Recent studies of the Cold War are transcending a narrow focus on the four decades of superpower rivalry.\(^1\) We now recognize that leaders and governments outside of Washington and Moscow also exerted political, economic, and moral influence well beyond their own borders. One striking example – and perhaps the most controversial nonsuperpower initiative – was the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which had a far larger global impact than commonly attributed. Henry Kissinger, who while he was in office was one of its bluntest critics, thirty years later called Ostpolitik “a tremendous achievement of Brandt [who] dared to raise the question of German national interests, attempted to relate them and indeed succeeded in relating them to the common interests of the West.”\(^2\)

Ostpolitik not only redefined West Germany’s relation with its Nazi past but also altered and ultimately transformed the global environment of the Cold War.\(^3\) From Bonn came an audacious policy not simply of stabilizing East-West relations and improving the lives of people behind the Iron Curtain, but also an active strategy of engaging its communist neighbors, ending West Germany’s sterile, costly global rivalry with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and expanding trade, political, and cultural relations with the Third World.\(^4\)

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This “normalization” and self-assertiveness became possible only after the West German government was prepared to acknowledge the consequences of World War II. Twenty-four years after the collapse of the Third Reich, Brandt recognized the loss of German territory, conducted grueling negotiations with Germany’s former victims in Eastern Europe, and renounced the use of force and the acquisition of nuclear weapons.5

Willy Brandt’s initiatives emerged from his frustration with the Cold War stalemate in Europe, but they also reached back to concepts he had harbored since the 1950s.6 With the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Germany’s division was tightly sealed. Drawing on their experiences in that fateful year as West Berlin’s governing mayor and its press spokesperson, Brandt and his close adviser Egon Bahr recognized that the “German problem” would not be solved by the superpowers, who seemed content with the “two-state-solution.”7 Brandt and Bahr, whose political careers had begun in the rubble of postwar Germany, jointly and gradually devised a new approach to the Cold War with West Germany as an active player pursuing its own interests. Recognizing the power of new ideas emanating from the besieged center, they sought to entice Moscow, where the key to German unification and political movement in Eastern Europe was supposedly stored.

The Kremlin was slow to respond. For more than a decade, the Soviet Union, the patron of East Germany, had emitted a steady stream of vitriolic criticism of Bonn’s neo-Nazi personnel and revanchist tendencies. However, in 1964, Nikita Khrushchev’s successors felt an increasing threat from the People’s Republic of China’s huge numbers and nuclear power and from a major war developing in Vietnam. Through its proposals for a European Security Conference, floated at the Warsaw Pact meetings in 1966 in Bucharest and in 1969 in Budapest, the Soviet Union aimed at consolidating its European gains and pacifying the continent in the wake

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of an unruly East Asia and Middle East. In 1967, tiny Israel had trounced its Soviet-armed Arab enemies, paving the way for U.S. entry into the region. In August 1968, the Prague Spring, although crushed by the Warsaw Pact, weakened the Kremlin morally and politically. Moreover, the much-heralded Kosygin reforms of the 1960s had patently failed to deliver the expected improvements to the Soviet economy. Thus in 1969, despite the mixed sentiments within the communist camp, Soviet Party Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev was open to serious and practical discussions with the new government in Bonn.8

Brandt was an ideal partner. The formerly powerless West Berlin mayor, on whom Moscow and its allies had heaped ridicule in 1961, had risen to chairman of the Social Democratic Party, to foreign minister in 1966, and to the chancellorship in a closely fought election in 1969. Moreover, Brandt’s distinctive antifascist credentials represented a complete break in West German politics, combining deep political convictions with shrewd diplomacy.9 Brandt’s foreign policy, rooted more in Gustav Stresemann’s sober pragmatism than in Otto von Bismarck’s arrogant acrobatics, appealed to skeptical Soviet leaders. Like Stresemann, Willy Brandt fully accepted the reality of Germany’s defeat and he eschewed the nationalist assertiveness demanded by the West German right; but also like Stresemann, Brandt had a long-term vision of peaceful revision involving economic and moral blandishments as well as deft mediation between friends and adversaries.10

Willy Brandt’s readiness to address the issues of guilt and morality transformed West German politics. His frank confrontation with the German past – combined with Bonn’s eagerness to de-emphasize Cold War


Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer

polarities – enabled the chancellor and his colleagues to pursue German political and economic interests even more assertively than his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) predecessors whose first and tentative attempts at Ostpolitik never crossed certain thresholds. By the end of 1969, the once nationalist Free Democratic Party (FDP) led by Walter Scheel was ready to weather heavy internal strain with the shift from its old CDU allegiance to a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Brandt figured as chancellor and the FDP leader as foreign minister. Only now, with the conservative CDU and Christian Social Union (CSU) parties no longer in government, could a “new,” that is, the “actual” Ostpolitik unfold.11

Some foreign observers recognized in Brandt the face of a new German nationalism. While his domestic critics expressed frustration and anger over his apologies and renunciation, the rest of the world suddenly took note of a more self-confident and activist West Germany. Bonn’s allies were wary of Brandt’s balancing act between East and West; its communist neighbors feared his supple maneuvers; and Third World countries faced the political and practical consequences of Bonn’s cease-fire with the communist world.

The accomplishments of the SPD/FDP government were achieved speedily. Within a year of Brandt and Scheel’s attaining office, bilateral treaties were signed in Moscow and Warsaw. In 1971, the Quadripartite Agreement stabilized the future of West Berlin and its beleaguered inhabitants; and that year Brandt became the third German in the twentieth century to win the Nobel Peace Prize after Stresemann and the pacifist journalist Carl von Ossietzky.

Now a world statesman, Brandt solidified his power at home. In the spring of 1972, after barely surviving a no-confidence motion, his government achieved parliamentary ratification of the two eastern treaties and won a resounding victory in the November federal elections. After the conclusion of their Basic Treaty in December 1972, both Germanys entered the United Nations in September 1973. That year the Bonn government finally signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia, which was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.

Introduction

West Germany's Ostpolitik was conducted at a tumultuous time in world history. While war was still raging in Indochina, fighting also erupted between India and Pakistan (1971) and violence flared in Northern Ireland. Palestinian terrorists hijacked Western planes and in 1972 kidnapped Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics; one year later war erupted again between Israel and its neighbors. Moreover, in 1973 a military junta in Chile overthrew the government of Salvador Allende.

Ostpolitik paralleled but also diverged from the course of U.S.-Soviet détente. Between 1969 and 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted arms reduction negotiations and concluded an agreement on Berlin while the Nixon administration also made its spectacular opening to China. However, a large range of U.S. political opinion reacted coolly to a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and to expanding trade relations; and in 1974 Richard Nixon, besieged by the crisis over Watergate, became the first American president to resign from office.

At the same time, major economic changes were occurring in Europe and the world. In 1971, the West’s economy was destabilized when the United States ended the Bretton Woods System and removed the dollar from the gold standard. In 1973, the European Common Market had its first expansion with the entry of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark; but this was also the year of the “oil crash,” which precipitated an energy crisis throughout the globe.

Brandt’s fall in June 1974, ostensibly caused by the discovery of an East German spy in his personal entourage, was less an international event than an internal political maneuver. We now know that the inconspicuous Günter Guillaume delivered far fewer secrets to his East Berlin paymaster than did lower-level GDR spies in the various Bonn ministries, who had greater access to classified material. Indeed, it was Brandt’s political associates who orchestrated his downfall. Exploiting the political danger of the chancellor’s private romances (of which Guillaume was fully informed), they forced the chancellor to resign in order to save the SPD’s future electoral prospects.

Brandt’s humiliating departure after four and a half momentous years in office launched a long debate over his Ostpolitik. Infused with partisan sentiments, politicians and scholars have long debated the merits and demerits of his foreign policy.

Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer

and argued whether Ostpolitik accelerated or prolonged the day of German reunification. Nonetheless, not even Brandt's severest critics have questioned the chancellor's courage and dedication but rather distrusted him for his charisma. It was difficult to deny that between 1969 and 1974 Willy Brandt achieved an extraordinary freedom of movement for West Germany in continental and global affairs on which his successor Helmut Schmidt was to capitalize in subsequent years.

This book, based on recently opened public and private sources from all over the world, represents the first broad, critical examination of how friends, adversaries, and foreign bystanders responded to Brandt's Ostpolitik. Archival access is still highly uneven, and in some instances nonexistent in many countries. Yet the available documentation makes it possible to identify and analyze the reflections, intended and unintended, of the momentous changes that began in West Germany's small, Rhenish capital in 1969 and left their mark on the second half of the Cold War.

