This book provides a collection of sources, many of them fragmentary and previously scattered and hard to access, for the development of Peripatetic philosophy in the later Hellenistic period and the early Roman Empire. It also supplies the background against which the first commentator on Aristotle from whom extensive material survives, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. AD 200), developed his interpretations, which continue to be influential even today. Many of the passages are here translated into English for the first time, including the whole of the summary of Peripatetic ethics attributed to ‘Arius Didymus’.

Robert W. Sharples was Emeritus Professor of Classics at University College London. He published extensively on the Peripatetic tradition in antiquity, notably in the context of the Theophrastus Project and of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series. He also published a successful textbook, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), and a number of editions of ancient texts. Professor Sharples died in the summer of 2010 shortly before the publication of this book.
PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHY
200 BC TO AD 200

An Introduction and Collection of
Sources in Translation

ROBERT W. SHARPLES

with indexes prepared by

MYRTO HATZIMICHALI
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The period of ancient Greek and Roman philosophical thought that falls between the Hellenistic philosophers of the third and second centuries BC, on the one hand, and the Platonism of late antiquity on the other, is at present the least known in the English-speaking world. During the second half of the twentieth century much scholarship was devoted to showing that the thought of those two periods was of general philosophical interest and deserved a place in standard syllabuses. For the Hellenistic period, in particular, one problem was the difficulty of finding, and making reference to, much of the textual evidence, scattered as it was in a wide range of mostly later ancient authors. This problem was solved, and the philosophical interest of the material highlighted, by the publication in 1987 of A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley’s sourcebook *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. For late antiquity a similar role has been played by Richard Sorabji’s sourcebook *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD*, published in 2004. That had its origins in a conference held at the Institute of Classical Studies in London in 1997, with the express intention of introducing the period and the main personalities and issues within it to those who might be familiar with some aspects of ancient philosophy, but not with that period, and might be encouraged to work on it.

It was with a similar intention that a conference on the philosophy of the period from 100 BC to AD 200 was held at the Institute in 2004. The proceedings of that conference have been published in Sorabji and Sharples 2007; but it was also intended that it should give rise to a series of sourcebooks, of which this is one, containing a selection of material relevant to the study of the Peripatetic tradition between 200 BC and AD 200. Some explanation, both of the use of the term ‘Peripatetic’ and of the chronological limits, is called for.

Aristotle’s views and writings were discussed in this period both by those who identified themselves as belonging to the Aristotelian tradition in philosophy and by members of other schools, the former indeed often
replying to attacks by the latter. During the period, interest in Aristotle shifted from discussion of his doctrines, often mediated through second- or third-hand witnesses, to detailed study of the text of his unpublished or ‘esoteric’ works, those which we still possess today; but the two approaches were not mutually exclusive, and one advantage of the arrangement by themes which I have adopted is that it highlights the way in which certain philosophical issues remained central throughout. I have used the term ‘Peripatetic’ rather than ‘Aristotelian’ simply because of the ambiguity of the latter, which could be taken to imply that the views in question were those held by the historical Aristotle himself. Those who discussed his philosophy in our period did not indeed hesitate to describe the views they set out as ‘Aristotelian’, for they regarded themselves as simply spelling out the implications of what Aristotle himself had said, even, as we shall see, on questions which he had not himself considered and which only entered the philosophical arena later. To follow them in this would, however, run the risk of misleading the reader.

Michael Frede showed (Frede 1999) that there was a decisive shift in ancient philosophy at the start of the first century BC. It was at this point that philosophers started to look back to the great figures of the classical past and to treat their writings as in some sense canonical. This was indeed, as he argued, part of a general shift in ancient Greek culture; it affected philosophy later than some other areas, for example literature.\(^1\) The new interest in Aristotle’s texts in the first century BC shows that the Peripatetic tradition was no exception to this – it may indeed be seen as a paradigm case. (See further below, on 2A.) The interpretation of Aristotle’s works has continued to be a focus of, and an inspiration to, philosophical activity from the first century BC until the present day; so the present collection will be of interest to many not least because it traces the earliest stages of that story – in so far as the available evidence enables us to reconstruct them.

