Introduction

> It is impossible, Mr Speaker, not to pause here for a moment, to reflect on the inconstancy of human greatness, and the stupendous revolutions that have happened in our age of wonders. Could it be believed when I entered into existence, or when you, a younger man, were born, that on this day, in this house, we should be employed in discussing the conduct of those British subjects who had disposed of the power and person of the Grand Mogul? This is no idle speculation. Awful lessons are taught by it, and by other events, of which it is not too late to profit.
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> Edmund Burke, Speech on Fox's India Bill, 1783.[1]

Edmund Burke's pregnant pause invited the commons of Great Britain to gaze on the lonely, impoverished emperor of Hindustan, and to beware the fate of empires. Seven years after the publication of the first volume of Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, imperial history appeared to Burke as the record of 'awful lessons'. Britain's own imperial destiny hung in the balance. Her colonies in North America, after a long and bitter struggle, were breaking off to build a new model of republican liberty, much heralded by radicals in Britain itself. Meanwhile, a British trading company, the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies (or East India Company for short), had conquered a 'vast mass' of territories, 'larger than any European dominion, Russia and Turkey excepted', 'composed of so many orders and classes of men . . . infinitely diversified by manners, by religion, by hereditary employments, through all their possible combinations'. 'The handling of India', Burke urged his compatriots, was a 'matter in a high degree critical and delicate. But oh! It has been handled rudely indeed'.[2]

When Edmund Burke 'entered into existence', as he so grandly put it, he did so as a British subject in England's oldest Atlantic colony, Ireland.

[1] Edmund Burke, *On Empire, Liberty and Reform. Speeches and Letters* (David Bromwich (ed.), Yale, 2000), pp. 298–9.
[2] Ibid., p. 296.

Born in 1729, Burke grew up with a conception of the British empire as a pan-Atlantic community of Britons that was 'Protestant, commercial, maritime and free'.[3] The imagined community of this empire, leaving out the vast numbers of slaves and indigenous peoples under its subjection, were white Protestants governed by the English common law and representative institutions. A sense of empire as a bulwark of British liberty against the threat of continental tyranny was worked out in trans-Atlantic dialogues during the early eighteenth century, and reached its patriotic apogee around the Seven Years War (1756–63).[4] Yet, in its moment of military triumph, the old empire began to unravel, as the pan-Atlantic community of the British shattered into warring tribes, and new conquests of alien peoples in distant lands began to divulge their 'awful lessons'.[5]

The East India Company's conquests in India had been swift and chaotic. Since it's founding in 1600, the Company had exercised its monopoly rights to trade with India through small forts and factories perched on the coasts. For much of this period, the Company was militarily weak, and dependent on the good will of Indian rulers, especially the Mughals, the central Asian dynasty that ruled over much of north India from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.[6] Yet, in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the balance of power in India decisively shifted. The Mughal empire, beset by factionalism, rebellion and new threats from beyond its frontiers, began to fragment. At the same time, European traders mobilized unprecedented naval and military resources in response to the globalizing dynamics of European warfare, but also in an effort to exert power and influence over Indian territories. As even Edmund Burke could not have guessed, these transformations in India signalled an epochal shift in world power, as militarizing European nation states cut into the great agrarian empires of Asia, establishing the foundations of modern colonial empires.[7]

[3] For this formulation, see David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 195–7.
[4] Ibid.; Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (Cambridge, 1995); Jack P. Greene, 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution', *OHBE*, 2, pp. 208–31; Elijah Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000).
[5] P. J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires. Britain, India and America, c. 1750–1783* (Oxford, 2005).
[6] For a good survey, see John Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, NCHI, 1.5 (Cambridge, 1993).
[7] C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London, 1989).

