Introduction

In 1904, a British resident in the southern Japanese city of Shimonoseki donated potted miniature *bonsai* plants to the wounded soldiers on the Japanese Red Cross hospital ship, *Kōsaimaru*, with the attached letter:

> Although it is still early days yet since the war started between Russia and Japan, it is for certain that the Japanese military will win having exchanged a number of gun shots. Oh, such a feeling of pride as an alliance partner … Our highly respected soldiers and officers of Great Japan, brave and fearlessly advancing, shoot well and do well. I am presenting these potted *bonsai* plants to ease the pain of the soldiers who received the honourable injuries.[1]

Mr Reed was not alone in sensing excitement over the first major international war of the twentieth century. Across the Pacific, in the United States, a group of worthy American ladies proposed to host a tableau-vivant to collect donations for the relief of Japanese families of soldiers.[2] Evidently, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 attracted considerable contemporary international interest, fought between a newly emerging Asian power and a 'European' monolith, compounded by a dramatic outcome with the Japanese victory. For Russia, the war destabilised the Tsarist regime, triggering the 1905 Revolution. The victory signalled that Japan had joined the ranks of the great powers, hitherto an exclusive preserve of the white, Western states. Japan as a harbinger of the new regional order challenged the established European imperial interests in East Asia, leading to an intensification of imperial rivalry in the region. Symbolic in nature, the war fuelled the imagination of international contemporaries, representing many iconic clashes: the West versus East, Europe versus Asia, Christians versus 'heathens', tradition versus modern, and the white race versus the yellow race. The spectacle of the smallest empire in the world taking on one of the largest was plucky at best, if not downright foolhardy.

[1] Hosokawa Gentarō, *Byōinsen Kōsaimaru kenbunroku: Nichiro sensō hitchō*, Kitami Akihiko (ed.), (Tokyo: Hakubunkan shinsha, 1993), p. 106.
[2] Matsumura Masayoshi, *Nichiro sensō to Kaneko Kentarō: Kōhō gaikō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Shin'yūdō, 1980), p. 345.



1. 'La Guerre Russo-Japonaise', postcard, *c.* 1904–5.

The Japanese engaged in a highly effective international propaganda campaign, prior to and during the war, to win the hearts of the Western powers, especially Britain and the United States. In particular, the Japanese were apprehensive about the Russian manipulation of the 'Yellow Peril' propaganda to blacken their 'honourable' intentions in declaring war on Russia. Yet the Japanese did not quite realise that they were preaching to the converted, as Anglo-Saxon opinion, certainly at the elite level, was inclined to be favourably disposed to them at the time. This attitude was due to the strength of the 'national efficiency' movement in Britain and the United States, coupled with the strong undercurrent of anti-Slavism. The crux of the 'national efficiency' ethos was that Western

societies needed to regenerate themselves in order to create modern societies if they were to remain competitive and continue their dominance in world affairs; and Japan, alongside Germany, was idealised by this movement as one of the models of modernity.[3] However, Western interest in Japan was premised on a paradox: on the one hand, Japan represented the modern; whilst on the other, it represented tradition. In particular, advocates of national efficiency were fascinated with the warrior ethics of Japan, persuasively argued as Japan's spiritual backbone by Nitobe Inazō in his influential publication, *Bushido, the soul of Japan* in 1899.[4] Theodore Roosevelt was a keen student of the book, as was H. G. Wells, who even named his elite class of people the 'Samurai' in his *Modern Utopia* published in 1905.[5] The popularity of Japan coincided with probably the cosmopolitan period in the history of Japan, when a not insignificant portion of its leadership, particularly in the armed forces, was trained for a few years in the Western world and often spoke at least one European language.[6] To all intents and purposes, Japan had seemingly managed to build an efficient modern nation-state at a break-neck speed since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, without losing its spirituality as an Eastern culture.

