This chapter gives a selection of purely philosophical texts which influenced the phenomenological approach to psychiatry. They make up a tradition which has been called the ‘phenomenological movement’ in European thought (Spiegelberg 1969; Spiegelberg 1972). Before presenting these individual philosophers we offer a brief account of their unifying features. This is treacherous territory because the question ‘What is phenomenology?’ has been highly resistant to one answer. Furthermore, it is a question for philosophers and historians of ideas and we write here as psychiatrists. With these two important cautions in mind some points can be made.

Firstly, phenomenology is not synonymous with the notion of subjectivity ordinarily understood. It is not simply the detailed description of mental events (Ratcliffe 2009). Secondly, phenomenology is not a doctrine nor primarily is it a school. Indeed, rather like the conceptual analysis of Moore and Russell, it is a method of inquiry first and foremost, despite real disagreements existing within the phenomenological movement as to the precise nature of that method (Spiegelberg 1969). As such, it can be applied to different areas of concern and is by no means limited to mental phenomena. ‘Phenomenon’ for Husserl and others is simply ‘that which appears’. Hence, a phenomenological psychiatry is by no means confined to studying abnormal mental phenomena, but can include the phenomenon of the clinical consultation, of inpatient services, the science of psychiatry, how mental illness manifests to wider society in the media, amongst other themes. Many of these themes have yet to be addressed systematically by phenomenological psychiatry.

Simon Glendinning (Glendinning 2007) offers some ideas about phenomenology’s relationship to philosophy and about the nature of phenomenological inquiry itself. He tries to identify some shared features of philosophers typically recognized as ‘phenomenologists’.

- Phenomenology is a way of doing philosophy, and in particular, has a role to play in developing a critique of the default natural scientific outlook, the ‘natural attitude’.
- Phenomenology eschews any constructive theoretical work: phenomenology does not seek to advances theses or defend positions.
- Phenomenology emphasizes description or elucidation rather than explanation or analysis. Phenomenology is an effort to make explicit that which was implicit, to become reflectively aware of that which was already evident.
- Phenomenology works to avoid ‘blinkers’ and prejudice: perhaps the strongest appeal to empirically minded psychiatrists lies in this idea of avoiding theoretical assumptions and distortions. Phenomenology urges us to return to what is given as given, as phenomena.
- Phenomenology eschews a ‘narrow argument’ style of persuasion but rather seeks that the reader or listener comes reflectively to terms with something pre-reflectively before his or her eyes. Rather than taking the reader through a series of argumentative steps, phenomenology seeks to show the world in a clear and explicit way: hence, being ‘convinced’ is more akin to ‘seeing’ things in a certain way and hence obviously true, rather than being persuaded of the truths of certain propositions.

We now offer some very brief introductions to individual philosophers, either phenomenologists themselves or others who influenced the movement, together with sample texts.
Editors’ introduction

Brentano was an important impetus to both Husserl and Jaspers. Further, his work continues to be of crucial importance to philosophy of mind and cognitive science through his notion of intentionality as a defining feature of the mental (Smith 1994). The other crucial notion from Brentano of importance for phenomenological psychiatry is that of descriptive psychology. We will discuss both these concepts briefly; selections from his writings where he presents these notions follow.

For Brentano, psychology is an immature science. He believes that psychology waits on advances from physiology to mature. Hence, Brentano makes a distinction between ‘genetic’ or ‘explanatory’ psychology and ‘descriptive’ psychology. The explanatory psychology is based on physics and physiology and answers causal questions whereas descriptive psychology is relatively freer from this dependence on basic science. Rather, for Brentano, descriptive psychology is akin to philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology (Mulligan 2004). However, he still thinks that in some sense descriptive psychology is empirical, and refers to it as such, due to a belief that it is based on ‘inner’ perception. Mulligan helpfully describes Brentano’s conception of descriptive psychology thus:

...conceptual truths about and analyses of psychological phenomena in which classifications, the identification of the fundamental types of psychological phenomena, and claims about relations of necessary co-existence are prominent (p. 67) (Mulligan 2004).

Descriptive psychology is prior to explanatory psychology: one needs to have a clear account of the nature of the mental phenomenon to be investigated prior to causal and explanatory claims being made. Whereas descriptive psychology yields exact and exceptionless truths, explanatory psychology will reveal contingent causal mechanism that could logically be different from mental phenomenon yet still underpin them.

