diplomatic figures.12 Those accounts are now being supplemented by a growing scholarly literature based on archival research and newly published volumes in documentary series such as the U.S. State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States*; the *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte on behalf of the German Foreign Office; and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s *Documents on British Policy Overseas*. Because many of the official records of the later portion of the period covered by this volume are still not accessible to researchers, there are still gaps in the scholarly literature. Any review of the historiography must, by necessity, be selective.

As Max Kaase and Andrew Kohut have shown recently in *Estranged Friends? The Transatlantic Consequences of Societal Change*, Western Europeans’ admiration and sympathy for the United States declined markedly from the early 1960s to the Nixon years.13 European opinion of the United States improved briefly at the outset of the Carter presidency, only to turn

---


13 The percentage of people holding a favorable view of the United States hit postwar highs in 1964 after the tragic death of President John F. Kennedy, reaching 84 percent in West Germany, 74 percent in Italy, 66 percent in Britain, and 41 percent in France. A low point was reached in West Germany in 1973, when only 45 percent had a favorable view of the United States. In Great Britain, Italy, and France, the figures had sunk even lower by 1976, to 24, 25, and 28 percent, respectively. See Max Kaase and Andrew Kohut, *Estranged Friends? The Transatlantic Consequences of Societal Change* (New York, 1996), 55.
more critical once again. It was only in the mid-1980s, as Ronald Reagan became more enthusiastic about détente, that views of the United States in Western Europe became more favorable. It is not surprising that some contemporary scholars and observers thought that the Atlantic alliance was in “crisis” or that the allies might drift apart. Scholarly discussion of the causes and consequences of the strains within the alliance during the 1970s has focused on the bilateral relations between the United States and the individual European states, West Germany’s Ostpolitik, and European integration. Here, we concentrate on recent studies of European governments’ dealings with Washington, which have centered in large part on the leading personalities, and on European integration.

In Western Europe, three long-term processes during the 1960s and 1970s influenced the intra-European balance, the dynamics of European integration, and transatlantic relations. First, President Charles de Gaulle’s decision in 1966 to take France out of the integrated military structures of NATO made West Germany the United States’ most important European ally next to Britain. Second, in the wake of decolonization, the geopolitical orientation of France and Britain became more European. And third, Italy and West Germany both enjoyed a boost in international status from their strong economic growth up until 1973. Having entered the 1970s as Western Europe’s strongest economy, West Germany was able to weather the oil crisis better than most other Western nations.

The era of Social Democratic–Liberal coalition governments under Willy Brandt (1969–1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982) marks an important transition in West Germany’s relations with its allies. A more self-assured West Germany strengthened its diplomatic status by establishing closer relations to Moscow through a new Ostpolitik. At the same time, Bonn...
distanced itself from Washington, where both Brandt and Ostpolitik were eyed with some skepticism. Unjustly so, argues Peter Merseburger in what could be described as the first scholarly biography of the chancellor. It was, after all, Brandt who brought Bonn more into line with the détente policy Washington had pursued since the Cuban missile crisis. Without calling the Atlantic alliance into question, the Brandt government began to look for political means to improve German security; by normalizing of relations with Moscow, it hoped to establish closer links with the East German state. Merseburger concludes that Brandt’s Ostpolitik was crucial in giving West Germany the “capacity for action” in the international arena.

West Germany’s capacity for action was also enhanced through European integration. Haig Simonian argues that Brandt’s enthusiasm for European integration was partly due to the need to “balance and enhance” his Ostpolitik by developing closer links to the West. Andreas Wilkens contends, by contrast, that Brandt’s Westpolitik, especially his European integration policies, probably would have been much the same without Ostpolitik. In any case, Bonn’s closer cooperation with France on European integration suggests that it was moving somewhat closer to a Gaullist vision of Europe and seeking a measure of independence in foreign policy from the United States.

Under Brandt’s Atlanticist successor in the Chancellery, relations between Bonn and Washington improved during Gerald Ford’s brief tenure but then became more strained than ever before during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Barbara Heep attributes the difficulties in German-American relations in the late 1970s in large part to the differing personalities of the pragmatist Schmidt and the idealist Carter. Klaus Wiegrafe goes so far as to speak of a “rupture” (Zerwürfnis) in German-American relations during the Schmidt-Carter years. Wiegrafe, who had access to some of Schmidt’s papers, argues that neither Schmidt nor Carter wanted German-American relations to deteriorate, but a variety of factors led to that result. In addition

18 Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 623.
19 Ibid., 856.
to the end of the golden age of postwar economic growth with the oil crisis, Wiegrefe points to Bonn’s efforts to gain influence within the Atlantic alliance at a time when Washington was looking to Western Europe for greater support on the international stage. A certain German disillusionment about the often invoked German-American friendship, Schmidt’s arrogance, and Carter’s lack of foreign policy experience and insensitivity to issues of concern to West Germany also contributed to the deterioration in relations between the two countries. The argument that Bonn was seeking to play a more prominent international role fits well with Inge Schwammel’s contention that Schmidt’s European policy was motivated by the wish to transform West Germany into a great power. European integration was instrumentalized by Schmidt, according to Schwammel, to gain leverage in Washington. Herbert Dittgen, in contrast, argues that despite the “irritations” between Schmidt and Carter, German-American cooperation was, given the considerable economic, political, and military challenges of the period, very “successful.”

