Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics – rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about the relationship of trust to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how informal institutions can affect trust without reducing it to fully determined expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, Emilia-Romagna, Italy, and Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and it shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust among Sicilian mafiosi.

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The Political Economy of Trust

Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany

HENRY FARRELL

George Washington University
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Acknowledgments

What is the relationship between institutions and trust? This question, which has fascinated me for many years, spurred both my dissertation and this (very different and, I hope, much improved) book. My fascination began when my academic mentor, Sam Barnes, suggested that I read Robert Putnam's 1993 book, *Making Democracy Work*. Like many others, I was captivated by the breadth and ambition of the book, which sought to reconcile arguments from political culture, the new institutional economics, Renaissance history, and many other sources to come up with a grand theory of the basic underpinnings of politics. I was also dissatisfied with Putnam's account of trust and cooperation in Italy in ways that I at first had difficulty describing, even to myself, and I started to pull, in a not very organized way, on loose threads to see what might give.

As I began to define my question better, I became aware of the extensive literature in game theory and rational choice on institutions and cooperation, in large part as a result of the tutelage of Jim Johnson. Yet I found this literature unsatisfactory too, especially when it tried to explain the more diffuse kinds of trust and cooperation that Putnam and others had written about. This book represents my efforts to come up with a better answer than either approach and, more generally, to try to use the rational choice theory of institutions as a way of understanding how individuals could come to trust and cooperate with each other, not only in the well-specified ways that game theoretic accounts describe but also in fuzzier situations, which are not clearly defined.
I owe intellectual and personal debts to many people. I also, to my very happy surprise, found that my intellectual conversations and research collaborations concerning this topic became the seedbed for many friendships. This is something that seems obvious now, but it was not at all obvious to me when I began as a graduate student to research this topic and write about it. When you enter into a community of argument, you find that it is a community in more than one way.

First, and most importantly, I am enormously grateful to my dissertation committee. I owe a great intellectual debt to my graduate school mentor and dissertation adviser, Sam Barnes. Not only did he provide me with a fine academic grounding in the understanding of trust and in Italian politics, but he also gave me free rein to build out from these foundations in unorthodox directions. Colin Crouch provided me with more specific guidance in comparative political economy and with a broader institutional framework in which I could pursue my particular interests. Margaret Levi gave me a much needed grounding in the literature on both trust and institutions. Mark Warren provided me with comments that helped me to see both the broader implications and more specific limitations of my argument.

In addition, I owe specific debts to Jack Knight and Jim Johnson. Many arguments presented in this book emerged from my running debate with Jack on trust and institutional theory over the last few years – we have written together on this and related topics, and we plan to write more in the future. As I have mentioned, Jim Johnson’s ICPSR course on rational choice provided me with many of the intellectual tools that I have used (or abused!) to write this book.

My original research for this book was carried out under the auspices of a larger project on the organization of local economies in Europe directed by Colin Crouch, Patrick le Galès, Carlo Trigilia, and Helmut Voelzkow. I am grateful to them for having given me the opportunity to piggyback my research interests on top of this larger project. I am also grateful to the two people with whom I worked most closely on the project, Ulrich Glassmann and Ann-Louise Holten. Ulrich carried out the lion’s share of the research in Germany, while Ann-Louise conducted interviews with Italian firms. I am grateful to them not only for their work with me on this topic but also for the many conversations that have informed the ideas and claims set out in this book. Luigi Burroni also provided help and support throughout the process of writing this book. I am eternally grateful to him. Chapter 4 of this...

Russell Hardin’s ideas are omnipresent in this book; my claims owe much to his accounts (developed in his solo-authored work and his work in collaboration with Karen Cook and Margaret Levi) of the encapsulated interest account of trust. He has been extraordinarily intellectually generous. Diego Gambetta deserves considerable thanks both for his generosity in making his database of Mafia-related information generally available and for some very helpful e-mail conversations about the Mafia and trust. Both Gary Herrigel and Jonathan Zeitlin provided me with good advice and tough, useful criticisms at early stages of this project. While both disagreed (and still disagree) vigorously with many of my claims, their intellectual generosity helped sharpen my arguments. Sven Steinmo’s conversation with me in a Brussels cafeteria also helped shape this project by forcing me to clarify my claims.

I am also grateful to Stefano Bartolini, Marco Bellandi, Nicola Bellini, the late Hans-Joachim Braczyk, Randy Calvert, Jim Caporaso, Karl Cerny, Roger Chickering, Karen Cook, Tyler Cowen, Gabi dei Ottati, Bruce Douglass, Mario Drago, Jean Ensminger, Neil Fligstein, Tom Garvin, Avner Greif, Lois Harder, Kieran Healy, Adrienne Heritièr, Joe Jupille, John Kenny, Peter Klein, Gerhard Krauss, Dawn Lyon, Rosarie McCarthy, Moore McDowell, Gary Miller, Kimberly Morgan, Maria Murray, the late Mancur Olson, Lin Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, Gabi dei Ottati, Gianfranco Poggi, Margherita Russo, Melissa Schwartzberg, Richard Sinnott, Sven Steinmo, Alec Stone Sweet, Carlo Trigilia, Josh Whitford, and Jonathan Zeitlin. All of these people provided helpful readings, criticisms, or feedback at different stages of the argument. Melissa Schwartzberg also provided much moral support as we both tried to finish our books for Cambridge. Two anonymous reviewers provided excellent, tough comments that have resulted in considerable improvements to the manuscript.

I am grateful to the European University Institute in Florence, for bringing me in as a researcher and for treating me as one of their own...
Acknowledgments

during the larger period of my dissertation research. I am also grateful to the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Society for hosting me for a month, and to the Akademie für Technikfolgenabschätzung for providing me with facilities and a happy work environment during my time in Stuttgart. Both the Max-Planck Project Group on the Law of Common Goods in Bonn and the Department of Political Science of the University of Toronto provided congenial work environments as I began to turn my research into a book. I owe a great debt of gratitude to all my former colleagues. My current intellectual home, the George Washington University, has provided me the resources to finish the book and membership in a thriving intellectual community.

The people at Cambridge University Press have provided me with considerable assistance and support as I wrote this book. I owe an especial debt of gratitude to my editor, Lew Bateman, both for patience and for intellectual support and advice throughout. Regina Paleski did a wonderful job as production editor in seeing this book reach press. Emily Spangler provided considerable help in coordinating the book cover and other matters. Finally, Scott Barker provided excellent copyediting, not only correcting for stylistic tics and English language errors but also, to my surprise and delight, spotting and correcting a grammatical mistake in Italian, too.

Last, but most important, family: I cannot express my gratitude to my wife, Nicole Erb, and our sons, Jack and Kieran. Nicole came into my life just after I had finished my dissertation; this book has been in gestation ever since. She has been extraordinarily patient and helpful in giving me time and space to complete it. Jack and Kieran have contributed in a more inadvertent fashion, through the dates on which they arrived in this world; Jack’s imminent arrival pushed me to complete the first major draft, and Kieran’s arrival (some 10 days before I write these words) pushed me to complete this one. I owe particular thanks to my parents and siblings, my late grandmother Eilis McDowell, and my aunt Niamh. Finally, this book is dedicated to my late aunt and godmother, Bairbre O’Dwyer, in fulfillment of a promise made long ago. She was never happy with half measures and asked, when I made her this promise, whether I was going to write an interesting book. I can only hope that this book would have been interesting enough to satisfy her formidable intellect, and I trust that her warmth and kindness would have led her to overlook the many flaws I am sure still remain.