Introduction

> Nothing but a legend, you say? You want nothing but facts? Facts are
> perishable, believe me, only legends remain, like the soul after the body, or
> perfume in the wake of a woman.
>
> Amin Maalouf[1]

The almost nine-hundred-day siege of Leningrad constituted one of the
most dramatic and tragic episodes of World War II. Even before it ended,
the siege became one of the war's most widely told stories. Both the
Soviet and the Allied press transformed besieged Leningrad into leg-
end, a compelling story of steadfastness and heroism. Inside the block-
aded city, Leningraders undertook a startling array of commemora-
tive projects, ranging from keeping diaries to producing documentary
films. Perhaps the best known of these contemporary commemorations
is Dmitrii Shostakovich's monumental *Leningrad Symphony*. Begun in
blockaded Leningrad, the piece had more than fifty international premiers
in 1942 and became an emblem of the city's suffering and its strength. In
the summer of 1942, the remnants of the Leningrad Philharmonic, sup-
plemented by musicians stationed at the Leningrad front, performed the
symphony in Leningrad itself. Broadcast by radio throughout the city, the
concert immediately became part of the epic story of the blockade. One
of the violins played that evening became a museum piece.

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[1] Amin Maalouf, *The Rock of Tanios*, trans. Dorothy S. Blair (New York: George Braziller,
1994), 261. Cited in Ellen L. Fleischmann, "Selective Memory, Gender, and Nationalism:
Palestinian Women Leaders of the Mandate Period," *History Workshop Journal*, no. 47
(Spring 1999): 142.

The extraordinary and unexpected plight of blockaded Leningrad easily lent itself to mythmaking. Just weeks after the surprise invasion of 22 June 1941, rapidly advancing German troops threatened the city. By the end of August, the local newspapers and radio were exhorting Leningraders to become "heroic defenders" on the "city front." Thus, the epic terms in which the state media would narrate the siege were set quite early. Of course, not all Leningraders responded as the authorities hoped. A minority blamed the military disasters on the Communists and called for Leningrad to be declared an open city. Still, the extent of defeatist sentiment in Leningrad should not be exaggerated. As the historian Andrei Dzeniskevich concludes, "The overwhelming majority of workers maintained loyalty to the party and the Soviet state."[2] Indeed, thousands of Leningraders became involved in local defense, working overtime in the war industry and standing watch on rooftops to extinguish incendiary bombs in buckets of sand.

The first air raids came in early September. The blockade began shortly thereafter. On 8 September 1941, German forces occupied the southern shore of Lake Ladoga (east of the city) and, together with Finnish troops north of the city, severed all land routes in and out of Leningrad. Facing determined resistance from the Soviet Army, the Germans failed to capture the city. They decided to rely instead on siege and starvation. The front lines stabilized within four kilometers of the city, and Leningraders found themselves cut off from what they began to call the mainland.

During the late fall and throughout the winter of 1941–42, the city's population – predominantly women, children, and the elderly – faced conditions that defy imagination. Temperatures in January 1942 reached forty degrees below zero centigrade (minus forty degrees Fahrenheit). Leningraders suffered the bitter cold in a city without heat, electricity, running water, or public transportation. Between 20 November and 25 December, the daily bread ration for dependents fell to a low of 125 grams (not quite 4.5 ounces, perhaps fifteen or twenty small bites of bread). Thousands died of starvation every day, and corpses piled up in streets and courtyards.

The situation within the city improved somewhat in early 1942, when an ice road across frozen Lake Ladoga, dubbed the "Road of Life" by the media, began to carry convoys of food into the city and to transport

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[2] Andrei Dzeniskevich, "The Social and Political Situation in Leningrad in the First Months of the German Invasion: The Psychology of the Workers," in Robert W. Thurston and Bernd Bonwetsch, eds., *The People's War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 77.

the sick and starving to the mainland. With the arrival of spring, the worst period of the blockade came to an end. The evacuation of civilians continued during the summer as flotillas replaced the ice road across Lake Ladoga.