The notion of intentionality has widely been taken up as a mark of the mental, the defining characteristic of mental states. For something to be intentional is to say that it intends or is about something. Thus intentionality is the aboutness of thought (Jacquette 2004). Further, there are no mental acts without a presentation, without an intended object. Intentionality allows Brentano to adopt a dualism based upon this idea of content: physical phenomena lack intentionality, whereas intentionality is the defining characteristic of mental phenomena. It is worth stressing, however, that this notion of ‘aboutness’ and intentionality doesn’t necessarily imply the idea of the mind somehow stretching out of the body toward the world, but rather suggests the mind taking on properties of the intended object. Part of the reason for this is Brentano’s indebtedness to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the soul takes in sensory and intelligible forms and thus, ‘Sensing and thinking, for a Brentanian Aristotelian is, to repeat, a form of taking in’ (Smith 1994, p. 41), a taking in of the form, but not the matter. So intentionality is not so much about the mind being directed to external objects, but rather, such aboutness is towards objects that are immanently within the mind, having been taken up by the senses.

Brentano, F. (1888–9), ‘The concept of descriptive psychology’


1. By this I understand the analysing description of our phenomena.
2. By phenomena, however, [I understand] that which is perceived by us, in fact, what is perceived by us in the strict sense of the word.
3. This, for example, is not the case for the external world.
4. To be a phenomenon, something must exist in itself [in sich sein]. It is wrong to set phenomena in opposition to what exists in itself [an sich Seiendes].

5. Something can be a phenomenon, however, without being a thing in itself, such as, for example, what is presented as such [das Vorgestellte als solches], or what is desired as such.

6. One is telling the truth if one says the phenomena are objects of inner perception, even though the term 'inner' is actually superfluous. All phenomena are to be called inner because they all belong to one reality, be it as constituents or as correlates.

7. By calling the description of phenomena descriptive psychology one particularly emphasizes the contemplation of psychical realities. Genetic psychology is then added to it as the second part of psychology.

8. Physiology has to intervene forcefully in the latter, whereas descriptive psychology is relatively independent of it.

9. Descriptive psychology is the prior part (of psychology). The relationship between it and genetic psychology is similar to the one between anatomy and physiology.

10. The value of descriptive psychology.
   (a) It is the foundation of genetic psychology.
   (b) It has a value in itself because of the dignity of the psychical domain.

Brentano, F. (1874), ‘The distinction between mental and physical phenomena’


All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes – the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena …

Our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms “physical phenomenon” and “mental phenomenon,” removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them. And it does not matter to us what means we use, as long as they really serve to clarify these terms.

Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perceptions or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.

Another characteristic which all mental phenomena have in common is the fact that they are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible. … However, besides the fact that it has a special object, inner perception possesses another distinguishing characteristic: its immediate, infallible self-evidence. Of all the types of knowledge of the objects of experience, inner perception alone possesses this characteristic. Consequently, when we say that mental phenomena are those which are
apprehended by means of inner perception, we say that their perception is immediately evident.

*****

Let us, in conclusion, summarize the results of the discussion about the difference between mental and physical phenomena. First of all, we illustrated the specific nature of the two classes by means of examples. We then defined mental phenomena as presentations or as phenomena which are based upon presentations; all the other phenomena being physical phenomena. Next we spoke of extension, which psychologists have asserted to be the specific characteristic of all physical phenomena, while all mental phenomena are supposed to be unextended. This assertion, however, ran into contradictions which can only be clarified by later investigations. All that can be determined now is that all mental phenomena really appear to be unextended. Further we found that the intentional in-existence, the reference to something as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomena are the exclusive object of inner perception; they alone, therefore, are perceived with immediate evidence. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they alone are perceived. On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena which possess actual existence in addition to intentional existence. Finally, we emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic the fact that the mental phenomena which we perceive, in spite of all their multiplicity, always appear to us as a unity, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same time, do not all appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon.

That feature which best characterizes mental phenomena is undoubtedly their intentional in-existence. By means of this and the other characteristics listed above, we may now consider mental phenomena to have been clearly differentiated from physical phenomena.

Our explanations of mental and physical phenomena cannot fail to place our earlier definitions of psychology and natural science in a clearer light. . .