In the non-Western world, too, Japan's brave challenge was eagerly watched. Rabindranath Tagore, the Bengali Nobel laureate, for one, was ecstatic at the Japanese victories, and paraded around the grounds of his school, Santiniketan, with his students. In particular, he was impressed with the Japanese soldiers who 'remained related to their Mikado and their country in reverential self-dedication'.[7] He even composed a poem in the Japanese poetic form of *tanka* to celebrate the Japanese victory in 1905:

> By the shores the ending of the night
> Into a dawn with blood-red clouds
> The small bird of the East cries noisily
> And sings the triumphal marches of honour.[8]

[3] For an excellent study of the movement, consult G. R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914* (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990).

[4] Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1987, originally published 1899). This was originally written in English and translated into many languages including Japanese and Arabic.

[5] From Theodore Roosevelt to Kaneko Kentarō, 23 April 1904, in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 777–8; Kaneko Kentarō, *Nichiro sen'eki hiroku* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1929), p. 119.

[6] This point was noted, for instance, by Sir Ian Hamilton, in his *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Edward Arnold, 1905), p. 150.

[7] Stephen N. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and his Critics in Japan, China and India* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 42–3.

[8] Niwa Kyōko, 'Tagōru to nihon', *Tagōru chosaku zenshū bekkan* (Tokyo: Daisanbumeisha, 1993), p. 345.

Colonel Pertev, who was attached as an Ottoman military observer to Japan's Third Army under General Nogi, concluded that the Japanese nation had won the war due to the unity of the country and the sacrificial spirit of its people.[9] The war also triggered an Egyptian nationalist, Mustafa Kamil, to write *The Rising Sun* (*al-Shams al-Mushriqah*) in 1904, as he saw in 'the new modern Japan' a prescriptive model for a politically independent Egypt.[10] Japan became a metaphor for Kamil's multi-pronged struggle: an anti-colonial one against the British; a pan-Islamic one against Russia; and a nationalist one for an independent Egypt. By contrast, the Egyptian poet Hafiz Ibrahim preferred to immortalise Japan in his famous poem, 'The Japanese Maiden' (*Ghada al-Yaban*) published in April 1904, which continued to be taught in Lebanese textbooks until the 1970s.[11] The Islamic world saw Japan not only as a role model for their struggle against Western colonisation but, also as an inspiration for Islamic reform and revival.[12] Indeed, Japan had cut an iconoclastic figure in the world where the orthodoxy was one of Western imperialism and colonisation.

Whatever impressions international public opinion might have held about 'Japan', the only way the Japanese state could realistically win against Russia, which possessed the largest land army in the world, was to engage in a limited war, fought for limited objectives, in line with its limited national capabilities. It was a hard won war for the Japanese, in terms of financial, economic, social and human costs. This accounted partly for the 'popular anger' expressed in the Hibiya Riot of September 1905, when it emerged that the Japanese government had forgone claims for war reparation in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Consequently, the Japanese state coffers had incurred a huge financial burden as the war had cost 1.7 billion yen, more than three times the initial estimate of half a billion yen, compared with a mere 200 million yen spent in the

[9] Gaimushō ōakyoku chūkintōka, 'Kindai nichi-to kankeishi', Ōkinshiryō dai 56 (October 1959), p. 13. Also, consult Handan Nezir Akemeşe, 'The Japanese Nation in Arms: A Role Model for Militarist Nationalism in the Ottoman Army, 1905–14', in Renée Worringer (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East and Japan* (Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 2007), pp. 63–89.

[10] Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., 'The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892–1919', P. M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 331; see also Michael Laffan, 'Mustafa and the *Mikado*: A Francophile Egyptian's Turn to Meiji Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19:3 (December 1999), 269–86.

[11] Sugita Hideaki, *Nihonjin no chūtō hakken: Gyaku enkinhō no naka no hikaku bunkashi* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1995), p. 203.