West Germany’s growing stature explains the end of French resistance to British entry into the European Community. Haig Simonian and Georges-Henri Soutou emphasize that Britain became a welcome balance to West Germany in French eyes, especially as Bonn took the initiative in improving relations with Moscow. President Georges Pompidou, as Andreas Wilkens has pointed out, was ready to welcome Britain into the European Community from the moment that British Prime Minister Edward Heath gave his assurance that he, too, was opposed to the idea of a supranational Europe. Franco-British agreement on the bases of European integration left West Germany an isolated proponent of a federal Europe.

Ostpolitik and West Germany’s growing international prominence also help explain, Soutou argues, why Pompidou attempted to establish something like a special relationship with the United States, especially in the area of nuclear arms. That initiative failed, however, because, first, Pompidou remained too Gaullist, insisting on France’s independence in political and security matters, and refused to cooperate in NATO. Second, Kissinger

---

24 Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 371–94.
and Nixon, despite “their proclaimed vision of a multipolar world,” Soutou argues, “never really abandoned the notion of a U.S.-led Atlantic world.”

The relationship between France and the United States thus remained, in the words of Frank Costigliola, a “cold alliance.” Nonetheless, as Costigliola points out, the 1970s saw a “slow thaw” between the two governments after the deep freeze of the de Gaulle era, due in large part to the end of the Vietnam War and the ascent of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to the French presidency in 1974. Giscard’s attitude toward the United States varied according to circumstances, as Hélène Miard-Delacroix has argued. In some instances, Giscard was in favor of close policy coordination among the members of the Atlantic alliance, especially on monetary matters. At other times, he resisted the United States in the name of French independence. Giscard, holding to a policy of “multipolarity,” thought France’s power would be enhanced through an independent Europe. Still, France did join the European Planning Group in NATO during his presidency, and he strongly supported NATO’s dual-track decision in 1979.

Studies dealing with British foreign policy in the 1970s frequently focus on either London’s often-difficult dealings with Europe or its “special relationship” with the United States. The Europhile Edward Heath brought Great Britain into the European Community in 1973. Heath’s memoirs not only attest to his love affair with Europe but also stand as the broadest firsthand British account of European politics in the 1960 and 1970s. A major question was – and remains – how far Heath was willing to commit Britain to Europe at the expense of relations with the United States. He was challenged by members of his own Conservative Party and of the Labour
opposition alike who wanted to “defend the Atlantic and Commonwealth links at all costs.”38 In Heath’s view, though, as he told Pompidou, “there could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, even if Britain wanted it, because one was barely a quarter the size of the other.” He was in favor, rather, of a “strong Europe . . . speaking with one voice” that would be able to exert influence in the world.39 Personality may also have played a part in London’s tilt toward Europe under Heath. He and Nixon, a recent study notes, did not get along well with one another.40 In his memoirs, Heath also criticizes Kissinger for his “lack of sensitivity” toward the concerns of the Europeans.41

Harold Wilson’s renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s entry into the European Community (EC) and the referendum on membership after the country had already joined the EC brought the British-European honeymoon to an end and Paris and Bonn closer together.42 Although Wilson campaigned in favor of continued EC membership during the referendum, he did so unenthusiastically. James Callaghan’s attitude to Europe was similarly ambiguous. Seeing himself as a devout Atlanticist,43 he had opposed British entry in 1971–72 while in the opposition.44 He became a reluctant supporter of EC membership, however, while serving as foreign secretary in Wilson’s cabinet, which was deeply divided on the issue. Membership in the EC, he believed, was “only marginal” to Britain’s economic success or failure.45 Reversing his earlier position, Callaghan came to see the European Community as a vehicle for Western Europe to assert itself vis-à-vis the superpowers,46 but he nonetheless preferred to deal with the United States bilaterally in the interest of maintaining the special relationship.47 Callaghan saw Britain as a mediator between Europe and the United States,

38 Young, This Blessed Plot, 225. 39 Heath, Course of My Life, 370. 40 Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 62, 73–8. 41 Heath, Course of My Life, 492. 42 Young, This Blessed Plot, 281–5. 43 Ibid., 285. 44 Ibid., 326. This can easily be contested, of course. Despite its rather dismal economic performance and economic policies during the 1970s, Britain quickly overtook West Germany and France in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows after it entered the European Community. Even before Thatcher became prime minister, the level of FDI in Britain was much greater than that of France and West Germany combined. In Britain, from 1971 to 1980, FDI totaled US$40.5 billion: in the same period, France received $16.5 billion and West Germany $14 billion in FDI. This had largely to do with the changed location of Britain — being inside rather than outside of the European Community. See data in Ziebura, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 318; cf. Matthias Schulz, “Vom Atlantiker zum Europäer? Helmut Schmidt, deutsche Interessen und die europäische Einigung,” in Die Bundesrepublik und die europäische Einigung 1949–2000: Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen, Mareike König and Matthias Schulz, eds. (Stuttgart, 2004), 213. 46 Callaghan, Time and Chance, 330. 47 See Matthias Schulz, “The Reluctant European: Helmut Schmidt, the European Community, and Transatlantic Relations,” in this volume.