We must consider only mental phenomena in the sense of real states as the proper object of psychology. And it is in reference only to these phenomena that we say that psychology is the science of mental phenomena.
Influences on phenomenology

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911)

Editors’ introduction

Dilthey’s influence on phenomenological psychiatry is crucial and is most clearly illustrated by Jaspers’ adoption of *Verstehen* or ‘interpretative understanding’ (Outhwaite 1986; Rickman 1987). Although understanding another is clearly a complex activity, for the German hermeneutic tradition there is nothing particularly mystical or technical about the concept of *Verstehen*: it is simply the everyday understanding of another, whether a real individual or a fictional or historical figure, which we all engage in. In contemporary philosophical terminology this is often termed folk psychology.

Dilthey’s hermeneutic project was similar to that of the neo-Kantians (Broome 2008). He was interested in the ‘historical sciences’ and his Kantian question was the reflection on the possibility of sciences that took the human mind as their object of study (Outhwaite 1986). Dilthey’s work on *verstehende Psychologie* is a crucial part of this wider concern. ‘Understanding’, as Outhwaite puts it (p. 27) is on this conception, experiencing another person’s ‘thoughts and emotions from the inside by “putting oneself in their shoes” (sich hineinversetztten) and reliving their experiences (nacherleben)’ (Outhwaite 1986). For Dilthey, such an approach should work in parallel with causal understanding. Further, *Verstehen* should never be complete, incapable of error, and explicitly relies on imagination. Its goal is to attempt to understand the individual and works by analogy (Makkreel 1998).

Dilthey, W. (1894), ‘Ideas about a descriptive and analytical psychology’


The task of laying a psychological foundation for the human studies

Explanatory psychology, which at present absorbs such a large measure of work and interest, establishes a causal nexus which claims to explain all mental phenomena. It tries to explain the constitution of the mental world according to its constituents, forces and laws, in the same way as physics and chemistry explain the physical world. . . . The difference between explanatory and descriptive science assumed here, corresponds to ordinary usage. By an explanatory science we understand the subsumption of a range of phenomena under a causal nexus by means of a limited number of unambiguously defined elements (i.e. constituents of the nexus). This concept describes an ideal science which has been shaped particularly by the development of atomic physics. So explanatory psychology tries to subsume mental phenomena under a causal nexus by means of a limited number of unambiguously defined elements. This is an extraordinarily bold idea containing the possibility of an immeasurable development of the human studies into a strict system of causal knowledge corresponding to that of the physical sciences. Every psychology wants to make the causal relationships of mental life conscious but the distinguishing mark of explanatory psychology is that it is convinced that it can produce a complete and transparent knowledge of mental phenomena from a limited number of unambiguously defined elements. It would be even more precisely characterized by the name constructive psychology.

*****

[T]he human studies must work towards more definite procedures and principles within their own sphere by trying them out on their own subject-matter, just as the physical sciences have done. We do not show ourselves genuine disciples of the great scientific
thinkers simply by transferring their methods to our sphere; we must adjust our knowledge to the nature of our subject-matter and thus treat it as the scientists treated theirs. We conquer nature by submitting to it. The human studies differ from the sciences because the latter deal with facts which present themselves to consciousness as external and separate phenomena, while the former deal with the living connections of reality experienced in the mind. It follows that the sciences arrive at connections within nature through inferences by means of a combination of hypotheses while the human sciences are based on directly given mental connections. We explain nature but we understand mental life. Inner experience grasps the processes by which we accomplish something as well as the combination of individual functions of mental life into a whole. The experience of the whole context comes first; only later do we distinguish its individual parts. This means that the methods of studying mental life, history and society differ greatly from those used to acquire knowledge of nature.

Descriptive and analytical psychology

If we try to gain knowledge of the comprehensive and uniform pattern of mental life we shall see if a descriptive psychology can be developed. Psychological analysis has certainly established many individual connections in our mental life. We can follow the processes which lead from an outer impression to the development of a perceptual image; we can pursue its transformation into a memory; we can describe the formation of fantasies and concepts. We can also describe motive, choice and purposive action. But all these particular patterns must be co-ordinated into a general pattern of mental life. The question is can we pave the way for this?

