Cambridge University Press
0521863678 - Modal logic for philosophers - by James W. Garson
Frontmatter/Prelims



Modal Logic for Philosophers

Designed for use by philosophy students, this book provides an accessible yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, nonrigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de re–de dicto distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues concerning the development of modal logic is woven into the text.

   The book uses natural deduction systems and includes a diagram technique that extends the method of truth trees to modal logic. This feature provides a foundation for a novel method for showing completeness, one that is easy to extend to systems that include quantifiers.

James W. Garson is professor of philosophy at the University of Houston. He has held grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and the Apple Education Foundation. He is also the author of numerous articles in logic, semantics, linguistics, the philosophy of cognitive science, and computerized education.





Modal Logic for Philosophers

JAMES W. GARSON
University of Houston





CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Cambridge University Press
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© James W. Garson 2006

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First published 2006

Printed in the United States of America

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Garson, James W., 1943–
Modal logic for philosophers / James W. Garson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86367-4 (hardback)
ISBN-10: 0-521-86367-8 (hardback)
ISBN-13: 978-0-521-68229-9 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-521-68229-0 (pbk.)
1. Modality (Logic) – Textbooks. I. Title.
BC199.M6G38    2006
160 – dc22    2006001152

ISBN-13 978-0-521-86367-4 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-86367-8 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-68229-9 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-68229-0 paperback

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for Nuel Belnap, who is responsible for anything he likes about this book





