Modal Logic for Philosophers
Designed for use by philosophy students, this book provides an accessible yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, nonrigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de re–de dicto distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues concerning the development of modal logic is woven into the text.
The book uses natural deduction systems and includes a diagram technique that extends the method of truth trees to modal logic. This feature provides a foundation for a novel method for showing completeness, one that is easy to extend to systems that include quantifiers.
James W. Garson is professor of philosophy at the University of Houston. He has held grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and the Apple Education Foundation. He is also the author of numerous articles in logic, semantics, linguistics, the philosophy of cognitive science, and computerized education.
JAMES W. GARSON
University of Houston
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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© James W. Garson 2006
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First published 2006
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Garson, James W., 1943–
Modal logic for philosophers / James W. Garson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86367-4 (hardback)
ISBN-10: 0-521-86367-8 (hardback)
ISBN-13: 978-0-521-68229-9 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-521-68229-0 (pbk.)
1. Modality (Logic) – Textbooks. I. Title.
BC199.M6G38 2006
160 – dc22 2006001152
ISBN-13 978-0-521-86367-4 hardback
ISBN-10 0-521-86367-8 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-68229-9 paperback
ISBN-10 0-521-68229-0 paperback
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Preface | page xiii | ||
Introduction: What Is Modal Logic? | 1 | ||
1 | The System K: A Foundation for Modal Logic | 3 | |
1.1 The Language of Propositional Modal Logic | 3 | ||
1.2 Natural Deduction Rules for Propositional Logic: PL | 5 | ||
1.3 Derivable Rules of PL | 9 | ||
1.4 Natural Deduction Rules for System K | 17 | ||
1.5 A Derivable Rule for ◇ | 20 | ||
1.6 Horizontal Notation for Natural Deduction Rules | 27 | ||
1.7 Necessitation and Distribution | 30 | ||
1.8 General Necessitation | 32 | ||
1.9 Summary of the Rules of K | 35 | ||
2 | Extensions of K | 38 | |
2.1 Modal or Alethic Logic | 38 | ||
2.2 Duals | 44 | ||
2.3 Deontic Logic | 45 | ||
2.4 The Good Samaritan Paradox | 46 | ||
2.5 Conflicts of Obligation and the Axiom (D) | 48 | ||
2.6 Iteration of Obligation | 49 | ||
2.7 Tense Logic | 50 | ||
2.8 Locative Logic | 52 | ||
2.9 Logics of Belief | 53 | ||
2.10 Provability Logic | 54 | ||
3 | Basic Concepts of Intensional Semantics | 57 | |
3.1 Worlds and Intensions | 57 | ||
3.2 Truth Conditions and Diagrams for → and ⊥ | 59 | ||
3.3 Derived Truth Conditions and Diagrams for PL | 61 | ||
3.4 Truth Conditions for | 63 | ||
3.5 Truth Conditions for ◇ | 66 | ||
3.6 Satisfiability, Counterexamples, and Validity | 67 | ||
3.7 The Concepts of Soundness and Completeness | 69 | ||
3.8 A Note on Intensions | 70 | ||
4 | Trees for K | 72 | |
4.1 Checking for K-Validity with Trees | 72 | ||
4.2 Showing K-Invalidity with Trees | 81 | ||
4.3 Summary of Tree Rules for K | 91 | ||
5 | The Accessibility Relation | 93 | |
5.1 Conditions Appropriate for Tense Logic | 93 | ||
5.2 Semantics for Tense Logics | 99 | ||
5.3 Semantics for Modal (Alethic) Logics | 104 | ||
5.4 Semantics for Deontic Logics | 108 | ||
5.5 Semantics for Locative Logics | 111 | ||
5.6 Relevance Logics and Conditional Logics | 112 | ||