The decisive fact for the study of mental structure is that the transitions from one state to another, the effect of one on another are part of inner experience. We experience this structure. We understand human life, history and all the hidden depths of the human mind because we experience these transitions and effects and so become aware of this structure which embraces all passions, sufferings and human destinies. Who has not experienced how images thrusting themselves on the imagination suddenly arouse strong desire which, confronted with great difficulties, urges us towards an act of will? In these and other concrete connections we become aware of particular transitions and effects; these inner experiences recur and one connection or another is repeated until the whole structure becomes secure, empirical, knowledge in our inner consciousness. It is not only the major parts of this structure which have an inner connection in our experience, we can become aware of such relationships within the parts themselves. The process of mental life in all its forms, from the lowest to the highest, is from the beginning a unified whole. Mental life does not arise from parts growing together; it is not compounded of elementary units; it does not result from interacting particles of sensation or feeling; it is always an encompassing unity. Mental functions have been differentiated in it but they remain tied to their context. This has reached its highest form of development in the unity of consciousness and the unity of the person and completely distinguishes mental life from the whole physical world. Knowledge of this context of life makes the new theory that mental processes are single, unconnected representations of a pattern of physical events, completely unacceptable.
Influences on phenomenology

Max Weber (1864–1920)

Editors’ introduction

Jaspers acknowledges a great debt to the sociologist Max Weber, both as a friend but also as the means by which he was introduced to Husserl and Heidegger (Jaspers 1981). Intellectually, Weber’s conception of ‘ideal types’ has had a profound influence in phenomenological psychiatry (Schwartz and Wiggins 1987; Ghaemi 2009), both in it being used to try to clarify what is thought of as a ‘typical’ presentation or symptom, but perhaps more strongly, used as an equivalent term as ‘essence’ when talking about the defining features of a given psychopathology (Broome 2006). However, although psychiatrists may think in terms of prototypical features, it would be mistaken to conflate this with Husserl’s concept of essence, as discussed below.

On most readings, Weber’s concept of ideal type is a construct one uses to interrogate the social world (i.e. phenomena involving meaning and value) (‘The construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a means’ (p. 90) (Weber 1904/2004)). Husserlian essences, however, are the result of performing the eidetic reduction (see below, pp. 15–16, 24–35). Thus, one measures empirical reality using the ideal type and compares the ideal type to empirical reality but this is done interpretatively rather than statistically. Husserlian essences, however, are obtained by bracketing away empirical reality. In other ways too, Weber’s notion of ideal types differs from Husserl’s notion of essence: in particular, Weber suggested that ideal types are variable for any question, depending upon the researcher’s question (Weber 1904/2004, p. 91; Parkin 2002), whereas essence is necessary and a priori. Further, ideal types do not exist in reality (‘In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.’ (Weber 1904/2004, p. 90)). As such, we should not, for Weber, expect anything we encounter to match the ideal type perfectly.

Burger offers a useful definition of Weber’s notoriously hard to pin down idea (Burger 1976, p. 134):

Ideal types are statements of general form asserting the existence of certain constellations of elements which are empirically only approximated by the instances of the class of phenomena to which each type refers.

Thus, ideal types vary, their structure is determined by the investigators’ concerns and the problems studied, and are never fully instantiated in empirical reality. Hence, the ideal type may serve as an extreme end of continuum that actual existent cases only approximate towards (the clearest, most distinct example of delusion we use to recognize other delusions but never expect to meet in reality, for example).

The subject matter of psychiatry, given its proximity to the phenomena of meaning, intentions, values and interpretations, and given its pragmatic nature, may find the notion of ‘ideal types’ more germane than that of essences as developed by Husserl initially in the fields of mathematics, logic, grammar and geometry.


We have in abstract economic theory an illustration of those synthetic constructs which have been designated as “ideas” of historical phenomena. It offers us an ideal picture of events on the commodity-market under conditions of a society organized on the principles of an exchange economy, free competition and rigorously rational conduct. This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this
construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that where market-conditioned relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal-type. This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no "hypothesis" but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. It is thus the "idea" of the historically given modern society, based on an exchange economy, which is developed for us by quite the same logical principles as are used in constructing the idea of the medieval "city economy" as a "genetic" concept. When we do this, we construct the concept "city economy" not as an average of the economic structures actually existing in all the cities observed but as an ideal-type. An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct [Gedankenbild]. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct [Gedankenbild] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.

