Introduction

Toward a Social History of the Terror

The “Great Terror” is one of the most important events in Soviet and, indeed, in twentieth-century history. The Russian revolution in 1917, based on the simple principle that working people should control the wealth they create, inspired movements throughout the world. The terror’s lawlessness, violence, and killing, however, thoroughly discredited and destroyed the world’s first socialist experiment. It raised critical and difficult questions: when did “terror” begin? What were the causes? Who was responsible? Who benefited, and who lost? In a prison camp in the 1930s, a young communist woman captured the urgency of these questions in an anguished poem:

We must give an answer: who needed
The monstrous destruction of the generation
That the country, severe and tender,
Raised for twenty years in work and battle?¹

Historians generally agree that the terror began with the assassination of Sergei M. Kirov, the head of the Leningrad party committee, in December 1934 and ended with the removal of Nikolai I. Ezhov, head of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), in November 1938. The most intense phase of repression is known in Russia as the Ezhovshchina or the “time of Ezhov,” synonymous with his leadership of the NKVD from November 1936 to November 1938. In these two years, millions of people were arrested, interrogated, shot, and sent to labor camps. The NKVD arrested more than 1,575,000 people in 1937–8, the vast majority

¹ Yelena Vladimirova, a Leningrad communist who was sent to the camps in the late 1930s, wrote the poem. It is reprinted in full in Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1989), p. 634.
Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin

(87 percent) on political grounds. Of the total arrested, approximately 1,345,000 were convicted, and 681,692 executed for counterrevolutionary crimes. An additional 1,473,424 died of disease, cold, hunger, accidents, and other causes in the camps, in exile, or in prison. From 1934 to 1940, 3,750,000 people, sentenced for criminal and political offenses, passed through the vast labor-camp system. In 1937 and 1938, there were so many arrests that the camps were thrown into crisis, unable to feed, clothe, or house the sheer numbers of new prisoners. Although political arrests and party purges occurred before and after the Ezhovshchina, the terror reached its height in 1937 and 1938, marking the Soviet experiment in ways that could never be eradicated or forgotten.

If historians largely agree about the timing of the “Great Terror,” they disagree on almost every other aspect: the intent of the state, the targets of repression, the role of external and internal pressures, the degree of centralized control, the number of victims, and the reaction of Soviet citizens. One long-prevailing view holds that the Soviet regime was from its inception a “terror” state. Its authorities, motivated by the desire to gain total political control, sent a steady stream of people to their deaths in camps and prisons. The stream may have widened or narrowed over time, but it never stopped flowing. In this view, the terror grew from the Bolsheviks’ commitment to a profoundly antidemocratic ideology. From the very moment they took power, they sought to crush civil society. Terror allowed them to consolidate power and to victimize all strata of a prostrate population. Scholars who advocated this interpretation were interested primarily in political history. Most, although not all, considered the Soviet Union a “totalitarian” state in which a small group of party leaders wielded total control over all aspects of social, economic, and

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4 “Ezhovshchina” and “the Terror” are terms that encompass purge, repression, and the general climate of fear. The term “purge” or chistka refers to a process within the Communist Party in which members were reviewed at periodic intervals and sometimes expelled for corruption, passivity, moral laxity, political opposition, or other reasons. In the late 1930s, these purges turned deadly, and expulsion was often, although not always, the prelude to arrest, imprisonment, or execution. Purge is also sometimes used to describe expulsions from an institution. The term “repression” refers to the wider phenomena of arrest, imprisonment, and execution affecting people within and outside the Party.
political life. As a result, in charting the political course of the state, they attached great importance to the actions of a few leaders, and little to the activities of workers, peasants, women, or other social groups.\(^5\)

In the 1980s, a new interest in social history prompted a “revisionist” challenge to this view. Historians began to take a closer look at the fissures and tensions within the Soviet state. They charted sharp vacillations in policy, relationships between central and local authorities, conflicts between campaign-style justice and the rule of law, and the effect of foreign and internal social threats. They explored a dynamic dialectic between state policies and social responses in which social tensions influenced state actions, producing in turn unforeseen consequences, which led to increasingly draconian solutions. They identified specific targets and episodes of repression.\(^6\) A few historians investigated institutions and groups, uncovering complex interactions between state initiatives and social or community interests. They began to explore “popular elements” in the terror, discovering that workers and peasants used its rituals and rhetoric to denounce managers and officials for abuse. The focus on the


reactions of various social groups raised new and fascinating questions about the relationship between interests “from below” and orders “from above” in sparking and spreading repression but, with a few exceptions, historians did not develop these initial findings. Historians also began to focus on personal subjectivities, charting the inner psychology as well as the outward public reaction to repression in an attempt to understand how individuals responded to the terror.

