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In 1910, in an article published in a New York journal, the *Independent*, called ‘The Souls of White Folk’, W. E. B. DuBois, the distinguished black American historian and activist, wrote about his perception of a sudden change of consciousness sweeping the world: ‘the world, in a sudden emotional conversion, has discovered that it is white, and, by that token, wonderful’. Suddenly, white folks had become ‘painfully conscious of their whiteness’, ‘the paleness of their bodily skins . . . fraught with tremendous and eternal significance’.1

At the meeting of the Pan-African Congress, in London, in 1900, DuBois had memorably declared that the problem of the twentieth century was the ‘problem of the color line’, an observation that he elaborated in the path-breaking collection of essays called *The Souls of Black Folk*, published in 1903. In the best-known essay, first printed in *Atlantic Monthly* as ‘Strivings of the Negro People’, DuBois famously defined the condition of the African-American in terms of ‘his two-ness – an American, a Negro: two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings’.2 White America, he insisted, had a black history of injustice, struggle and unmet longing: ‘The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife – this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.’3

*The Souls of Black Folk* has been described by an American historian, David Blight, as ‘an extended meditation on racial prejudice, political leadership, the economic oppression of black labourers in the South, and the development of African American culture both before and after emancipation’.4 Historians of the United States now rightly recognise

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this to be a work of key significance in their national history, but DuBois was also, already, keenly aware of the global dimension of the colour line, which he had defined, in 1900, as ‘the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea’.\(^5\) By 1910, it was also clear to DuBois that the problem of the colour line was the problem of what he called ‘whiteness’, which had recently acquired the force of a charismatic religion: ‘Wave upon wave, each with increasing virulence, is dashing this new religion of whiteness on the shores of our time.’\(^6\)

DuBois saw in this tidal wave of whiteness a new, modern, phenomenon. To be sure, colour consciousness had been present in earlier ages, but ‘the discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed’. Whiteness provided a mode of subjective identification that crossed national borders and shaped global politics. ‘What is whiteness’, DuBois wondered, ‘that one should so desire it?’ Whiteness, he realised, was fundamentally proprietorial: ‘Whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever, Amen.’\(^7\)

This book argues, following DuBois, that the assertion of whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss. Seeking a reason for white folks’ sudden stridency, DuBois noted that around the world, colonised and coloured peoples were everywhere in revolt: ‘Do we sense somnolent writhings in black Africa, or angry groans in India, or triumphant “Banzais” in Japan? “To your tents, O Israel!” these nations are not white. Build warships and heft the “Big Stick”.’\(^8\)

It was the United States president, Theodore Roosevelt, who had advocated the diplomacy of speaking softly and carrying a big stick in response to the triumphant Japanese, whose spectacular naval victory over Russia, in 1905, had deeply dismayed white men, but galvanised colonised peoples everywhere, from Africa, to Asia, to the Americas. In a bid to intimidate Japan, Roosevelt had despatched the United States fleet on a tour of the Pacific Ocean. Its rapturous reception by Australians, in Sydney and Melbourne, was reported in a long article in the *New York Independent*, the same journal that would publish ‘The Souls of White Folk’. ‘It is delightful to us to say’, an Australian journalist, W. R. Charlton, told his New York readers, ‘whether it be delusion, half-truth or the truth-absolute – that the Americans are our kinsmen, blood of our bone, blood of our bone, and one with us in our ideals of the brotherhood of man.’\(^9\) We can probably assume that DuBois, by then living in

New York, was one of Charlton’s readers. Perhaps he also read reports of the press luncheon in Sydney, where Rear Admiral Sperry had greeted his gratified hosts as a ‘white man to white men, and may I add, very white men’.10