The city remained within easy reach of German artillery, but something like normalcy returned. During the winter of 1942–43, the city's population was far smaller than it had been a year earlier, and better prepared for a winter under siege. Now German artillery fire took more lives than starvation. In January 1943, a Soviet offensive opened a narrow corridor that allowed the reestablishment of a rail connection to the mainland, albeit under heavy fire. A year later, fireworks – which some Leningraders mistook for artillery fire – marked the victorious lifting of the blockade. The human losses were staggering. Conservative postwar estimates put the number of dead at 670,000. More recently, historians have suggested a figure of one million deaths due to starvation as a reasonable approximation. No city in modern times has withstood greater losses.[3]

Since the war, and particularly since the early 1960s, the remarkable story of the blockade has been retold in countless memoirs, interviews, previously unpublished diaries, histories, films, monuments, poems, and museum exhibits. This book tells the story of these stories. Rather than attempting to reconstruct the experience of the blockade, the book aims to trace how, in the half century between the beginning of the Soviet-German war and the end of the Soviet Union, both the people who survived the siege and the state that claimed it as evidence of its own legitimacy remembered and recounted it.

At first glance, the story of the story of the blockade appears to be a relatively straightforward tale of the shifting tactics of the propaganda state. Desperate to mobilize the population, the wartime state extolled the resourcefulness, self-sacrifice, and self-reliance of heroic Leningrad. Shostakovich won the Stalin Prize for his symphony, and Leningrad won the designation "Hero City." Once the war had been won, Josef Stalin, eager to claim responsibility for the overall victory, suppressed the story. The blockade museum, opened during the war, was shuttered. Work on

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[3] A. R. Dzeniskevich, *Blokada i politika: Oborona Leningrada v politicheskoi kon"iunkture* (St. Petersburg: Nestor, 1998), 45–68. V. M. Koval'chuk, "Tragicheskie tsifry blokady (K voprosu ob ustanovlenii chisla zhertv blokirovannogo Leningrada)," in A. A. Fursenko, ed., *Rossiia v XIX-XX vv: Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Rafaila Sholomovicha Ganelina* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1998), 357–69. David M. Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1944: 900 Days of Terror* (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing, 2001), 180.

building war memorials ceased. After Stalin's death in 1953, his political
heirs, in search of their own legitimizing myths, revived the story of the
blockade, building new monuments and museums and staging elaborate
rituals of remembrance.

What complicates this picture of a memory fabricated by and for the
state is the fact that long after the Soviet collapse, the images, tropes, and
stories of the state-sanctioned cult of the war continued to show up in the
oral and written testimonies of blockade survivors – even survivors who
were generally unsparing in their attacks on the Soviet state. The freer
atmosphere created by the era of glasnost in the late 1980s and the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union in 1991 undoubtedly expanded the limits of
the speakable. It became possible, for example, for survivors to condemn
Stalin's refusal to declare Leningrad an open city. Nonetheless, the stories
told by the survivors of the blockade, the *blokadniki,* remained remark-
ably stable. Few, for example, were eager to claim that they themselves
had advocated surrender. The so-called Leningrad epic, like the myth of
the people's war more generally, outlived the state that sponsored it.[4]
Apparently, Leningraders (now Petersburgers) had at some point made
the story of heroic Leningrad their own.

The wartime ubiquity of blockade stories and the degree to which the
blockade was "commemorated in advance" help to explain this paradox-
ical outcome.[5] Many contemporary accounts of the blockade aimed to
transform the overwhelming, painful, and confusing experiences of the
city front into a coherent narrative of historic events. These narratives
often appeared in the official media and were told in state-approved terms.
However, because the tellers, whether "ordinary" Leningraders or well-
known contributors to the Soviet media, were people who had experi-
enced the air raids, shelling, and starvation firsthand, individual memo-
ries often shaped official narratives, even as official narratives worked to
sanitize, co-opt, and contain memory. Entangled from the outset, official

[4] Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik
Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 384. Catherine Merridale,
Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia (New York: Viking,
2000), 16–17, 213, 238–39, 329. Nina Tumarkin, "The Great Patriotic War as Myth
and Memory," *European Review* 11 (2003): 595, 609–10. Benjamin Forest and Juliet
Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet
National Identity in Moscow," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92
(September 2002): 531–32.
[5] Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in Lawrence
D. Kritzman, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past,* trans. Arthur
Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1: 18.

representations and individual recollections could not be easily distinguished and separated, even by survivors critical of the Soviet state.

Tracing the complicated interweaving of the political and the personal in stories of the blockade requires an approach that is at once chronological and thematic. The first part of this book (Chapters 1–3) focuses on the prewar and wartime narratives and commemorations that provided the framework for later memories and monuments. The second part explores immediate postwar efforts to rebuild the city and efface the memory of the blockade (Chapter 4) and the return of stories and monuments dedicated to the blockade in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapters 5 and 6). The book's final part, which analyzes how and whether blockade stories shifted in late– and post–Soviet Russia, as well as the return of the city's prerevolutionary name (Chapters 7 and 8), brings the story up to 1995. Each part is also organized thematically around the interactions of individual memories with state-sanctioned myths, urban space, and efforts to construct monuments and rituals of remembrance. The Epilogue addresses the question of the meanings of memories, myths, and monuments as fewer and fewer people who lived through the blockade remain to tell the tale.

