

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical
Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Parerga and Paralipomena

Short Philosophical Essays

Volume 2

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

Vitam impendere vero
[‘To devote one’s life to truth.’
Juvenal, *Satires* IV. 91]

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical
Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical
Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Contents*

Sporadic yet systematically ordered thoughts on multifarious topics	<i>page</i> 5
Chapter 1 On philosophy and its method	7
Chapter 2 On logic and dialectic	23
Chapter 3 Some thoughts concerning the intellect in general and in every respect	34
Chapter 4 Some observations on the antithesis of the thing in itself and appearance	84
Chapter 5 Some words on pantheism	92
Chapter 6 On philosophy and natural science	95
Chapter 7 On colour theory	161
Chapter 8 On ethics	183
Chapter 9 On jurisprudence and politics	217
Chapter 10 On the doctrine of the indestructibility of our true essence by death	241
Chapter 11 Additional remarks on the doctrine of the nothingness of existence	255
Chapter 12 Additional remarks on the doctrine of the suffering of the world	262
Chapter 13 On suicide	276
Chapter 14 Additional remarks on the doctrine of the affirmation and negation of the will to life	281
Chapter 15 On religion	292

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

4	Contents	
Chapter 16	Some remarks on Sanskrit literature	355
Chapter 17	Some archaeological observations	363
Chapter 18	Some mythological observations	367
Chapter 19	On the metaphysics of the beautiful and aesthetics	374
Chapter 20	On judgement, criticism, approbation and fame	407
Chapter 21	On learning and the learned	430
Chapter 22	Thinking for oneself	441
Chapter 23	On writing and style	450
Chapter 24	On reading and books	496
Chapter 25	On language and words	506
Chapter 26	Psychological remarks	520
Chapter 27	On women	550
Chapter 28	On education	562
Chapter 29	On physiognomy	568
Chapter 30	On noise and sounds	575
Chapter 31	Similes, parables and fables	579
	Some verses	586

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical
Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

*Sporadic
yet
systematically ordered thoughts
on multifarious topics*

Eleusis servat quod ostendat revisentibus

[Eleusis preserves something that it can reveal
only to the one who returns.

Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, VII. 30.6]

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical
Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

CHAPTER I

3

On philosophy and its method

§1

The very ground upon which all our knowledge and science rest is the inexplicable. Therefore every explanation leads back to this, by means of middle terms more or less, as on the sea the sounding lead now finds the bottom in greater, now in lesser depths, yet ultimately must reach it everywhere. This inexplicable devolves to metaphysics.

§2

Almost everyone thinks constantly that they are this or that human being (*tis anthrôpos*^a), along with the corollaries arising from this; on the other hand, that they are a human being at all (*ho anthrôpos*^b), and which corollaries arise from this, scarcely occurs to them and yet it is the main thing. Those few who incline more the way of the latter than the former principle are philosophers. The direction of the others, however, traces back to the fact that from the start they see always only the particular and individual in things, not what is universal in them. Only the more highly gifted see, more and more and according to their degree of eminence, the universal in particular things. This important difference permeates the entire cognitive faculty^c to such an extent that it reaches down to the intuition of the most mundane objects; which is why this intuition is different in eminent minds than in ordinary ones. This comprehension of the universal in the particular as it presents itself each time also corresponds with what I have called the pure, will-less subject of cognition,^d and what I have set up as the subjective correlate of the Platonic Idea. This is so because cognition can only remain will-less when it is trained upon the universal, whereas the objects of *willing* lie in particular things. Hence also

^a τις ἄνθρωπος [some particular human being] ^b ὁ ἄνθρωπος [the human being]
^c Erkenntnisvermögen ^d willenlose Subjekt des Erkennens

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

why the cognition of animals is strictly limited to this particular and correspondingly their intellect remains exclusively in the service of their will. Moreover the former direction of the spirit towards the universal is the unavoidable condition for genuine achievements in philosophy, poetry, and in general in the arts and sciences.

For the *intellect in the service of the will*, hence in practical use, there are only *particular things*; for the intellect that does art or science, and is therefore active for itself, there are only *universalities*, entire varieties, species, classes, *Ideas* of things, since even the plastic artist wants to represent the Idea in the individual, hence the species. This is based on the fact that the *will* is focused directly only on particular objects: these are its actual objects, for only they have empirical reality. Concepts, classes and species meanwhile can only become its objects very indirectly. This is why the crude person has no sense for universal truths, while the genius overlooks and misses what is individual; the forced preoccupation with the particular as such, as it comprises the stuff of practical life, is a burdensome drudgery to him.¹

§3

For philosophizing the two foremost requirements are these: first, that one have the courage to allow no question to weigh on one's mind, and second, that one bring everything *that is self-evident*^a into clear consciousness, in order to conceive of it as a problem. Finally too the mind must be truly idle in order to actually philosophize; it must not pursue purposes and hence not be steered by the will, instead, it must devote itself undividedly to the instruction imparted by the intuitive world^b and one's own consciousness. – Professors of philosophy, on the other hand, are focused on their
 5 personal use and advantage and what leads to them; there lies their earnestness. Hence they do not see at all so many things that are clear, indeed, they do not once become aware even of the problems of philosophy.

