Christopher Bennett presents a theory of punishment grounded in the practice of apology, and in particular in reactions such as feeling sorry and making amends. He argues that offenders have a `right to be punished' – that it is part of taking an offender seriously as a member of a normatively demanding relationship (such as friendship or collegiality or citizenship) that she is subject to retributive attitudes when she violates the demands of that relationship. However, while he claims that punishment and the retributive attitudes are the necessary expression of moral condemnation, Bennett's account of these reactions has more in common with restorative justice than traditional retributivism. He argues that the most appropriate way to react to crime is to require the offender to make proportionate amends. His book is a rich and original contribution to the debate over punishment and restorative justice.

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For Sue
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The first draft of the present manuscript was completed with the help of an AHRB Research Leave Scheme grant during 2005–6. But the ideas expressed here are ones that I have been working on for what now seems like rather a long time. Because it has taken so long to write I am afraid I cannot hope to acknowledge or thank everyone who has helped me in some way to develop the ideas presented here. This does not mean that I am not grateful to those who have taken the time to ask difficult or encouraging questions, or with whom I have had enlightening discussions. But there are some people I would like to mark out for thanks, starting with Tom Pink, Bob Stern, Leif Wenar and David Owens, who provided immeasurable help in the early stages of this project. I would also like to give particular thanks to Antony Duff for his generous support, advice and encouragement over the years.

I would also like to thank those who volunteered to look at drafts of the book, either as a whole or as sets of chapters: Linda Radzik, Leo Zaibert, Kimberley Brownlee, and John Tasioulas. I am also grateful to Richard Holton, John Skorupski, Gerry Johnstone, Matt Matravers, Andrew Schaap, Suzanne Uniacke, Rowan Cruft, Jim Dignan, Mick Cavadino, Julie Brownlie, Simon Anderson, Thom Brooks, Daniel Van Ness, Gwen Robinson, Joanna Shapland, Pedro Tabensky and Richard Dagger, audiences at Durham and Glasgow Philosophy Departments and Birkbeck College Law Department. Thanks also to an anonymous referee for Cambridge University Press who provided helpful and incisive comments. I am also grateful to my colleagues in Sheffield, who have continued to provide a supportive and stimulating research environment, as well as an object lesson in philosophical argument.

In addition I would like to record a special debt of gratitude to Sandra Marshall, with whom I had many formative philosophical discussions: I hope she recognises her influence in these pages.
Acknowledgements

Closer to home I would like to thank my parents and my brothers for support, encouragement and stimulation of many kinds. And finally of course the biggest 'thank you' goes to Sue, Sarah and Lois for putting up with having a philosopher in the house.