Memories and Myth

Blockade stories are at once deeply personal and profoundly political. The state's "memory created from above" often distorted or omitted a great deal, but it also deftly appropriated the "everyday" memory of survivors.[6] The power of blockade stories lay precisely in their complicated fusion of mythologized versions of individual life histories and of the nation's history. Struggling to cope with painful memories and to endow tragedy with meaning, survivors often internalized, even if they did not completely accept, the state's myths, and they often found their own uses for the state's monuments. Thus, the book does not attempt to draw sharp distinctions between the allegedly "raw," "unvarnished," "real" memories of survivors and the presumptively politicized myths – or lies – created by the state.[7] Instead, I view "myth" as deeply connected to

[6] Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *American Historical Review* 102 (December 1997): 1394, 1402.

[7] Nina Tumarkin emphasizes the disjuncture between the survivors' "raw" memory and the state's "myth." Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 188. Cynthia Simmons and Nina Perlina argue that "only with the advent of glasnost" could "unvarnished" accounts

memory. While it may not have been absolutely true, the myth of heroic Leningrad nonetheless offered a real and indispensable means of turning the "muddle of images" that people collected in wartime into meaningful and memorable narratives.[8]

War, as the psychiatrist Derek Summerfield has pointed out, "is a public and collective experience, leaving memories which can be described as social as much as personal."[9] I use "memory" to designate the elements in this amalgam that are primarily personal or autobiographical: the stories told by individual survivors to themselves or others that describe what Ol'ga Grechina called, in her 1994 memoir, "the blockade that I suffered, the one that is mine."[10] Such stories constitute a vital constituent of individual identity, the "scaffolding upon which all mental life is constructed."[11] Often, but not always, they maintain a personal, intimate tone, and insist, as Grechina's does, that "it is all the honest truth."

"appear in print in the USSR." Simmons and Perlina, *Writing the Siege of Leningrad: Women's Diaries, Memoirs, and Documentary Prose* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), xxxi. Geoffrey Hosking contrasts "real memory" and "the mythologized substitute." Hosking, "Memory in a Totalitarian Society: The Case of the Soviet Union," in Thomas Butler, ed., *Memory: History, Culture, and Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 118. Éléonora Martino-Fristot contrasts "tragic" individual memory and "epic" public memory, while also tracing their interactions. Martino-Fristot, "La mémoire du blocus de Léningrad, 1945–1999" (Ph.D. diss., Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, 2002).

[8] The term "muddle of images" is from Samuel Hynes, "Personal Narratives and Commemoration," in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 207. Studies of memory that have influenced my approach include Susan Crane, "Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory," *American Historical Review* 102 (December 1997): 1372–85; Andrew Lass, "From Memory to History: The Events of 17 December Dis/membered," in Rubie S. Watson, ed., *Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1994), 87–104; Paula Hamilton, "Memory Remains: Ferry Disaster, Sydney, 1938," *History Workshop Journal,* no. 47 (Spring 1999): 192–210; Daniel J Sherman, *The Construction of Memory in Interwar France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[9] Derek Summerfield, "The Social Experience of War and Some Issues for the Humanitarian Field," in Patrick J. Bracken and Celia Petty, eds., *Rethinking the Trauma of War* (London: Free Association Books, 1998), 22. See also Jennifer Cole, "Painful Memories: Ritual and the Transformation of Community Trauma," *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 28 (March 2004): 87–105.

[10] I have used the translation in Simmons and Perlina, *Writing the Siege,* 106. Ol'ga Grechina, "Spasaius' spasaia: Chast' I: Pogibel'naia zima (1941–1942 gg.)," *Neva,* 1994, no. 1: 212.

[11] Gerald D. Fischbach and Joseph T. Coyle, "Preface," in Daniel L. Schacter, ed., *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ix. The anthropologist Jonathan Boyarin proposes that "identity and memory are virtually the same concept." Boyarin, "Space, Time, and the

Personal narratives, in short, often claim to be purely personal and thus to
provide privileged access to the truth of the blockade and the individual.
Such claims are easily and often taken at face value.[12] By contrast, pairing
"memory" with "myth" offers a means of calling attention to the ways
in which personal memories – especially personal memories of the social
trauma of war – are shaped by what Summerfield calls "social memory"
and what I call myth.