[12] For an excellent treatment of this, cf., Selçuk Esenbel, 'Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900–1945', *American Historical Review* 109:4 (2004), 1–43. Also, see the recently published collection of articles in Worringer, *The Islamic Middle East*.

Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5. Not surprisingly, then, the tax burden per capita in 1904–5 had gone up by 200 per cent during the war, and continued at a high level into the post-1905 period. Out of the national population of 46.1 million, some 1.09 million Japanese soldiers were mobilised, leading to the deaths of 73,685 or 1.6 per cent of the population.[13] Many of the lower ranking soldiers came from rural backgrounds, as the farming population constituted roughly 50 percent of the total Japanese population at the time.[14] Moreover, the theatre of war was not in Japan or Russia, but in Korea and northeast China (Manchuria) – both declared neutral territories – and major disruptions were caused to people's lives there. The Russians proved to be a formidable enemy, and for the first eleven months until the Japanese finally captured the strategically crucial Port Arthur, after extremely heavy casualties giving rise to the term 'human bullets' (*nikudan*) for their suicidal infantry attacks, the nation unsurprisingly became demoralised.

Evidently, the Japanese leadership took a huge gamble in taking on Russia in the first instance. Therefore, it had to seize on the victory over the Battle of the Sea of Japan (also known as the Battle of Tsushima), which marked the high point of the entire Japanese land and naval campaign, in order to initiate peace negotiations through the good offices of Theodore Roosevelt, whose efforts were duly rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.[15] In this way, Japan was able to win against Russia in a relatively short war, lasting nineteen months, from February 1904 to September 1905.

Much of the historical scholarship on Japan's role in the Russo-Japanese War deals with the military, diplomatic, political and economic dimensions of the war.[16] This may be due to the presumption that the war is a significant landmark in the history of Japan's state-building, and of Japan's

[13] 'Dai jūnihen: Jin'in', in Rikugunshō (ed.), *Nichiro senō tōkeishū*, vol. 8, (Tokyo: Tōyō Shorin, 1995), p. 10.

[14] According to the 1920 census, taken in 1918, 49 per cent of the population were farmers, of which 21.6 per cent were poor tenant farmers. Naikaku tōkeikyoku, '5 shokugyō betsu hongyōsha hongyō naki jūzokusha oyobi kaji shiyōnin', *Taishō kyūnen kokusei chōsa hōkoku: zenkoku no bu dai ni kan shokugyō*. The figure of 21.6 per cent was compiled from Chūō bukka tōsei kyōryoku kaigi, *Nihon ni okeru nōgyō keiei narabini tochi shoyū no hensen ni kansuru sankō shiryō: Nōgyō kiso chōsa shiryō dai san* (Tokyo: Chūō bukka tōsei kyōryoku kaigi, 1943), pp. 13–21.

[15] The Japanese had asked Roosevelt to pretend that the peace initiative came from him and not the Japanese.

[16] For example, Ian Nish, *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Longman, 1985); Shumpei Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Furuya Tetsuo, *Nichiro sensō* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1996); Ōe Shinobu, *Nichiro sensō to nihon guntai* (Tokyo: Rippū shobō, 1987); Ōe Shinobu, *Nichiro sensō no gunjishiteki kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003).

international relations. The strength of the historical orthodoxy that presupposes the existence of a strongly unified nation-state in Meiji Japan underscores such a view.[17] Indeed, many scholarly works on modern Japan, both inside and outside Japan, took for granted (and some still do to this day) the monolithic nature of Japanese society. Predictably, these studies concluded that the modern Japanese state had managed successfully to penetrate society to the grassroots level, because they were principally interested in exploring the means by which the state had inculcated its ideas about building a national culture, in order to examine the process of state-building in modern Japan.[18] In this line of enquiry, the power of the Meiji state is taken for granted. The emphasis thus lay with the state, assuming that the people did not have much power or say in influencing the government initiatives; in other words, people lacked the power of historical agency, or at least people's relationship with the state was not regarded as being interesting because it explained little.[19]