The British Company made its most startling conquests in the Mughal province of Bengal.[8] Bengal was a notable example of the regionalization of power which followed the death of the Mughal emperor Aurungzeb in 1707. Starting with Murshid Quli Khan (1700–27), Shia Muslim rulers styled as *nawabs* (provincial governors) succeeded in building a semi-independent regional state in Bengal.[9] From the 1740s, as the *nawabs* fought off incursions by Maratha invaders from western India, they ceased to pay any tribute to the hidebound emperors in Delhi. Within Bengal, meanwhile, the *nawabs* achieved significant fiscal innovations, and the assessed value of the Bengal revenues increased by 40 per cent between 1722 and 1756.[10]

The *nawabs* had some success raising tax revenues in an age of rural commercialization and expanding foreign trade.[11] Nevertheless, cut off from military reinforcements from the north, they were also intensely vulnerable to powerful interest groups within their realm. These included the powerful bankers who financed their regime, big land-holders (*zamindars*) and, most dangerous of all, European trading companies clustered on the coast, which could tap into global networks of trade and militarism. In 1756, an inexperienced young *nawab*, Siraj-ud-daula, provoked by the haughty and aggressive behaviour of British traders in their port settlement of Calcutta, swept into the city, and drove the British into a desperate retreat down the river Hughli. But this attempt to discipline unruly British traders fatally backfired. The East India Company had assembled a formidable naval and infantry force at its south Indian base in Madras. These forces, originally designed to combat the growing power of the

[8] The Bengal province or *subah* was a fluid geographical and political entity in the eighteenth century, for which term Bengal stands as a necessary shorthand. The eighteenth century *nawabs* of Bengal annexed the northerly *subah* of Bihar in the 1730s and (only nominally) the south-western *subah* of Orissa. The Company's acquisitions were thus described in formal British documents of the period as 'Bengal, Bihar and Orissa'. Orissa was wrestled away from the *nawabs* by Maratha invaders from the west in the 1740s, and not reconquered by the British until after 1803. P. J. Marshall, *Bengal: the British Bridgehead, Eastern India 1740–1828*, NCHI, 2.2 (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 48, 93. 'Bengal' should thus usually be read in this book to refer to Bengal and Bihar, which both came under the sway of the Company in this period.

[9] P. J. Marshall, *Bengal: the British Bridgehead Eastern India 1740–1828*, NCHI, 2.2 (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 48–69.

[10] John R. McLane, *Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth Century Bengal* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 39.

[11] For the connections between agricultural expansion, commercialization and state-formation, see Richard M. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam on the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760* (Berkeley, CA, 1993); Rajat Datta, *Society, Economy, and the Market: commercialization in rural Bengal 1760–1800* (New Delhi, 2000).

French, were hurriedly diverted to Bengal, where they were put to remarkable use.[12]

The commander of the Company's forces, Robert Clive, swiftly retook Calcutta. Within a year, Clive had struck deals with big financial and political interests within the Bengal government, and routed Siraj-ud-daula's army at the battle of Plassey (1757). Clive then installed a new *nawab* in the provincial capital of Murshidabad, and secured from this ruler a grant of new territories (and their tax revenues) around Calcutta.[13] Thereafter, the allure of more territorial revenues proved too enticing for the British to resist, and the regional state of Bengal swiftly collapsed under the weight of British demands. The Company cultivated a series of *nawabs* as allies until they were either set aside or they rebelled against the Company's voracious appetite for tribute. In 1765, Robert Clive, on his second stint as the Company's governor in Calcutta, engineered the appointment of the East India Company as *diwan* (roughly translated as treasurer or chief revenue collector) of Bengal, by the captive Mughal emperor, Shah Alam II. The Company used the grant of the *diwani* to extend their controlling power over the entire territorial administration of Bengal. By the early 1770s, the East India Company's 250 or so civilian servants in Bengal, backed up by a few hundred British army officers and over 20,000 Indian soldiers, had become the rulers of Bengal.[14]

In the same period, the East India Company was also seeking to extend its territories around Madras in south India and Bombay in the west, but its territorial gains in these regions were much slighter. In the south, Company traders preferred to prop up the relatively pliant *nawab* of Arcot, whose regime was in effect mortgaged to British creditors. Bombay at this stage lacked the resources to expand its territories to a significant extent.[15] The Mughal province of Bengal, therefore, became

[12] Brijen Kishore Gupta, *Sirajudaullah and the East India Company, 1756–7. Background to the Foundation of British Power in India* (Leiden, 1966).

