The purpose of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer is to offer translations of the best modern German editions of Schopenhauer’s work in a uniform format suitable for Schopenhauer scholars, together with philosophical introductions and full editorial apparatus.

This volume of new translations unites three shorter works by Arthur Schopenhauer that expand on themes from his book *The World as Will and Representation*. *On the Fourfold Root* he takes the principle of sufficient reason, which states that nothing is without a reason why it is, and shows how it covers different forms of explanation or ground that previous philosophers have tended to confuse. Schopenhauer regarded this study, which he first wrote as his doctoral dissertation, as an essential preliminary to *The World as Will and Representation*. *On Will in Nature* examines contemporary scientific findings in search of corroboration of his thesis that processes in nature are all a species of striving towards ends; and *On Vision and Colours* defends an anti-Newtonian account of colour perception influenced by Goethe’s famous colour theory. This is the first English edition to provide extensive editorial notes on the different published versions of these works.

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THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF SCHOPENHAUER

GENERAL EDITOR

Christopher Janaway

Titles in this series:

The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics
translated and edited by Christopher Janaway

The World as Will and Representation: Volume 1
translated and edited by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman
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by Christopher Janaway

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings
translated and edited by David E. Cartwright, Edward E. Erdmann and
Christopher Janaway with an Introduction by David E. Cartwright
and Edward E. Erdmann
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Schopenhauer is one of the great original writers of the nineteenth century, and a unique voice in the history of thought. His central concept of the will leads him to regard human beings as striving irrationally and suffering in a world that has no purpose, a condition redeemed by the elevation of aesthetic consciousness and finally overcome by the will’s self-denial and a mystical vision of the self as one with the world as a whole. He is in some ways the most progressive post-Kantian, an atheist with profound ideas about the human essence and the meaning of existence which point forward to Nietzsche, Freud, and existentialism. He was also the first major Western thinker to seek a synthesis with Eastern thought. Yet at the same time he undertakes an ambitious global metaphysics of a conservative, more or less pre-Kantian kind, and is driven by a Platonic vision of escape from empirical reality into a realm of higher knowledge.

Schopenhauer was born in 1788, and by 1809 had gone against his family’s expectations of a career as a merchant and embarked on a university career. He completed his doctoral dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in 1813, then spent several years in intensive preparation of what became the major work of his life, The World as Will and Representation, which was published at the end of 1818, with 1819 on the title page. Shortly afterwards his academic career suffered a setback when his only attempt at a lecture course ended in failure. Thereafter Schopenhauer adopted a stance of intellectual self-sufficiency and antagonism towards university philosophy, for which he was repaid by a singular lack of reaction to his writings. In 1836 he published On Will in Nature, an attempt to corroborate his metaphysics with findings from the sciences, and in 1841 two self-standing essays on free will and moral philosophy, entitled The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. A large supplementary second volume to The World as Will and Representation appeared in 1844, accompanied by a revised version of the original which now appeared as Volume 1; then in 1851 another two-volume work, Parerga
and Paralipomena, a collection of essays and observations. Only in the 1850s did serious interest in Schopenhauer’s philosophy begin, with a favourable review appearing in an English journal and a few European universities offering courses on his work. In this final decade before his death in 1860 he published a third edition of The World as Will and Representation and a second edition of The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. After Schopenhauer’s death his follower Julius Frauenstädt produced the first six-volume edition of his works in 1873, providing the basis for many subsequent German editions up to the Sämtliche Werke edited by Arthur Hübscher, which we use as the basis for our translations in the present edition.

Though Schopenhauer’s life and the genesis of his philosophy belong to the early part of the nineteenth century, it is the latter half of the century that provides the context for his widespread reception and influence. In 1877 he was described by Wilhelm Wundt as ‘the born leader of non-academic philosophy in Germany’, and in that period many artists and intellectuals, prominent among them Richard Wagner, worked under the influence of his works. The single most important philosophical influence was on Nietzsche, who was in critical dialogue throughout his career with his ‘great teacher Schopenhauer’. But many aspects of the period resonate with Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, his pessimism, his championing of the Upanishads and Buddhism, and his theory of the self and the world as embodied striving.

Over the last three decades interest in Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world has been growing again, with a good number of monographs, translations, and collections of articles appearing, where before there were very few. More general trends in the study of the history of philosophy have played a part here. There has recently been a dramatic rise in philosophical interest in the period that immediately follows Kant (including the German Idealists and Romanticism), and the greater centrality now accorded to Nietzsche’s philosophy has provided further motivation for attending to Schopenhauer. Yet until now there has been no complete English edition of his works. The present six-volume series of Schopenhauer’s published works aims to provide an up-to-date, reliable English translation that reflects the literary style of the original while maintaining linguistic accuracy and consistency over his philosophical vocabulary.

Almost all the English translations of Schopenhauer in use until now, published though they are by several different publishers, stem from a single translator, the remarkable E. F. J. Payne. These translations, which were done in the 1950s and 1960s, have stood the test of time quite well
and performed a fine service in transmitting Schopenhauer to an English-speaking audience. Payne’s single-handed achievement is all the greater given that he was not a philosopher or an academic, but a former military man who became a dedicated enthusiast. His translations are readable and lively and convey a distinct authorial voice. However, the case for new translations rests partly on the fact that Payne has a tendency towards circumlocution rather than directness and is often not as scrupulous as we might wish in translating philosophical vocabulary, partly on the fact that recent scholarship has probed many parts of Schopenhauer’s thought with far greater precision than was known in Payne’s day, and partly on the simple thought that after half a century of reading Schopenhauer almost solely through one translator, and with a wider and more demanding audience established, a change of voice is in order.

In the present edition the translators have striven to keep a tighter rein on philosophical terminology, especially that which is familiar from the study of Kant – though we should be on our guard here, for Schopenhauer’s use of a Kantian word does not permit us to infer that he uses it in a sense Kant would have approved of. We have included explanatory introductions to each volume, and other aids to the reader: footnotes explaining some of Schopenhauer’s original German vocabulary, a glossary of names to assist with his voluminous literary and philosophical references, a chronology of his life, and a bibliography of German texts, existing English translations, and selected further reading. We also give a breakdown of all passages that were added or altered by Schopenhauer in different editions of his works, especially noteworthy being the changes made to his earliest publications, On the Fourfold Root and the single-volume first edition of The World as Will and Representation. A further novel feature of this edition is our treatment of the many extracts Schopenhauer quotes in languages other than German. Our guiding policy here is, as far as possible, to translate material in any language into English. The reader will therefore not be detained by scanning through passages in other languages and having to resort to footnote translations. Nevertheless, the virtuoso manner in which Schopenhauer blends Latin, Greek, French, Italian, and Spanish extracts with his own prose style is not entirely lost, since we have used footnotes to give all the original passages in full.

