

#### THE FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Paul M. Kellstedt's and Guy D. Whitten's *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research* provides an introduction to the scientific study of politics, supplying students with the basic tools needed to be both critical consumers and producers of scholarly research in political science. The book begins with a discussion of what it means to take a scientific approach to the study of politics. At the core of such an approach is the development of causal theories. Because there is no magic formula by which theories are developed, the authors present a series of strategies and develop an integrated approach to research design and empirical analyses that allows students to determine the plausibility of their causal theories. The text's accessible presentation of mathematical concepts and regression models with two or more independent variables is a key component to this process, along with the integration of examples from political science and the real world to help students grasp the key concepts.

Paul M. Kellstedt is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the American Politics Program at Texas A&M University. He is the author of *The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes* (2003), which won the Goldsmith Book Prize. Professor Kellstedt is also the author or co-author of articles appearing in scholarly journals such as *American Journal of Political Science*, *British Journal of Political Science*, and *Political Analysis*, as well as several book chapters. He has been an Academic Visitor at Nuffield College, Oxford, and a Harvard University Fellow in the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government.

Guy D. Whitten is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the European Union Center at Texas A&M University. He has published a variety of papers in scholarly journals, including *American Journal of Political Science*, *British Journal of Political Science*, and *Electoral Studies*. Professor Whitten serves on the editorial board of *Electoral Studies* and has previously served on the editorial boards of *Journal of Politics* and *Political Research Quarterly*. He has been a visiting researcher at the University of Amsterdam and is a frequent instructor at the Summer School for Social Science Data Analysis and Collection at the University of Essex in the United Kingdom.



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# Political Science Research

Paul M. Kellstedt

Texas A&M University

Guy D. Whitten

Texas A&M University





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#### Dedicated to

Lyman A. Kellstedt, Charmaine C. Kellstedt,
David G. Whitten, and Jo Wright-Whitten,
the best teachers we ever had

- PMK and GDW



# Contents

	Figure	es	page xv
	Table	s	xvii
	Ackn	owledgments	xix
1	The S	Scientific Study of Politics	1
	Overv	view	1
	1.1	Political Science?	1
	1.2	Approaching Politics Scientifically: The Search for Causal	
		Explanations	3
	1.3	Thinking about the World in Terms of Variables and Causal	
		Explanations	7
	1.4	Models of Politics	14
	1.5	Rules of the Road to Scientific Knowledge about Politics	15
		1.5.1 Make Your Theories Causal	15
		1.5.2 Don't Let Data Alone Drive Your Theories	16
		1.5.3 Consider Only Empirical Evidence	17
		1.5.4 Avoid Normative Statements	17
		1.5.5 Pursue Both Generality and Parsimony	18
	1.6	A Quick Look Ahead	18
	Conce	epts Introduced in This Chapter	19
	Exerc	ises	20
2	The A	Art of Theory Building	22
	Overv	view	22
	2.1	Good Theories Come from Good Theory-Building Strategies	22
	2.2		23
		2.2.1 Time-Series Example	24
		2.2.2 Cross-Sectional Example	25
	2.3	<del>_</del>	26
		2.3.1 Moving from a Specific Event to More General	
		Theories	26

vii



#### viii Contents

	2.3.2	Know Local, Think Global: Can You Drop the	
		Proper Nouns?	27
2.4	Examin	e Previous Research	28
	2.4.1	What Did the Previous Researchers Miss?	29
	2.4.2	Can Their Theory Be Applied Elsewhere?	29
	2.4.3	If We Believe Their Findings, Are There Further	
		Implications?	30
	2.4.4	How Might This Theory Work at Different Levels of	
		Aggregation (Micro  → Macro)?	30
2.5	Think F	Formally about the Causes That Lead to Variation in	
	Your D	ependent Variable	31
		Utility and Expected Utility	32
	2.5.2	The Puzzle of Turnout	34
2.6	Think a	bout the Institutions: The Rules Usually Matter	36
		Legislative Rules	36
		The Rules Matter!	38
2.7	Extensi		39
2.8		o I Know If I Have a "Good" Theory?	40
		Is Your Theory Causal?	40
	2.8.2	Can You Test Your Theory on Data That You Have	
		Not Yet Observed?	41
		How General Is Your Theory?	41
		How Parsimonious Is Your Theory?	41
		How New Is Your Theory?	41
• •		How Nonobvious Is Your Theory?	42
2.9	Conclus		42
		oduced in This Chapter	43
Exerc	ises		43
Eval	uating (	Causal Relationships	. 45
Overv	_		
3.1		ty and Everyday Language	45 45
3.1		ty and Everyday Language	43
3.2	Relation	urdles along the Route to Establishing Causal	48
	3.2.1	Putting It All Together – Adding Up the Answers to	40
	3.2.1	Our Four Questions	50
	3.2.2		30
	3.2.2	Thinking Skill	50
	3.2.3	What Are the Consequences of Failing to Control	30
	3.2.3	for Other Possible Causes?	53
3.3	Why Is	Studying Causality So Important? Three Examples	30
J.J		olitical Science	54
	3.3.1	Life Satisfaction and Democratic Stability	54
	3.3.2	School Choice and Student Achievement	55
	3.3.3	Electoral Systems and the Number of Political Parties	57