[13] Some historians choose to emphasize how Company officials exploited an internal crisis within Bengal, while others argue that the internal crisis was deliberately engineered by the 'sub-imperialism' of the British. Compare, for example, Marshall, *Bengal: the British Bridgehead*, pp. 70–92, with Sushil Chaudhury, *The Prelude to Empire. Plassey Revolution of 1757* (New Delhi, 2000).

[14] The number of civilian 'covenanted' servants of the Company in Bengal rose from about 70 in the early 1750s to around 250 in the early 1770s, and this despite very high mortality during the wars of this period. By 1769 there were 3,000 British soldiers in Bengal, out of a total military force of more than 25,000. P. J. Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 15–16, 218.

[15] P. J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires*, pp. 229–30.

the launching pad for further territorial expansion, and also the main laboratory for the development of new conceptions of empire.

Older ideas of an 'empire of liberty', connoting British settlers and the extension of English common law and representative assemblies, scarcely seemed to fit with the new conquests. These conquests were achieved by recruiting a large infantry force from among an indigenous population with sophisticated and varied cultural, religious and political traditions. They had been made, moreover, by a chartered trading company, which suddenly appeared to many in Britain as a new kind of *imperium in imperio*, a many-headed hydra threatening to disturb the turbulent frontiers of British constitutional politics. Meanwhile, the very idea of India in eighteenth-century Britain was veiled with pejorative and exotic connotations associated with 'Asiatic' peoples. It conjured up images of grand Islamic despots ruling tyrannically over timid pagans, florid and fanciful literature bred under a searing sun, and men corrupted by heat and the harem into terminal effeminates.[16]

Presenting the problems of Indian empire in these stark terms tends to efface the long history of the Company as both a military and territorial power in South Asia, and the elaborate systems of government and administration developed in the presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.[17] Nonetheless, the dramatic territorial conquests of the 1750s and 1760s brought India to new prominence in British imperial politics, and appeared to demand a serious rethinking of the very nature of empire.[18] Indeed, the Company's struggles to administer and police its new territories, its alarming financial instability, and the complex moral problems raised by the admixture of trade with

[16] For contemporary ideas of Asiatic or oriental despotism see, Nasser Hussain, *The Jurisprudence of Emergency. Colonialism and the Rule of Law* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2003), pp. 44–50; Susan Kingsley Kent, *Gender and Power in Britain, 1640–1990* (London, 1999), p. 97; John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 259. While modern scholars, following the work of Edward Said (*Orientalism*, 1978), have tended to use the term 'orientalism' to describe European studies of 'the east', the term Asiatic, as in 'Asiatic manners' or 'Asiatic despotism', was more commonly used than 'oriental' by eighteenth-century Britons. William Jones, in his first annual 'discourse' as President of the journal *Asiatick Researches* in 1784, argued that 'Asiatick' was the more classical and proper term to describe the region stretching from Japan to Turkey and North Africa, while 'Oriental' was merely 'relative' and 'indistinct'. *Asiatick Researches* 1 (Calcutta, 1788, repr. London, 1801), p. xii.

[17] This pre-history of British imperialism in India is only now getting the attention it deserves; see especially, Philip Stern, '"One body Corporate and Politick": the Growth of the East India Company-State in the Later Seventeenth Century' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 2004).