Contents

Preface page xiii
    Introduction: What Is Modal Logic? 1
1   The System K: A Foundation for Modal Logic 3
    1.1  The Language of Propositional Modal Logic 3
    1.2  Natural Deduction Rules for Propositional Logic: PL 5
    1.3  Derivable Rules of PL 9
    1.4  Natural Deduction Rules for System K 17
    1.5  A Derivable Rule for ◇ 20
    1.6  Horizontal Notation for Natural Deduction Rules 27
    1.7  Necessitation and Distribution 30
    1.8  General Necessitation 32
    1.9  Summary of the Rules of K 35
2   Extensions of K 38
    2.1  Modal or Alethic Logic 38
    2.2  Duals 44
    2.3  Deontic Logic 45
    2.4  The Good Samaritan Paradox 46
    2.5  Conflicts of Obligation and the Axiom (D) 48
    2.6  Iteration of Obligation 49
    2.7  Tense Logic 50
    2.8  Locative Logic 52
    2.9  Logics of Belief 53
    2.10  Provability Logic 54
3   Basic Concepts of Intensional Semantics 57
    3.1  Worlds and Intensions 57
    3.2  Truth Conditions and Diagrams for → and ⊥ 59
    3.3  Derived Truth Conditions and Diagrams for PL 61
    3.4  Truth Conditions for  63
    3.5  Truth Conditions for ◇ 66
    3.6  Satisfiability, Counterexamples, and Validity 67
    3.7  The Concepts of Soundness and Completeness 69
    3.8  A Note on Intensions 70
4   Trees for K 72
    4.1  Checking for K-Validity with Trees 72
    4.2  Showing K-Invalidity with Trees 81
    4.3  Summary of Tree Rules for K 91
5   The Accessibility Relation 93
    5.1  Conditions Appropriate for Tense Logic 93
    5.2  Semantics for Tense Logics 99
    5.3  Semantics for Modal (Alethic) Logics 104
    5.4  Semantics for Deontic Logics 108
    5.5  Semantics for Locative Logics 111
    5.6  Relevance Logics and Conditional Logics 112
    5.7  Summary of Axioms and Their Conditions on Frames 115
6   Trees for Extensions of K 116
    6.1  Trees for Reflexive Frames: M-Trees 116
    6.2  Trees for Transitive Frames: 4-Trees 121
    6.3  Trees for Symmetrical Frames: B-Trees 123
    6.4  Trees for Euclidean Frames: 5-Trees 129
    6.5  Trees for Serial Frames: D-Trees 133
    6.6  Trees for Unique Frames: CD-Trees 135
7   Converting Trees to Proofs 136
    7.1  Converting Trees to Proofs in K 136
    7.2  Converting Trees that Contain Defined Notation into Proofs 147
    7.3  Converting M-Trees into Proofs 149
    7.4  Converting D-Trees into Proofs 151
    7.5  Converting 4-Trees into Proofs 152
    7.6  Converting B-Trees into Proofs 154
    7.7  Converting 5-Trees into Proofs 159
    7.8  Using Conversion Strategies to Find Difficult Proofs 163
    7.9  Converting CD-Trees into Proofs in CD and DCD 164
    7.10  A Formal Proof that Trees Can Be Converted into Proofs 165
8   Adequacy of Propositional Modal Logics 172
    8.1  Soundness of K 172
    8.2  Soundness of Systems Stronger than K 180
    8.3  The Tree Model Theorem 182
    8.4  Completeness of Many Modal Logics 188
    8.5  Decision Procedures 189
    8.6  Automatic Proofs 191
    8.7  Adequacy of Trees 191
    8.8  Properties of Frames that Correspond to No Axioms 192
9   Completeness Using Canonical Models 195
    9.1  The Lindenbaum Lemma 195
    9.2  The Canonical Model 198
    9.3  The Completeness of Modal Logics Based on K 201
    9.4  The Equivalence of PL+(GN) and K 210
10   Axioms and Their Corresponding Conditions on R 211
    10.1  The General Axiom (G) 211
    10.2  Adequacy of Systems Based on (G) 215
11   Relations between the Modal Logics 221
    11.1  Showing Systems Are Equivalent 222
    11.2  Showing One System Is Weaker than Another 224
12   Systems for Quantified Modal Logic 228
    12.1  Languages for Quantified Modal Logic 228
    12.2  A Classical System for Quantifiers 231
    12.3  Identity in Modal Logic 234
    12.4  The Problem of Nondenoting Terms in Classical Logic 239
    12.5  FL: A System of Free Logic 242
    12.6  fS: A Basic Quantified Modal Logic 245
    12.7  The Barcan Formulas 248
    12.8  Constant and Varying Domains of Quantification 250
    12.9  A Classicist’s Defense of Constant Domains 254
    12.10  The Prospects for Classical Systems with Varying Domains 256
    12.11  Rigid and Nonrigid Terms 260
    12.12  Eliminating the Existence Predicate 262
    12.13  Summary of Systems, Axioms, and Rules 263
13   Semantics for Quantified Modal Logics 265
    13.1  Truth Value Semantics with the Substitution Interpretation 265
    13.2  Semantics for Terms, Predicates, and Identity 268
    13.3  Strong Versus Contingent Identity 270
    13.4  Rigid and Nonrigid Terms 276
    13.5  The Objectual Interpretation 278
    13.6  Universal Instantiation on the Objectual Interpretation 281
    13.7  The Conceptual Interpretation 286
    13.8  The Intensional Interpretation 288
    13.9  Strengthening Intensional Interpretation Models 293
    13.10  Relationships with Systems in the Literature 294
    13.11  Summary of Systems and Truth Conditions 300
14   Trees for Quantified Modal Logic 303
    14.1  Tree Rules for Quantifiers 303
    14.2  Tree Rules for Identity 307
    14.3  Infinite Trees 309
    14.4  Trees for Quantified Modal Logic 310
    14.5  Converting Trees into Proofs 314
    14.6  Trees for Systems that Include Domain Rules 319
    14.7  Converting Trees into Proofs in Stronger Systems 320
    14.8  Summary of the Tree Rules 321
15   The Adequacy of Quantified Modal Logics 323
    15.1  Preliminaries: Some Replacement Theorems 324
    15.2  Soundness for the Intensional Interpretation 326
    15.3  Soundness for Systems with Domain Rules 329
    15.4  Expanding Truth Value (tS) to Substitution (sS) Models 332
    15.5  Expanding Substitution (sS) to Intensional (iS) Models 337
    15.6  An Intensional Treatment of the Objectual Interpretation 339
    15.7  Transfer Theorems for Intensional and Substitution Models 342
    15.8  A Transfer Theorem for the Objectual Interpretation 347
    15.9  Soundness for the Substitution Interpretation 348
    15.10  Soundness for the Objectual Interpretation 349
    15.11  Systems with Nonrigid Terms 350
    15.12  Appendix: Proof of the Replacement Theorems 351
16   Completeness of Quantified Modal Logics Using Trees 356
    16.1  The Quantified Tree Model Theorem 356
    16.2  Completeness for Truth Value Models 361
    16.3  Completeness for Intensional and Substitution Models 361
    16.4  Completeness for Objectual Models 362
    16.5  The Adequacy of Trees 364
17   Completeness Using Canonical Models 365
    17.1  How Quantifiers Complicate Completeness Proofs 365
    17.2  Limitations on the Completeness Results 368
    17.3  The Saturated Set Lemma 370
    17.4  Completeness for Truth Value Models 373
    17.5  Completeness for Systems with Rigid Constants 377
    17.6  Completeness for Systems with Nonrigid Terms 379
    17.7  Completeness for Intensional and Substitution Models 382
    17.8  Completeness for the Objectual Interpretation 383
18   Descriptions 385
    18.1  Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 385
    18.2  Applying Russell’s Method to Philosophical Puzzles 388
    18.3  Scope in Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 390
    18.4  Motives for an Alternative Treatment of Descriptions 392
    18.5  Syntax for Modal Description Theory 394
    18.6  Rules for Modal Description Theory: The System !S 396
    18.7  Semantics for !S 400
    18.8  Trees for !S 402
    18.9  Adequacy of !S 403
    18.10  How !S Resolves the Philosophical Puzzles 407
19   Lambda Abstraction 409
    19.1  De Re and De Dicto 409
    19.2  Identity and the De ReDe Dicto Distinction 413
    19.3  Principles for Abstraction: The System λS 415
    19.4  Syntax and Semantics for λS 416
    19.5  The Adequacy of λS 422
    19.6  Quantifying In 424
    Answers to Selected Exercises 432
Bibliography of Works Cited 445
Index 449




