Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries, yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. In an important contribution to this ongoing project, Johann Graf Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of the institutions necessary to carry out corrupt transactions and those that are helpful in inhibiting them. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring a reputation of unreliability. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption – the “invisible foot” – whereby the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining interdisciplinary theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anticorruption reform.

JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF is Chair in Economic Theory at the University of Passau, Germany, and Senior Research Consultant to Transparency International. He is the founder of the Corruption Perceptions Index, Which he has orchestrated since 1995.
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform

Theory, Evidence, and Policy

JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF
To Maria, Philipp, Frederik, and Felix
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of boxes</th>
<th>page viii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A roadmap to this book</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Enemies of corruption</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption?</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Corruption and transactions costs: The rent-seeking perspective</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Exporters’ ethics and the art of bribery</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: An empirical approach</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Corrupt relational contracting</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Concluding thoughts</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Technical details to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject index</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© Cambridge University Press  
www.cambridge.org
List of boxes

Box 1 Corruption and the size of the public sector  
Box 2 Corruption and decentralization 6 
Box 3 Corruption and regulatory quality 10 
Box 4 Corruption and competition among private firms 12 
Box 5 Sources of the 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index 21 
Box 6 Corruption and trust 29 
Box 7 Corruption, values, and colonialism 32 
Box 8 Corruption and gender 34 
Box 9 Corruption and geographic preconditions 35 
Box 10 Corruption and official wages 37 
Box 11 Corruption and democracy 39 
Box 12 Corruption and parliamentarism 41 
Box 13 Corruption and voting systems 43 
Box 14 Corruption and press freedom 46 
Box 15 Corruption and the judiciary 47 
Box 16 Corruption and income per head 72 
Box 17 Corruption and growth of GDP 73 
Box 18 Corruption, productivity, and quality 76 
Box 19 Corruption and distorted budget allocation 88 
Box 20 Corruption and inequality 91 
Box 21 Corruption and the underground economy 95 
Box 22 Corruption and investments 100 
Box 23 Corruption and the composition of investments 104 
Box 24 Different types of corruption and investment 105 
Box 25 How to fix a football match, by Declan Hill 169 
Box 26 Corruption distorting the private sector 174 
Box 27 Hindering corrupt intermediaries 184 
Box 28 Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties, jointly written with Mathias Nell 229
Acknowledgements

This book is a twelve-year project, combining research efforts since 1994. At an early stage, some parts of it became highly prominent: The Corruption Perceptions Index, which was designed in 1995 and is compiled under my leadership at the University of Passau since then, on behalf of Transparency International. This index was not predominantly designed to serve as a tool for alerting politics and the public at large. Its initial aim was to serve as a starting point for academic research. Considerable progress has been made on this front of research since then – the empirical investigations reviewed here provide evidence on this.


Some special thanks go to W. Zucchini, who was invaluable in refining the statistical methodology for the Corruption Perceptions Index and devoted much time and effort to designing appropriate algorithms. I owe many thanks to H.-J. Jarchow, who supervised my habilitation at the University of Göttingen. He provided me with the freedom to devote my efforts to a new area of research and supported me with his critical accuracy. Further special thanks are due to Peter Eigen. Without his organizational support through Transparency International much of my work would not have had the opportunity to reach out to a broader audience already at its early stages. Similar thanks go to Frank Vogl, Jeremy Pope, George Moody-Stuart.
Lawrence Cockroft, and many others within Transparency International. They established a community that injects spirit into what is otherwise bloodless research. Although this book is dedicated to academic rigor I hope that some of this spirit remains.

University of Passau, October 06
A road map to this book

Those who are willing to carry out corrupt acts lose the capacity to commit to honesty. This is the core argument developed and exploited in this book. Corrupt actors can neither commit to honestly serving the public nor credibly promise reciprocity to their corrupt counterparts. This thought is at the center of understanding the disastrous economic and social consequences of corruption. At the same time, this concept deserves to be placed at the center of reform. Bribe-takers and bribe-givers have a schizophrenic relationship to honesty. They betray their superiors and the public but attempt to signal reciprocity to each other – and often fail in doing so. A strategy for reform must exploit this failure. The Achilles’ heel of corrupt transactions is that a briber often does not know what he will get in return. This is a crucial weakness of those who are willing to engage in corrupt transactions. Anticorruption can therefore take the tactic of a judo-fighter – someone who exploits his opponents’ weaknesses.

The power of economic thinking started with the concept of the invisible hand. Competition substituted for benevolence by guiding self-seeking actors to serve the public. With respect to fighting corruption we do not have such a powerful mechanism. If something comes close to it, it is the corrupt actor’s capacity to betray each other. This betrayal is a good thing. I call this the principle of the invisible foot.\(^1\) The willingness to take bribes works against the corrupt actors. Anticipating this, even self-seeking individuals may have reason to commit to honesty rather than seek opportunities for bribes.