5.7 Summary of Axioms and Their Conditions on Frames | 115 | ||
6 | Trees for Extensions of K | 116 | |
6.1 Trees for Reflexive Frames: M-Trees | 116 | ||
6.2 Trees for Transitive Frames: 4-Trees | 121 | ||
6.3 Trees for Symmetrical Frames: B-Trees | 123 | ||
6.4 Trees for Euclidean Frames: 5-Trees | 129 | ||
6.5 Trees for Serial Frames: D-Trees | 133 | ||
6.6 Trees for Unique Frames: CD-Trees | 135 | ||
7 | Converting Trees to Proofs | 136 | |
7.1 Converting Trees to Proofs in K | 136 | ||
7.2 Converting Trees that Contain Defined Notation into Proofs | 147 | ||
7.3 Converting M-Trees into Proofs | 149 | ||
7.4 Converting D-Trees into Proofs | 151 | ||
7.5 Converting 4-Trees into Proofs | 152 | ||
7.6 Converting B-Trees into Proofs | 154 | ||
7.7 Converting 5-Trees into Proofs | 159 | ||
7.8 Using Conversion Strategies to Find Difficult Proofs | 163 | ||
7.9 Converting CD-Trees into Proofs in CD and DCD | 164 | ||
7.10 A Formal Proof that Trees Can Be Converted into Proofs | 165 | ||
8 | Adequacy of Propositional Modal Logics | 172 | |
8.1 Soundness of K | 172 | ||
8.2 Soundness of Systems Stronger than K | 180 | ||
8.3 The Tree Model Theorem | 182 | ||
8.4 Completeness of Many Modal Logics | 188 | ||
8.5 Decision Procedures | 189 | ||
8.6 Automatic Proofs | 191 | ||
8.7 Adequacy of Trees | 191 | ||
8.8 Properties of Frames that Correspond to No Axioms | 192 | ||
9 | Completeness Using Canonical Models | 195 | |
9.1 The Lindenbaum Lemma | 195 | ||
9.2 The Canonical Model | 198 | ||
9.3 The Completeness of Modal Logics Based on K | 201 | ||
9.4 The Equivalence of PL+(GN) and K | 210 | ||
10 | Axioms and Their Corresponding Conditions on R | 211 | |
10.1 The General Axiom (G) | 211 | ||
10.2 Adequacy of Systems Based on (G) | 215 | ||
11 | Relations between the Modal Logics | 221 | |
11.1 Showing Systems Are Equivalent | 222 | ||
11.2 Showing One System Is Weaker than Another | 224 | ||
12 | Systems for Quantified Modal Logic | 228 | |
12.1 Languages for Quantified Modal Logic | 228 | ||
12.2 A Classical System for Quantifiers | 231 | ||
12.3 Identity in Modal Logic | 234 | ||
12.4 The Problem of Nondenoting Terms in Classical Logic | 239 | ||
12.5 FL: A System of Free Logic | 242 | ||
12.6 fS: A Basic Quantified Modal Logic | 245 | ||
12.7 The Barcan Formulas | 248 | ||
12.8 Constant and Varying Domains of Quantification | 250 | ||
12.9 A Classicist’s Defense of Constant Domains | 254 | ||
12.10 The Prospects for Classical Systems with Varying Domains | 256 | ||
12.11 Rigid and Nonrigid Terms | 260 | ||
12.12 Eliminating the Existence Predicate | 262 | ||
12.13 Summary of Systems, Axioms, and Rules | 263 | ||
13 | Semantics for Quantified Modal Logics | 265 | |
13.1 Truth Value Semantics with the Substitution Interpretation | 265 | ||
13.2 Semantics for Terms, Predicates, and Identity | 268 | ||
13.3 Strong Versus Contingent Identity | 270 | ||
13.4 Rigid and Nonrigid Terms | 276 | ||
13.5 The Objectual Interpretation | 278 | ||
13.6 Universal Instantiation on the Objectual Interpretation | 281 | ||
13.7 The Conceptual Interpretation | 286 | ||
13.8 The Intensional Interpretation | 288 | ||
13.9 Strengthening Intensional Interpretation Models | 293 | ||
13.10 Relationships with Systems in the Literature | 294 | ||
13.11 Summary of Systems and Truth Conditions | 300 | ||
14 | Trees for Quantified Modal Logic | 303 | |
14.1 Tree Rules for Quantifiers | 303 | ||
14.2 Tree Rules for Identity | 307 | ||
14.3 Infinite Trees | 309 | ||
14.4 Trees for Quantified Modal Logic | 310 | ||
14.5 Converting Trees into Proofs | 314 | ||
14.6 Trees for Systems that Include Domain Rules | 319 | ||
