Introduction

In the last decade there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in studying moral rationality within the broad context of personality, selfhood, and identity. Although a concern with the moral self was never entirely absent from the cognitive developmental approach to moral reasoning, it is fair to say that sustained preoccupation with the ontogenesis of justice reasoning did not leave much room for reflection on how moral cognition intersects with personological processes. Indeed, some topics, such as moral personality, moral selfhood and identity, and the study of virtues and of character were pushed to the margins for paradigmatic or strategic reasons, because, for example, such notions could not be reconciled to moral judgment stage-typing, or could not provide what was wanted most, which was a way to defeat ethical relativism on psychological grounds.

Yet the neglect of the moral dimensions of selfhood and personality could not endure for long, mostly because moral notions go to the very heart of what it means to be a person. Moral notions penetrate our conceptions of what it means to live well the life that is good for one to live. These are foundational questions that have commanded deep reflection since antiquity, reflection that psychological science cannot evade, not the least because the moral formation of children is the central concern of parents, schools, and communities who are charged with educating the next generation. It matters to us that we raise children to be persons of a certain kind. It matters to us that we become such persons. In this respect there are few domains of study more crucial than moral psychology, and few topics of greater importance than the development of moral self-identity, moral character, and moral personality.

Yet moral psychology is not a cohesive field of study, and, indeed, psychology is not a unified discipline. As a result, research that is relevant

to moral psychology can be found in diverse literatures and fields of study that invariably invoke different theoretical traditions, methodologies, and terms of reference. Some of the best writings on moral psychology are not written by psychologists at all, in fact, but by philosophers, two of whom are contributors to this volume. Oftentimes researchers who study dispositions do so without the moral domain in mind. Or, those who study the dispositional aspects of moral functioning – under the headings, say, of moral self-identity, character, or personality – propose powerful and interesting models, albeit without developmental grounding, bypassing entirely relevant developmental literatures that might serve integrative purposes. In turn developmental research on moral self-identity would profit from the well-attested literatures of social and personality psychology that flesh out adult forms of moral psychological functioning. As it stands now, "moral personality" is like an orphan who wanders about developmental, personality, and social psychological neighborhoods, recognizing some commonplaces but getting lost all the same.

We would like to bring the study of moral personality home to an integrative field of study. The purpose of this edited volume is to provide a seedbed for the study of the moral self and the nature of moral identity, personality, and character. The impetus for this volume was the *2006 Notre Dame Symposium on Personality and Moral Character*, which brought together renowned scholars from diverse perspectives to wrestle with how best to understand the moral dimensions of personality, and what this might require by way of theory and methodology. To our knowledge this was the first time that nationally visible scholars representing developmental, social, personality, and cognitive psychology were assembled to address theoretical and empirical questions regarding moral selfhood, personality, and identity. A second *Notre Dame Symposium* in 2008, held under the auspices of Notre Dame's College of Arts and Letters Henkels Lecture Series, resulted in more voices being added to the ongoing conversation.

The aim of the two Notre Dame symposia, and now of this volume, is to carve out space for a new field of study on the moral self that is deeply integrative across the domains of psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. Heretofore, the fragmented research on moral personality has been mostly a study of cognition without desires, rationality without brains, agents without contexts, selves without culture, traits without persons, persons without attachments, dispositions without development. We hope the present volume starts to change all that. One will find here diverse points of view and genuine disagreement about the meaning of foundational constructs,

to be sure, but we are confident that the volume points the way to promising integrative futures.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

The volume includes contributions from philosophy, personality, neuro-science, and from social and developmental psychology. We were tempted to group this overview by discipline, but such an organizing scheme would only reinforce disciplinary boundaries and undermine the volume's thematic intention, which is that such boundaries are likely to get in the way of strong integrative theory building and research.

The first two chapters set the pace for the volume by presenting options for moral personality from the perspective of extant theory and research in personality science. In the first chapter, Dan McAdams explores the implications of his "new Big Five" perspective for the moral personality, while Daniel Cervone and Ritu Tripathi take up the social cognitive option in the second.

For McAdams, personality is (1) an individual's unique variation on general evolutionary design for human nature, which is (2) experienced as a pattern of dispositional traits, (3) characteristic adaptations, and (4) self-defining life narratives, which are (5) situated complexly in social contexts and culture. If one wants to ask about moral personality, one must first specify at what level the question is directed. Moral personality is a plural concept. Moral considerations are embedded at each level, although perhaps morality is of prime importance in the construction of self-defining life stories – the internalized and evolving narratives that people construct to make meaning and find purpose in life. In summarizing 15 years of research on life stories of generative adults, McAdams contends that life stories of personal redemption are particularly valued as a powerful narrative of virtue and goodness in American adult life, one that provides a script that motivates, sustains, and provides meaning for moral projects.