[18] H. V. Bowen, 'British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756–63', *JICH*, 26 (1998), pp. 1–27.

government, and Europe with Asia, provoked an extended crisis of imperial nerve in Britain.[19] A massive famine, which overwhelmed many parts of Bengal in 1769–70, further magnified the sense of crisis. This coincided with major upheavals in the Atlantic world of empire, leading to the American rebellion and revolution. As the British government strove over several decades to control its over-mighty mercantile subjects in India, Burke and others unfurled their own florid rhetoric on the Nabobs, British traders turned Asiatic rulers, whom it was feared were establishing a 'tyranny that exists to the disgrace of this nation'.[20]

Historians in general have paid far more attention to Burke's high-minded rhetoric than to the self-representations of the Nabobs themselves, and in part because of this, the process of ideological rearmament that accompanied colonial state-formation in eighteenth-century India has remained obscure. This study focuses on British officials who devised policies for the government of Bengal in the late eighteenth century, mainly servants of the British East India Company. It shows how their conceptions of power in Bengal were intimately tied to languages of politics generated in Britain and the Atlantic world of empire, and how these notions were deployed alongside British arms in the construction of colonial authority.

This book describes a distinctive style of colonial state-building that has tended to lie buried under later notions of the British civilizing mission. In the nineteenth century, theorists of empire often justified British rule in India by reference to enlightenment ideas about stages of civilization. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that there were 'conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization'. It was incumbent on a 'more civilized people' to advance the condition of

[19] For a brilliantly original account of the crisis of legitimacy associated with 'Asiatic' conquests, P. J. Marshall, *'A Free though Conquering People': Britain and Asia in the Eighteenth Century*. An inaugural lecture in the Rhodes Chair of Imperial History delivered at King's College, London (London, 1981).

[20] Burke, 'Speech on Fox's India Bill', in Burke, *On Empire, Liberty and Reform*, p. 370. For ideas about Nabobs, see Philip Lawson and Jim Phillips, 'Our Execrable Banditti: Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth Century Briton', *Albion*, 16 (1984), pp. 225–41. 'Nabob' was a corrupted transliteration of the Persian word *nawab*, which literally means 'deputy', but was a title accorded to provincial governors within the Mughal empire. According to Holzman, one of the earliest uses of this word in England was Horace Walpole's reference in 1764 to 'Mogul Pitt and Nabob Bute', but Nabob came to refer in particular to returned Anglo-Indians. J. M. Holzman, *The Nabobs in England. A Study of the Returned Anglo-Indian, 1760–1785* (New York, 1926), p. 8.

'a barbarous or semi-barbarous one'.[21] By the mid-nineteenth century it appeared to Mill that 'it was rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations, to be held either in direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy'.[22]

Yet for Edmund Burke's generation, for whom the 'Grand Mogul' was until recently a vivid symbol of the enduring power of Asiatic empires, the naturalness of European colonial power could not be so much taken for granted. Nor were the ideas of 'advanced' and 'backward' peoples yet fixed into their nineteenth-century hierarchies.[23] India, after all, was still one of the world's biggest suppliers of manufactured textile goods, and Britain was only in the early stages of the gradual evolution of its own modern industrial economy. Indians were not, Burke argued, like the 'savages' found among the natives of the Americas, 'but a people for ages civilized and cultivated', with a 'nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities, not exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in Europe; merchants and bankers . . . millions of ingenious manufacturers and mechanicks; millions of the most diligent, and not the least intelligent, tillers of the earth.'[24]

Burke's rhetoric was distinctive and contentious in its day, but it reflected a wider fluidity in eighteenth-century conceptions of the world, before the hard edges of 'western modernity' had been sharpened and refined. Indeed, this work will argue that Burke's views of Britain's Asiatic empire can only be understood in the context of ideas developed within the service of the East India Company that he came to so mistrust. In eighteenth-century British debates about India, the rhetoric of barbarism and civilization was cut across by view of the world as a set of 'ancient constitutions', closely related to the particular 'genius' of different peoples.[25] This constitutional geography was strongly informed

[21] J. S. Mill, 'On the Government of Dependencies by a Free State', in *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, 1856), pp. 313–40. For a study which situates Mill in the wider history of liberal imperialism, see Uday Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999).

