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Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

Index

- ABA and BAB design 52–53
- affiliated values
 - in incentive compatible auctions 25–26
 - in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
- aliased effects 49
- anticompetitive behavior identification 5
- assignment of units to treatments 48, 51–52
- auction bids
 - comparison with hedonic ratings 256–258
 - comparison with other measures of value 258–260
 - comparison with purchase decisions 258–260
 - comparison with taste tests 255–256
- auction bids and economic theory, validity of predictions 248–252
- auction design case studies
 - calibration of real and hypothetical bidding 229–239
 - fixed or fungible preferences 217–222, 223, 224, 225
 - gift exchange 225–228, 229, 230
 - hybrid auctions and consequential bidding 239–245
 - preference learning 196–199
 - second price auction tournaments 209–214, 215, 217
 - WTP, WTA and the auction mechanism 199–204, 205, 208, 209
- auction mechanism
 - and unengaged bidders (case study) 202, 206–208, 209
 - choosing 69–76
- auction mechanism-dependent bidding
 - behavior (case study) 199–204, 205, 208, 209
- auction theory, 19 *see also* economic theory
- balanced design 49–51
- baseball card auctions (case study) 230–237
- Bayes models 4–5
- BDM (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak) mechanism
 - 17, 19–20, 69–70
 - demand revealing performance 27–8, 30–32, 33
 - relaxation of expected utility theory 24–25
- beef tenderness grading system (case study) 113–121, 175–186
 - analytical framework 114–115
 - conclusions 120, 121
 - data and methods 117–118
 - instructions for beef steak auction experiments 175–186
 - linking theoretical model to auction bids 116–117
 - marbling and tenderness 113–114
 - results 118–121
 - US beef quality grading system 113–114
- behavioral economists, use of information on people's values 1–2
- bidding behavior
 - factors affecting 19
 - in consequential auctions (case study) 239–245
- Bradley-Terry-Luce model 111
- business managers, eliciting values for non-market goods 1
- buyers, willingness-to-pay 1
- calibration of real and hypothetical bidding (case study) 229–239
- case studies *see* auction design case studies; valuation case studies
- censored regressions with auction bids 95–100
 - double hurdle model 98–100
 - interval censored observations 96
 - left censored observations 96
 - likelihood function 97
 - right censored observations 96
 - Tobit model 97–100
 - uncensored observations 96
- censoring, quantile regression with auction bids 101, 102

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

298 Index

- Christmas gift giving, welfare effects (case study) 225–228, 229, 230
- cluster analysis 108–109
- coherent arbitrariness 265–267
- collective auction 69, 70
- commitment costs 43–44
- conditional mean regression, comparison with quantile regression 100–102
- confounding factors 47–49, 50, 52–54
- conjoint analysis 4–5
- consequential bidding (case study) 239–245
- context and control issues 53–54, 57–60
 - balance between 174–175
 - balance in experimental auctions 6–16
- context-dependent preferences 238–239
- contingent valuation 4
- control and context issues 53–54, 57–60
 - balance between 174–175
 - balance in experimental auctions 6–16
- controversial goods case study (demand for GM food) 154–161, 163, 191–195
 - conclusions 162–163
 - EU stance on GM food 154–155
 - experiment 155–157
 - instructions for GM food auction 191–195
 - results 157–161, 162
 - US stance on GM food 154–155
 - use of biotechnology in food production 154
- controversial goods case study (food from animals treated with growth hormones) 169–174
- bovine somatotropin (bST) 169–170
- conclusions 173–174
- experimental design 170–171
- health controversy 169–170
- porcine somatotropin (pST) 169–170
- results and discussion 171–173
- controversial goods case study (irradiation of food) 163–169
 - conclusions 167–169
 - experiment 163–165
 - results 165–167, 168
 - welfare effects of anti-technology messages 167–169
- convergent validity 235, 255–261
 - auction bids and hedonic ratings 256–258
 - auction bids and other measures of value 258–260
 - auction bids and purchase decisions 258–260
 - auction bids and taste tests 255–256
 - external validity 235, 261
- cumulative prospect theory 42–43
- CVM-X method 237
- Dasgupta and Maskin mechanism 89
- data analysis
 - censored regressions with auction bids 95–100
 - cluster analysis 108–109
 - elementary statistical analysis 95, 112
 - factor analysis 106–108
 - market share simulation 109–112
 - panel data regression with auction bids 103–106
 - quantile regression with auction bids 100–102, 103
- demand, effects of price/availability of
 - substitutes and complements 79–80, 250
- demand reduction 53, 76–80
- demand revealing, performance of incentive compatible mechanisms 27–32, 33
- diminishing marginal utility 76–80, 249
- discrete choice models 4–5
- double hurdle model 98–100
- Dutch auctions, efficiency 28
- eBay 62–63
- econometric techniques 4–5
- economic theory, evidence for predictions
 - demand is affected by price/availability of substitutes and compliments 250
- diminishing marginal utility 249
- factors affecting WTP and WTA 251–252
- market price increases as demand increases 248–249
- more is preferred to less 249–250
- testing reliability at individual level 5
- the value of a dollar to a person is exactly \$1.00 252
- values will rise (fall) with positive (negative) information 250–251
- see also* auction theory
- economic value of choices 1
- economists, use of information on people's values 1–2
- efficiency of design 49–51
- endowment effect 262–263
 - case study 199–204, 205, 208, 209
- endowment versus full bidding 65–68
- English auctions 17, 19–20, 24–25, 69
 - demand revealing performance 27–32, 33
- ex-post regression analysis 53
- exchange institutions 1
- expected utility theory 5
 - relaxation of the independence axiom 24–25
- experimental auctions
 - active market environment 3–4

