This book is about amnesties for grave international crimes that states adopt in moments of transition or social unrest. The subject is naturally controversial, especially in the age of the International Criminal Court. The goal of this book is to reframe and revitalize the global debate on the subject and to offer an original framework for resolving amnesty dilemmas when they arise. Most existing literature and jurisprudence on amnesties deal with only a small subset of state practice and sidestep the ambiguity of amnesty’s position under international law. This book addresses the ambiguity head on and argues that amnesties of the broadest scope are sometimes defensible when adopted as a last recourse in contexts of mass violence. Drawing on an extensive amnesty database, the book offers detailed guidance on how to ensure that amnesties extend the minimum leniency possible, while imposing the maximum accountability on the beneficiaries.

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NECESSARY EVILS

AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE

Mark Freeman
Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world.

– JERUSALEM TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 4:8 (37a)
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preface</th>
<th>xiii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations and Legal Terms</td>
<td>xix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opening Considerations:</strong> On the Perennial Relevance of Amnesties</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I: The Debate on Amnesties</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defining Amnesty</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amnesties and the Fight against Impunity</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Transitional justice and amnesty</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 The lesser-evil argument and the limits of trial impact</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Evaluating the legitimacy and impact of amnesties</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Amnesties and International Law</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Treaty sources explicitly related to amnesty</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Treaty sources implicitly related to amnesty</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Nontreaty sources explicitly related to amnesty</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 International jurisprudence explicitly related to amnesties</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1 UN treaty bodies</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2 Regional human rights courts and commissions</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3 International and hybrid criminal courts</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5 Other legal rights and obligations  
4.5.1 Whether the right to amnesty is untouched by explicit prosecution commitments  
4.5.2 Whether there are countervailing obligations with respect to the same violations  
4.5.3 Whether there are conflicting state obligations between different human rights  
4.6 Legal defenses  
4.7 The question of limitations and derogations  
4.8 Reconciling international legal norms  

5. Amnesties and the International Criminal Court  
5.1 Background on the ICC  
5.2 General considerations about amnesties and the ICC  
5.3 Specific Rome Statute provisions related to amnesty  
5.4 The ICC in Uganda  
5.5 Conclusion  

6. The Evolving UN Position on Amnesties  
6.1 Legal questions about the UN position  
6.2 Policy questions about the UN position  
6.2.1 The mediation influence argument  
6.2.2 The burden-of-persuasion argument  
6.2.3 The practical guidance argument  
6.2.4 The counterweight argument  
6.2.5 The rigid and principled stand argument  
6.2.6 The deterrence of violence argument  
6.2.7 The ethics and rule of law argument  
6.3 Alternatives to the current UN position  