In Cervone and Tripathi's view, a more flexible approach to personality theory is available in the social-cognitive perspective. They emphasize a model that includes cognitive appraisal and the limits of working memory that can move us down the road in explaining the shifting behavior people exhibit. They show how the Knowledge-and-Appraisal Architecture (KAPA) model of personality best captures the distinction between affective and cognitive processes, and contextual variation, in disposition. KAPA provides a way to characterize the consistency in personality across situations

by combining "enduring knowledge about the self" and "dynamic processes of meaning construction that occur within a given encounter," factors that vary idiosyncratically and are constrained by working memory limitations. In each situation, the individual appraises affordances based on self-efficacy (knowledge of self) in the context (beliefs about the situation). Appraisals operate continually as dynamic functions within situations, allowing the individual to select an appropriate course of action.

Owen Flanagan (Chapter 3) and David Wong (Chapter 4) each provide powerful philosophical perspectives on personality and identity. Flanagan defends the notion of personality against recent claims that character traits do not exist or, if they do exist, are trumped easily by the demand characteristics of situations. He also unpacks problematic metaphysical assumptions that underlie self-narratives, including the notion of "free will," and certain master-narratives ("hard work and effort pay") that function like heuristics, but are larded with descriptive and normative claims that do not bear analysis. His point here is that proper moral education requires the examination and critique of the metaphysical assumptions underlying moral precepts, especially in regards to master-narratives about the self or the good life.

In Chapter 4, Wong explores the interplay among culture, morality, and identity. In his naturalistic theory, moralities are part of culture. After sorting out various philosophical difficulties with respect to culture, Wong proposes that we think of culture as a kind of conversation that necessarily involves plural voices, and he works out the implications of this metaphor for understanding moral identity. For example, he points out the differences between a conversationalist view of culture – one that fluctuates, exhibits tensions, diversity, and contradictions – and an essentialist view that considers culture fixed and static. The conversationalist view allows the individual to select which aspects of a culture to adopt, to adapt, or reject. Within this conversation, one's moral identity may also fluctuate. Wong urges us to consider that such culturally flexible behavior may also apply to morality. Individuals may be not only linguistically bilingual but also morally bilingual.

The first four chapters, then, provide overviews and critiques of moral personality from psychological and philosophical perspectives. The next two chapters take up neuroscience and evolutionary perspectives on moral functioning. In Chapter 5, Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveiros-Souza, and Roland Zahn review the research on moral cognitive neuroscience. They stress that human emotion and cognition functionally are not separate but intertwined, which is most evident in the experience of a moral dilemma

when motivational significance is linked to abstract symbols and ideas. They note that the neurophysiology of attachment often underlies moral motivation. The brain systems that promote attachment enable humans to imbue other things with motivational abstract meaning, or what the authors' call "sophisticated moral sentiments." These allow an individual to embrace broader notions of "other" as understood by his culture, which Moll et al. term "extended attachment," at the same time "promoting altruistic behaviors within sociocultural groups" and "facilitating outgroup moralistic aggression."

The next chapter by Darcia Narvaez also builds on evolutionary neuroscience to suggest a dynamic view of moral personality, expressed as three ethics rooted in evolved strata of the brain. The three basic moral orientations – Security, Engagement, and Imagination – can be dispositional or situationally activated, influencing perceptual processing and goal salience. The most primitive and related to survival, Security, becomes the default ethic, if early experience is too far from the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. To develop sophistication, the other ethics require nurturing experience during sensitive periods. Narvaez challenges moral psychology to pay more attention to early development, sensitive periods, and their relation to moral functioning.

In Chapter 7, Ross Thompson reviews developmental literatures that speak to the development of moral character in early childhood. After reviewing classic moral developmental theories, he explores current research findings on the development achievements of infants and young children, including the ability to understand others' needs, awareness of intentionality and of normative behavioral standards. Although these literatures are not traditionally considered a contribution to moral development, they are clearly foundational to the emergence of the moral self. Thompson also reviews evidence regarding moral affect and on the development of conscience, which he regards as the foundation of the moral personality. Conscience can be defined as the cognitive, affective, and relational processes that influence how young children construct and act consistently with generalizable, internal standards of conduct. The burgeoning research on early conscience development shows that young children are developing moral orientations that are simpler, but fundamentally similar, to those of older children and adolescents, and that the moral capacities of youngsters have been underestimated. Thompson argues that the conceptual foundations of moral reasoning are well-established in early childhood; and that the development of cooperation and compliance and other features of the moral self are bound up with the dynamics of early relationships with caregivers.

Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill (Chapter 8) also take up developmental issues, but their starting point is modern personality theory. Lapsley and Hill begin by considering some broad issues concerning the basic units of personality, and recent advances in understanding the trait-structure and types of personality. They then extract five themes from the extant empirical literature on personality development – including temperament, persons, and contexts, continuity and consequence, the special status of early adulthood – and explore their implications for theory and research in the moral character development literature. After noting the two traditions of social cognitive development, Lapsley and Hill attempt to explicate a possible developmental course for the social cognitive mechanisms that seem to underlie moral self-identity, as well as prospects for future integrative research.

In Chapter 9, Daniel Hart and Kyle Matsuba present a distinctive model which claims that the contours of moral identity are constrained not only by stable aspects of personality but also by characteristics of family and neighborhood, a view that aligns with the best insights of developmental contextualism. By invoking two constituent layers to moral personality – enduring "dispositional traits" and "characteristic adaptations" – the model shares some affinity with the "new Big Five" framework of McAdams, "but it emphasizes the importance of broader contextual influences as well." Whereas moral identity includes self-awareness, a sense of self-integration, and continuity over time, a commitment to plans of action and an attachment to one's moral goals, moral identity is also a joint product of personal and contextual factors. They review evidence of factors that lead to moral commitment, including relationships that draw adolescents into moral activities and protect against "moral collapse." Community service is one such activity that promotes moral identity and civic engagement.

The new Big Five framework is also put to good use by Lawrence Walker and Jeremy Frimer (Chapter 10) who examined adult brave and caring exemplars. Walker and Frimer assessed moral personality at the levels of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative self-narratives, along with moral reasoning. Overall, caring and brave exemplars were distinguished in their personality profiles, with strong differences (favoring caring exemplars) evident in nurturance, generativity, and optimistic affective tone. Moreover, the caring exemplars' communal, generative, and affiliation/intimacy orientations were evident both at the levels of characteristic adaptations and in the life-story narratives. Differences between moral exemplars and non-exemplars were also examined and were best revealed, not so much at the level of dispositions and adaptations, but at the level of life-story narratives. Walker and Frimer identified a foundational core to the moral personality,

which is characterized by (1) an orientation to agency and communion; (2) the tendency to reframe critical life events redemptively, that is, as leading to positive results; (3) the presence of mentors and helpers in early life; and (4) the quality of childhood attachments.

Robert Emmons (Chapter 11) describes the rich yield that result from explicating the features of a particular virtue – gratitude – and the role it plays in motivating moral action. For Emmons, gratitude serves as a moral barometer that provides one with an affective readout, which accompanies the perception that another has treated one prosocially, as well as with a moral motive. Reviewing evidence of the "moral motive hypothesis," Emmons shows that gratitude shapes prosocial responding, and that gratitude is a psychologically substantive experience, relevant to how people negotiate their moral and interpersonal lives.

From gratitude we move on to the dispositional basis of altruism. Is there such a thing as the "altruistic personality"? Gustavo Carlo, Lisa PytlikZillig, Scott Roesch, and Richard Dienstbier (Chapter 12) think there is. After reviewing the empirical basis of their claim, they describe a study on those who volunteer others to help victims, reporting that those with greater altruism were more likely to volunteer themselves, especially when trait distress was high. Moreover, sex differences were found for those volunteering others. Men with high distress and high prosocial traits were *more* likely to send others to help whereas women with these traits were *less* likely to do so. Carlo and his colleagues conclude with some fertile suggestions for future research.

In Chapter 13, Michal Pratt, Mary Louise Arnold, and Heather Lawford take up the relationship between prosocial moral identity and a sense of generativity in adulthood, using narrative strategies that build on McAdams's life-narratives approach. They articulate a refreshing theoretical perspective that cuts across traditional developmental psychology, personality theory, and family studies, integrating life-course and systems perspectives. Following Erikson, they consider identity and morality to be mutually sustaining, and identity to be a central motivation throughout the life span. Pratt, Arnold, and Lawford present evidence for the early construction of generative moral themes during adolescence and emergent adulthood. These themes are revealed in the stories that adolescents tell about their lives and, in particular, in their account of their commitment to moral ideals. Hence the authors show the usefulness of tracing themes of identity through the lifespan, but also that of generativity.