In the past decade, there has been an outpouring of research on social and cultural aspects of modern Japanese society at war, embracing such themes as conscription, war commemoration, war monuments, the army and regional society, with a comparative focus that delineates changes over Japan's three major wars from 1894 to 1945.[20] Yet in these studies, the 1904–5 experience is given a cursory rather than a comprehensive treatment, as the main objective is to illuminate the experience of the Second World War. The centenary of the Russo-Japanese War in 2004–5 resulted in a steady stream of academic publications (not to mention a substantial corpus of popular publications), especially in Japan.[21] Still, the only

[17] The Meiji period, from 1868 to 1912, was the first imperial reign under the Meiji Emperor (known as Mutsuhito) since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. This was followed by the Taishō period (1912–26), Shōwa period (1926–89), and Heisei period (1989–), the current reign under Emperor Akihito.

[18] For instance, Yamamoto Nobuyoshi and Konno Toshihiko, *Kindai kyōiku no tennōsei ideorogī: Meijiki gakkō gyōji no kōsatsu* (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1987); Nakamura Masanori, *Sengoshi to shōchō tennō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992).

[19] Sheldon Garon's *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) breaks away from this interpretation by offering a more nuanced understanding of state–society relations.

[20] For example, Harada Keiichi, *Kokumingun no shinwa: Heishi ni naru to iukoto* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2001); Arakawa Shōji, *Guntai to chiiki: Shirīzu nihon kindai kara no toi* 6 (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2001); Motoyasu Hiroshi, *Gunto no irei kūkan: Kokumin tōgō to senshisha tachi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2002); Ichinose Toshiya, *Kindai nihon no chōheisei to shakai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2004).

[21] Some articles in the two volumes of John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff and Yokote Shinji (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005), and David Wolff, Steven G. Marks, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, John W. Steinberg and Yokote Shinji (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World*

sizeable work that explores the 1904–5 war from the perspective of Japanese society emphasised human suffering and pain of the people under the authoritarian Meiji state (1868–1912).[22] Therefore, there still has not been enough work done on the 1904–5 war from the perspective of Japanese society and culture. At the bottom line, the implicit scholarly consensus seems to fall into one of two trends: either that an independent scholarly investigation of wartime Japanese society in 1904–5 can only affirm the monolithic national culture of the Meiji state; or that the significance of the 1904–5 experience was primarily as a prelude to the 1937–45 war. Further, historians of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 claim that it was their war that founded the social framework in which later imperial wars were fought and not the war of 1904–5.[23] One historian has even argued that the Russo-Japanese War was simply a larger version of the Sino-Japanese War, as the latter had a much more fundamental influence on the making of modern Japan.[24]

In the light of the lacuna in the existing literature, I propose to develop a new line of historical enquiry that focuses on the Russo-Japanese War from the perspective of Japanese society. My guiding question is a simple one: what did the war mean to the Japanese people and how did they respond to it? My primary interest lies in understanding popular responses to the war, as a way of critically reassessing how the war influenced the relationship between state and society. In so doing, I show that sources of power, and forces of social and cultural change, did not emanate solely from the authority of the state downwards to the people. Instead, the relationship between state and society, at least as far as the period under study is concerned, involved a not insignificant level of implicit 'negotiations' of diverse interests. This reveals the prevalence of the state–society relationship, which was more symbiotic and interactive in nature than hitherto understood. By shifting our analytical focus from state to society, there emerges an alternative picture of wartime Japanese society which

War Zero 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007); David Wells and Sandra Wilson (eds.), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–05* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). In Japanese, for instance, Komori Yōichi and Narita Ryūichi (eds.), *Nichiro sensō sutadīzu* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten, 2004); Matsuyama daigaku (ed.), *Matsuyama no kioku: Nichiro sensō hyakunen to roshiahei horyo* (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2004).