CHRISTOPHER JANAWAY
Three kinds of notes occur in the translation:

(i) Footnotes marked with asterisks (*, **, and so on) are Schopenhauer's own notes.
(ii) Footnotes marked with small letters (a, b, c) are editorial notes. These either give information about the original wording in Schopenhauer's text (in German or other languages), or provide additional editorial information. All (and only) such additional information is enclosed in brackets [ ]. All footnote material not in brackets consists of words from the original text.
(iii) Endnotes marked with numerals 1, 2, 3. The endnotes for each work, given at the end of the individual work, indicate variations between the different texts of the works.

Schopenhauer's works are referred to by the following abbreviations. In each instance, we give reference to the Hübsher volume and page. We give page references to those Cambridge editions published as of the date of the present volume: BM and FW are found in The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (2009) and WWR 1 (2010). The Hübsher page numbers can be used to locate passages in future volumes of the Cambridge edition:

BM On the Basis of Morals [Über die Grundlage der Moral].
FR On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde].
FW On the Freedom of the Will [Über die Freiheit des Willens].
Editorial notes and references

| PP 1, 2 | Parerga and Paralipomena [Parerga und Paralipomena], Vols. 1 and 2. |
| VC     | On Vision and Colours [Über das Sehn und die Farben]. |
| WN     | On Will in Nature [Über den Willen in der Natur]. |
| WWR 1, 2 | The World as Will and Representation [Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung], Vols. 1 and 2. |

Unpublished writings by Schopenhauer are referred to thus:


Passages in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are referred by the standard method, using A and B marginal numbers corresponding to the first and second editions of the work. Other writings by Kant are referred to by volume and page number of the monumental ‘Akademie’ edition (Berlin: Georg Reimer/Walter de Gruyter, 1900–), in the form Ak. 4: 397. References to works of Plato and Aristotle use the standard marginal annotations.
Introduction

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Genesis of the work

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason began life as Schopenhauer’s dissertation. In his dissertation, Schopenhauer begins with a general statement of the principle of sufficient reason: ‘nothing is without a ground for its being rather than not being.’ Schopenhauer argues that the principle is derived from four different ground-consequent relations, what he calls the four ‘roots’ of the principle. He argues that previous philosophers recognized and conflated two of these roots: that in order for a proposition to be true it must have a reason and that any alteration of a real object must have a cause. The former Schopenhauer called ‘the principle of sufficient reason of knowing’ and the latter he called ‘the principle of sufficient reason of becoming’. Schopenhauer argues for recognition of two more roots that he refers to as ‘the principle of sufficient reason of being’ and ‘the principle of sufficient reason of acting’. Schopenhauer believed that were philosophers carefully to specify to which of the four different forms of the principle of sufficient reason they refer, they would be spared a great deal of confusion.

Schopenhauer had planned to submit the dissertation to the University of Berlin for his doctorate in philosophy. Instead he sent it to the University of Jena. His change of plan was a function of circumstance. After two years at the University of Göttingen, he switched his allegiance from medicine to philosophy due to the influence of his first philosophy professor, Gottlob Ernst Schulze. In 1811 Schopenhauer enrolled at Berlin, drawn there with the hope that in Johann Gottlieb Fichte he would hear a great philosopher. But after his a priori veneration for Fichte had turn to disdain, and after fearing that Berlin would be attacked by Napoleon, in May 1813 he fled to Weimar, and then travelled south to the small town of Rudolstadt, where
he laboured on his dissertation from July to the end of September. Fearing that sending his dissertation to Berlin could make it a casualty of the war, on 24 September he sent it to the nearby University of Jena, after paying the required examination fee.

The letter, composed in Latin, accompanying his dissertation, composed in German, is surprisingly uncharacteristic for a philosopher whose typical voice was confident, even sometimes arrogant about the quality of his work. After providing the dean of the philosophy faculty, Heinrich Carl Eichstädt, with a description of his academic preparation, he requested that Jena’s ‘sagacious’ faculty advise him whether they found anything unclear, rambling, untrue, or even offensive in his work. In matters of philosophy, he continued, it was not wise to ‘rely on one’s own judgement’, and he explained that in Rudolstadt he had no philosophically learned friends to review his manuscript. He was also particularly keen to know whether anyone had anticipated his criticisms of Kant’s proof of the law of causality, since he lacked access to a good library.¹ Eichstädt quickly circulated a letter announcing the dissertation while mentioning that its author was son of ‘the well-known authoress, Frau Hofrätin Schopenhauer’. On 2 October 1813, Schopenhauer was awarded his degree in absentia, with the distinction magna cum laude.

Despite the conciliatory tone of Schopenhauer’s communications with the faculty at Jena, in a more characteristic move, the young philosopher was simultaneously arranging to have 500 copies of the work published,² and the work was out by the end of October. Unfortunately, the published dissertation earned, at best, lukewarm reviews.³ Indeed, the most stinging might have come from the young man’s mother, who asked sarcastically whether his book was for pharmacists. Schopenhauer retorted that his work would still find readers when not even a single copy of her writings could be found in a junk yard. Undaunted, Johanna Schopenhauer spat back, ‘Of yours the entire printing will still be available’.⁴

¹ GB 3–5, letter to Eichstädt, 22 September 1813
² GB 3, letter to Friedrich Justin Bertuch, 15 September 1813
⁴ Reported by Wilhelm Gwinner, Gespräche (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog, 1971), p. 17
Introduction