Aristotle’s colleagues and immediate successors in the late fourth and third centuries BC, such as Theophrastus of Eresus (head of the school from 322 until his death in 288/7 or 287/6 BC) and Strato of Lampascus (head from Theophrastus’ death to c. 269 BC) continued his work by conducting enquiries in the areas in which he had worked, and by developing doctrines which

\(^1\) Why this should have been so is a question to which simple answers are not going to be adequate, but one relevant factor seems to be that the centre for philosophy in the third and second centuries BC remained Athens rather than Alexandria, and that it was with the latter that antiquarian study of earlier Greek culture was particularly associated – even though, ironically enough, the model for that study was itself Aristotelian. See Glucker 1998, especially 312–14. Alexandrian scholars were interested in Plato’s dialogues, but above all as literary and stylistic models. (I owe this point to Herwig Maehler.)
recognisably form part of the same intellectual agenda, even though they were ready to disagree with him and even though they emphasised some of the areas in which he had worked more than others. What they did not for the most part do, as far as we can see, was to regard Aristotle’s writings as containing a body of doctrine which it was their task to interpret. This, the invention of Aristotelianism, was to come later, its foundations being laid in our period. Much of the work of Aristotle’s immediate successors was in what we would now regard as natural science rather than philosophy; the questions with which they were concerned were not, in general, the ones which were dominant in the Peripatetic tradition in our period, and to attempt to survey their work in the present sourcebook would both increase its length massively and reduce its coherence. The issue of the boundary between philosophy and natural science – once, significantly, known as ‘natural philosophy’ – is one to which we will need to return.

In the second century BC there was a change. After Strato the Peripatetic school had gone into decline; the reasons for this have been much debated, but a central one seems to have been that already under Aristotle himself the Lyceum was not so much a school of philosophy, in the way that term was understood in fourth- and third-century Athens, but an organisation conducting research in a wide variety of fields, and that in this area it could not compete with the state-sponsored activities in Alexandria. The exception to the decline, however, was Critolaus. As far as we can tell from our evidence, he was interested in Aristotelian doctrines rather than in Aristotelian texts; but to a large extent he seems to have defined those doctrines in conscious opposition to Stoicism, a trend that was to continue in subsequent centuries, and some of the issues on which he took positions are those which were central to subsequent debate as well. Consequently Critolaus is part of our story in a way in which Theophrastus and Strato are not.

At the other end of our period, the decision has been made to exclude Alexander of Aphrodisias, the commentator on Aristotle who flourished in about AD 200, for two reasons. The massive scale of his surviving writings – about two thousand pages of Greek text survive, even though much has been lost or survives only in quotations by later witnesses or in Arabic translation – means that a selection would either be hopelessly inadequate or else would unbalance the entire collection. And, secondly, Alexander has already been covered in Richard Sorabji’s sourcebook (Sorabji 2004). Passages from Alexander have therefore been included here only either when they are evidence for the earlier thinkers with whom the present collection is concerned, or when they continue and elucidate the debates characteristic of our period.
As already indicated, the material here is arranged thematically. After an initial chapter comprising material relating to the identification and activities of the Peripatetics of this period, subsequent topics are arranged approximately in the order of themes familiar from the standard arrangement of Aristotle’s own works in the Bekker edition, with certain modifications. Material on metaphysics, in the sense of general ontology, has been placed after that on the categories, not after that on physics in the broad ancient sense of that term. Especially for this period, when discussion of ontology and discussion of the categories were closely linked, this seems more appropriate than placing metaphysics after psychology and biology. Material on theology, including providence and the ordering of the world as a system, has been placed within physics, for this again suits the nature of the discussions in this period; and within physics it has been placed between discussion of the heavens and that of soul, for it relates closely to the former. The standard order with which modern readers are familiar in the case of Aristotle’s own works is logic–physics–ethics; but in late antiquity the standard order of Aristotle’s works was logic–ethics–physics. This may or may not be the ordering introduced by Andronicus (cf. Barnes 1997, 32–3), but it seems likely that the ancient order developed during our period, and it therefore seems appropriate to follow it.

Two extended texts have been included as units in their entirety, rather than being divided up thematically: the account of Aristotle’s doctrines in Diogenes Laertius 5 (Chapter 3) and the account of Peripatetic ethics in Stobaeus commonly attributed to Arius Didymus (15). The former is available in English translation in the Loeb series; the latter has not, as far as I am aware, previously been available in English in its entirety. In both cases it seemed appropriate to include the whole of these texts, since numerous parts of them are relevant to other, thematic sections and are cross-referred to from them. While there are other texts too for which a case for inclusion of the whole could be made, such as the pseudo-Aristotle treatise On the World (De mundo), in these cases it seemed more appropriate to include, in the thematic sections, only those passages which are particularly important for specific themes; De mundo is available in English translation in Furley 1955, and much of it is concerned with natural science, such as its chapter 4 on meteorological phenomena. Although some