[22] Ōhama Tetsuya, *Meiji no bohyō* (Tokyo: Kawade shobō, 1990), reprinted as an expanded version, *Shomin no mita nisshin/nichiro sensō* (Tokyo: Tōsui shobō, 2003).

[23] For instance, Stewart Lone, *Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China 1894–95* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Hiyama Yukio, *Kindai nihon no keisei to nisshin sensō: Sensō no shakaishi* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 2001); Ōtani Tadashi and Harada Keiichi (eds.), *Nisshin sensō no shakaishi: 'bunmei sensō' to minshū* (Osaka: Fōramu A, 1994).

[24] Miyachi Masato, 'Nihonteki kokumin kokka no kakuritsu to nisshin sensō', in Hikakushi hikaku rekishi kyōiku kenkyūkai (ed.), *Kurobune to nisshin sensō: Rekishi ninshiki o meguru taiwa* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1997), p. 320.

exposes social complexities and unmasks the power of popular agency. This is not to say that the state consciously sought to 'negotiate' with the people as a rule; but that, contrary to the image we have of the authoritarian Meiji state, in reality it practised an ad-hoc, and laissez-faire, approach on many wartime social issues. In any event, the state recognised the need, from time to time, to be sensitive to popular demands, and we see evidence of these 'sites' of interaction in the chapters that follow. As far as feasible, therefore, I attempt to locate and focus on these 'sites' in order to illuminate the complex nature of the state–society relationship. This casts a more critical perspective on the presumed authoritarian nature of the Meiji state, by putting into perspective the limits of state power and influence.

A contemporary slogan of the 'unity of the nation' (*kyokoku itchi*) called for the state and nation to unite on the eve of the war, as Japan was about to embark on the largest, and the costliest, war in its history. Contemporary evidence also shows, nonetheless, that the Japanese state encountered difficulties trying to construct its own image of the ideal nation at war, which ran at odds with how society – with its diverse constituents – and the Japanese people experienced the war. Therefore, I will argue that the state was not monolithic but also that society too was diverse and complex. In wartime Japanese society, therefore, there existed different voices and different interests, some more vocal than others but, nonetheless, all finding their place in the war-torn society. Pro-war chauvinists shared the 'public sphere' with anti-war activists, whilst the 'silent majority' wrote freely about their fears, worries and hopes from encampments at the front. It is this complex social reality, displaying pluralism and diversity, that I am interested in investigating in this book. In order to do this, the principal actors will be the so-called 'ordinary people', such as the conscripts who were mobilised to fight for the country, the local elite who worked zealously behind the lines to facilitate the war effort, men and women, old and young, and children, all of whom were affected by the war whether they liked it or not. What I attempt to do is to privilege the voices and actions of the people, whilst at the same time contextualising them within the social framework of the time.

At this point, let me define *kokumin*, which acts as a crucial concept in the study. *Kokumin* is a Japanese neologism, a compound noun made up of two Chinese characters 'country' and 'people', introduced into the modern political discourse in nineteenth-century Japan. It can be used as a collective noun to mean the 'nation', or as a singular noun, to mean a 'citizen'. By definition, *kokumin* is a politically inclusive term, presuming one-ness and sameness as a category. Nevertheless, the reality was that *kokumin* were not all equal in contemporary Japanese society, as some were more equal than others, seeing that universal male suffrage did not

arrive until 1926, and female suffrage not until 1945. Therefore, it is problematic to deal with *kokumin* as a unitary category because it meant different things to different segments of the population at the time. As *kokumin* is a political term, it is not appropriate to use it to imply 'the people' as social and cultural beings. Therefore, I have decided to use *kokumin* when I want to refer to the political nation, or the political person, in the sense of a 'citizen'. Otherwise, I will simply use 'people' (in the sense of '*minshū*' or '*taishū*'), when I want to refer to 'the people' in a more general sense.