14.7 Converting Trees into Proofs in Stronger Systems | 320 | ||
14.8 Summary of the Tree Rules | 321 | ||
15 | The Adequacy of Quantified Modal Logics | 323 | |
15.1 Preliminaries: Some Replacement Theorems | 324 | ||
15.2 Soundness for the Intensional Interpretation | 326 | ||
15.3 Soundness for Systems with Domain Rules | 329 | ||
15.4 Expanding Truth Value (tS) to Substitution (sS) Models | 332 | ||
15.5 Expanding Substitution (sS) to Intensional (iS) Models | 337 | ||
15.6 An Intensional Treatment of the Objectual Interpretation | 339 | ||
15.7 Transfer Theorems for Intensional and Substitution Models | 342 | ||
15.8 A Transfer Theorem for the Objectual Interpretation | 347 | ||
15.9 Soundness for the Substitution Interpretation | 348 | ||
15.10 Soundness for the Objectual Interpretation | 349 | ||
15.11 Systems with Nonrigid Terms | 350 | ||
15.12 Appendix: Proof of the Replacement Theorems | 351 | ||
16 | Completeness of Quantified Modal Logics Using Trees | 356 | |
16.1 The Quantified Tree Model Theorem | 356 | ||
16.2 Completeness for Truth Value Models | 361 | ||
16.3 Completeness for Intensional and Substitution Models | 361 | ||
16.4 Completeness for Objectual Models | 362 | ||
16.5 The Adequacy of Trees | 364 | ||
17 | Completeness Using Canonical Models | 365 | |
17.1 How Quantifiers Complicate Completeness Proofs | 365 | ||
17.2 Limitations on the Completeness Results | 368 | ||
17.3 The Saturated Set Lemma | 370 | ||
17.4 Completeness for Truth Value Models | 373 | ||
17.5 Completeness for Systems with Rigid Constants | 377 | ||
17.6 Completeness for Systems with Nonrigid Terms | 379 | ||
17.7 Completeness for Intensional and Substitution Models | 382 | ||
17.8 Completeness for the Objectual Interpretation | 383 | ||
18 | Descriptions | 385 | |
18.1 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions | 385 | ||
18.2 Applying Russell’s Method to Philosophical Puzzles | 388 | ||
18.3 Scope in Russell’s Theory of Descriptions | 390 | ||
18.4 Motives for an Alternative Treatment of Descriptions | 392 | ||
18.5 Syntax for Modal Description Theory | 394 | ||
18.6 Rules for Modal Description Theory: The System !S | 396 | ||
18.7 Semantics for !S | 400 | ||
18.8 Trees for !S | 402 | ||
18.9 Adequacy of !S | 403 | ||
18.10 How !S Resolves the Philosophical Puzzles | 407 | ||
19 | Lambda Abstraction | 409 | |
19.1 De Re and De Dicto | 409 | ||
19.2 Identity and the De Re–De Dicto Distinction | 413 | ||
19.3 Principles for Abstraction: The System λS | 415 | ||
19.4 Syntax and Semantics for λS | 416 | ||
19.5 The Adequacy of λS | 422 | ||
19.6 Quantifying In | 424 | ||
Answers to Selected Exercises | 432 | ||
Bibliography of Works Cited | 445 | ||
Index | 449 |
The main purpose of this book is to help bridge a gap in the landscape of modal logic. A great deal is known about modal systems based on propositional logic. However, these logics do not have the expressive resources to handle the structure of most philosophical argumentation. If modal logics are to be useful to philosophy, it is crucial that they include quantifiers and identity. The problem is that quantified modal logic is not as well developed, and it is difficult for the student of philosophy who may lack mathematical training to develop mastery of what is known. Philosophical worries about whether quantification is coherent or advisable in certain modal settings partly explains this lack of attention. If one takes such objections seriously, they exert pressure on the logician to either eliminate modality altogether or eliminate the allegedly undesirable forms of quantification.