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Runia 2002 has shown that there was a major change in theology from Philo of Alexandria onwards; it ceased to be studied, in the Hellenistic manner, as part of physics, and the divine came rather to be regarded as a subject of study sui generis. In my own 2002a I have attempted to show that this shift applied especially to the Platonic tradition, broadly defined; it did not apply, or did not to the same extent apply, to the Peripatetic tradition.
information on Nicolaus of Damascus has been included and his compendium *On the Philosophy of Aristotle* has been mentioned occasionally, excerpts from it do not play a large part in this collection, for reasons explained in the Introduction below; the same applies to the Peripatetic material in pseudo-Andronicus, *On the Passions*.

Study of the thought of this period, and not only of that in the Peripatetic tradition, encounters the difficulty that some background knowledge is required not only of Aristotle’s own thought and writings, but also of the differences between Aristotle and Plato on the one hand and of the Stoic tradition on the other. All philosophers have, however, to varying degrees reacted, and continue to react, to the thought of their predecessors, and the fact that Descartes was influenced by his predecessors (cf. Menn 1998 and 2003) has not led to arguments that no one should study Descartes unless they have first studied later ancient and medieval philosophy. The thought of most of the period with which the present book is concerned is however intrinsically backward-looking to an extent to which not every period of philosophy has been, and I have therefore attempted, in the discussions which follow the selection of passages in each chapter, to provide some essential background. I have assumed that most readers will at least have some familiarity with the general chronology of ancient Greek and Roman history and of the major philosophical figures and movements within this. Beyond that, there is a question how much background knowledge should be assumed, and how much incidental information given; I hope it will at least be clear to readers where they should look for information if it is not given here.

A more intractable difficulty in coming to grips with the period of thought examined in the present sourcebook, at least for beginners, is that what is at issue is not a developed system of thought, but rather the earlier stages of the process by which such a system – Aristotelianism – eventually came to be constructed on the basis of Aristotle’s works. As it has increasingly come to be realised that many doctrines which have for nearly two millennia been regarded by students and critics of Aristotle as central to his philosophy are in fact interpretations by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and only questionably held by Aristotle himself, there is a particular interest in examining the stage in that process which preceded Alexander himself.

3 For example: that Aristotle identifies form with the essence of the species (see Rashed 2007, especially 30–1, 151–2); that Aristotle’s theology is to be found in *Metaphysics Α* (Bodéüs 1992, 67 n. 34); that the movement of the heavens is caused by a desire to imitate the Unmoved Mover(s) (Berti 1997, 64; 2000, 201; cf. Broadie 1993, 379; Laks 2000, 221 n. 37).
Three further lines of demarcation have also had to be drawn, though, as in all such cases, their precise location has inevitably been to a certain extent arbitrary. First, the materials collected here are intended to elucidate the history and development in our period of the Peripatetic tradition – what might loosely be called the Peripatetic school, though not in our period a school in the sense of a formal institution. They are not intended to shed light on the whole history of the reception of Aristotle in the period. (After all, it is not usual to regard ‘Platonism’ as including every discussion of Plato.) Consequently, although interpretations of Aristotle by members of other philosophical schools are included to some extent, the emphasis is necessarily on the views, observations and agendas of those who defined themselves, or were regarded by others, primarily as followers of the Aristotelian tradition. There is, after all, some danger in assuming that, because a non-Peripatetic author makes an observation about Aristotle, their doing so must necessarily reflect discussion among Peripatetics at the time. Few, one hopes, would still suppose that, whenever Cicero mentions Plato, what he says necessarily and always reflects current interpretations of Plato to the exclusion of acquaintance with the actual text. True, while Cicero demonstrably could and did read Plato for himself, it is less obvious that ‘outsiders’ were reading, or would have wanted to read, Aristotle’s complex and obscure unpublished writings for themselves. That Cicero in On the Nature of the Gods 2.95 makes his Stoic spokesman Balbus cite the adaptation of Plato’s cave analogy in Aristotle’s published On Philosophy (Aristotle, fr. 12 in Rose 1886) may not tell us anything about Peripatetics in the time of Cicero. If Cicero could read Plato for himself (as we know he did, for he translated several passages), he could also read Aristotle’s published or ‘exoteric’ works. The sort of source-criticism which rested on the assumption that Cicero read a text or entertained a philosophical thought only if someone else in his own period or just before it was already doing so is now rightly discredited. Cicero’s – or his Stoic source’s – use of Aristotle in On the Nature of the Gods 2.95 is part of the history of the reception of Aristotle, but that is not the same thing as the history of Peripatetic philosophy. Seneca’s account of the four Aristotelian ‘causes’ (12C) is included, because there are features of it which may suggest that it could tell us something about contemporary Aristotelian exegesis, presumably by Peripatetics (see, however, the commentary on this passage). However, Seneca’s references to Aristotle in the Natural Questions are