7. Conclusions  

Part II: The Design of Amnesties  
1. Introduction  
2. Last Recourse Threshold  
2.1 Existence of an urgent and grave situation  
2.2 Exhaustion of appropriate options to end the urgent and grave situation  
2.3 Exhaustion of leniency options short of amnesty to end the blackmail  
3. Overarching Parameters for Amnesty Design  
3.1 A legitimate process  
3.2 Minimum legal entrenchment  
3.3 Legitimate end
3.4 Minimum leniency 127
3.5 Maximum conditions 128
3.6 Maximum viability 129
  3.6.1 Typology of context and amnesty beneficiaries 130
  3.6.2 Transitional justice measures 131
  3.6.3 Features of the broader settlement 135
4. Specific Amnesty Design Choices 137
  4.1 Minimum legal entrenchment 138
    4.1.1 Nature of legal instrument 139
    4.1.2 Whether permanent or temporary in character 140
    4.1.3 Relation between amnesty and other laws 142
  4.2 Legitimate end 143
    4.2.1 Explicit objectives mentioned in the preamble 143
    4.2.2 References to sources of international law 144
  4.3 Minimum leniency 144
    4.3.1 The crimes or acts that are expressly eligible or ineligible 145
      4.3.1.1 Political versus ordinary offenses distinction 145
      4.3.1.2 Express exclusion of human rights crimes 148
      4.3.1.3 Express exclusion of crimes motivated by greed 149
      4.3.1.4 Express exclusion of crimes motivated by malice 150
    4.3.1.5 Express exclusion of selected context-specific crimes 150
    4.3.2 The persons who are expressly eligible or ineligible 151
      4.3.2.1 Distinctions according to affiliations and subaffiliations 152
      4.3.2.2 Distinctions according to rank 154
      4.3.2.3 Distinctions according to forms of criminal participation 155
    4.3.2.4 Express exclusion of beneficiaries of prior amnesties 156
      4.3.2.5 Express exclusion of foreign mercenaries 156
      4.3.2.6 Express exclusion of specific individuals 156
    4.3.3 Express legal consequences of grant of amnesty for the beneficiary 157
      4.3.3.1 Immunity of individual from prospective forms of liability 157
      4.3.3.2 Effect on ongoing investigations, subpoenas, warrants, and trials 158
      4.3.3.3 Effect on prior judgments and sentences 159
      4.3.3.4 Effect on personal records 160
      4.3.3.5 Effect on third parties 161
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3.6</td>
<td>Variation in legal consequences depending on crime or rank</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.4</td>
<td>Geographical scope of application</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.5</td>
<td>Temporal scope of application</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Maximum conditions</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>Conditions for obtaining individual grants of amnesty</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.1</td>
<td>Requirement to submit an individual application</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.2</td>
<td>Requirement to meet application deadline</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.3</td>
<td>Requirement of full and accurate disclosure of crimes</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.4</td>
<td>Requirement of apology</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.5</td>
<td>Requirement of public hearing</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.6</td>
<td>Requirement to participate in tradition-based justice process</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.7</td>
<td>Requirement of restitution and community service</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.8</td>
<td>Requirement of relocation and supervision</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.9</td>
<td>Requirement of DDR participation</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.10</td>
<td>Requirement of renunciation of violence</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.11</td>
<td>Requirement of release of hostages and prisoners of war</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1.12</td>
<td>Requirement of cooperation with law enforcement authorities</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>Conditions for retaining individual grants of amnesty</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2.1</td>
<td>Requirement of nonbreach of amnesty’s preconditions</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2.2</td>
<td>Requirement of nonrecidivism</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2.3</td>
<td>Requirement of compliance with prospective prohibitions</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2.4</td>
<td>Parallel requirement of pledges by the larger group</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Maximum viability</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>The supervisory body and its mandate</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>Contestation of individual amnesties by victims</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3</td>
<td>Contestation of individual amnesties by rejected applicants</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Final Considerations: On the Perennial Contestation of Amnesties 183

Appendix 1: Summary Guidelines for Effective Amnesty Design 189
Appendix 2: Selected Excerpts from International Legal Instruments 192
Appendix 3: Selected Excerpts from Jurisprudence on Amnesties 196
Notes 249
Index 347
This book is about amnesties adopted, reluctantly and in contexts of mass violence, for serious crimes under international law. The subject is naturally controversial. My intention in writing the book is merely to contribute to the debate, not to resolve it. The issue belies any neat solution.

More than any other measure, it is amnesty that constitutes the lightning rod – the hot-button issue – for individuals and groups dedicated to the fight against impunity. In that respect, the subject offers an important lens through which to understand the almost-seismic legal-political shift that has taken place in the global fight against impunity since the end of the Cold War – from the establishment of ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals to the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court, the emergence of truth and reconciliation commissions, and the adoption of a formal UN position on amnesties that reverses the institution’s long-standing prior practice.