Differences between editions

Thirty-four years, 1813 to 1847, lapsed between the two editions of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophic first-born, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. At nearly sixty, Schopenhauer understated the substantive changes between the editions. He claimed that it was his intent ‘to deal with my youthful self indulgently, and as far as it is ever possible, to let him have his say’, but to ‘cut him off’ when he said something ‘incorrect or superfluous’. Although in this way Schopenhauer allowed that the later edition corrected errors and deleted superfluous material, to the older philosopher the most significant difference between the two editions was a matter of voice. ‘The sensitive reader’, he claimed, ‘will certainly never be in doubt whether he hears the cadence of the old or the young man’. He characterizes the voice of the 1813 version as an ‘unassuming tone’ born of a young man who is ‘still naïve enough to believe quite seriously that all those who occupy themselves with philosophy could have nothing to do with anything else but the truth’. This youthful voice he contrasts with that of ‘the firm, but at times somewhat acerbic voice of the old man who finally had to discover what a noble society of tradespeople and submissive syphons he has fallen among and what they aimed at’ (p. 3). Certainly there are noticeable changes of voice between the two editions. For example, in § 10 of the 1854 edition, Schopenhauer changes the young man’s critique of Christian Wolff from ‘I don’t understand’ to the straightforward claim that Wolff made ‘a mistake’ (p. 24). It is apparent that as a young man Schopenhauer’s deference was intentional. In § 46 of the 1813 dissertation, Schopenhauer praised Schelling for providing an illuminating account of Kant’s distinction between the intelligible and empirical character and the relation between freedom and nature. Yet his marginal notes in Schelling’s text are bluntly critical. In this passage, Schelling did not refer to Kant by name, but to idealism. Schopenhauer’s marginal notation in his copy of Schelling’s *Philosophische Schriften* (1809) scolds, ‘Kant, you unseemly scoundrel’. In 1854, the entire section, § 46, is eliminated. Nevertheless, in no other book did he delete so much of the original, and nowhere else would he make such substantive philosophical changes.

Yet these changes to *On the Fourfold Root* were made relatively late in Schopenhauer’s philosophical career, and they were prompted by the significant development of a philosophic train of thought, first articulated...
in his principal work, *The World as Will and Representation* (1819), and further developed in *On Will in Nature* (1836) and the second edition of his principal work (1844). This development placed the first edition of *On the Fourfold Root* in a curious relation to his principal work, for in the ‘Preface to the first edition’ of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer makes three imposing demands on readers seeking to truly understand his philosophy. The second of these demands was that his readers study the introduction or propaedeutic to this work, *On the Fourfold Root*. He claims that readers will only be able to engage in his novel way of philosophizing by knowing what this principle is, what it signifies, and the limits of its validity. Not only would his readers learn that the world exists only as a result of this principle, but they would also realize that this principle is the form of any object and that all objects are conditioned by the subject.

Yet when Schopenhauer issued this demand in 1818, he was a much different philosopher than the younger dissertator of 1813. He was more philosophically mature, and he had revised his understanding of the significance of Kant’s philosophy. Consequently in the first preface to his principal work, he forewarns his readers that he could now provide a better presentation of the subject matter of his dissertation because he could clarify many of the ideas that resulted from his excessive preoccupation with the Kantian philosophy, particularly his uncritical employment of Kant’s pure categories of the understanding and Kant’s views of the inner sense and the outer sense. Schopenhauer explains that these Kantian ideas were only secondary concerns, so he had not thought about them deeply. With no sense of the burden he is about to impose on his readers, he then casually mentions that, after they become acquainted with his principal work, correction of these wayward passages will come automatically to readers’ minds.

Schopenhauer’s remarks concerning the means by which he would clarify his dissertation only hint at the changes he would make twenty-nine years after those mentioned in the first edition of his principal work. Between the time of the two editions of *On the Fourfold Root*, he had discovered the first edition of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* in which he found a

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6 Schopenhauer also included in this demand reading the first chapter of *On Vision and Colours*. His first demand was to read the book twice, and the third was to be thoroughly acquainted with Kant’s philosophy; Schopenhauer also mentioned that spending some time in the school of the divine Plato and familiarity with the *Upanishads*, would serve as means to make readers more receptive to his thought (due to Plato) and so that what he had to say would not sound foreign or inimical (due to the *Upanishads*), see WWR 1, 6–9 (Hübcher SW 2, viii–xiii)
greater commitment to idealism and fewer contradictions than in its second edition. He had also rehearsed for the first time his physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of intuition in his *On Vision and Colours*, and he had discussed how his philosophy was corroborated by the sciences in *On Will in Nature*. He had also published his ethics in the ‘narrower sense’ in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, and he had more than doubled the length of *The World as Will and Representation* in its second edition by including a second volume of essays that supplemented his discussions in the single-volume first edition.\(^7\) Consequentially, the second edition of *On the Fourfold Root* is a work dramatically unlike what Schopenhauer envisioned, even if ‘clarified’, when he wrote the 1819 introduction, and the work now serves as an introduction to his principal work in a way that does not require readers to correct wayward discussions themselves.

There are obvious differences between the two editions. In the Hübischer *Sämtliche Werke*, both editions have eight chapters, and whereas the earlier version had fifty-nine sections, the second has fifty-two. Yet the second edition runs to some sixty-seven pages longer than the first. While some materials from omitted sections find their place in the second edition, other sections, §§15, 17, 22, 46, 49, 50, 51, and 56, virtually disappear.\(^8\) He adds a new section (§12) on Hume, but still does not add Fichte to the section on ‘Kant and his School’ (§13). But unlike in his dissertation, where Fichte is never mentioned, he now freely abuses his former teacher, as he does his bête noire, Hegel, who was also ignored in the dissertation.\(^9\) Indeed, he includes unrestrained complaints against his contemporaries and even blames Kant for setting the stage for the wild flights into ‘Cloudcuckooland’ made by post-Kantians (p. 107). He cuts his only quotation from Goethe, but adds two more and denounces the reception of Goethe’s colour theory. He adds references to Eastern philosophy and religion, and he adds references to relevant supporting discussions found in his other books. To further indicate his allegiance to Kant, he replaces the word ‘metaphysical’ with ‘transcendental’.