4 Cf. also, on the question of Seneca’s direct use of Plato, Inwood 2007a, 108–9; 2007b, 150.
almost all taken from the *Meteorology* itself, and so do not seem to tell us much about Peripatetic philosophy in his day. See also 18T.

A particular problem is created here by the approach of Antiochus of Ascalon, known to us chiefly through the writings of Cicero. Antiochus claimed that Plato, his immediate followers in the Old Academy, Aristotle and his early followers, and the Stoics, grouped together as ‘the old philosophers’, all shared a common set of doctrines, though with individual variations. Antiochus’ interpretation of Peripatetic ethics, and the contrast he drew between Peripatetics and Stoics in this regard, can legitimately be regarded as part of the history of the topic, because it connects both with Aristotle’s own statements and with points made in our period by those who were Peripatetics in a more straightforward sense than Antiochus was. Even Cicero’s criticisms of Theophrastus for weakening the original doctrine and allowing fortune to count for too much are in a sense part of our subject, just because, by contrasting Aristotle and Theophrastus, Cicero or Antiochus is advancing a particular interpretation of Aristotle. However, when Antiochus states the Stoic doctrine of two physical principles as that of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics (Cicero, *Academia* 1.24), even if there may be some historical truth in this where the Academy is concerned (see Sedley 2002), the sense in which it can be regarded as a contribution to the interpretation of Aristotle seems at best tenuous; or at least, if this aspect of Antiochus’ views belongs in the history of Aristotelianism, it does so no more, and possibly less, than it does in the history of Platonism.

Secondly, this collection is structured around the philosophical themes and topics which seem to characterise Peripatetic thought in our period. This is necessary if the contents of the collection are to be manageable and easily understood. In general, no attempt has been made at comprehensiveness in including contributions which were made by one thinker but do not seem to have preoccupied others. For some of the authors included here, indeed, there at present exists no complete collection of fragments and testimonia; the present selection has been designed specifically as a source-book, that is to say a convenient collection of material for those who wish to become familiar with the main issues relating to its subject matter, and no

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5 The exceptions are *Natural Questions* 7.5.4, which reports Aristotle, *Meteorology* 1.6, but appears to add detail not in the text of Aristotle (so Corcoran 1971–2 ad loc., vol. 11 237 n. 2), and 7.30.1 = Aristotle, fr. 14 Rose 1886. But the former is probably due to misunderstanding; what Aristotle says is that the light of the comet in question extended *spatially* as far as Orion’s belt and was dispersed there, but Seneca interprets this as a process *in time*. The latter apparently derives from Aristotle’s lost dialogue *On Philosophy*, and there is no reason to suppose that Seneca’s referring to it is significant for Peripatetic discussion *in his own time*. 
attempt has therefore been made at the completeness which is needed in the definitive collection of all the evidence relating to a particular thinker, which in these cases is something we still have to await. The fact that certain themes were of particular interest and were topics of discussion is itself significant for the way in which Peripatetic philosophy in our period operated within a larger philosophical and cultural context; the key influence here is that of Stoicism, which explains the prominence of concern with substance (Chapter 12), with the place of sense perception in achieving knowledge (14), with the emotions (16), with the ethical development of the individual (18), with the eternity of the world (20), with providence (22) and with fate (23) – for in all these areas Peripatetic thought was reacting to, and to a greater or lesser extent disagreeing with, Stoicism. The aspect of Aristotle’s legacy that is strikingly absent is above all his work on biology; this is to be attributed to the way in which systematic investigations in this area had come to be replaced by the collection and transmission of information in reference works of various sorts; other omissions are political theory (for the context of political activity had changed beyond recognition from the autonomous city-states which Aristotle himself studied; see, however, below), and rhetoric and literary criticism (for here Aristotle’s contributions had been absorbed into traditions that had separate lives of their own apart from philosophy). One puzzle which has not yet I think been adequately solved is why there was such interest – and not only among Peripatetics – in Aristotle’s work Categories; this may in part be just an impression created by the place of this text in later philosophical teaching and the perhaps disproportionate amount of information on it that we possess, above all through Simplicius’ commentary (approximately 171,000 words of commentary on 10,500 words of text), but I do not think that that can be the whole story. (I have advanced some further suggestions in Sharples 2008b.)