Even if one lays those philosophical worries aside, serious technical problems must still be faced. There is a rich menu of choices for formulating the semantics of quantified modal languages, and the completeness problem for some of these systems is difficult or unresolved. The philosophy of this book is that this variety is to be explored rather than shunned. We hope to demonstrate that modal logic with quantifiers can be simplified so that it is manageable, even teachable. Some of the simplifications depend on the foundations – in the way the systems for propositional modal logic are developed. Some ideas that were designed to make life easier when quantifiers are introduced are also genuinely helpful even for those who will study only the propositional systems. So this book can serve a dual purpose. It is, I hope, a simple and accessible introduction to propositional modal logic for students who have had a first course in formal logic (preferably one that covers natural deduction rules and truth trees). I hope, however, that students who had planned to use this book to learn only propositional modal logic will be inspired to move on to study quantification as well.
A principle that guided the creation of this book is the conviction that visualization is one of the most powerful tools for organizing one’s thoughts. So the book depends heavily on diagrams of various kinds. One of the central innovations is to combine the method of Haus diagrams (to represent Kripke’s accessibility relation) with the truth tree method. This provides an easy and revealing method for checking validity in a wide variety of modal logics. My students have found the diagrams both easy to learn and fun to use. I urge readers of this book to take advantage of them.
The tree diagrams are also the centerpiece for a novel technique for proving completeness – one that is more concrete and easier to learn than the method of maximally consistent sets, and one that is extremely easy to extend to the quantifiers. On the other hand, the standard method of maximally consistent sets has its own advantages. It applies to more systems, and many will consider it an indispensable part of anyone’s education in modal logic. So this book covers both methods, and it is organized so that one may easily choose to study one, the other, or both.
Three different ways of providing semantics for the quantifiers are introduced in this book: the substitution interpretation, the intensional interpretation, and the objectual interpretation. Though some have faulted the substitution interpretation on philosophical grounds, its simplicity prompts its use as a centerpiece for technical results. Those who would like a quick and painless entry to the completeness problem may read the sections on the substitution interpretation alone. The intensional interpretation, where one quantifies over individual concepts, is included because it is the most general approach for dealing with the quantifiers. Furthermore, its strong kinships with the substitution interpretation provide a relatively easy transition to its formal results. The objectual interpretation is treated here as a special case of the intensional interpretation. This helps provide new insights into how best to formalize systems for the objectual interpretation.
The student should treat this book more as a collection of things to do than as something to read. Exercises in this book are found embedded throughout the text rather than at the end of each chapter, as is the more common practice. This signals the importance of doing exercises as soon as possible after the relevant material has been introduced. Think of the text between the exercises as a preparation for activities that are the foundation for true understanding. Answers to exercises marked with a star (∗) are found at the end of the book. Many of the exercises also include hints. The best way to master this material is to struggle through the exercises on your own as far as humanly possible. Turn to the hints or answers only when you are desperate.
Many people should be acknowledged for their contributions to this book. First of all, I would like to thank my wife, Connie Garson, who has unfailingly and lovingly supported all of my odd enthusiasms. Second, I would like to thank my students, who have struggled though the many drafts of this book over the years. I have learned a great deal more from them than any of them has learned from me. Unfortunately, I have lost track of the names of many who helped me make numerous important improvements, so I apologize to them. But I do remember by name the contributions of Brandy Burfield, Carl Feierabend, Curtis Haaga, James Hulgan, Alistair Isaac, JoBeth Jordon, Raymond Kim, Kris Rhodes, Jay Schroeder, Steve Todd, Andy Tristan, Mako Voelkel, and especially Julian Zinn. Third, I am grateful to Johnathan Raymon, who helped me with the diagrams. Finally, I would like to thank Cambridge University Press for taking an interest in this project and for the excellent comments of the anonymous readers, some of whom headed off embarrassing errors.