The dissertator, however, is a philosopher of his times. Like the German Idealists, Schopenhauer is convinced that Kant’s great unknown, the thing

\(^7\) See WWR 2, ch. 47 (Hübischer *SW* 3, 679) where he claims that *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* has dealt with ‘morality in the narrower sense’ of the term

\(^8\) See ‘Collation of the two editions’, p. lvii

\(^9\) It appears that Schopenhauer had borrowed a copy of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* when he was writing his dissertation, but claimed not to have read it; see *GB* 6, letter to Carl Friedrich Frommann, 4 November 1813
in itself, is the weak point of the critical philosophy.¹⁰ At Göttingen he had been instructed by the author of Aenesidemus (1792), Gottlob Ernst Schulze, who argued that by viewing things in themselves as the cause of empirical intuitions, Kant had employed the concept of causality transcendentally, that is, Kant had applied the concept beyond the bounds of all possible experience. His Berlin professor Fichte had also considered the very idea of the thing in itself to be nonsense. So it is not surprising that in his early reflections on Kant, he would eschew the thing in itself, and that he would proudly state in his dissertation that ‘our investigation does not rigidify in a thing in itself’ (see p. 184). By the time of his principal work, however, Schopenhauer adopts Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves, chides the German Idealists for abandoning it, and considers this distinction to be Kant’s ‘greatest merit’.¹¹

Just as Schopenhauer reversed his stance toward the thing in itself long before the second edition of On the Fourfold Root, the same was true of his early commitment to the function of Kant’s twelve pure categories of the understanding in the intuition of the external world. To be sure, the dissenter was breaking free of the Kantian paradigm in which the perception of the external world was the result of a synthesis of sensory intuitions via the pure categories of the understanding. For example, the younger philosopher writes ‘I agree with Kant that the law of causality in connection with the other categories, thus generally with the understanding, makes possible the totality of objective cognition that we call experience... Except that, according to my view, the understanding does this only by unifying time and space through its categories, not through mere categories alone’ (see p. 166). Schopenhauer struggles to describe this unity or synthesis as an unconscious, immediate inference while he views Kant as describing it as involving mediated inferences:

Through the category of causality we originally cognize the object as actual, i.e. acting on us. That we are not conscious of this inference presents us with no difficulty: we are never conscious of the inference from the colour of the body to its shape. Moreover, it is no inference of reason, no combining of judgments: we have nothing to do with the concept of the category, but with the category itself. The category itself leads immediately from the effect to the cause; therefore, we are as little conscious of its function as that of the other categories, since precisely through these categories our consciousness changes from dull sensation

¹⁰ Schopenhauer calls the thing in itself the weak point of Kant’s philosophy in a early note where he also writes ‘the thing in itself – is 0’, see MR 1, 190ff. (HN 2, 166)
¹¹ See WWR 1, 444 (Hubscher SW 2, 494). This remark dates from the first edition.
to intuition. I would like to give the name of inference of understanding to this inference. It is a type of inference that is not mediated through any abstract concept. (see p. 168)

Three years later, in On Vision and Colours, he would abandon this view in his analysis of the intellectual nature of intuition. He would also argue in his principal work that one of Kant’s gravest mistakes was not to distinguish sufficiently between ‘intuitive cognition’ and ‘abstract, discursive cognition’.12 The understanding is now no longer the faculty of concepts in any sense for Schopenhauer; only reason is the faculty of concepts and of inferences. Reason, therefore, plays no role in the cognition of natural objects. He notes that non-human animals are incapable of formulating concepts but, just like humans, they are aware of a world of spatio-temporal objects, standing in causal relations. For this reason Schopenhauer attributes understanding to animals, but he follows the long-standing philosophical tradition of not attributing reason to them. Yet Schopenhauer differs from Kant, who views the faculty of reason as conferring a dignity to humans, making humans morally considerable and animals not. To Schopenhauer, animals share the same essence as humans: they are also will; they also suffer; and they are also morally considerable.

To accommodate his new insights, Schopenhauer made the appropriate changes in the second edition. So he carefully notes in the second edition that bodily sensations are the data for the application of the law of causality, but the body itself does not present objects. The sole function of the understanding, or ‘intellect’, becomes the immediate, intuitive apprehension of causal connections between objects. And Schopenhauer jettisons what he calls ‘the complicated clockwork of the twelve Kantian categories’ (p. 76). He also drops the reference to the body as the ‘immediate object’, not simply to remove obscuring jargon to which the dissertator was inclined, but to denote that sensations are not objects.13

In addition to eliminating vestiges of the Kantian account of cognition of the external world, Schopenhauer also had to rid the dissertation of views that were inconsistent with the metaphysics developed in The World as Will and Representation. This was especially true of his early view that will functioned causally. Consequently § 47 of the first edition, ‘Causality of Will on Cognition’, becomes § 44 in the second, and it receives the new title, ‘Influence of Will on Cognition’. The initial sentence is transformed from ‘The will not only causally affects the immediate object’ to ‘the
influence that will exercises on cognition is not based on causality’. The reason for this change is straightforward. The cognizing and willing subjects are identical, which absolutely rules out any causal relation between them. Schopenhauer had also argued in *The World as Will and Representation* that the body and will are identical.\(^\text{14}\) Therefore there is no causality between will and body, which are one and the same. Moreover, because causality functions only in the world as representation, within the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, and will is outside the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, there can be no causal relation between will and representation. So in the second edition, Schopenhauer also omits § 46, ‘Motive, Decisions, Empirical and Intelligible Character’, eliminating a discussion of how ‘the decision appears to be related to the subject of willing, and appears to be the point of contact between the unknowable subject of will (lying outside of time) and motives (lying in time)’ (p. 187).\(^\text{15}\)

Even in the first edition, however, Schopenhauer realized that he could not be speaking literally about the relation of the intelligible and empirical characters: ‘Perhaps I could better indicate what is meant, although also figuratively, if I call it [the intelligible character] a universal act of will lying outside of time, of which all temporal acts are only the emergence, the appearance’ (ibid.). He would use this metaphor elsewhere.\(^\text{16}\)

### The Second Edition

The alterations Schopenhauer’s dissertation underwent in the second edition formed it into the proper introduction to his principal work, as did his elaborations on a number of his earlier views. To be sure, it retains its original structure, except that he adds a preface to the second edition. In his statement of method in the first chapter, he still evokes ‘Plato, the divine’ and the ‘amazing Kant’ (p. 1). He argues that the method of philosophy – indeed, the method of all knowledge – must comply with two laws: the law of homogeneity and the law of specification. The former requires that we note similarities among things, uniting them into species, and species into genera, until we subsume all under some all-encompassing concept. The latter principle moves the consideration in the reverse direction. The

\(^\text{14}\) See *WWR* 1, 127 (Hübser *SW* 2, 122 ff.)