Thirdly, the emphasis is on discussion of philosophical issues. Aristotle was, after all, a polymath, and it is not easy to separate his contributions to philosophy from his contributions to what we would regard as the natural sciences. In so far as it is possible, however, the focus here is on the former rather than the latter. Aristotle’s work in natural science was not, in general, being developed in our period by those who identified themselves as

\[6\] I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for Cambridge University Press for emphasising this.

\[7\] The way in which sense perception operates, however, has been placed under physics, linked as it is in Aristotle himself with the topic of the soul.


\[9\] Word counts taken from the on-line Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
specialists in Aristotle (the exception being astronomy – see 21 below; but even here we are concerned with attempts to interpret Aristotle’s texts, or to reinterpret them in the light of advances that had been made in the subject). Topics such as Seneca’s disagreements with Aristotle’s views on the causes of meteorological phenomena (for which see, e.g., Kidd 1992) do not therefore belong here. A special case concerns the use and criticism of Aristotelian theories by Galen; passages in which there is reason to suppose that Galen is reacting to Peripatetics of his own period rather than directly to Aristotle or to Theophrastus (25B, 26AE) have been included, but Galen’s attitude to Aristotle’s own writings is not part of the history of Peripatetic philosophy in our period. Moreover, it is hoped that a further volume in the present series will consider the relation of Galen to all the philosophical traditions of his day, and it is in this context that his attitude to Aristotle in particular will best be considered.

The present book follows the principles and layout of the first volume of Long and Sedley 1987 (LS). Selected passages on each topic, in translation, are followed by a discussion setting them in context. An attempt has been made to provide information necessary for immediate understanding of the passages in the footnotes to the passages themselves, but the discussion at the end of the chapter should also be consulted. Within each chapter passages in the same chapter are referred to by capital letter only; those in other chapters by chapter number plus letter. Where reference is made to a passage in another chapter, the discussion of that passage in the commentary on that chapter should also be consulted. Longer passages are subdivided into numbered sections for ease of reference; these divisions are made purely for the purpose of this book and do not reflect standard editorial divisions of the passages involved. For Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics book numbers and Bekker column-and-line references are given, but not chapter numbers, because of the risk of confusion where there are two systems in use and some texts have both. Difficulty may also be caused if ‘source for B’ is

10 It seems possible that the first book, and the first part of the second book, of the Supplementary Problems variously attributed to Aristotle and to Alexander, but not in fact by either (1 and 2.1–38 in Kapetanaki and Sharples 2006 = Aristoteles, Problematiga inedita 1 and 2.1–38 in Bussemaker = Alexander, Problematiga 3 and 4.1–38 in Usener 1859), were compiled in the second century AD, and so in our period (see Sharples 2005, 54–6, and Kapetanaki and Sharples 2006, 9–10); but these texts tell us little of any systematic developments in Peripatetic thought (cf. Kapetanaki and Sharples 2006, 22–7). The pseudo-Aristotelian Problems in Bekker’s edition seem to date, in the main, from the third century BC; there are scattered references to Aristotle’s Problems by Aristotle himself and others that correspond to nothing in either collection (cf. Flashar 1991, 303–16), but the texts referred to are impossible to date precisely and again do not connect with central themes of Peripatetic philosophy.

11 It is, however, usefully discussed by Moraux 1984, 687–808, and Gottschalk 1987, 1166–71.
used to refer both to an earlier writer (A) from whom a writer B drew material, and to a later writer (C) who is our evidence for lost works of (B); to avoid ambiguity, I have confined the use of ‘source’ to the former case, and in the latter have spoken either of ‘evidence’ or of ‘witnesses’.