#### ix Contents

	3.4 Why Is Studying Causality So Important? Three Examples	
	from Everyday Life	61
	3.4.1 Alcohol Consumption and Income	61
	3.4.2 Treatment Choice and Breast Cancer Survival	62
	3.4.3 Explicit Lyrics and Teen Sexual Behavior	63
	3.5 Wrapping Up	65
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	65
	Exercises	65
4	Research Design	67
	Overview	67
	4.1 Comparison as the Key to Establishing Causal Relationships	67
	4.2 Experimental Research Designs	68
	4.2.1 "Random Assignment" versus "Random Sampling"	74
	4.2.2 Are There Drawbacks to Experimental Research	
	Designs?	74
	4.3 Observational Studies (in Two Flavors)	77
	4.3.1 Datum, Data, Data Set	79
	4.3.2 Cross-Sectional Observational Studies	81
	4.3.3 Time-Series Observational Studies	82
	4.3.4 The Major Difficulty with Observational Studies	83
	4.4 Summary	83
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	84
	Exercises	84
5	Measurement	86
	Overview	86
	5.1 Why Measurement Matters	86
	5.2 Social Science Measurement: The Varying Challenges of	
	Quantifying Humanity	88
	5.3 Problems in Measuring Concepts of Interest	91
	5.3.1 Conceptual Clarity	91
	5.3.2 Reliability	92
	5.3.3 Measurement Bias and Reliability	93
	5.3.4 Validity	94
	5.3.5 The Relationship between Validity and Reliability	95
	5.4 Controversy 1: Measuring Democracy	96
	5.5 Controversy 2: Measuring Political Tolerance	99
	5.6 Are There Consequences to Poor Measurement?	101
	5.7 Conclusions	101
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	102
	Exercises	102
6	Descriptive Statistics and Graphs	104
	Overview	104
	6.1 Know Your Data	104



#### x Contents

	6.2 What Is the Variable's Measurement Metric?	105
	6.2.1 Categorical Variables	106
	6.2.2 Ordinal Variables	106
	6.2.3 Continuous Variables	107
	6.2.4 Variable Types and Statistical Analyses	108
	6.3 Describing Categorical Variables	109
	6.4 Describing Continuous Variables	110
	6.4.1 Rank Statistics	111
	6.4.2 Moments	114
	6.5 Limitations	118
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	118
	Exercises	118
7	Statistical Inference	120
	Overview	120
	7.1 Populations and Samples	120
	7.2 Learning about the Population from a Sample: The Central	
	Limit Theorem	122
	7.2.1 The Normal Distribution	122
	7.3 Example: Presidential Approval Ratings	128
	7.3.1 What Kind of Sample Was That?	129
	7.3.2 A Note on the Effects of Sample Size	130
	7.4 A Look Ahead: Examining Relationships between Variables	131
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	132
	Exercises	132
8	Bivariate Hypothesis Testing	134
	Overview	134
	8.1 Bivariate Hypothesis Tests and Establishing Causal	424
	Relationships	134
	8.2 Choosing the Right Bivariate Hypothesis Test	135
	8.3 All Roads Lead to p	136
	8.3.1 The Logic of p-Values	136
	8.3.2 The Limitations of <i>p</i> -Values	137
	8.3.3 From <i>p</i> -Values to Statistical Significance	138
	8.3.4 The Null Hypothesis and <i>p</i> -Values	138
	8.4 Three Bivariate Hypothesis Tests	139
	8.4.1 Example 1: Tabular Analysis	139
	8.4.2 Example 2: Difference of Means	145
	8.4.3 Example 3: Correlation Coefficient	150
	8.5 Wrapping Up	155
	Concepts Introduced in This Chapter	156
	Exercises	157
9	Bivariate Regression Models	159
	Overview	159
	9.1 Two-Variable Regression	159
	9.2 Fitting a Line: Population ⇔ Sample	160