This book charts the spread of ‘whiteness’ as a transnational form of racial identification, that was, as DuBois noticed, at once global in its power and personal in its meaning, the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self. The emergence of self-styled ‘white men’s countries’ represented whiteness in defensive, but defiant, mode, a response to the rising power of what Charles Pearson, a Liberal politician in the colonial parliament of Victoria, had named, in National Life and Character: A Forecast, ‘the black and yellow races’.11 Pearson’s prophecy challenged imperial complacency, but as one of his London reviewers noted, Pearson wrote from a different vantage point in the world:

The reader can indeed discern that Mr Pearson’s point of view is not London or Paris, but Melbourne. He regards the march of affairs from the Australian point of view, and next to Australia what he seems to see most clearly is the growth of Chinese power and of the native populations of Africa. In this forecast, in fact, Europe loses altogether the precedence it has always enjoyed. It appears here as not only the smallest, but as the least important continent.12

In his arresting commentary on changing world forces, Pearson was indeed, to use Dipesh Chakrabarty’s phrase, ‘provincialising Europe’.13

Pearson’s apprehension of a postcolonial world in which white men would be ‘elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside’ by peoples whom they looked down upon as servile, set alarm bells ringing around the globe. In his own alarmist tract, The Rising Tide of Color, published nearly two decades later, an American, Lothrop Stoddard, paid tribute to Pearson’s book as ‘epoch-making’ and hailed the ‘lusty young Anglo-Saxon communities bordering the Pacific – Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, and our own “coast” as pace-setters in declaring themselves “All White”’. Nor were their policies separate developments. ‘Nothing was more striking’, Stoddard noted, ‘than the instinctive and instantaneous solidarity which binds together Australians and Afrikanders, Californians and Canadians, into a “sacred Union” at the mere whisper of Asiatic immigration’.14 Stoddard was lobbying for what would become the Johnson Act of 1924, which has usually been

10 Age (27 August 1908).
12 Athenaeum (4 March 1893).
understood within the framework of US national history, but is better illuminated when placed in the larger frame of the transnational solidari-

ties of which Stoddard himself wrote.

In recent scholarship, ‘whiteness studies’ have emerged as a produc-
tive new field of historical enquiry, but most investigations have con-
ceptualised their subject within a national frame of analysis, identifying
local dynamics at work within histories deemed distinctive or even excep-
tional.15 Studies that now acknowledge the necessity for a global context
still confine their own analyses within a national interpretative frame and
that has been especially the case with United States scholarship.16 But,
as DuBois and contemporaries on the other side of the colour line saw
clearly, the emergence of the ‘new religion’ of whiteness was a transna-
tional phenomenon and all the more powerful for that, inspiring in turn
the formation of international movements of resistance, such as the pan-
African and pan-Asian alliances that threatened to bring about the very
challenge to their world dominion that white men feared.17

In *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, we trace the transnational circu-
lation of emotions and ideas, people and publications, racial knowledge
and technologies that animated white men’s countries and their strategies
of exclusion, deportation and segregation, in particular, the deployment
of those state-based instruments of surveillance, the census, the passport
and the literacy test. The project of whiteness was thus a paradoxical
politics, at once transnational in its inspiration and identifications but
nationalist in its methods and goals. The imagined community of white
men was transnational in its reach, but nationalist in its outcomes, bol-
stering regimes of border protection and national sovereignty. A project
that took shape in international conversations about inter-racial encoun-
ters increased isolationism. Thus one somewhat dismayed observer was
moved to describe the Commonwealth of Australia as a ‘Hermit Democ-

racy’, cutting itself off from all international intercourse.18

15 On ‘whiteness’ see, for example, Ruth Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters: The
Social Construction of Whiteness* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993);
Class* (London, Verso, 1991); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different
Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1999); Aileen Moreton-Robinson, *Talkin’ Up to the White Woman:
Indigenous Women and Feminism* (St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 2000). On
the influence of external ideas on national formations see, for example, Russell McGre-
gor, *Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and the Doomed Race Theory, 1880–1939*