[22] J. S. Mill, 'On the Government of Dependencies by a Free State', p. 323.

[23] For an excellent discussion of this theme, see Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire. The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ, 2005), pp. 14–19.

[24] Burke, 'Speech of Fox's India Bill', in *On Empire, Liberty and Reform*, pp. 295–6. For a stimulating treatment of Burke's Indian thought, emphasizing the theme of 'threatened communities', see Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, pp. 153–90.

[25] The rhetoric of barbarism was not entirely absent; it was especially likely to be used against Muslims, and against hill tribes on the margins of agricultural and industrial society. For examples of the latter use, see Kate Teltscher, *India Inscribed. European and British Writing on India, 1600–1800* (Delhi, 1995), pp. 121–4.

by Montesquieu's idea of the spirit of the laws, but also by British understandings of their own constitution as an ancient inheritance refined by the wisdom of the ages. British strategies of colonial state-building in Bengal often involved excavating the constitutional history of India to find workable models for their own government.

The notion of the ancient constitution was a hallmark of early modern political thought in Britain. In its 'classic phase' in the early seventeenth century, the ancient constitution of England denoted a coherent world-view associated especially with English common-law scholars. This world-view asserted the continuity of the past and the present in English history, and the self-sufficiency of the common law as a system of law rooted in custom and reason.[26] The true nature of the ancient English constitution was widely contested between different political interests, and the idea of the connectedness of the present with the past became vulnerable in the eighteenth century to new forms of historicist critique. Nonetheless, the ancient constitution remained a prominent motif of British political debate in the second half of the eighteenth century.[27] Indeed, the quest for 'continuous, instructive and politically legitimating' pasts also defined political debate in other European monarchies in the early modern period.[28]

This book argues that the language of ancient constitutionalism was transplanted to Bengal, where the British tried to justify their rule by reference to an ancient Mughal constitution.[29] As in Britain itself, the ancient constitution was a political slogan that was variously and often loosely used. 'Ancient' often meant simply 'previous' – pertaining, for example, to the Mughal empire, which had first established itself in Bengal in the late sixteenth century. The term ancient constitution might imply an ongoing, present concern with deep historical roots; or, more commonly in India, it could refer to an old system of government that had become run down and needed to be restored. 'Ancient' might

[26] For the idea of the 'classic phase' of ancient constitutionalism, see Glenn Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution. An Introduction to English Political Thought* (Philadelphia, 1992), p. 99. The classic modern account is J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (1st edn, 1957, repr. Cambridge, 1987); the Scots had their own versions of an ancient constitution based on the legendary Dalriadic kingdom. See Colin Kidd, *British Identities Before Nationalism. Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600–1800* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 123–45.

[27] Ibid., pp. 75–98; Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics*, pp. 257–64.

[28] Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination. Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830* (Yale, 1990), p. 91.

[29] Contemporaries wrote 'Mogul' to describe the dynasty descended from the central Asian warrior chief, Babur, in the late fifteenth century, but Mughal is the more usual transliteration today.

also denote great 'antiquity'. Indeed, an important feature of this concept was its tendency to push back into deep 'immemorial' time. Some Britons came to argue that the Mughals had in fact preserved elements of a more ancient constitution – comprising 'Hindu' forms of law and property – that predated the Islamic conquests of India.

The concept of an ancient Mughal constitution began as a device for justifying the transformation of a British trading company into a major territorial power, but it rapidly evolved into an ideological cornerstone of the Company's rule in Bengal. It was the frame through which early colonial politics were debated and disputed, by Company officials, by British critics of the Company like Edmund Burke, and also by Indian officials and land-holders trying to negotiate with or resist the growing power of the British. Finally, this book shows how the empire of constitutional restoration subsided before a new idea of British India in the late 1780s and 1790s, as the effects of Company rule corroded the older patterns of Mughal provincial administration, and the Company itself was tied more firmly to the decks of a globalizing British empire.