Preface

The main purpose of this book is to help bridge a gap in the landscape of modal logic. A great deal is known about modal systems based on propositional logic. However, these logics do not have the expressive resources to handle the structure of most philosophical argumentation. If modal logics are to be useful to philosophy, it is crucial that they include quantifiers and identity. The problem is that quantified modal logic is not as well developed, and it is difficult for the student of philosophy who may lack mathematical training to develop mastery of what is known. Philosophical worries about whether quantification is coherent or advisable in certain modal settings partly explains this lack of attention. If one takes such objections seriously, they exert pressure on the logician to either eliminate modality altogether or eliminate the allegedly undesirable forms of quantification.

   Even if one lays those philosophical worries aside, serious technical problems must still be faced. There is a rich menu of choices for formulating the semantics of quantified modal languages, and the completeness problem for some of these systems is difficult or unresolved. The philosophy of this book is that this variety is to be explored rather than shunned. We hope to demonstrate that modal logic with quantifiers can be simplified so that it is manageable, even teachable. Some of the simplifications depend on the foundations – in the way the systems for propositional modal logic are developed. Some ideas that were designed to make life easier when quantifiers are introduced are also genuinely helpful even for those who will study only the propositional systems. So this book can serve a dual purpose. It is, I hope, a simple and accessible introduction to propositional modal logic for students who have had a first course in formal logic (preferably one that covers natural deduction rules and truth trees). I hope, however, that students who had planned to use this book to learn only propositional modal logic will be inspired to move on to study quantification as well.

   A principle that guided the creation of this book is the conviction that visualization is one of the most powerful tools for organizing one’s thoughts. So the book depends heavily on diagrams of various kinds. One of the central innovations is to combine the method of Haus diagrams (to represent Kripke’s accessibility relation) with the truth tree method. This provides an easy and revealing method for checking validity in a wide variety of modal logics. My students have found the diagrams both easy to learn and fun to use. I urge readers of this book to take advantage of them.

   The tree diagrams are also the centerpiece for a novel technique for proving completeness – one that is more concrete and easier to learn than the method of maximally consistent sets, and one that is extremely easy to extend to the quantifiers. On the other hand, the standard method of maximally consistent sets has its own advantages. It applies to more systems, and many will consider it an indispensable part of anyone’s education in modal logic. So this book covers both methods, and it is organized so that one may easily choose to study one, the other, or both.

   Three different ways of providing semantics for the quantifiers are introduced in this book: the substitution interpretation, the intensional interpretation, and the objectual interpretation. Though some have faulted the substitution interpretation on philosophical grounds, its simplicity prompts its use as a centerpiece for technical results. Those who would like a quick and painless entry to the completeness problem may read the sections on the substitution interpretation alone. The intensional interpretation, where one quantifies over individual concepts, is included because it is the most general approach for dealing with the quantifiers. Furthermore, its strong kinships with the substitution interpretation provide a relatively easy transition to its formal results. The objectual interpretation is treated here as a special case of the intensional interpretation. This helps provide new insights into how best to formalize systems for the objectual interpretation.

   The student should treat this book more as a collection of things to do than as something to read. Exercises in this book are found embedded throughout the text rather than at the end of each chapter, as is the more common practice. This signals the importance of doing exercises as soon as possible after the relevant material has been introduced. Think of the text between the exercises as a preparation for activities that are the foundation for true understanding. Answers to exercises marked with a star (∗) are found at the end of the book. Many of the exercises also include hints. The best way to master this material is to struggle through the exercises on your own as far as humanly possible. Turn to the hints or answers only when you are desperate.

   Many people should be acknowledged for their contributions to this book. First of all, I would like to thank my wife, Connie Garson, who has unfailingly and lovingly supported all of my odd enthusiasms. Second, I would like to thank my students, who have struggled though the many drafts of this book over the years. I have learned a great deal more from them than any of them has learned from me. Unfortunately, I have lost track of the names of many who helped me make numerous important improvements, so I apologize to them. But I do remember by name the contributions of Brandy Burfield, Carl Feierabend, Curtis Haaga, James Hulgan, Alistair Isaac, JoBeth Jordon, Raymond Kim, Kris Rhodes, Jay Schroeder, Steve Todd, Andy Tristan, Mako Voelkel, and especially Julian Zinn. Third, I am grateful to Johnathan Raymon, who helped me with the diagrams. Finally, I would like to thank Cambridge University Press for taking an interest in this project and for the excellent comments of the anonymous readers, some of whom headed off embarrassing errors.





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