#### xi Contents

	9.3	Which	Line Fits Best? Estimating the Regression Line	162
	9.4		ing Our Uncertainty about the OLS Regression Line	165
		9.4.1	Goodness-of-Fit: Root Mean-Squared Error	167
		9.4.2	Goodness-of-Fit: R-Squared Statistic	167
		9.4.3	Is That a "Good" Goodness-of-Fit?	169
		9.4.4	Uncertainty about Individual Components of the	
			Sample Regression Model	169
		9.4.5	Confidence Intervals about Parameter Estimates	171
		9.4.6	Hypothesis Testing: Overview	172
		9.4.7		173
		9.4.8	The Relationship between Confidence Intervals and	
			Two-Tailed Hypothesis Tests	175
		9.4.9	One-Tailed Hypothesis Tests	175
	9.5	Assump	otions, More Assumptions, and Minimal Mathematical	
		Require	ements	177
		9.5.1	Assumptions about the Population Stochastic	
			Component	177
		9.5.2	Assumptions about Our Model Specification	180
			Minimal Mathematical Requirements	181
			How Can We Make All of These Assumptions?	181
			oduced in This Chapter	182
	Exerc	ises		182
10	Mult	iple Reg	gression Models I: The Basics	. 183
	Overv	view		183
	10.1	Modeli	ng Multivariate Reality	183
	10.2	The Pop	pulation Regression Function	184
	10.3	From T	wo-Variable to Multiple Regression	184
	10.4	What H	Sappens When We Fail to Control for Z?	188
		10.4.1	An Additional Minimal Mathematical Requirement	
			in Multiple Regression	192
	10.5	Interpre	eting Multiple Regression	193
	10.6	Which 1	Effect Is "Biggest"?	196
	10.7	Statistic	cal and Substantive Significance	198
	10.8	Implica	tions	199
	Conce	epts Intro	oduced in This Chapter	200
	Exerc	ises		200
11	Mult	iple Reg	gression Models II: Crucial Extensions	. 202
	Overv	view		202
	11.1	Extensi	ons of OLS	202
	11.2	Being S	mart with Dummy Independent Variables in OLS	203
		11.2.1	Using Dummy Variables to Test Hypotheses about a	
			Categorical Independent Variable with Only Two	
			Values	203
		11.2.2	Using Dummy Variables to Test Hypotheses about a	
			Categorical Independent Variable with More Than	
			Two Values	207



#### xii Contents

	11.3	Testing Interactive Hypotheses with Dummy Variables	210
	11.4	Dummy Dependent Variables	212
		11.4.1 The Linear Probability Model	212
		11.4.2 Binomial Logit and Binomial Probit	215
		11.4.3 Goodness-of-Fit with Dummy Dependent Variables	219
	11.5	Outliers and Influential Cases in OLS	220
		11.5.1 Identifying Influential Cases	221
		11.5.2 Dealing with Influential Cases	224
	11.6	Multicollinearity	225
		11.6.1 How Does Multicollinearity Happen?	226
		11.6.2 Detecting Multicollinearity	227
		11.6.3 Multicollinearity: A Simulated Example	228
		11.6.4 Multicollinearity: A Real-World Example	230
		11.6.5 Multicollinearity: What Should I Do?	232
	11.7	Being Careful with Time Series	233
		11.7.1 Time-Series Notation	233
		11.7.2 Memory and Lags in Time-Series Analysis	234
		11.7.3 Trends and the Spurious Regression Problem	236
		11.7.4 The Differenced Dependent Variable	239
		11.7.5 The Lagged Dependent Variable	241
	11.8	Wrapping Up	242
	Conce	epts Introduced in This Chapter	243
12	Multi	iple Regression Models III: Applications	244
12	<b>Mult</b> i Overv		244 244
12		iew	
12	Overv		244
12	Overv	iew Why Controlling for $Z$ Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity	244 244
12	Overv 12.1 12.2	iew Why Controlling for Z Matters	244 244
12	Overv 12.1 12.2	iew Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for Democracy	244 244 245
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3	iew Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for	244 244 245
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4	iew Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for Democracy Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects	<ul><li>244</li><li>244</li><li>245</li><li>248</li></ul>
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5	Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for Democracy Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects International Trade	<ul><li>244</li><li>244</li><li>245</li><li>248</li><li>251</li></ul>
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5	Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for Democracy Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects International Trade Conclusions epts Introduced in This Chapter	<ul> <li>244</li> <li>244</li> <li>245</li> <li>248</li> <li>251</li> <li>253</li> </ul>
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise	Why Controlling for Z Matters Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for Democracy Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects International Trade Conclusions epts Introduced in This Chapter ises	244 245 248 251 253 254
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper	Why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  adix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	<ul> <li>244</li> <li>244</li> <li>245</li> <li>248</li> <li>251</li> <li>253</li> <li>254</li> <li>255</li> <li>255</li> </ul>
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper	why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  adix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	244 244 245 248 251 253 254 254 255
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper	Why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  adix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	244 244 245 248 251 253 254 255 256 257
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper	why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  adix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	244 244 245 248 251 253 254 255 256 257
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper Apper	Why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  adix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	244 244 245 248 251 253 254 255 256 257
12	Overv 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Conce Exercise Apper Apper	Why Controlling for $Z$ Matters  Example 1: The Economy and Presidential Popularity  Example 2: Politics, Economics, and Public Support for  Democracy  Example 3: Competing Theories of How Politics Affects  International Trade  Conclusions  epts Introduced in This Chapter  ises  Indix A. Critical Values of $\chi^2$	244 245 248 251 253 254 255 256 257 259



