THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA

This book is one of the first attempts to analyze how developing countries through the early twenty-first century have established systems of social protection and how these systems have been affected by the recent processes of globalization and democratization. The book focuses on Latin America, a pioneer in welfare state development in the developing world, to identify factors associated with the evolution of welfare state policies during the preglobalization period prior to 1979 and studies how globalization and democratization in the last thirty years affected governments’ fiscal commitment to social spending. In contrast with the Western European experience, more developed welfare systems evolved in countries relatively closed to international trade, while the recent process of globalization that has swept the region has put substantial downward pressure on social security expenditures. Health and education spending has been relatively protected from greater exposure to international markets and has actually increased substantially with the shift to democracy.

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The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America

Globalization, Democracy, and Development

ALEX SEGURA-UBIERGO
International Monetary Fund
Als meus pares, el meu avi, i a la Mariella
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Acknowledgments

This is a book about economics and politics, two disciplines that have been strongly related since the time Adam Smith and David Ricardo referred to modern-day economics as political economy more than two hundred years ago. Over the years, I have accumulated debts with experts in both fields; they have taught me that economic analysis without a careful regard for political and institutional issues remains largely incomplete (and, I would add, uninteresting), while political analysis can also benefit in substance and rigor from the solid micro-foundations and the strong methodological traditions of economics.

While I cannot list all the people whose ideas have influenced my thinking over the years, I would like to single out some individuals who either provided direct comments to my manuscript or influenced my thinking in one way or another. This book is certainly a better one thanks to them. To be sure, all remaining faults and weaknesses are mine alone.

My first debt of gratitude is to Professor Carlos Mulas-Granados, admired colleague and best friend, who has shared my passion for economics and politics since we met at Columbia University almost ten years ago. He introduced me to some of the recent literature on the political economy of the welfare state, which he had become acquainted with thanks to seminars he had taken with Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Francis Castles – two giants of the study of the welfare state – at the Juan March Institute in Madrid. This book would not have been possible without him.

My second debt of gratitude is to Robert Kaufman, Alfred Stepan, Alfred Fishlow, and Robert Shapiro from Columbia University. Professor Kaufman was the first to introduce me to Latin American political economy. The idea for this book developed in a political economy seminar that he led at Columbia University. We coauthored an article in *World Politics* that became the foundation for some of the more detailed quantitative research.
that is presented in this book. I could not be more grateful for the advice and guidance, at all levels, that he has continually provided over the years, to the very last stages of this book. Alfred Stepan taught me most of what I know about political institutions, and convinced me (given my obsession for econometrics and quantitative methods) that analytical arguments should not hide behind seemingly sophisticated formulas. “If you cannot say it in simple words, it cannot be an important argument,” he used to tell me. I hope that I have been able to follow his advice in this book. His infectious passion for interdisciplinary knowledge and his encyclopedic knowledge of political institutions around the world have always impressed me tremendously. Alfred Fishlow's scholarship on economic history has been another source of inspiration since I was a young student of economics in Spain and read with fascination his work on railroads and the American economy. It was a great honor to have him as a member of my dissertation committee at Columbia University. His work also had a great influence on this book, especially on Chapter 2. Robert Shapiro was the best professor of statistics and quantitative methods that I have ever had. He taught me that methods are nothing without good underlying theories and was always an example of dedication and commitment.

Third, I would like to thank three great economists I had the honor to work with during my first assignment at the International Monetary Fund: Marcelo Selowsky, Montek Ahluwalia, and David Goldsbrough. In different ways they all taught me something that has made this book better. Montek Ahluwalia, the first Director of the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, is an intellectual giant with an elegance in presenting compelling arguments that is rarely seen. David Goldsbrough was widely seen as one of the best senior managers of the institution: he has an admirable combination of intelligence, modesty, and friendliness and a rare capacity to lead effective teams. However, my greatest debt is to Marcelo Selowsky, a distinguished economist from the University of Chicago and former World Bank chief economist for Latin America and later Eastern Europe and Central Asia. His intuitive approach to economics (yet based on strong analytical fundamentals), his imaginative thinking, and his capacity to grasp “the big picture” are unparalleled. If I have been able to use even a fragment of these skills, this book will be a success.

Other people that I would also like to thank for reasons that I cannot name individually include Francisco Rivera-Batiz, Jagdish Baghwati, Edmund Phelps, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Helen Milner, Arturo Sotomayor, Alina Rocha Menocal, Emilio Pineda, and Marta Noguer from Columbia University; Pau Rabanal and Marc Siscart from New York University; Julio Cotler, Carolina
Acknowledgments

Trivelli, Martin Tanaka, Hildegarde Venero, and Johanna Yancari from the Institute of Peruvian Studies in Peru; and Eduardo Ley, Antonio Spilimbergo, Sanjeev Gupta, Gerd Schwartz, and Reza Vaez-Zadeh from the International Monetary Fund. Eduardo Ley and Antonio Spilimbergo do deserve a special mention for pushing me to continue working on the manuscript during the final stages of the review process, when working on a book combined with a full-time job became an almost impossible task. Eduardo convinced me to put aside my passion for the Spanish guitar to complete the book. Without him, perhaps my musicianship would now be better, but I would certainly have an unpublished manuscript in my hands.

Scott Parris, editor for economics and finance at Cambridge University Press, also deserves a special mention. Scott believed in my book manuscript from the start, and he always provided words of encouragement and praise that helped me through the different rounds of manuscript revisions. I will always be very grateful for that. I am also grateful to Katie Grezcylo, who managed the editing process with incredible attention to detail, clarity, and consistency.

Finally, I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the generous support received from the Fulbright Commission in Spain, which made it possible for me to pursue my doctoral studies in the United States, where the initial ideas for this book first developed.

The analysis and opinions in this book are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMF.

This book is dedicated to my parents and grandfather, who always encouraged me to pursue my studies; and my wife, Mariella, who endured with patience and loving sympathy (in Barcelona, New York, Lima, Washington, and Dakar) all the time I spent away from her working on this book.