16 See, for example, Mae N. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern


18 ‘Australian Ideals’, *The Times* (5 September 1908), Deakin papers 1540/15/2567
National Library of Australia (NLA).
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In drawing the global colour line, immigration restriction became a version of racial segregation on an international scale, as Lothrop Stoddard memorably stated. Not surprisingly, the education or literacy test, first used to disenfranchise black voters in Mississippi in 1890, also became the basis of United States immigration restriction laws, promoted by Anglo-Saxonists such as Henry Cabot Lodge and the members of the Boston-based Immigration Restriction League, legislation which served in turn as a model for Natal and the other British Dominions. The republican origins of the literacy test as an instrument of racial exclusion were significant. In dividing the world into white and not-white it helped render the imperial non-racial status of British subjects increasingly irrelevant and provided a direct challenge to the imperial assertion that the Empire recognised no distinction on the basis of colour or race, that all subjects were alike subjects of the Crown. This book is also, then, about the British betrayal of the idea of imperial citizenship.

Histories of immigration policy, like studies of whiteness, have usually been told as self-contained national stories, their dynamics located in distinctive local reactions against particular groups of foreign immigrants – whether Chinese, Indian, Islanders, Japanese, Jews or southern Europeans. Some historical studies have, to be sure, identified parallel developments in Australasia, British Columbia and New Zealand and on the west coast of the United States. Usually, however, their stories have remained parallel, rather than dynamically inter-connected and thus mutually formative. What most histories have tended to miss is what DuBois could see clearly, that is, the significance of racial identifications to the constitution of modern political subjectivities and ways of being in the world, in a process that shaped white men’s sense of collective belonging to a larger community, joined together by what Theodore Roosevelt always liked to call ‘fellow feeling’.

In his influential book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defined nations as ‘imagined communities’ in the sense that they were composed of individuals who, though they might never meet face to face, came to identify with their compatriots and believed themselves to hold certain values, myths and outlooks in common. At the core of this process of identification was the cultural and historical imagination, its key


introduced the novel and newspaper. Anderson stressed the affective, as well as the imaginary, dimension of national identification, which he imagined, significantly, as ‘fraternal’. Paradoxically, one outcome of Anderson’s argument has been to naturalise the nation as the imagined community of modern times, an effect that has obscured the ascendancy of transnational racial identifications and their potency in shaping both personal identity and global politics. This book seeks to elucidate the dynamics and effects of a transnational project that sought, in effect, dominance over four continents, an ambition that led one commentator to warn that the new solidarity of white men would drive Chinese and Indians into an unprecedented pan-Asiatic alliance, led by Japan, that would ultimately see the eclipse of Western civilisation.

The idea of the ‘white man’s country’ emerged in the context of nineteenth-century imperialisms and the great modern migrations that saw some 50 million Chinese, the same number of Europeans and about 30 million Indians migrate to new homes around the world. A large proportion of these voyagers went to South Africa, the Americas and Australasia, to lands taken by force from their Indigenous inhabitants, who were systematically displaced or destroyed. Migration rested on and required Aboriginal dispossession.

White men claimed a special right to lands in the ‘temperate zone’, claims made against their Indigenous inhabitants and all those peoples they would designate as ‘not-white’, including Afghans, Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Sryrians and Pacific Islanders. Though recently established, white men’s countries sought legitimacy through locating themselves in the long tradition of Anglo-Saxon race history that dated back to the mythic glories of Hengist and Horsa. They shared an English-speaking culture and newly ascendant democratic politics, priding themselves, as Anglo-Saxons, on a distinctive capacity, indeed a genius, for self-government. It was their commitment to democratic equality that made racial homogeneity seem imperative. In the tradition of J. S. Mill, they argued that democracy could only survive in the absence of distinctions of caste and colour.

White men’s countries rested on the premise that multiracial democracy was an impossibility: this was the key history lesson learnt from the great tragedy of Radical Reconstruction in the United States, propounded by numerous writers including the British Liberal politician and historian, James Bryce, whose *American Commonwealth* was taken up as

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a ‘Bible’ by white nation-builders in Australia and South Africa. Bryce also wrote about the countries of Latin America, which were ineligible for membership of the white men’s club: their Spanish or Portuguese ancestry, their mixed-coloured populations and political instability were regarded as regrettable, but related, disqualifications, regardless of their own aspirations.