II

Part I contains an investigation of the communist adversaries and addressees of Bonn's new diplomacy. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were fragmented and suspicious. At the same time, the members of the communist bloc were weary of remaining hostages to the dictates of hard-line East Germany. Brandt's brilliant gestures of expiation over Germany's historical crimes in Eastern Europe did much to diffuse the “German menace” as a unifying issue inside the Warsaw Pact. Despite some major irritations, such as border guarantees, compensation issues, and the fate of German-speaking minorities, Brandt's new communist partners could expect significant gains as well as economic benefits.

Andrey Edemskiy, who has consulted newly available material from the Russian archives and recent memoirs, has analyzed the origins and nature of Leonid Brezhnev's Westpolitik. Edemskiy stresses Brezhnev's forceful personal efforts to promote détente with West Germany and gain trust in Willy Brandt. This foreign policy served as a valuable instrument for the general

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secretary to attain unfettered power within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee; consequently, by 1973, the allies of the GDR were demoted. To be sure, given the existing fears of Germany within the Soviet Union because of the horrors between 1941 and 1944, the threat of large-scale emigration by the sizable German minority in the Russian and Kazakh republics, and the reservations within the European communist camp, Moscow’s decision to seek an accommodation with Bonn represented a truly momentous, if ultimately disappointing decision.

The case of Poland presents the most striking example of the sea change in West German diplomacy after Willy Brandt assumed the chancellorship in 1969. Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, who commends Brandt’s “key contribution to the start of the normalization process between West Germany and Poland,” also calls him the “spiritual patron of Polish-German rapprochement” after 1989. Yet far from lionizing the contemporary SPD–FDP government in Bonn, Ruchniewicz’s essay emphasizes the permanent tensions between Bonn and Warsaw fueled by the acrimonious domestic debate within the FRG. Nonetheless, although the hard-liners in both capitals wielded nationalist rhetoric and propaganda, “normalization” eventually prevailed.

Post-1968 Czechoslovakia, traumatized by Soviet-imposed “normalization,” responded cautiously to Bonn’s overtures. Alone among Bonn’s East European negotiating partners, the Prague government felt no urgent need to accommodate West Germany. Oldřich Tůma shows how the 1973 bilateral treaty and mutual diplomatic recognition between Prague and Bonn figured neither as a breakthrough nor a solution to all the historical tensions in Czechoslovak-German relations. In very different veins, the August 1968 experience loomed large for both sides. As foreign minister, Brandt and his advisor Bahr had encouraged the Dubček regime’s reforms to an extent they came to regret. After the Soviet intervention they were not without feelings of guilt to prevent “another Czechoslovakia,” that is, a repeated tragedy in the Eastern bloc. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic may have been Ostpolitik’s longest shot in Europe, yet, as Tůma also notes, 1973 brought a West German embassy to Prague’s Palais Lobkowicz. It was this extraterritorial building that in the autumn of 1989 became a major site in speeding up the downfall of the communist regimes in both East Berlin and Prague.

III

Bonn’s most important Western allies in Washington and Paris were initially skeptical and disconcerted by Ostpolitik although ultimately both
Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer

recognized its merits, the latter more than the former.16 France under Charles de Gaulle and his successor Georges Pompidou claimed to be the inventor of détente. It was not by accident that the term itself had found its way into English from the French language. On the other hand, the United States under President Richard Nixon was determined to launch an “era of negotiations” with the Soviet Union to defuse global tensions and help America out of its Vietnamese quagmire. With West Germany under Willy Brandt speeding ahead toward Moscow, and a Bonn chancellor becoming the first Western ruler to meet General Secretary Brezhnev face to face, Paris and in particular Washington were worried about the inversion of global arrangements.

Holger Klitzing underlines the reactive character of Washington’s German policy. The White House’s alarm peaked between late 1969 and the fall of 1970. However, before the apprehensions of the U.S. administration could disrupt U.S.–West German relations, Nixon’s National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger stepped in, and through a process of “co-opting” Ostpolitik became actively involved in the Berlin talks. Eventually, Brandt’s policy not only served as a catalyst for superpower détente, but also resulted in a significant reduction of tensions, keeping the option of German unification open and improving Bonn’s position as an international actor.

In her interpretation of the impact of Ostpolitik on Franco–German relations during Georges Pompidou’s presidency, Marie-Pierre Rey demonstrates how Paris-Bonn solidarity and a common faith in a European future overcame any initial doubts. France’s earlier venture into détente with Moscow had undoubtedly facilitated Brandt’s initiatives. Overall, Paris refrained from going as far as signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, but it also skillfully used its own rapprochement as a buffer against any potential German drift eastward. West Germany and France mutually supported each other’s policies on both sides of the European Cold War divide and appeared to be playing remarkably complementary roles.