*****

When a genetic definition of the content of the concept is sought, there remains only the ideal-type in the sense explained above. It is a conceptual construct [Gedankenbild] which is neither historical reality nor even the "true" reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. Such concepts are constructs in terms of which we formulate relationships by the application of the category of objective possibility. By means of this category, the adequacy of our imagination, oriented and disciplined by reality, is judged.

In this function especially, the ideal-type is an attempt to analyze historically unique configurations or their individual components by means of genetic concepts. Let us take for instance the concepts "church" and "sect." They may be broken down purely classificatorily into complexes of characteristics whereby not only the distinction between them but also the content of the concept must constantly remain fluid. If however I wish to formulate the concept of "sect" genetically, e.g., with reference to certain important cultural significances which the "sectarian spirit" has had for modern culture, certain characteristics of both become essential because they stand in an adequate causal relationship to those influences. However, the concepts thereupon become ideal-typical in the sense that they appear in full conceptual integrity either not at all or only in individual instances. Here as elsewhere every concept which is not purely classificatory diverges from reality. But the discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e., the fact that we comprehend reality only through a chain of intellectual modifications postulates such a conceptual short-hand. Our imagination can often dispense with explicit conceptual formulations as a means of investigation. But as regards exposition, formulations in the sphere of cultural analysis is in many cases absolutely necessary. Whoever disregards it entirely must confine himself to the formal aspect of cultural phenomena, e.g., to legal history. The universe of legal norms is naturally clearly definable and is valid (in the legal sense!) for historical reality. But social science in our sense is concerned with practical significance. This significance however can very often be brought unambiguously to mind only by relating the empirical data to an ideal limiting case.
Editors’ introduction

Bergson is not commonly acknowledged as an influence on phenomenological psychiatry, and perhaps this state of affairs is similar to his rather under-acknowledged and diffuse influence on philosophy more generally (Matthews 1996; Gutting 2001; Mullarkey 2010). For our purposes, Bergson’s work was a direct influence upon both Scheler and the French psychiatrist Minkowski. In particular, it was Bergson’s early work, translated as *Time and Free Will*, that impacted upon psychopathology. Here, Bergson offers a sustained critique of how mental life is viewed, and specifically how the tools and ways of thinking about the physical, external, world have been imported into the discourse of how we think about our mental life. For Bergson, using the language of mechanism in the domain of the living is, as it were, a category mistake (Guerlac 2006). Newtonian physics presents a world of quantity, of measurement and mathematization, and importantly for Bergson, the idea of reversibility. Equations can be reformulated in the opposite direction, reversed, yet, we are unable to draw this parallel with mental life and specifically for Bergson, time, and thinking in time, is irreversible (Guerlac 2006). The quantitative differences in the physical world, captured in measurement, are, Bergson argues, not present in mental life where the differences that occur are those of quality. The dominant psych-ology of Bergson’s day led to the danger of thinking of these distinct qualities as quantitative differences in intensity and hence, trying to measure them (Guerlac 2006), viewing them as differences in degree rather than kind. From these concerns about the science of psychology Bergson’s important work uses these insights to discuss the living, the nature of consciousness and, importantly, time and free will. Bergson situates his own work as a response to Kant: praising Kant for his Newtonianism and demonstrating the importance of external apperception in the experience of space, but argues against Kant and Kantians employing these insights in thinking about inner life, and also in their seeming conflation of space with the radical alterity that is time. Unlike space, time is not a homogenous milieu (Guerlac 2006).

Bergson, H. (1910), Selections from *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*


Neither inner joy nor passion is an isolated inner state which at first occupies the corner of the soul and gradually spreads. At its lowest level it is very like a turning of our states of consciousness towards the future. Then, as if their weight were diminished by this attraction, our ideas and sensations succeed one another with greater rapidity; our movements no longer cost us the same effort. Finally, in cases of extreme joy, our perceptions and memories become tinged with an indefinable quality, as with a kind of heat or light, so novel that now and then, as we stare at our own self, we wonder how it can really exist. Thus there are several characteristic forms of purely inward joy, all of which are successive stages corresponding to qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states. But the number of states which are concerned with each of these alterations is more or less considerable, and, without explicitly counting them, we know very well whether, for example, our joy pervades all the impressions which we receive in the course of the day or whether any escape from its influence. We thus set up points of division in the interval which separate two successive forms of joy, and this gradual transition from one to the other makes them appear in their turn as different