A particular note of explanation is needed in connection with references to ‘Aëtius’, the doxographical writer or compiler of a catalogue of the opinions (doxai) of various philosophers whose work was ‘reconstructed’ by Diels in his Doxographi Graeci (= Dox.: see the list of abbreviations below). Diels’ reconstruction is, as has been shown above all by Mansfeld and Runia 1996–, open to question in many of its details: he treated as sections of the original work material preserved in only one of the witnesses for it, rearranged the material in one of those witnesses (Stobaeus) to fit the sequence in the other (pseudo-Plutarch), and, inevitably, sometimes made questionable judgements as to what material in Stobaeus came from Aëtius and what from elsewhere. I have therefore given references to ‘Aëtius’ only in cases where a passage occurs in both witnesses; where it is found only in one I have given the reference to that witness first and then added the reference to ‘Aëtius’. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Aëtius did produce his catalogue of opinions in about AD 100; what he says in his preface (§E below) about the scope and organisation of Peripatetic philosophy is surely evidence for one way in which this was seen during our period, and I have therefore included not only the preface but also other passages in which Aëtius, as reconstructed, refers to Aristotle or (in particular) to ‘the Peripatetics’, as these too may be evidence for Peripatetic activity in our period, though such reports may also be repetitions of earlier material whose time of origin cannot easily be determined.

The compilation of a sourcebook such as this naturally involves drawing on information from many sources, both published work and informal discussions. Among the former I should especially record my indebtedness to Moraux 1973 and 1984, to Gottschalk 1987, and to those in addition to myself who gave papers on aspects of Peripatetic philosophy in this period in the conference on philosophy between 100 BC and AD 200 held in London in 2004 and published in Sorabji and Sharples 2007; Tobias Reinhardt, Jonathan Barnes and Richard Sorabji; among the latter, to the participants in a colloquium on Boethus held in Paris in 2007, especially Maddalena Bonelli, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat and Philippe Hoffman; also to Victor Caston, Riccardo Chiarradonna, John Dudley, Philip van der Eijk, Erik Eliasson, Andrea Falcon, Bill Fortenbaugh, Pamela Huby, Thomas Johansen, George Karamanolis, Inna Kupreeva, Tony Long, Herwig Maehler, Vivian Nutton, Jan Opsomer, Marwan Rashed, Malcolm
Preface

Schofield, and to the anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press. I owe a particular debt to Bill Fortenbaugh, not least because, by asking me to participate in the Theophrastus Project and to write a paper (Sharples 1983b) on ‘Arius Didymus Doxography C’ he first introduced me to the complexities of the Peripatetic tradition after Aristotle and before Alexander. Some of the material contained here has been used in teaching an undergraduate course on Philosophy under the Roman Empire, in 2005–6 and in 2007–8, and I am grateful to the students involved for their comments and questions, and also for misunderstandings which showed me where clarification might be particularly needed. I should also record my gratitude for the library facilities and intellectual environment provided over many years by the Institute of Classical Studies and the Warburg Institute, and to the Department of Greek and Latin, University College London, for the way in which it encouraged staff to pursue their own research interests and to develop informal contacts with scholars with similar interests from other institutions and indeed from other countries. Translations are my own except where otherwise specified. I am grateful to the following for permission to reuse translations by myself previously published elsewhere (full details are given at the end of each passage). Akadémiai Kiadó: from Sharples 2008b, 8ABC; E. J. Brill: from Sharples 2002b, 22O, 24L; Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd: from Sharples 1983a, 1Ab, 23HSTU; from Sharples 1992, 22T; from Sharples 2004, 12JK, 17CDEF, 22F, 23V, 26C, 27BIJK, and material in the commentaries on 12 and on 17; Walter de Gruyter and Co. Ltd: from Sharples 1999, 18Ab(4); Institute of Classical Studies, University of London: from Sharples 2003b, 22V; from Sharples 2007a, part of 6A; from Sharples 2007b, 22D(i)H, 23ABOPQ, and material in the commentary on 23; from Sharples 2007c, 18HIUVW,Ab (1)–(3),Ac; from Sharples 2007d, 24GKPRSTUWAa; Oxbow Books: from Sharples 1991, 23R. I am also grateful to Liverpool University Press and to Philip van der Eijk for permission to take, from Sharples and van der Eijk 2008, 23N; and to Tobias Reinhardt and the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, for permission to take 9B from Reinhardt 2007.
Abbreviations

Abbreviations of journal titles correspond to those used in *L’Année philologique* and abbreviations of ancient sources correspond to those used in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, with the following additions and variations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BT</strong></td>
<td>Bibliotheca Teubneriana. Leipzig and Stuttgart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CB</strong></td>
<td>Collection Budé. Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CMG</strong></td>
<td>various eds. 1907–. <em>Corpus Medicorum Graecorum</em>. Leipzig and Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FrGrHist</strong></td>
<td>Jacoby, F. 1923–. <em>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</em>. Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GCS</strong></td>
<td><em>Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller</em>. Leipzig.</td>
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List of abbreviations

RUSCH  Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities. New Brunswick, NJ.