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

Index

299

- advantage over other value elicitation methods 3–5
- applications 6, 7–14
- control/context balance 6–16
- description of heterogeneity in valuations 4–5
- determination of individual willingness to pay 4
- early work 5
- elicitation of homegrown values 6–16
- exchange mechanism 3–4
- incentive compatible mechanisms 3–4, 16–17
- induced value experiments 5–6, 15–16
- purpose 5
- two basic strategies 16
- valuation of non-market goods 3–4
- valuations are directly obtained 3–4
- see also* English auctions; BDM
 - mechanism; collective auctions; Dutch auctions; n th price auctions; random n th price auctions; second price auctions; Vickrey's second price auctions
- experimental auctions (conducting)
 - affiliation of values in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
 - avoiding misperceptions in participants 62–65
 - BDM mechanism 69–70
 - best practices 62
 - choosing an auction mechanism 69–76
 - collective auction 69, 70
 - Dasgupta and Maskin mechanism 89, 90
 - demand reduction 76–80
 - diminishing marginal utility 76–80
 - endowment versus full bidding 65–68
 - English auction 69
 - field substitutes 79–80
 - focus groups 62
 - initial qualitative study 62
 - learning in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
 - multiple good valuation 76–80
 - negative values 92–94
 - n th price auction 69
 - random n th price auction 69, 70
 - repeated bidding round auctions 80–88, 90, 92
 - second price auction 69
 - training and practice for participants 62–65
- experimental auctions (preliminaries)
 - experimental design 47–54
 - sample size determination 55–57
 - study objectives 46–47
 - study setting and context (field versus laboratory) 57–60
 - use of students as subjects 46–47
- experimental design 47–54
 - ABA and BAB design 52–53
 - aliased effects 49, 50
 - assignment of units to treatments 48, 51–52
 - balanced design 49–51
 - common expectation among participants 53
 - confounding factors 47–49, 50, 52–54
 - control of design variables 47–51
 - definition of experimental unit 51–52
 - demand reduction 53
 - efficiency of design 49–51
 - ex-post regression analysis 53
 - extraneous variables 52–54
 - finding designs 51
 - fractional factorial design 48–51
 - full factorial design 47–48, 49
 - issues of control and context 53–54
 - main-effects only design 48–51
 - orthogonal design 49–51
 - randomization 48, 52
 - replication of treatments 51–52
 - software 51
 - within-subject design 48, 52–53
- experimental unit, definition 51–52
- external validity 261
- face validity of data 6–16
- factor analysis 106–108
- farm financial records valuation (case study) 149–154, 186–190
 - benefits of farm recordkeeping 149–150
 - conclusions 152–154
 - data and methods 150–151
 - instructions for financial records auction 186–190
 - results 151–152, 153
- field substitutes, effects of 79–80, 250
- 'first choice' or 'highest utility' rule 110–111
- first price auction 23–24
 - efficiency 28
- fixed or fungible preferences (case study) 217–222, 223, 224, 225
- focus groups 62
- food from animals treated with growth hormones (case study) 169–174
- bovine somatotropin (bST) 169–170
- conclusions 173–174
- experimental design 170–171
- health controversy 169–170
- porcine somatotropin (pST) 169–170
- results and discussion 171–173