§4

The *poet* brings images of life, human characters and situations before one's imagination, sets all this in motion, and leaves it to each person to think with these images as far as one's power of mind^c reaches. This is why he suffices for persons of the most varying capabilities, even for fools and sages

^a *sich von selbst versteht* ^b *die anschauliche Welt* ^c *Geisteskraft*

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)*On philosophy and its method*

9

alike. The *philosopher* on the other hand does not bring life itself in this manner, but instead the finished thoughts abstracted from life by him; now he requires that his reader think just this way and just as far as he himself. In this manner his public becomes very small. Accordingly the poet is to be compared to one who brings flowers, the philosopher to one who brings their quintessence.

Another great advantage that poetic achievements have over philosophical is this, that all works of poetry exist side by side without hindering each other, indeed, even the most heterogeneous among them can be enjoyed and appreciated by one and the same mind; meanwhile, each philosophical system, scarcely does it enter the world, is already plotting the downfall of all its brothers, like an Asian sultan who comes to power. For, just as there can be only *one* queen in a beehive, so too only *one* philosophy as order of the day.^a Systems after all are of such an unsocial nature, like spiders who sit all alone in their web and watch how many flies may be caught in it, but approach another spider only in order to do battle. So while the poetic works graze peacefully next to each other, like lambs, the philosophical works are born rapacious beasts, such that in their lust to destroy, like scorpions, spiders and certain insect larvae, they target their own species. They come into the world like the armoured men from the seed of Jason's dragon teeth, and to this day, like the latter, they have all mutually annihilated one another. Already this struggle has lasted over two thousand years: will a final victory and enduring peace ever arise from it? 6

As a result of this essentially polemic nature, this 'war of all against all'^b of philosophical systems, it is infinitely harder to achieve legitimacy as a philosopher than as a poet. The poet's work after all demands nothing more of the reader than to engage a series of entertaining or inspiring formulations, and a few hours of devotion. The philosopher's work, on the other hand, aims to overthrow the reader's entire way of thinking, and demands of him that he declare everything that he has learned and believed in this genre to be in error, his time and effort lost, and that he must begin anew; at best it leaves a few of the predecessor's ruins standing, in order to make a foundation of them. To this is added the fact that it has an official opponent in every teacher of an already existing system, indeed, that occasionally even the state extends its protection to a preferred philosophical system and using its powerful, material means prevents the rise of any other. Now let one further add that the size of the philosophical public

^a *an der Tagesordnung* ^b *bellum omnium contra omnes* [Hobbes, *Leviathan* I, 13]

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-87185-3 - Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays: Volume 2

Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Christopher Janaway

Excerpt

[More information](#)

10

Parerga and Paralipomena

compared to the poetic is proportionate to the number of people who want to be instructed versus entertained and one is able to measure under which auspices^a a philosopher makes his appearance. – On the other hand, to be sure, what rewards the philosopher is the approval of thinkers, the elite^b of long periods of time and all countries, without national differences; the masses learn eventually to honour his name by deferring to authority. Accordingly, and because of the slow but deep effect of philosophy's course on the entire human race, the history of philosophy has flowed for millennia beside the history of kings and yet counts a hundred times fewer names than the latter; which is why it is a great achievement for the philosopher to secure a lasting place there.

§5

7 The philosophical writer is the guide and his reader the wanderer. If they are to arrive together, then above all they must depart together, i.e., the author must take his reader up to a standpoint that they certainly have in common; this however can be nothing other than that of empirical consciousness, common to all of us. Here then let him take him firmly by the hand to see how high above the clouds he may reach, on mountain paths, step by step. This is also how *Kant* did it; he proceeds from the entirely common consciousness^c of his own self^d as well as that of other things. – How wrong it is, on the other hand, to want to proceed from the standpoint of an alleged intellectual intuition^e of hyperphysical relations, or even of events, or even of a reason that perceives the supernatural, or of an absolute self-thinking reason; for all of this means departing from a standpoint of cognitions that are not directly communicable, where already at the outset the reader never knows whether he is standing with his author or miles away from him.

§6

Dialogue with another relates to our own, serious meditation and deep reflection upon things as a machine relates to a living organism. For only in the former is everything as though cut from one piece or played in one key, such that it can achieve complete clarity, distinctness and true coherence, indeed even unity. In the other, however, heterogeneous pieces of very

^a *quibus auspiciis* ^b *Auserwählten* ^c *vom ganz gemeinen Bewußtseyn* ^d *des eigenen Selbst*
^e *intellektualen Anschauung*