\(^\text{15}\) Schopenhauer also observes here that Kant’s concept of the intelligible character is more correctly called ‘unintelligible’, and he compliments Schelling’s exposition of Kant’s position

\(^\text{16}\) For Schopenhauer’s discussion of the metaphorical use of the term ‘universal act of will lying outside of time’, see *GB* 237, letter to Johann August Becker, 21 September 1844
law of specification recognizes genera under this all-embracing concept of family, then species in the genera, and the individual in the species. He agrees with Kant. Both laws are transcendental *a priori* principles of reason, and as such nature must conform to them. The significance of the principle of sufficient reason remains the same: it is ‘the mother of all sciences’, since the principle is that which structures a mere aggregate of facts into a coherent body of knowledge, one in which a particular finding follows from another as its grounds. The principle is also that which always permits us to ask ‘why’. Later, he makes his infamous statement that the principle of sufficient reason is ‘the principle of all explanation’ (p. 148). He still employs Christian Wolff’s statement of the principle of sufficient reason as its most general expression: *Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit*, ‘Nothing is without a reason why it is rather than it is not’ (p. 10).

Schopenhauer will argue, however, that the Wolffian formula is simply an abstraction, following the law of homogeneity, derived from four different relations, each of which is based on a *synthetic a priori* law, the so-called fourfold roots of the principle of sufficient reason, the subjects of the fourth to the seventh chapters.

In the second chapter, ranging from Plato through Kant and his school, Schopenhauer surveys the philosophical literature on his subject, finding that previous philosophers failed to distinguish clearly among the various forms of the principle and only gradually and confusedly recognized two expressions of the principle, namely, that in order for a proposition to be true it must have a reason and that any alteration of a real object must have a cause. The former Schopenhauer would designate as ‘the principle of sufficient reason of knowing’ and the latter as ‘law of causality’, to which he also will refer as ‘the principle of sufficient reason of becoming’ (p. 38). Whereas in the dissertation Schopenhauer claimed that the principle of sufficient reason itself can not be proven, and he claims that to ask for a ‘why’ for this principle is to ask a question that cannot be answered, in the second edition he drops the last claim and provides a dialectical proof. To demand a proof for the principle is already to assume it to be true and to do so is to require ‘a proof for the right to require a proof’ (p. 28).

In the third chapter, Schopenhauer introduces the basis on which he develops the four ‘roots’ of the principle of sufficient reason. He does so on the basis of that which he viewed as the first, universal, and essential condition for all cognition: the correlativity of subject and object. Our cognizing consciousness, our sensibility, understanding, and reason, divides

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37 See p. 31
into subject and object. All experience, any cognition, and any awareness require the experiencer and the experienced, the cognizer and the cognized, the subject of awareness and the object of awareness. The subject is never the object or the object the subject. By observing different objects of awareness, different sorts of representations, Schopenhauer develops four classes of objects, and the four ‘roots’ of the principle of sufficient reason. It is useful to examine how Schopenhauer sees the principle of sufficient reason governing different species of a ground-consequent relation.

*Principle of sufficient reason of becoming*

The fourth chapter of *On the Fourfold Root* focuses on the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, or the law of causality, the form of the principle that governs intuitive, complete, empirical representations. The sum total of these intuitive representations constitutes empirical reality. In brief, Schopenhauer calls the class of objects governed by this form of the principle of sufficient reason ‘real objects’, and this principle governs alterations of states of things and not things themselves. He states this principle as: ‘If a new state of one or more real objects appears, then there must be another, previous state from which the new one follows according to a rule, i.e. as often as the first exists, every time. Such a sequence is called a *consequence*, the first state a *cause*, the second an *effect*’ (p. 38). Since the principle of sufficient reason is the source of all necessity, Schopenhauer attributes a type of necessity to each of its expressions. In this case of the law of causality, the form of necessity is ‘physical necessity’, that is, once the cause appears, the effect cannot fail to appear (p. 146).

The fourth chapter is the chapter that received the most extensive revisions in the second edition. Schopenhauer had to carefully cut elements that reflected his earlier uncritical acceptance of Kant’s account of the empirical intuition of objects that constitute the external world. It contains nine sections in each edition (17–25 in the second, 18–26 in the first), but its length more than doubles, despite dropping § 22 ‘Mental images and dreams. Fantasy’ in the second edition. This expansion is not due simply to his adding criticisms directed at his contemporaries and citing ancestors of his views, but is due primarily to his significantly expanding the section on ‘Principle of sufficient reason of becoming’ and by his adding § 21 ‘Apriority of the concept of causality – Intellectual basis of empirical intuition. – The understanding’, where Schopenhauer elaborates

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18 Originally this was § 23 in the first edition, § 20 in the second
on the physiological arguments for the intellectual nature of intuition, first stated in *On Vision and Colours*. It is in § 21 that Schopenhauer clearly and emphatically articulates the intellectual nature of intuition, arguing that ‘the understanding first creates and produces this objective external world from the raw stuff of a few sensations in the sense organs’ (p. 52). Moreover, since sensation is, for Schopenhauer, ‘a completely subjective process internal to the organism because it is beneath the skin’ (p. 79), he believes that he maintains Kant’s fundamental idealistic insight and avoids the Achilles’ heel of Kant’s philosophy, namely, applying the law of causality in transcendent fashion by positing things in themselves as the cause of sensation.\footnote{Schopenhauer refers to the Achilles’ heel of Kant’s philosophy in *PP* 1, § 13 (Hübscher *SW* 5, 95)}