White men’s countries emerged in the radical challenge posed by democracy and trade unionism to hereditary aristocratic privilege. This was an age when ‘glorious manhood asserts its elevation’, in the words of New South Wales republican poet, Daniel Deniehy, when pride of manhood found expression in pride of race to enshrine the white man as the model democrat. In the New World encounters of diverse peoples, the masculine democracies of North America and Australasia defined their identity and rights in racial terms: the right of Anglo-Saxons to self-government and the commitment of white workers to high wages and conditions, against those they saw as undermining their new-found status, whether they be aristocrats or ‘coolies’. In their social and political experiments in equality – and with ‘state socialism’ in Australasia – they were utopian in their modernist vision.

When glorious manhood asserted its elevation, white men monopolised the status of manhood itself. Coolies, Islanders, Asians and Blacks were cast as not simply deficient as workers, colonists and citizens, but also as men. They were docile, servile, dependent, unfree. Hence, the struggles of coloured and colonised men to achieve recognition, or restitution, of their manhood as well as national independence. For example, Indian nationalists, such as Lajpat Rai, frequently charged that British rule was ‘sapping our manhood . . . polluting the very foundations of our manhood’, while DuBois told the Universal Races Congress, in 1911, that ‘the present Negro problem of America’ was ‘whether at last the Negro will gain full recognition as a man’.24

Chinese and Japanese campaigns for an end to racial discrimination were, on the other hand, more likely to invoke the equality of nations enshrined in international law. When Lowe Kong Meng, Cheok Hong Cheong and Louis Ah Mouy, the authors of The Chinese Question in Australia, cited the ‘illustrious Vattel’ and other authorities on the equality of

sovereign nations and their obligations of reciprocity under international law, local Australian democrats responded by insisting on their sovereign right to self-government, to say who could or couldn’t join their political community.25 Against the sovereignty of nations, or emperors, white men invoked the status of the elevated sovereign masculine subject.26 International treaties, guaranteeing freedom of movement, were attacked precisely for detracting from the sovereignty of autonomous self-governing men.

Immigration restriction became the quintessential expression of the masculine sovereignty of ‘self-governing communities’, a popular formulation that worked to collapse the distinction between independent republics and British colonies, thereby recasting the meaning of sovereignty itself. ‘It should be stated’, the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin advised its readers, ‘that the six separate Australian colonies, though nominally under British rule, are practically, each of them, separate republics, electing their own legislatures by universal suffrage, levying and expending their own revenues, and each one of them separately making their own laws’. In aristocratic societies, such as China, treaties might be maintained against popular wishes, advised the editor, but not so in Australia or America, where ‘the power of the people’ was supreme.27

In Australia, Alfred Deakin constantly intoned the mantra of Victorian and later, Australian self-government against Colonial Office interference and presumption. In 1908, he provocatively praised Theodore Roosevelt’s leadership in discharging his responsibilities ‘to the lasting benefit of your fellow citizens of the United States and of all self-governing people, especially this new Commonwealth of Australia’, the national name chosen precisely for its American republican resonances.28 The figure of the ‘white man’, in whose name white men’s countries were forged, was produced in a convergence of imperial and republican discourse that found political expression in the late nineteenth century in talk of an Anglo-American alliance. Previous studies have charted racial discourse across the British Empire or drawn attention to the links between the anti-Chinese policies of California and the Australian colonies, but few have analysed the inter-relationship of British and American racial regimes in

27 Daily Evening Bulletin (10 April, 29 July 1878).
the same analytical frame.29 Yet, crucially, the idea of the ‘white man’s country’ crossed and collapsed the imperial/republican divide, drawing on the discursive resources of both traditions to enshrine the dichotomy of white and not-white. The British Empire drew a distinction between ruling and ruled races; republican ideology drew a distinction between races fit and not fit for self-government. United States naturalisation law rested on the dichotomy of white and not-white.