My intention with this book is to be polemical. I believe some of my colleagues in the global fight against impunity have been moving too quickly toward closure of the amnesty debate. As someone who has chosen a professional career in human rights, and has advised on the question of amnesty in more than a dozen states, I have long been troubled by this premature push to close the debate. The fact is that there are many fundamental questions concerning amnesty that remain unresolved and that require debate. Yet the book would have little value if it only raised questions. Therefore, throughout
the text, the reader will find concrete suggestions about how to reconcile the legal and policy tensions that are endemic to the question of amnesty. The goal is to nurture a debate that will have practical results.

My hope is that the book will find an audience beyond the legal profession. The legal perspective is only one among many, and yet it has dominated amnesty debates thus far. Unless more voices are added to the debate, crucially important and different perspectives will be absent. Georges Clemenceau famously said that war is something too serious to be left to the military. Similarly, amnesty is too serious to be left to the legal profession.

I also wish for this book to find an audience beyond elite policy circles. Persons outside of such circles are almost certainly unaware of the radical normative and institutional changes of recent years that have turned the generally positive image of amnesty into a generally negative one. As a result, there may be a gap between the new rules and the commonsense perspective of the broader global public, including in countries where amnesty may be a necessary last recourse.

There has been much scholarship on amnesties in recent years, although there are relatively few book-length treatments of the subject. My intention is not to repeat what others have already said. However, it is necessary to cover some familiar ground, taking into consideration the broader audience that this book seeks to reach and the fact that not many people read, for example, the numerous legal journals in which the debates on amnesty have been, in equal parts, illuminating and passionate.

The research for this book originated several years ago when I began a project that involved the creation of a significant amnesty database. The database grew over the years and today includes nearly six hundred human rights–related amnesty texts, thanks to the support of many friends and colleagues, most notably Louise Mallinder and Jorge Errandonea. It was always my belief that such a database was necessary to ensure “smart” amnesty outcomes or outcomes based on deep comparative and technical knowledge of all the possible negative and positive amnesty design choices. I also wanted to avoid engaging in the error common to some of the legal literature and jurisprudence on amnesties, which involves making broad conclusions on the topic on the basis of the same small cluster of amnesty laws and cases taken from Latin America, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. Still, I am aware that my own amnesty database is far from complete. There are undoubtedly hundreds more amnesties than have been identified to date.

Although it is important, comparative expertise on amnesties is no guarantee of smart outcomes in and of itself. Expertise in mediation, international law, and military strategy could be just as important in some situations or, indeed, more so. At the same time, expertise on amnesty legislation can help
avoid foreseeable mistakes and ensure that amnesties are appropriately limited to maximally preserve future justice options. In that respect, I wish to underline that this book is ultimately less about amnesties than about the art of the pursuit of justice. It is about the art of balancing the demands of law with the human and political realities of particular contexts, while always placing a premium on justice in the broadest sense of the term.

The book is divided into two main parts. Drawing from a wide cross section of primary and secondary sources, Part I explains what amnesties are (and are not), why they tend to be viewed as inimical to the fight against impunity, and how international law treats them. It also explores the impact of the International Criminal Court on current debates and the merits of the UN Secretariat’s evolving position on what crimes should be barred from future amnesties. Seeking to replace the current ad hoc approach to amnesty negotiation, Part II presents an original methodology for the design of amnesties to help limit the harm they cause to the international rule of law and victims’ rights. The discussion includes argument on why amnesties should be adopted only as a last recourse, as well as a detailed presentation on design options for the content of an amnesty. The design options aim to ensure that amnesties pursue a legitimate end, are minimally entrenched in the domestic legal system, confer the minimum amount of leniency on the beneficiaries, impose the maximum conditions on them, and offer the greatest likelihood of being effectively administered.

Also included are an introductory chapter that presents several of the book’s underlying themes, arguments, and dilemmas and a concluding chapter that explores different aspects of the contestation of amnesties, following their adoption. The book is complemented by appendices of primary source materials on amnesties, including excerpts from international instruments and selected jurisprudence. There is also a glossary of common abbreviations and legal terms, although the reader will note that I use a number of terms without defining them, such as human rights crimes, international community, peace, democracy, and many more. Each of these terms can be dissected and parsed in various ways. I would ask the reader simply to adopt the commonsense or everyday meaning of these terms, except where the text specifies otherwise. Amnesty is the only term I will devote significant time to defining.