   "Myth" in this context is not meant as a synonym for state-manu-
factured falsehood, a tendentious account of the blockade in need of
debunking. Neither is it meant to evoke the common understanding
of myth as a fictitious, even fantastic narrative used to explain the
unknown.[13] Instead, the term is meant to suggest the shared narratives
that give form and meaning to the recall of past experience. In "its original
sense," as Stuart Charmé points out in his study of biography, "'myth'
[*mythos*] refers to plot." In any individual life, this plot is "not appar-
ent in the immediate quality of experience." On the contrary, it must be
imaginatively constructed.[14]

   The necessity of constructing meaningfully plotted memory may be
especially acute in the case of chaotic, painful, unmanageable recollections
of war. Examining personal narratives from World War I, Samuel Hynes
emphasizes that "myth here, it scarcely needs saying, is not a synonym
for falsehood; rather, it is a term to identify the simplified, dramatized
story that has evolved . . . to contain the meanings of the war that we [or
survivors] can tolerate, and so make sense of its incoherencies and contra-
dictions." This simplified, dramatized narrative can, Hynes argues, both
"confirm, but also perhaps construct" the "memories of men who fought
but did not write about their wars" because it endows the "incoherence
of war" with "order and meaning."[15] It is precisely this sense of a tolera-
ble narrative distilled from and, in turn, shaping personal memories that
I mean to evoke with the term myth. My interest is not in ascertaining
the accuracy of myths, but in emphasizing, as Malcolm Smith does in his

      Politics of Memory," in Jonathan Boyarin, ed., *Remapping Memory: The Politics of
      TimeSpace* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 23.
[12] Joan Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (Summer 1991): 777.
[13] Fleischmann, "Selective Memory," 143–44.
[14] Stuart L. Charmé, *Meaning and Myth in the Study of Lives: A Sartrean Perspective*
      (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 151.
[15] Hynes, "Personal Narratives," 207. See also George Mosse's concept of the "Myth of the
      War Experience," "which looked back on the war as a meaningful and sacred event" but
      was not "entirely fictitious." George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory
      of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 7.

study of the London Blitz, that myths "are important historical events in their own right."[16]

Like the myth of the London Blitz, which may be its nearest analogue, the simplified, dramatized story of the Leningrad blockade grew out of the state's effort to mobilize an urban population under attack. In both cases, the media worked to persuade individuals that their personal sorrows, along with their seemingly small contributions to the war effort, carried historic, if not epic, importance. Stories of remarkable fortitude and courage, authenticated by images of Londoners singing in shelters or of young women standing watch on Leningrad's rooftops while the bombs fell, transformed the everyday horrors of urban war into heroic legend. Both myths drew on experiences remembered by individuals while providing those who lived through the war with compelling and uplifting frameworks for narrating – and therefore remembering – their own experiences. Both proved exceptionally durable.[17]

Such durable myths are sometimes identified as "collective memory" or "social memory." I have avoided these terms primarily because they lack the emphasis on narrative provided by myth. Other scholars have criticized these terms because they create the misleading impression that collectives somehow "remember" just as individuals do, and have suggested "collective remembrance" and "collected memory" as alternatives.[18] While these terms convey the process by which individuals participate in the construction of public remembrances and monuments, they are less effective than myth in underlining the centrality of shared narratives in the construction of individual memories. Moreover, myth, unlike terms that emphasize retrospective "remembrance," leaves open the possibility that the experience remembered and the act of "collecting" memory may be simultaneous. This was certainly the case in wartime Leningrad, where the process of planning and constructing museums, memorials, and archives began long before the blockade ended.

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[16] Malcolm Smith, *Britain and 1940: History, Myth, and Popular Memory* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 6.

[17] Angus Calder, *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 1–3. Jean R. Freedman, *Whistling in the Dark: Memory and Culture in Wartime London* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1999), 1–2, 14. Smith, *Britain and 1940*, 2–9.

[18] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory,* trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). On "collective remembrance," see Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, "Setting the Framework," in *War and Remembrance*, 9–10. On "collected memory," see James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), xi–xii. See also Hynes, "Personal Narratives," 206; Boyarin, "Space, Time," 23.