In the 1990s, newly released archival materials provided important information on Stalin’s role and the targets of repression. The documents provided incontestable proof of Stalin’s close personal involvement
in repression. Peppered with Stalin’s signature and marginal notes, they revealed his hand to be quite literally everywhere. The archives also yielded new information about victims. Earlier estimates of arrests and executions in 1937–8 proved to be highly inflated. Historians originally estimated the number of people arrested to be between 7 million and 20 million. New figures, based on archival materials, show that approximately 2.5 million people were arrested, for both political and nonpolitical crimes. Similarly, historians had estimated the number of executions at roughly 7 million, but the actual number, 681,692, turned out to be one-tenth of that estimate. Although the number of victims was discovered to be smaller than previously thought, the range of groups within the population targeted for repression turned out to be far wider. New findings substantially expanded the categories of victims beyond the economic managers, party and military leaders, former oppositionists, and foreign communists previously identified by historians. “Order 00447” for “mass operations” in July 1937 set target numbers for the imprisonment or execution of criminals, village clergy, religious activists, former kulaks, lishbentsy (nobles, industrialists, and others deprived of voting rights), and other “hostile elements.” It was followed by “Order 00486,” which mandated the arrest of wives of men convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes, and a series of “national operations” aimed at Germans, Poles, Romanians, Finns, Latvians, and other groups. The mass operations alone resulted in the arrest of 766,000 people, of which 385,000 were executed. These findings led to a new subset of research, which one historian termed “victim studies.”

9 The 2.5 million figure covers political and nonpolitical charges and includes the 1.575 million arrested by the security police. See Getty et al., “Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years,” pp. 1022–3.


11 Shearer, “Social Disorder and the NKVD in the 1930s,” p. 103; McLoughlin and McDermott, “Rethinking Stalinist Terror,” in McLoughlin and McDermott, Stalin’s Terror, p. 3. See also Ilic, Stalin’s Terror Revisited.
New findings from the archives had a mixed influence on debates over the terror. They reinforced the longstanding contention of proponents of the totalitarian thesis that Stalin played a large personal role in the repressions. His role in mandating the mass operations encouraged some historians to conceptualize the terror more narrowly as “a series of centrally directed punitive actions.” In the words of Oleg Khlevniuk, “Mass repressions started and ended on orders from above, whenever Stalin considered an action appropriate.” Even local “excesses” were “determined by the central directives themselves.”

Discovery of the mass operations, however, also sparked interest in the social tensions that pushed central party leaders into authorizing such sweeping arrests. Some historians argued that Stalin initiated the mass operations in order to eliminate disgruntled social groups that might serve as a “fifth column” in the event of war. Barry McLoughlin noted that the impetus for Order 00447 to a certain extent “came from below” and “definitely went beyond the Stalin-Ezhov axis.” Regional party leaders, concerned about how disaffected social groups would vote in the upcoming democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet, welcomed and widened the mass operations.

Moreover, new research blurred the sharp distinction between proponents of the totalitarian thesis and revisionists. Leading revisionists were in fact the first to reveal Stalin’s great personal role in the repressions, a key tenet of the totalitarian thesis. At the same time, new documents challenged the idea that Stalin’s obsessive drive for power was the main force behind the terror. Vacillation, switchbacks, and backtracking marked the Party’s winding “road to terror.” Stalin and party leaders even hesitated over how to interpret the Kirov murder, an event that in retrospect served as the main catalyst for the terror. And if “revisionists,” so attuned to

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15 Lynne Viola, William Chase, and J. Arch Getty, all labeled “revisionists” at one time, made important contributions to our understanding of political repression.

16 See Getty and Naumov, *The Road to Terror*. 
social history, made significant contributions to the new political history, some political historians, dissatisfied by the narrow focus on Stalin and a few central party leaders, raised important questions about the connections between terror and “the recurring tremors of the industrialization and collectivization upheavals.” Finally, new political findings enriched, rather than invalidated, earlier attempts to explore the element of terror “from below” by clarifying the dynamic between central orders and social responses. Most of the new archival discoveries, however, still centered on central party authorities. Apart from a few pioneering articles and books, historians have yet to engage either the influence of social pressures on central party policies or the responses of various social groups to repression, two critical elements in developing a social history of the terror.