Obviously, such a definitional concern reflects my interest in understanding how the Japanese people, especially the conscripts, understood the concept of *kokumin*. How strong was the sense of the 'nation' amongst the people? Significantly, this study will show that the key political terms of the day such as *kokumin* and *kokka* (state), another neologism, were understood more flexibly by contemporaries in 1904–5. Fluidity and ambiguity in the contemporary usage of the key terms indicate that the proselytising of official nationalism was not as thorough, or at least, its impact was felt less pervasively, in contemporary Japanese society than is often thought.

In this study, the lower ranking soldiers tell us their war experiences through their personal diaries and letters. These personal materials provide an invaluable, and deeply enriching, insight into the social and psychological world of the conscripts as they recorded their thoughts on the meaning of life, war, death, comradeship, family, and the army, revealing their prejudices as well as social expectations and cultural norms. Although personal diaries have been used in previous studies, they have been treated primarily as sources of information. What I propose to do, however, is to give them the primacy they deserve, as key sources to understanding what *kokumin* thought about the war, and how they responded to it. As conscripts were called to fight for the state on the basis of their duty as *kokumin*, it is particularly pertinent to focus on their personal thoughts about the war, in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of their role and war experience.

Indeed, it will soon become apparent that the people did not all appear as helpless victims of the state's oppression; at least, when one listens more intently to their war experiences, one gets a better understanding of their social world as lived by them and their social values as practised by them, as they tried to cope with, as well as rationalise, impositions placed on them as *kokumin* in wartime society. Indeed, their thoughts and actions as written down in their diaries and letters reveal a substantial amount of independence and freedom, as most people lived their lives without having to deal with the official orthodoxy. Most importantly, for our

purpose, they reveal how people expressed ambivalence towards the war, for which they were expected to fight and sacrifice their lives. The question is not whether or not the Japanese people were demonstrating patriotism in going to war, seeing that they did not have a choice about being mobilised, and that *kokumin*, apart from a tiny minority, were law-abiding and would do what was expected of them, out of their sense of duty (*gimu*). We must remember, too, that though it was the duty of *kokumin* to go to war when called upon to do so, the state nonetheless could not take for granted that this would happen without any effort expended on its part. This gives rise to the new wartime slogan of 'honourable war dead' (*meiyo no senshi*) as an attempt to make this onerous national duty more 'palatable'. War diaries reveal the struggle between the public and the private persona of conscripts, as they felt torn between duty to the state and duty to the family. Moreover, when they faced the tragic reality of battlefield deaths, we discover the reality of what they thought about death and the rhetoric surrounding war death. This is the first study of the war to deal, in any detail, with such questions that attempt to understand the mind of the conscripts as they went about carrying out their duty as *kokumin*, by examining personal sources in their own right rather than a reflection of official documents.

By focusing on popular responses, especially in terms of the local sites of interaction between the state and individuals, it is possible to see how the people, from time to time, came to effect changes in the policies and initiatives of the state in wartime Japanese society. Therefore, I consider the local context as a crucial site of interaction that influenced many social norms and cultural practices that concerned the people and their attitudes towards the war, particularly, as we shall see, in the cases of mobilisation and commemoration. This study will demonstrate that local elites played a significant social role during the war, and their presence was felt pervasively in many areas of local life. They acted as motors of their communities and, in many instances, helped to establish war-related cultural practices that came to be adopted by the state.

Often the local elites are perceived as the grassroots agency of the state, as convenient local agents of nationalism, willing to serve the interests of the state for nominal awards and honours. If one looks at the conduct of the local elite from the perspective of the state, this interpretation provides a convenient framework in which to understand the role of the state at the grassroots level. Yet the role of the local elite can appear differently if we shift our perspective from the state to the local community. Therefore, it seems that the role of the local elite historically has been a more ambiguous one, because whilst they gave the semblance of acting as an intermediary of official nationalism, their interests were expressed, and