§ 23 ‘Disputation of the proof of the apriority of the concept of causality advanced by Kant’, expands on materials provided in § 24 of the dissertation.\footnote{In the dissertation the title of § 24 was ‘Disputation of Kant’s proof of this principle and assertion of a new proof with the same purport’. Schopenhauer’s new proof is based on the ‘unshakeable certainty’ we attribute to the law of causality; see p. 86. In the second edition Schopenhauer claims that § 21 has provided the proof, which this unshakeable certainty merely confirms} Here Schopenhauer criticizes Kant’s argument in the infamous ‘Second analogy’\footnote{See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A189/B232–A211/B256} where Kant attempts to show the *a priori* status and necessity of the law of causality from the fact that it is required to recognize an objective succession of representations, in contrast to a mere subjective succession of alterations. To represent a subjective sequence, Kant introduces the example of a house surveyed visually from top to bottom, and to illustrate an objective sequence, an example of observing a ship moving steadily downstream. Kant claims that the former has no necessary ordering, and the latter an irreversible and necessary ordering, and that this distinction could not be made if alteration were not an instance of an effect following a cause. Schopenhauer objects. Kant forgets that both examples deal with states of affairs in which objects change in regard to one another. The observer of the ship is stationary, whereas in the example of the house, the subject’s eyes move and, given this movement, the sequence is just as irreversible as that of the ship. Had the observer the power to move the ship like that of moving the eyes, the course of the ship would be reversible. In either case, the cognition of the house, or the movement of the ship, is an event governed by causal laws. Events can succeed in an objective sequence without the former event causing the latter, such as a roof tile striking you as you happen to leave your house. Here it is not your leaving the house that is the cause of your being struck (unless, perhaps, you slammed the
door too hard), but the sequence is objective. Or consider the sequence of notes in a piece of music. This sequence is not determined by the listener, but is an objective sequence that is such that the earlier note is not the cause of the latter. Schopenhauer concludes that the apprehension of objective sequences is direct and does not require inferring it from causal laws, and suggests that since we are aware of countless objective temporal sequences, if every one of these successions had to be based on knowledge of causal laws determining these sequences, we would have to be omniscient.22

Principle of sufficient reason of knowing

The fifth chapter deals with the second class of objects for the subject, which is concepts or abstract representations, and Schopenhauer refers to the ability to formulate concepts as the faculty of reason, a faculty restricted to human beings. The job of reason is to abstract concepts from intuitive representations, and concepts are meaningful only insofar as they can be traced back to empirical intuitions. And although he promised a new explanation of reason in his dissertation, it was not until the second edition that he would include § 34 ‘Reason’, a section that tripled the length of this chapter. Yet instead of augmenting his earlier views and teasing out new insights, he used this section to vent his frustrations at being ignored for more than thirty years. Here he reviles his contemporaries for the wild flights of reason developed in their philosophy, for portraying this faculty as having some privileged access to the absolute, to the supersensible via some invented ability like ‘intellectual intuition’ (p. 116). Despite his esteem for Kant, he pins the blame here on Kant’s view of practical reason and his supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative.23 By setting practical reason as the means for justifying metaphysical beliefs about freedom, the soul, and God, Kant had emboldened others to transform theoretical reason into the source of knowledge of such things, even though Kant himself had denied it such extraordinary powers. If practical reason could justify such beliefs, if it could become the source of moral laws a priori, it was a small step to view theoretical reason as having the capacity to grasp the object for which Kant said it longed, the unconditional. Schopenhauer sneers that ‘If it is thus taught that we possess a faculty for cognition which is immediate, material (i.e. providing the matter, not merely the form), and supersensible (i.e. leading beyond all possibility of experience), a faculty expressly intended for metaphysical

22 See p. 88  23 See p. 113
insight, one inherent in us for such a purpose, and that this faculty comprises our reason — then I must be so impolite as to call it a bare-faced lie’ (p. 109). This barefaced lie he then traced to what he regarded as Jacobi’s perversion of Kant and to the development of Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s philosophies:

For fifty years, so-called German philosophy based itself on such a completely fictitious faculty, snatched out of thin air: first as the free construction and projection of the absolute I and its emanations into the not-I; then as the intellectual intuition of absolute identity, or indifference, and its evolutions into nature, or of the origin of God out of his dark ground, or groundlessness, à la Jakob Bohme; finally as the pure self-thinking of the absolute idea and the theatre of the ballet of the self-movement of concepts; and all the while still as immediate apprehension of the divine, the supersensible, of holiness, of fineness, truthfulness, goodness — and whatever other ’nesses’ may be desirable — or even a mere presentiment, _Ahnen_ . . . of all that splendidness.’ (p. 116)

Yet Schopenhauer’s treatment of the principle of sufficient reason of knowing remains the same as in the dissertation. Reason combines concepts into judgments, and no judgement is intrinsically true; its truth is based on something else. He states this form of the principle of sufficient reason as ‘If a judgement would express knowledge, it must have a sufficient ground, and on account of this property it receives the predicate true. Truth is thus the relation of a judgement to something distinct from it which is called its ground, and as we will soon see, even admits of a significant variety of forms’ (p. 100). He then recognizes four ways by which a judgement is grounded in something other than itself, and, thus, four kinds of truths: logical, empirical, transcendental, and metalogical. Just as he holds that the principle of sufficient reason of becoming articulates physical necessity, which is primarily the inevitability of an effect from a cause, this form of the principle of sufficient reason deals with ‘logical necessity’, the necessity of a true proposition following from a ground.

Schopenhauer’s account of the four types of truths is brief and somewhat perfunctory, tending to be driven by neatly drawn systematic considerations. A judgement or proposition is logically or formally true if it is based simply on conceptual relations with another proposition. Thus the proposition ‘No P is S’ is logically true because it immediately follows from converting the proposition ‘No S is P’. A proposition, however, can also be materially true if it is inferred from a proposition with material content: an example of such a proposition is ‘No cats are insects’, which follows from the proposition ‘No insects are cats’. In his analysis of logical truth, Schopenhauer privileges classical Aristotelian categorical logic, ‘the whole
science of syllogisms’, as stating the sum total of rules for applying the principle of sufficient reason to judgments, as formulating the canon of logical truth. Consequently, Schopenhauer recognizes that arguing, concluding, and inferring were the proper functions of the faculty of reason and that failure to reason in a way consistent with the rules of syllogistic reasoning demonstrates a defect in one’s reason.24