IV

Asian countries, from a wary China, to a vacillating India, to a divided Korea, were inspired or alarmed by Brandt’s audacious model of Cold War diplomacy. Moreover, in Asia there were limits of Ostpolitik’s impact, because fundamental political decisions rested exclusively with the superpowers. Yet

the West German initiative and a changed European environment did not fail to resonate, for example in China’s historic rapprochement with the United States.

**Ostpolitik** heavily influenced South-North Korean relations during the early 1970s. As outlined by Meung-Hoan Noh, whose chapter is based on both Korean and German sources, between 1971 and 1973 the two rival governments on the Northeast Asian peninsula began to reconsider their hostile positions, spurred by South Korean elites who hoped to emulate the government in Bonn. However, neither Korean government was able to overcome its mistrust and hostility; nor was there much international support for Korean reunification.

The two major Asian powers, China and India, viewed the German initiatives through the lens of their strikingly different relationships with the USSR along with their particular economic and national interests.

In his essay on **Ostpolitik** and the impact of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on China’s relation with the two Germanys, Bernd Schaefer demonstrates how China eventually came to lean in favor of the technologically more powerful West Germany. Although Willy Brandt was reluctant to play the “China card” against an extremely wary Soviet Union, that is, to expand his **Ostpolitik** with a **Fernostpolitik**, Bonn’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972 represented a major extension of West German interests. By 1973, China, out of “its anti-Sovietism” and, even more, its pragmatism, came out in support of ending the “absurdity” of Germany’s division and maintained this stance throughout the 1970s. Brandt’s resignation in May 1974 deprived him of a historic visit to Beijing that had already been envisaged by both sides.

By contrast, in India, as Amit Das Gupta has written, Brandt’s personal charisma and realpolitik carried the day. During the Bangladesh crisis, the West German chancellor coordinated his policies with his West European partners, thus earning New Delhi’s gratitude for the early recognition of the new state. As an indication of Bonn’s increased leverage in Moscow, the Soviet Union failed to support the GDR in its contest with Bonn for diplomatic recognition in South Asia, thus clearing the way for closer ties between West Germany and India.

V

Embattled Israel, ambitious Yugoslavia, and beleaguered South Africa were all intrigued by **Ostpolitik** but in strikingly different terms. West Germany’s new assertiveness involved a more-or-less strict separation between
Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer

politics and economics whether in dealing with the Arab–Israeli conflict, the nonaligned movement, or neocolonial issues.

As Carole Fink writes in her chapter, Israel became particularly uncomfortable with West Germany’s new international identity, as symbolized by Brandt’s Nobel Peace Prize and his representing a proud, prosperous people no longer chained to the Nazi past. Between 1969 and 1974, when Bonn began wooing Israel’s mortal enemies – the Soviet Union and the Arab states – a once special relationship was transformed. Israel, on its side, by refusing to negotiate with Arab terrorists and launching a major settlement program in the occupied territories, was also responsible for the cooling of bilateral ties.

Tilman Dedering shows how the apartheid state of South Africa initially attempted to jump on the bandwagon of Ostpolitik and superpower détente while maintaining the status quo at home. Yet the Pretoria government also refused to engage adversaries in its own region as Bonn had done on the European continent. Soon enough South Africa also recognized that its Western allies’ political realism would add to its ostracism by the world community.

Milan Kosanović has described how Yugoslavia’s ambitions for closer relations with Bonn were frustrated. Marshal Tito had hoped to become Brandt’s conduit to the nonaligned movement. However, West German–Yugoslav relations became bogged down over questions of reparations and migrant workers; and although Brandt and Tito exchanged views about the global situation, the dream of a convergence between Bonn’s economic weight and Belgrade’s political prestige remained unfulfilled.

William Glenn Gray discusses how the detachment of economic and political elements affected nuclear issues. While acknowledging Brandt’s leadership in 1969 in convincing West Germany to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Gray also documents the chancellor’s forceful promotion of his country’s political and business interests as well as its technological prowess. Instead of “normalizing” the international nonproliferation regime, as Ostpolitik accomplished in Europe, West Germany’s global nuclear policies represented a challenge to the two superpowers for years to come.

VI

This volume represents a first step toward an international history of West Germany’s Ostpolitik between 1969 and 1974. These original case studies are by no means comprehensive, and more work remains to be done. Despite their considerable efforts, the editors were unable to obtain scholarly