In the figure of the white man, the imperialist became a democrat and the democrat an imperialist. The Australian prime minister, Alfred Deakin, commended the statement of the New Zealand prime minister, Richard Seddon, about the British Empire:

> though united in the whole, [the Empire] is, nevertheless, divided broadly in to two parts, one occupied wholly or mainly by a white ruling race, the other principally occupied by coloured races who are ruled. Australia and New Zealand are determined to keep their place in the first class.30

When writing about the necessity of American rule in the Philippines in *The Strenuous Life*, Theodore Roosevelt pointed to the composition of the population: ‘half-caste and native Christians, warlike Moslems, and wild pagans. Many of their people are utterly unfit for self-government, and show no signs of becoming fit. Others may in time become fit, but at present can only take part in self-government under a wise supervision, at once firm and beneficent.’31

One indicator of the global ascendancy of the politics of whiteness was its ability to recast the previous multiplicity of nations, races and religions – Aryan, Caucasian, Chinese, Hindus, Kanakas, Islanders, Malays, Blacks, Lascars, Moslems, Japanese – in binary terms as ‘white’ or ‘not-white’. English-speaking countries were pace-setters in this regard. Thus, in 1902, the French government wrote to the British Foreign Office to enquire whether the Japanese should be categorised as white or not-white.32 Japan considered their categorisation as not-white a grievous injury: ‘The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher than that of Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians or other Eastern peoples, that to refer to them in the same terms cannot but be regarded in the light of a reproach, which is hardly warranted by the fact of the shade of the national complexion’, wrote the

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29 For a recent exception see Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
32 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Enclosure, M. Cambon to Lansdowne, 24 September 1902. CO 885/8/1.
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Japanese consul in Sydney to the Australian government in 1901.33 Again, as DuBois noted, the effect of the dichotomy of white and not-white was to say that not-white was ‘nothing’.34

Recent postcolonial scholarship has established the importance of viewing metropolitan and colonial formations within the same analytical frame. In our study, the binary of metropole and colony – like Europe itself – loses its analytical primacy, as we trace the circulation of knowledges and the production of identities in formative encounters in New World communities bordering the Indian and Pacific oceans, in relations between Asian powers and white men’s governments, between Indian and South African imperial subjects, in Durban and London, between an American philosopher and an Australian political leader in the Blue Mountains in New South Wales, between republican citizens and British colonists in Vancouver, Seattle and Washington. Our book explores the influence of key thinkers and political leaders, such as Charles Pearson, James Bryce, Lowe Kong Meng, Theodore Roosevelt, W. E. B. DuBois, M. K. Gandhi, Tokutomi Soho, W. M. Hughes and Jan Smuts. We look at the discursive frameworks that shaped race thinking and justified racial exclusion, as well as the diverse ways in which the peoples thus excluded argued the injustice of what one Chinese diplomat at the Universal Races Congress in 1911 called the ‘White Policy’.

White racism was attacked on different grounds, from different vantage points, with critics drawing on different discursive resources. They variously quoted international law, cited the equality of imperial subjects, the principle of racial equality, the rights of man(hood) and the idea of non-discrimination. They organised international conferences, such as the Universal Races Congress, formed pan-African and pan-Asian movements and called for international covenants on racial equality and human rights. Importantly, international campaigns for racial equality and human rights often began as a response to the barriers to mobility and other racial discriminations enacted by New World democracies in the nineteenth century. In charting these demands our book suggests a new genealogy of human rights. It also points to the importance of the diasporic experience of Chinese and Indian colonists, patriots in exile such as Gandhi and Sun Yat Sen, in shaping nationalist agendas.

Nineteenth-century commentators were preoccupied with the implications and consequences of the unprecedented encounters of diverse peoples, made possible by new steam-powered transport technologies that,

33 Eitaki to Prime Minister Edmund Barton, 3 May 1901, CO 418/10, UK National Archives.