There was a time when it was considered taboo to say too much about amnesties out of fear that the world’s villains would seek to use the information to their own nefarious ends. Happily, that taboo has been overcome. Almost everything to be known about amnesties is now in the public domain where it belongs, and I know of no evidence demonstrating that amnesty outcomes have worsened as a result. Indeed, the opposite may have happened – amnesty scholarship and databases may be serving to refine and improve amnesty
outcomes. At the same time, there remains much to debate and learn. This book represents my attempt to contribute to that debate by presenting some new questions and ideas on what is at stake and on how to bridge the perceived divide between amnesties and the cause of justice.

Brussels
June 2009
Acknowledgments

Like most books, this one benefited immensely from the contributions of family, friends, and colleagues. I would first like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Drazan Djukic, Jorge Errandonea, Marieke Vlaemynck, and Anatoly Vlasov, each of whom contributed extensive and superb research and editorial assistance at different stages of the manuscript’s preparation. I am indebted to all of them.

I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Luc Huyse, Kate Carey, Louise Mallinder, Michael J. Nesbitt, Max Pensky, Joanna Quinn, Tyrone Savage, Leslie Vinjamuri, and Gwen K. Young, for having read and commented on the full manuscript. Their insights and feedback were crucial in making this a better book. I am similarly grateful to Reed Brody, Phil Clark, Gibran van Ert, Dadimos Haile, Pierre Hazan, Antje Herrberg, Sonia Herrero, Larry May, Julie Ringelheim, Martien Schotsmans, Ron Slye, and Géraldine de Vries for their very helpful comments on Part I of the manuscript.

My research for this book began many years ago when I first joined the International Center for Transitional Justice, and I remain appreciative of the early support and many stimulating conversations I had with colleagues while there.

I also extend my sincere thanks to John Berger at Cambridge University Press for his encouragement and patience throughout the writing process, and to Katherine Faydash, Peggy Rote, and Eleanor Umali for their excellent editorial support.
Finally, I wish to thank Annamie, Malachai, and Jonas for putting up with my many long days and nights typing away at the computer. It is to them and to my parents, David and Claire, that I dedicate this book.
Abbreviations and Legal Terms


aut dedere
the duty to extradite or prosecute

aut judicare


de jure
in or concerning law

ECHR the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

ECOSOC the UN Economic and Social Council

force majeure an extraordinary event or circumstance beyond one’s control

Geneva the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949:

Conventions

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
ABBREVIATIONS AND LEGAL TERMS


ICC the International Criminal Court


ICJ the International Court of Justice

ICJ Statute the Statute of the ICJ, which is contained within the UN Charter

ICTR the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

ILC the International Law Commission

jus cogens a peremptory international norm from which no derogation is ever permitted

lex specialis (or lex specialis derogat legi generali) means the rule of international legal interpretation according to which a specific law governing a subject takes precedence over a general law governing the same subject

locus standi the right to bring a legal action

mutatis mutandis with the necessary changes being made

ne bis in idem the right not to be tried or punished for a crime for which the person already has been convicted or acquitted

OAS the Organization of American States
obiter (or obiter dictum) means an aside or a remark by a judge or court that is superfluous to the determination of the case

opinio juris the belief that an action was carried out because it was obligatory to do so

proprio motu by one’s own initiative

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3

Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609

ratione loci the territorial scope

ratione materiae the subject-matter scope

ratione personae the personal scope

ratione temporis the temporal scope


res judicata a matter that already has been adjudicated


Slavery Convention the Slavery Convention (1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253, as amended by the subsequent Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926 (1955), 212 U.N.T.S. 277

UDHR the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948)