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If to Burke the fall of the 'Grand Mogul' evoked something like astonishment and awe, to many Britons in the nineteenth century, it was a matter neither of surprise nor regret. When the imperial administrator and scholar, Sir Henry Elliot, produced his *Biographical Index to the Historians of Mohammedan India* (1849), an index of Arabic and Persian histories, he did so not 'on account of any intrinsic value in the histories themselves', for they had no claim 'to rank higher than annals', with their 'dry narration' leavened by speculations of 'the most puerile and contemptible kind'.[30] The index would serve, however, to warn the 'young Brutuses and Phocions' of India, if they should harbour 'romantic sentiments' about the 'Muhammadan period', that it was a 'dark period' of 'conspiracies, revolts, intrigues, murders and fratricides'.[31] Elliot's was an extreme view, and British writers continued to valorize some aspects of the Mughal empire – for example, the supposed enlightened tolerance of the Emperor Akbar or the glories of Mughal architecture. Nonetheless, few among the imperial race doubted

[30] 'Original Preface', 1849, reprinted in H. M. Elliot and J. Dowson (eds.), *History of India by its own Historians. The Muhammadan Period*, 8 vols. (Calcutta, 1867–77), vol. I, pp. xviii–xix.

[31] Ibid., xxiii, xix. For British historiography on the Mughals and other Indo-Islamic rulers, see Peter Hardy, *Historians of Medieval India. Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing* (London, 1960), pp. 1–9, and J. S. Grewal, *Muslim Rule in India: the Assessment of British Historians* (Oxford, 1970).

that the rise of British power was a decisive break with the arbitrary despotism of the so-called 'Muslim period' of Indian history.

Yet the murky origins of their own empire remained a problem for British imperialists, as Burke's rhetoric against corrupt and rapacious Nabobs, greedy youths feasting on timid Asiatic prey, echoed down the decades. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a growing band of British imperial historians, often employed by the imperial bureaucracy, put together a kind of reverse Whig theory of Indian history driven by the teleological pull of a benevolent colonial despotism. In this view, India had descended into a dark age after the Mughals imposed only a fragile and temporary order on its diverse peoples.[32] The depredations of the British Nabobs were merely one more symptom of the general anarchy and decay attendant on Mughal decline, and they were redeemed by the far-sighted state-building of imperial governors of Bengal like Robert Clive (1765–7), Warren Hastings (1772–85) and Lord Cornwallis (1786–93), and by the gradual assertion of parliamentary oversight.[33] The rise of British India in its nineteenth-century form was conceived as an entirely logical and rational development, as the British imperial state gradually imposed its genius for bureaucratic order on anarchic 'natives'.

In the twentieth century, as the British were forced to face 'the inconstancy of human greatness' themselves, imperial pomposity and its historical justifications were gradually deflated by first nationalist and later post-colonial critiques. Now the corrupt British Nabobs did not appear so much as brief aberrations from the imperial norm, but as infamous exemplars of the systemic plunder of India by an alien power.[34] More recently, stimulated by Edward Said's thesis that western knowledge of the orient was a type of 'discourse' through which imperial domination was established and sustained, scholars turned their attention to the epistemological violence perpetrated by colonialism.[35]

[32] A good example is W. K. Firminger's treatment of 'the broken down Mogul government', in 'Historical Introduction to the Bengal Portion of the Fifth Report', *The Fifth Report From the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1812*, 3 vols. (Calcutta, 1918), vol. I, pp. xxii–li.

[33] The fullest narrative of this type was H. H. Dodwell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, *British India, 1497–1858* (Cambridge, 1929). The teleology was made fully apparent in the title; late medieval India was not a nation-in-waiting but a colonial dependency-in-waiting. For a good discussion of Dodwell's work in the wider context of nineteenth-century imperial history, see Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Scandal of Empire. India and the Creation of Imperial Britain* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), pp. 326–7.

[34] See, for example, the classic liberal nationalist work of R. C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule* (London, 1901).

[35] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978).