This book shifts attention from the machinations of top party leaders to the mechanisms by which repression engulfed Soviet society. It explores how terror spread downward and outward through the hierarchical layers of the unions, a network that encompassed 22 million members and reached from the All Union Central Council of Unions (VTsSPS) to factory and shop committees. It argues that repression was a mass phenomenon, not only in the number of victims it claimed, but also in the number of perpetrators it spawned. Party leaders presented the murderous abrogation of civil rights that we presently term “the Terror” as patriotic “anti-terror” measures. They stressed that vigilance and denunciation were duties of all loyal citizens. Moreover, they couched these “anti-terror” measures in the language of antibureaucratization, socialist renewal, and mass control from below, appeals with strong popular resonance. While recognizing the importance of state signals and actions, the book argues that repression was also institutionally disseminated. People participated as perpetrators and victims, and sometimes both, through their membership in factories, unions, schools, military units, and other institutions. The complex issues and rivalries unique to these organizations helped fuel the political culture of repression.

In the factories and the unions, the social tensions of industrialization were critical to the spread of terror. Workers, shop foremen, local party members, and union leaders adopted the slogans of repression and used them, often against each other, to redress longstanding grievances,
shift blame for intractable problems in production, and advance personal agendas. Party and union leaders strongly encouraged workers and union members to attack and remove corrupt and abusive officials. Highly publicized campaigns for secret-ballot, multicandidate elections in the unions, the soviets, and the Party accompanied the terror. The slogans of repression were intimately intertwined with those of democracy. Superficially, these two phenomena appear in sharp contradiction. What could denunciations, spy mania, fear, mass arrests, extralegal trials, and executions possibly have in common with secret ballots, new elections, official accountability, and the revitalization of democracy from below? Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin examines this paradox and the troubling questions it raises about mass participation and support for repression.

The terror was not simply a targeted surgical strike “from above” aimed at the excision of oppositionists and perceived enemies, but a mass, political panic that profoundly reshaped relationships in every institution and workplace. It provided new concepts and language – “unmasking enemies,” “suppressing criticism from below,” “wreckers,” “family circles,” “lickspittles,” and “toadies” – that gave workers and officials new avenues to pursue their interests. The unions, the VTsSPS, and the party committees in the factories all participated in a process of “self-devouring” in which their own members enthusiastically accused and denounced each other in ritualized exposures and expulsions. The perpetrators of purge often became victims of the very processes they had initially promulgated. Members of unions and local party organizations frequently became the agents of their own demise.

This internal dynamic, with its complicated organizational and psychological mechanisms of self-destruction, differed sharply from the mobile killing squads and genocidal death camps of Nazism. If the rhetoric of Nazism was aimed at the “enemy” without, the rhetoric of the Soviet terror centered on “unmasking” the “enemy” within. In this sense, the analogy between Hitler and Stalin, so commonly invoked, does little to illuminate the dynamics of the Soviet terror. The Nazis’ genocidal policies

were perhaps closest to the mass operations, which also targeted specific social and national groups for arrest, deportation, or execution, but the Soviet terror was far broader than the mass operations. It transformed every workplace and institution with its ritualized “unmasking” of trusted workmates, internal reviews, accusations, and denunciations. A worker, party member, engineer, or official could as easily become a victim as a perpetrator. No one fully understood why certain victims were selected. Party members struggled in shocked incomprehension to explain the arrest of relatives and spouses at party meetings. Unlike the German genocidal war against the Jews, the line between victims and perpetrators in the Soviet case was blurred. Yesterday’s denouncer often became tomorrow’s victim."


Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin traces the evolution of terror in the factories and the unions. Beginning with a broad overview of Soviet industrialization, it examines the initial apathy of workers and party members toward the hunt for “enemies,” the concerted efforts of central party leaders to whip up hysteria over “wrecking” in industry, and the rapid descent into madness in the factories and the unions. In exploring the responses of workers, local party members, union officials, managers, and shop heads, it seeks to understand how fundamentally decent, normal people move, in clear, comprehensible stages, toward self-destruction.