After considering the nature of gratitude (Chapter 11), altruism (Chapter 12), and generativity (Chapter 13), the volume next examines the problem of

integrity, personal responsibility, and moral identity. Barry Schlenker, Marisa Miller, and Ryan Johnson (Chapter 14) argue that what determines the strength of the relationship between moral beliefs and moral behavior is a person's commitment to ethical ideologies. These ideologies function as a dominant schema that influences the appraisal of the social landscape and guides behavior. Some individuals have steadfast commitment to ethical ideologies ("integrity"), while others view the commitment as expedient and adaptable. The authors view the principled-expedient continuum because of its implications for moral identity, self-regulation, and moral behavior, and because it captures some of the great tensions in human affairs. Schlenker designed the Integrity Scale to measure steadfast commitment to ethical principles. Research using the scale indicates that integrity is accurately perceived by friends, is reflected in self-beliefs, affects social judgment, and predicts pro-social and anti-social activities. The authors conclude with an account of the "triangle model of responsibility," which explains when and why the self-system becomes engaged in moral action (or disengages from undesirable behavior).

Chapter 15, by Benoit Monin and Alex Jordan, takes up a social psychological account of the moral self. After challenging a self-consistency view of moral identity, the authors draw a distinction among three other possible meanings: moral identity as a normative ideal (a type of identity that has deeply integrated moral values and leads to an exemplary life); moral identity as a stable personality variable (how much one sees the self as a moral person); and moral identity as a dynamic and reflective self-image (a fluctuating sense of one's morality at any given moment). As social psychologists, they focused on the third meaning. They argue that everyday situations and behaviors affect our moral self-regard from moment to moment, and that this fluctuating self-regard in turn affects later behavior. They review empirical evidence to show that that when people are made secure about their morality – in the sense that they have already demonstrated their "moral credentials" – they sometimes act less morally. They also find that people sometimes boost their moral self-image to compensate for failure in other domains. When the behavior of moral exemplars is seen as an indictment of other people's choices, they are disliked rather than admired.

Linda Skitka and Scott Morgan argue in Chapter 16 that a moral frame of mind can cut both ways as a "double-edged sword." That is, the way that people's moral concerns play out in everyday social interaction may not always have normatively virtuous implications. For example, stronger moral conviction about specific issues is associated with more intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., that of a friend)

and distant (e.g., with the owner of a store one frequents) relationships; lower levels of goodwill and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups; and decreased ability to compromise on procedural solutions for conflict. People are also more likely to perceive vigilantism and other sacrifices of due process as fair when they achieve "moral" ends. This "double-edged sword" of moral perception shows that what can be described from the mindset of the actor as moral is nonetheless condemned as immoral from the mindset of the observer. Although primarily associated with pro-social and positive consequences, people's moral convictions, motives, and sentiments are sometimes associated with negative and antisocial consequences as well. As a result, the authors warn that efforts to increase the centrality of moral identity or of moral concerns could have paradoxical effects – and double-edged swords – that lead as much to negative as to positive consequences.

A social cognitive theory of moral identity is endorsed in Chapter 17 by Karl Aquino and Dan Freeman. What is prized about this line of research is its application to a specific context, which is the ecology of business settings. For the authors, moral identity is a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates choices, behaviors, and responsiveness to others, to the extent that identification with morality is judged as highly self-important. Indeed, whether moral identity influences moral behavior hinges on its salience, that is to say, its self-importance. Moral identity is motivational to the extent that one desires to maintain self-consistency. However, the authors point out that the salience of moral identity can be influenced by situational factors, including financial incentives, group norms, and role models. These factors may increase or decrease the salience of moral identity within one's working self-concept. Moral identity exerts greater regulatory control and motivational potency when situational factors elevate its salience. The authors review empirical evidence for the social-cognitive view of moral identity, along with certain moderators of moral identity, particularly as these apply to business settings.

The volume's final chapter (Chapter 18) is by Augusto Blasi, whose writings on moral self, identity, and personality are considered classic and foundational to the emerging discipline. In his chapter, Blasi seems to take a sharp turn from his usual emphasis on the moral self to an emphasis on the importance of reflective reasoning of the mature moral agent. He offers a masterful critique of the intuitionist shift in some areas of moral psychology, taking on in turn, Haidt (2001), Hauser (2006), and Gigerenzer (2008). Calling on evolutionary explanations, these theorists present rather fuzzy and unfalsifiable theories about the primacy of evolved heuristics

and intuitions in moral judgment, despite the fact that they admit intuitions often lead us astray. Blasi is critical of their dismissal of the reality and importance of reasoned reflection in the way we live our moral lives. In emphasizing the dominance of intuition and heuristics in moral judgment, not only do they ignore everyday moral functioning, they ignore the great number of studies conducted showing how reasoning and reflection are normal parts of adult lives. Blasi presents sample types of skills adults need for optimal functioning, and advocates a shift in emphasis in the field toward understanding mature adult functioning.

The volume concludes with a brief reflection by the editors on some of the recurring themes and tensions that resonate throughout the volume, and with some ideas for an interdisciplinary field of moral personality studies.

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