In the Soviet case, where the "evolution" of simplified, dramatized stories involved a great deal of state intervention, ideology might provide a workable substitute for myth. However, it too lacks a clear emphasis on narrative. Myth may be understood as ideology turned into a story – by both the state seeking legitimacy and individuals seeking meaning in traumatic events. Richer in local detail and more dynamic than ideology, myth may also be more readily internalized.[19] Focusing on the construction of mythical narratives provides a powerful means of exploring ideology and memory as, in the words of the historian Michael David-Fox, "mutually interactive phenomena that can mold one another in powerful ways."[20]

The idea that individual memories cannot be cleanly separated from myth – in the sense outlined here of shared, simplified narratives – draws on recent studies in cognitive psychology and on work in psychiatry that emphasizes the social dimensions of memory. Such work critiques the "current discourse on trauma," which views abnormal, so-called traumatic memory as the universal result of traumatic events, with perhaps some variation across cultures. The emphasis on the universality of traumatic memory leads to the conclusion that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may affect victims of traumas that range, as the title of an important book on treating trauma has it, from domestic abuse to political terror.[21] The concept of the "unrepresentablity" of trauma, the difficulty if not impossibility of assimilating it into "normal" memory, has been particularly influential and contested in studies of the memory of the Holocaust.[22] However, recent work in cognitive psychology has called

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[19] Lars T. Lih, "*Vlast'* from the Past: Stories Told by Bolsheviks," *Left History* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 29.

[20] Michael David-Fox, "Cultural Memory in the Century of Upheaval: Big Pictures and Snapshots," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2 (Summer 2001): 612.

[21] The phrase "current discourse on trauma" comes from Patrick J. Bracken, "Hidden Agendas: Deconstructing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder," in *Rethinking the Trauma of War,* 38. Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 1997). On cross-cultural variations, see Selma Leydesdorff et al., "Introduction: Trauma and Life Stories," in Kim Lacy Rogers, Selma Leydesdorff, and Graham Davis, eds., *Trauma and Life Stories: International Approaches* (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–26. On the history of the concept of trauma, see Paul Lerner and Mark S. Micale, eds., *Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). On the history of PTSD, see Allan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[22] Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, eds., *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992). Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed*

into question the "special," abnormal status of traumatic memory. It is by no means a settled proposition that the cognitive processes involved in remembering extremely happy events differ appreciably from those involved in remembering traumatic ones.[23] At the same time, psychiatrists involved in treating traumatized individuals in war zones from Rwanda to Bosnia argue that the discourse on trauma "has systematically side-lined the social dimensions of suffering; instead it promotes a strongly individualistic focus, presenting trauma as something that happens inside individual minds." Questioning the universality of PTSD, they empha-size that the meanings individuals attach or come to attach to their own suffering shape their perceptions and memories of the war experience.[24]

This critique of the discourse on trauma is relevant to a study of the memory of blockaded Leningrad, where, as in the more recent conflicts that have stimulated the critique, the trauma in question involved an attack on an entire community, and responses were necessarily both indi-vidual and social. The belief that sacrifices served a just and worthwhile cause, the ability to "draw on social or political values, and on cooperative effort and solidarity" made it possible for those experiencing war to view themselves not as "passive victims" of trauma but as "active citizens." None of which is to deny that such experiences often produce lasting dam-age. Rather, the central point, for humanitarian aid organizations and his-torians, is that "war-affected populations are largely directing their atten-tion not inwards, to 'trauma,' but outwards, to their devastated social world."[25] The damage that they see is in the world, not in themselves. From this point of view, the finding that the Soviet veterans and survivors of the war interviewed in the 1990s "do not remember trauma" is not so surprising, and does not necessarily require an explanation grounded

Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Saul Friedlander, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). Y. Zerubavel, "The 'Mythological Sabra' and Jewish Past: Trauma, Memory and Contested Identities," *Israel Studies* 7 (2002): 115–44.

[23] J. D. Read, "Introduction to the Special Issue: Trauma, Stress, and Autobiographical Memory," *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 15 (December 2001): S1–S5. Stephan Porter and Angela Birt, "Is Traumatic Memory *Special*? A Comparison of Traumatic Memory Characteristics with Memory for Other Emotional Life Experiences," in ibid., S101–17. Dorthe Bernsten, "Involuntary Memories of Emotional Events: Do Memories of Traumas and Extremely Happy Events Differ?" in ibid., S135–58.

[24] Bracken, "Hidden Agendas," 38.

[25] Summerfield, "The Social Experience," 23, 34.