Schopenhauer’s account of empirical truth contains no examples of empirically true propositions. It is likely that he thought no examples were necessary. A proposition, he claims, is empirically true if it is grounded in experience. Since an empirically true proposition is not true by virtue of conceptual relations, it is materially true. (The proposition, ‘The cat is on the mat’, is true if only if, in fact, there is a cat on the mat.) Transcendently true propositions, conversely, are those propositions that are grounded on the a priori forms of intuition; that is, those founded in the faculty of the understanding or pure sensibility. For example, the judgement ‘two straight lines do not enclose a space’ is grounded in the a priori form of space; ‘$3 \times 7 = 21$’, is grounded in the a priori form of time; ‘Nothing happens without a cause’ is based on the a priori law of causality. Lastly, a proposition is metalogically true if it is grounded in the ‘laws of thought’, that is, in the law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, or the principle of sufficient reason of knowing itself. By discovering that it is impossible to think contrary to these laws, we recognize through reason that metalogical truths are conditions of the possibility of all thinking; ‘we then find that to think contrary to them is of as little avail as it is to move our limbs against the direction of their joints’ (p. 104). For example, Schopenhauer claims that the proposition, ‘matter is permanent’, is a metalogical truth, because we cannot think of matter as arising or passing away.

Principle of sufficient reason of being

The sixth chapter is Schopenhauer’s analysis of the third class of objects, pure or non-empirical intuitions of space and time, and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing these objects, which he calls the principle of sufficient reason of being. This chapter received few alterations. Other than systematically substituting ‘transcendental’ for ‘metaphysical’,

24 In the Preface to The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 17 (Hübscher SW 4, xxff.) Schopenhauer criticized Hegel’s ‘lack of understanding’ by citing an example from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophic Sciences that illustrated Hegel’s inability to reason properly through syllogisms.
he remained faithful to his original commitment to Kant’s intutionalist philosophy of mathematics, relating mathematical concepts to the pure forms of sensibility, that is, to space and time. Specifically, he held that space and time could be objects of non-empirical or *a priori* intuitions that enable us to know their nature better than considerations provided by either the understanding or reason. Kant, he argues, also held the thesis that the relations of position in space and succession in time are made intelligible only by means of intuition, ‘by explaining that the difference between the right and left glove absolutely cannot be made intelligible in any other way than by means of intuition’ (p. 124).

As Schopenhauer had already argued in his earlier analysis of the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, space and time are the *a priori* forms of sensibility. As such space and time are transcendentally ideal, because they are subjectively imposed frameworks in which we must perceive the world. Yet, space and time are empirically real, since we intuit them as objective structures of experience, existing, as it were, independently of our consciousness. Schopenhauer holds that intuitions of space and time are pure or non-empirical, unlike our intuitions of real objects, our experience of spatio-temporal particulars like tables and chairs, which (as intuitive representations) are perceived *a posteriori*. Like both Kant and Newton, he accepts the claim that space and time are particular and, like Kant, he argues that space and time are constituted in such a way that every point determines and is determined by every other point. This relationship, he claimed, is called ‘position’ in space and ‘succession’ in time. The principle of sufficient reason of being states, therefore, that ‘parts of space and time determine one another’ (*ibid.*).

Following the lead of Kant, Schopenhauer claims that arithmetic is associated with the experience of sequential order in time, such as when we count a series of numbers in sequence. Each number presupposes the preceding numbers as the ground of its being. Employing Kant’s infamous example of ‘7 + 5 = 12’, Schopenhauer rejects Herder’s view that it is an identity statement. Rather, an identity statement would be ‘12 = 12’. Instead, ‘7 + 5 = 12’ is a synthetic *a priori* judgement, just as Kant maintained, because it is non-empirical, necessarily true, and informative: the concepts of 7 and 5 do not contain, as it were, the concept 12, as in an analytical statement, ‘All bodies are extended’, where the concept ‘body’ contains that of ‘extension’, and which says no more than ‘All bodies are bodies’. He argues that, unlike arithmetic, geometry deals with the non-empirical intuition of space, and as such, every part of space determines and is determined by every other part. Thus the proposition that ‘a triangle
with two equal angles has equal subtending sides’ is something that can be grasped by intuition. Euclid’s demonstration of the same, Schopenhauer maintains, simply provides the grounds for the truth of a judgement and fails to provide deep insight into spatial relationships and ‘the feeling is similar to that which is produced when someone pulls a rabbit out of a hat, and we cannot understand how the trick works’ (p. 128). Like all products of reason, Euclidean geometry lacks intuition’s rich ability to apprehend the world.

Principle of sufficient reason of acting

The seventh chapter, Schopenhauer’s analysis of the principle of sufficient reason of acting or ‘the law of motivation’, received significant alterations in order to accommodate his metaphysics of will. Schopenhauer holds that the class of objects governed by this principle is unique, since it is a class with a single member for each person, the subject of willing, which is cognized only in time (p. 140). After reiterating his hallmark claim that the subject of cognition is never an object of cognition, Schopenhauer asserts that the subjects of cognition and willing are identical. The identity of the subjects of cognition and willing is something ‘immediately given’, and this identity is denoted by the word ‘I’.55 This identity is inexplicable, eluding all forms of the principle of sufficient reason, whose scope of application is confined to objects of cognition. Retaining a remark from the dissertation, Schopenhauer writes, ‘But whoever truly realizes the inexplicability of this identity will with me call it the miracle par excellence’ (p. 136). A short five years later, he claims that The World as Will and Representation is ‘to some degree, an explanation of this [miracle]’.56

Schopenhauer also recognizes another ‘miracle par excellence’ in the first edition of his principal work, a miracle that he did not state in either edition of On the Fourfold Root. The statement of this ‘miracle’ moved him to acknowledge a new variety of truth that extended his classification beyond logical, empirical, transcendental, and metalogical truths. This new truth, that one’s body and will are identical, he called the ‘philosophical truth par excellence’.57 In 1813, however, he was not prepared to acknowledge this truth, just as he was unwilling to give any credence to Kant’s notion of the

55 In the dissertation, Schopenhauer argued that this insight is not gleaned via a Schellingian intellectual intuition; see this text, n. 125 and Hübcher SW 3, 70
56 WWR 1, 126 (Hübcher SW 2, 121). This remark dates from the first edition
57 WWR 1, 127 (Hübcher SW 2, 121)
thing in itself. This truth would lead him to argue against the traditional thesis that volitions are prior to and causally produced bodily movements. Willing and acting are one and the same, he held, and we only distinguish between the two in reflection: ‘Every true act of his will is immediately and inevitably a movement of his body as well . . . An act of will and an act of the body are not two different states cognized objectively, linked together in a causal chain, they do not stand in a relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same thing, only given in two entirely different ways: in one case immediately and in the other case to the understanding in intuition.’