## **Figures**

1.1	The road to scientific knowledge	page 4
1.2	From theory to hypothesis	9
1.3	What would you expect to see based on the theory of	
	economic voting?	10
1.4	What would you expect to see based on the theory of	
	economic voting? Two hypothetical cases	12
1.5	What would you expect to see based on the theory of	
	economic voting?	12
1.6	What would you expect to see based on the theory of	
	economic voting? Two hypothetical cases	13
2.1	Presidential approval, 1995–2005	24
2.2	Military spending in 2005	25
2.3	Gross U.S. government debt as a percentage of GDP,	
	1960–2004	42
2.4	Women as a percentage of members of parliament, 2004	43
3.1	The path to evaluating a causal relationship	51
3.2	Theoretical causes of the number of parties in legislatures	57
3.3	Nazi vote and the number of parties winning seats in Weimar	
	Republic elections, 1919–1933	59
3.4	Number of parties winning seats in German Bundestag	
	elections, 1949–2002	60
4.1	The possibly confounding effects of a healthy lifestyle on the	
	aspirin-blood-pressure relationship	71
5.1	Reliability, validity, and hypothesis testing	96
5.2	Polity IV score for Pakistan	98
6.1	Pie graph of religious identification, NES 2004	110
6.2	Bar graph of religious identification, NES 2004	110
6.3	Example output from Stata's "summarize" command with	
	"detail" option	111
6.4	Box-whisker plot of incumbent-party presidential vote	
	percentage, 1880–2004	114
6.5	Histogram of incumbent-party presidential vote percentage,	
	1880–2004	116

xiii



#### xiv Figures

6.6	Histograms of incumbent-party presidential vote percentage,	117
(7	1880–2004, depicted with 2 and then 10 blocks	117
6.7	Kernel density plot of incumbent-party presidential vote	117
7 1	percentage, 1880–2004  The percentage are helicity distribution	
7.1	The normal probability distribution The 68–95–99 rule	123
7.2		124
7.3	Frequency distribution of 600 rolls of a die	124
8.1	Box-whisker plot of Government Duration for majority and minority governments	147
8.2	Kernel density plot of Government Duration for majority and	11/
0.2	minority governments	147
8.3	Scatter plot of change in GDP and incumbent-party vote share	151
8.4	Scatter plot of change in GDP and incumbent-party vote share	
	with mean-delimited quadrants	152
8.5	What is wrong with this table?	156
9.1	Scatter plot of change in GDP and incumbent-party vote share	162
9.2	Three possible lines	163
9.3	OLS regression line through scatter plot with mean-delimited	
	quadrants	165
9.4	Stata results for two-variable regression model of	
	$VOTE = \alpha + \beta \times GROWTH$	166
9.5	Venn diagram of variance and covariance for <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i>	168
10.1	Venn diagram in which <i>X</i> , <i>Y</i> , and <i>Z</i> are correlated	191
10.2	Venn diagram in which <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i> are correlated with <i>Z</i> , but	
	not with each other	192
11.1	Stata output when we include both gender dummy variables in	
	our model	204
11.2	Regression lines from the interactive model	207
11.3	Regression lines from the interactive model	212
11.4	Three different models of Bush vote	218
11.5	Stata lvr2plot for the model presented in Table 11.8	222
11.6	OLS line with scatter plot for Florida 2000	223
11.7	Venn diagram with multicollinearity	226
11.8	The growth of golf and the decline of the American family,	
	1947–2002	237
11.9	The growth of the U.S. economy and the decline of the family,	
	1947–2002	238
11.10	First differences of the number of golf courses and percentage	
	of married families, 1947–2002	240
12.1	A simple causal model of the relationship between the	
	economy and presidential popularity	245
12.2	A revised model of presidential popularity	246