This book does not provide readers with recipes on how to fight corruption. Instead of designing a toolbox it rather presents a methodological approach that, I hope, will inspire anticorruption in the

\(^1\) This term was originally invented by Brock and Magee (1984). They used the term to indicate welfare losses arising in rent-seeking competition. My usage is different here.
future. This is repeatedly supported by cases and examples. Chapter 1 presents methodological and quantitative details. How is corruption defined, how is it measured? Why did some older guiding principles for anticorruption fail? I argue that corruption is not eliminated by fighting on a different battleground, such as reducing government, decentralizing public decision-making, privatizing public property, or enhancing competition. Corruption is a genuinely new challenge that requires novel answers. The invisible hand of competition brings about good markets but not good governance. This is shown in Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 surveys some empirical evidence on anticorruption, including its sometimes poor performance, and starts to present the core concept of this book. Having dismissed many alternative approaches to fighting corruption, the principle of the invisible foot is elaborated.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore that the corrupt actors’ lack of commitment to honesty is at the core of the welfare losses of corruption. In Chapter 3, this idea is developed for bribe-taking bureaucrats. There should be no doubt that bribe-taking is often a utility-maximizing strategy of a self-seeking bureaucrat. But the downside of one’s willingness to take bribes is that such actors disqualify for professions where their commitment would be vital.

A similar thought arises for heads of government, as explored in Chapter 4. They might transfer public funds into their private pockets. But they are not trusted by investors if they disrespect law. The advantage from bribery turns against its actors. This is at the core of understanding the social costs of grand corruption, the type of corruption that takes place higher up in hierarchy.

Chapters 3 and 4 at the same time provide readers with an up-to-date assessment of research, both empirical and theoretical. Such an assessment is also provided in the various boxes of this book, which allow readers to obtain a quick grasp of empirical research. I hope such details do not distract readers from the core message of the book. There is a multitude of social costs invoked by corruption. This ascertains that we cannot avoid the negative consequences of corruption but must fight corruption itself. We are given no alternative but to devote our efforts to reducing corruption.

Chapter 5 asks whether we should facilitate or impede corruption. The answer appears straightforward in favor of the latter option.
But we must note that the traditional rent-seeking theory argued differently. It opted in favor of facilitated corruption because otherwise competition for preferential treatment would waste resources for lobbying, engaging lawyers for lawsuits, or harassing politicians with public campaigns. I show that this conclusion is misguided – our effort must be directed toward increasing the transaction costs of corruption.

Chapter 6 shows how in practice corrupt actors attempt to secure reciprocity. This chapter might be misunderstood as a how-to-bribe guide for criminal actors. But learning how to arrange bribes is a fruitful starting point for reform. We must understand our enemies if we want to defeat them. We must understand corrupt actors’ temptation to betray each other in order to encourage precisely this behavior.

Chapter 7 brings our thought to the international arena. The invisible hand of competition brings about good markets. But does it destroy good governance? This proposition, fortunately, would take things too far. The reason for ethics to survive market pressures relates to the skills required in corrupt transactions. I address this topic by raising an empirical question: do differences in skills affect trade? Are some exporters advantaged in entering corrupt markets? The answer is a clear yes. The skill of bribery is at the core of understanding some remarkable differences in trade patterns of large exporting nations. Ethical behavior can survive market pressure. Whereas some actors may refrain from corruption owing to moral concerns, others are simply untalented. One application of this finding relates to corrupt intermediaries. These offer expertise on corrupt transactions to the untalented. Certification should be offered to those intermediaries who are willing to commit to anticorruption.

Chapter 8 picks up the international perspective of Chapter 7 and confronts it with a challenging position. While I claim that transaction costs of corruption should be increased we hear investors complain about the unpredictability of corruption. Should we prefer corruption to be predictable? Is reliability and reciprocity always a good thing? This is not an academic debate. Politics is often involved in guaranteeing international reciprocity even when corruption was involved. I argue that this practice must be stopped. The unpredictability of corruption is precisely what may put an end to it. We must make sure that corruption remains a risky and capricious activity.
Chapter 9 brings us back to the question of how corrupt actors reciprocate. It shows that corrupt transactions are often embedded in regular, legal business transactions. These transactions can provide the breeding ground by establishing the trust and the reciprocity necessary to engage in illegal deals. This chapter is crucial for understanding that there is no “corrupt marketplace.” There is hardly ever a given demand for corrupt services and supply of such, with a going rate for bribery being determined in equilibrium. Corruption is restricted to insiders with established links. Corruption is open only to those who exploit long-standing relationships for a criminal career.

Chapter 10 summarizes. Other guiding principles for anticorruption such as repression, prevention, or transparency may run out of steam. The principle of the invisible foot should be at the core of anticorruption and provide future inspiration. A plethora of building blocks can emanate from this principle; this book does not try to be exhaustive in this regard. One focus that deserves recognition is the design of the legal system. Penalties may mark the starting point of a corrupt career. An asymmetric design of penalties may avoid this problem and inhibit corrupt reciprocity. This is only an example for the overarching principle of the invisible foot. To state it again: corrupt actors can neither commit to honestly serving the public nor credibly promise reciprocity to their corrupt counterparts. Reform is about exploiting this handicap.