John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind

This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle’s philosophy of language. It examines Searle’s work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth conditional versus non-truth conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning skepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of “what is said” in relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle’s work in philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area.

SAVAS L. TSOHATZIDIS is Professor of General Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language, Department of Linguistics, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.
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Contributors

Nicholas Asher is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Linguistics at the University of Texas at Austin

Kent Bach is Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University

Stephen J. Barker is Associate Professor and Reader in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham

Wayne A. Davis is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University

Christopher Gauker is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cincinnati

Mitchell Green is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia

Robin Jeshion is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside

Kepa Korta is Director of the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information at the University of the Basque Country

Martin Kusch is Professor of Philosophy and Sociology of Science at the University of Cambridge
Contributors

JOHN PERRY is the Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University

FRANÇOIS RECANATI is Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

JOHN R. SEARLE is the Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley

SAVAS L. TSOHATZIDIS is Professor of General Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
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