### **Tables**

4.1	Example of cross-sectional data	page 80
4.2	Example of time-series data	81
6.1	Frequency table for religious identification in the 2004 NES	109
6.2	Values of incumbent vote ranked from smallest to largest	113
6.3	Median incomes of the 50 states, 2004–2005	119
8.1	Variable types and appropriate bivariate hypothesis tests	135
8.2	Union households and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential	
	election	140
8.3	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election:	
	Hypothetical scenario	141
8.4	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election:	
	Expectations for hypothetical scenario if there were no	
	relationship	142
8.5	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election	142
8.6	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election:	
	Calculating the expected cell values if gender and presidentia	1
	vote are unrelated	142
8.7	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election	142
8.8	Gender and vote in the 2004 U.S. presidential election	143
8.9	Government type and government duration	149
8.10	Contributions of individual election years to the covariance	
	calculation	153
8.11	Covariance table for economic growth and incumbent-party	
	presidential vote, 1880–2004	154
8.12	Incumbent reelection rates in U.S. congressional elections,	
	1964–2006	157
9.1	Measures of total residuals for three different lines	164
10.1	Three regression models of U.S. presidential elections	193
10.2	Bias in $\hat{\beta}_1$ when the true population model is	
	$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + u_i$ but we leave out Z	201
11.1	Two models of the effects of gender and income on Hillary	
	Clinton Thermometer scores	205
11.2	Religious Identification in the 1996 NES	208

жv



#### xvi Tables

11.3	The same model of religion and income on Hillary Clinton	
	Thermometer scores with different reference categories	209
11.4	The effects of gender and feelings toward the women's	
	movement on Hillary Clinton Thermometer scores	211
11.5	The effects of partisanship and performance evaluations on	
	votes for Bush in 2004	213
11.6	The effects of partisanship and performance evaluations on	
	votes for Bush in 2004: Three different types of models	217
11.7	Classification table from LPM of the effects of partisanship	
	and performance evaluations on votes for Bush in 2004	219
11.8	Votes for Gore and Buchanan in Florida counties in the 2000	
	U.S. presidential election	222
11.9	The five largest (absolute-value) DFBETA scores for $\beta$ from	
	the model presented in Table 11.8	224
11.10	Votes for Gore and Buchanan in Florida counties in the 2000	
	U.S. presidential election	225
11.11	Random draws of increasing size from a population with	
	substantial multicollinearity	230
11.12	Pairwise correlations between independent variables	231
11.13	Model results from random draws of increasing size from the	
	2004 NES	232
11.14	Golf and the decline of the family, 1947–2002	238
11.15	GDP and the decline of the family, 1947–2002	239
12.1	Excerpts from the table of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson on	
	the relationship between the economy and presidential	
	popularity	246
12.2	Excerpts from the table of Evans and Whitefield on the	
	relationship between the economy and support for democracy	250
12.3	Excerpts from the table of Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares on	
	the political causes of international trade	252





An inevitable part of the production of a book like this is an accumulation of massive intellectual debts. We have been overwhelmed by both the quality and quantity of help that we have received from our professional (and even personal) contacts as we have gone through every stage of this project.

This book arose out of more than 20 years of combined teaching experience at Brown University, the University of California, Los Angeles, the University of Essex, the University of Minnesota, and Texas A&M University. We tried out most of the examples in this book on numerous classes of students before we refined them into their present state. We thus owe a debt to every student who raised his or her hand or showed us a furrowed brow as we worked our way through these attempts to explain the complicated processes of scientifically studying politics.

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xvii



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