In his dissertation, Schopenhauer does not recognize the identity of willing and acting: ‘Acting is not willing, but the effect of willing when it becomes causal’ (p. 185). Desires are also not instances of willing, unless they cause an action. Rather in the dissertation, the cause of an action is a decision, something imparting causality to a particular desire. Schopenhauer provides the following account of an action: ‘If a person P performed action A, then P had a motive M to do A, and M is a desire to do A, one that was prompted by decision D to do A.’ Here Schopenhauer views the decision as making desire causally effective and a matter of willing. In this early theory of action, he also views the decision itself as an expression of a person’s character, and to provide more content to this account, Schopenhauer employs Kant’s distinction between a person’s empirical and intelligible characters. The empirical character is expressed as the general pattern of a person’s behaviour, and this character is discovered by reflecting on the sum total of a person’s actions. Schopenhauer argues, moreover, that the unity and unalterability of a person’s conduct suggests that it is the appearance of something completely unknowable, lying outside of time; that it points to, as it were, a permanent state of the subject of willing. But after making this remark, Schopenhauer explains why he said ‘as it were’, pointing out that ‘state’ and ‘permanent’ have application only within the temporal framework; technically there is no means of speaking about anything outside of time. For this reason, he also writes in a parenthetical remark that Kant’s intelligible character might ‘more be called unintelligible’ (p. 188).

Although Schopenhauer would later regard Kant’s distinction between the empirical and intelligible characters to be as significant as his distinction between appearances and things in themselves, in eliminating § 46 ‘Motive, decisions, empirical and intelligible character’ from the second edition
of On the Fourfold Root, Schopenhauer carefully removed any passages inconsistent with his claim that willing and acting are identical.29 Changing the title of his earlier § 47, 'Causality of the will on cognition', to § 44 'Influence of will on cognition', he claims that 'The influence that will exercises on cognition is not based on causality, strictly speaking, but on the identity of the cognizing with the willing subject' (p. 138). Whereas in the first edition he had said that willing itself is given immediately to our inner sense and is impossible to define or describe, in the second he notes that 'Precisely because the subject of willing is immediately given in self-consciousness, what willing is cannot be further defined or described; moreover, it is the most immediate of all of our cognitions, and indeed, the fact that it is immediate must ultimately cast light on all remaining cognitions, which are mediated' (p. 136). By 1847, however, he had long known that this immediate awareness is the key for his viewing will as the essence of all appearances.

In light of these changes, Schopenhauer also revised the earlier theory of action. To articulate his mature view, he directs his readers to his prize essay, 'On the freedom of the human will', where he had directly integrated motives into a general account of the types of causality expressed within the world as appearance.30 Everything in the world, he argues, follows from a sufficient ground and, among different types of beings, different causal relations prevail. Among lifeless or inorganic beings, the specific causal relationship is between a physical, mechanical, or chemical cause and some effect. Among living beings, in plants, stimuli, such as water, heat, and light, lead to a response such as growth, and in animals, both human and non-human, the causal relation is motivation, which leads to a willed action, causality functioning through cognition. In any change, moreover, there are two necessary factors. There is some original and inherent force attributed to the being upon which some causal influence is exercised, and there is some cause that occasions the manifestation of the force. He also holds that these forces are outside the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, underlying as it were, all causal relationships, but not subject to it. Gravity, electricity, and magnetism are the types of forces prevailing in non-living beings and these types of causes he calls 'causes in the narrowest sense'. Vital force is that which is expressed in plant life, and stimulus is the

29 See WWR 1, 535 (Hubscher SW 2, 599), where Schopenhauer says that Kant’s discussion of the opposition between the intelligible and empirical characters is 'one of the most excellent things anyone has ever said'.
30 He does this in § 20 of the second edition (p. 49)
type of cause prevailing therein. Lastly, character is the force in animal life, and the types of causes operating therein are motives. Consequently, an action becomes the manifestation of an animal's character in reaction to a motive. All forces, including the human character, represent the endpoints of explanation:

Now just as this is the case with causes in the narrowest sense and with stimuli, it is no less the case with motives – given that motivation is not essentially different from causality, but merely a kind of it, namely causality that proceeds through the medium of cognition. So here too the cause calls forth only the manifestation of a force that is not to be traced back further to causes, and is consequently not to be further explained – a force, which is here called will.\(^{31}\)

Despite the significant alterations found in his second account of the fourth form of the principle of sufficient reason, Schopenhauer uses in both editions the same thin argument for the \textit{a priori} nature of the principle of sufficient reason of acting, the so-called 'law of motivation':

With every observed decision of others, as well as our own, we regard ourselves as justified in asking, 'Why?'; i.e. we presume it to be necessary that there was something preceding it, from which it followed, which we call the ground, or more precisely, the motive for the action now resulting. It is as inconceivable that there can be an action without a motive as that there can be movement of an inanimate body without a push or pull. (pp. 136–7)

By also claiming that ‘\textit{motivation is causality seen from within}’, Schopenhauer directly relates the law of motivation to the law of causality, and he calls this insight ‘the cornerstone of my whole metaphysics’ (p. 138).

\textit{General remarks and results}

The eighth chapter concludes both editions of \textit{On the Fourfold Root}. In the second edition, however, Schopenhauer drops § 50 ‘Transition’, § 51 ‘Other principles of the division of the four types of grounds’, § 56 ‘Confirmation from languages’, and § 58 ‘Apology concerning imagination and reason’. He adds a new § 49 ‘Necessity’, in which he argues that the principle of sufficient reason is the basis of all necessity: ‘For \textit{necessity} has no other genuine and clear sense than the inevitability of the consequent when the ground is posited. Therefore any necessity is \textit{conditioned}; thus, absolute, i.e. unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms [\textit{contradictio in adjecto}]. For \textit{being necessary} can never mean anything other than following\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) \textit{FW}, 67–8 (Hübscher \textit{SW} 4, 47)