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

300 Index

- forecasting market share of a new product
 - (case study) 119, 137–141, 175–186
 - calculating market share 137–139
 - data and methods 119, 139
 - instructions for beef steak auction
 - experiments 175–186
 - results 139–141
- fractional factorial design 48–51
- fresh food with multiple quality attributes
 - (case study) 141–149
 - experimental design 142–145
 - results and discussion 145–149
 - study objectives 141
 - summary 149
- full bidding versus endowment 65–68
- full factorial design 47–48, 49
- future research in experimental auctions
 - ability to forecast retail behavior 272–273
 - comparison with choice-based methods 273–274
 - diversification of purposes and contexts 7–14, 269–270
 - experimental design issues 274–275
 - interaction of emotions and auction
 - institutions 276–277
 - personality traits and bidding behavior 276
 - potential for pattern recognition 275–276
 - prediction markets 277–278
 - rationality of statements of value 270–271
 - relationship to real world behavior 271–272
 - testing economic theory 274
- gift exchange, welfare effects (case study) 225–228, 229, 230
- GM (genetically modified) food demand (case study) 154–161, 163, 191–195
 - conclusions 162–163
 - EU stance on GM food 154–155
 - experiment 155–157
 - instructions for GM food auction 191–195
 - results 157–161, 162
 - US stance on GM food 154–155
 - use of biotechnology in food production 154
- GM food tolerance (case study) 129–137
 - conclusions 136–137
 - controversy over GM foods 129–130
 - experiment 130–134
 - GM labelling and tolerance standards 129–130
 - results 134–136
- hedonic ratings, comparison with auction bids 256–258
- homegrown values elicitation 6–16
 - explanation of the dominant strategy 33
 - validity of measurements 247–248
- hybrid auctions and consequential bidding (case study) 239–245
- hypothetical bidding, tendency to overstate (case study) 229–239
- incentive compatible auctions 19–20
 - assumptions underlying the theory 24–27
 - BDM (Becker-Deegroot-Marschak) mechanism 19–20
 - bidders' goals outside experimental context 26–27
 - effects of affiliated values 25–26
 - English auction 19–20
 - explanation of the dominant strategy 33
 - n th price auction 19–20
 - random n th price auction 19–20
 - relaxation of expected utility theory 24–25
 - second price auctions 19–20
 - separate what people say from what they pay 19–20
 - situations when not incentive compatible 24–27
 - theory of 20–27
 - Vickrey's second price auction 19–23
 - weakly dominant strategy 19–20
- incentive compatible mechanisms 3–4
 - BDM (Becker-Deegroot-Marschak) mechanism 17
 - demand revealing performance 27–32, 33
 - English auction 17
 - random n th price auction 17
 - second price auction 16–17
 - testing in induced value studies 27–32, 33
 - Vickrey auction 16–17
 - Vickrey n th price auction 17
- induced value auctions, testing of incentive compatible mechanisms 27–32, 33
- induced value experiments 5–6, 15–16
- informing policy case study (beef tenderness grading system) 113–121, 175–186
 - analytical framework 114–115
 - conclusions 120, 121
 - data and methods 117–118
 - instructions for beef steak auction
 - experiments 175–186
 - linking theoretical model to auction bids 116–117
 - marbling and tenderness 113–114
 - results 118–121
 - US beef quality grading system 113–114
- informing policy case study (tolerance for GM food) 129–137
 - conclusions 136–137

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

Index

301

- controversy over GM foods 129–130
- experiment 130–134
- GM labelling and tolerance standards 129–130
- results 134–136
- informing policy case study (valuing safer food) 121–127, 128, 129
- conclusions 129
- experiment 124–125
- prevalence of food-borne diseases 121–122
- results 126–127, 128, 129
- study objectives 122–124
- insincere bidding, and auction treatment (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
- irradiation of food (case study) 163–169
- conclusions 167–169
- experiment 163–165
- results 165–167, 168
- welfare effects of anti-technology messages 167–169
- learning in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
- likelihood function, censored regressions with auction bids 97
- logit model 111
- main-effects only design 48–51
- market price increases as demand increases (theory) 248–249
- market segmentation, effects of valuation heterogeneity 5
- market share simulation 109–112
- Bradley-Terry-Luce model 111
- ‘first choice’ or ‘highest utility’ rule 110–111
- logit model 111
- money-metric utility 110
- share of preference model 111
- marketing case study (forecasting market share) 119, 137–141, 175–186
- calculating market share 137–139
- data and methods 119, 139
- instructions for beef steak auction experiments 175–186
- results 139–141
- marketing case study (fresh food with multiple quality attributes) 141–149
- experimental design 142–145
- results and discussion 145–149
- study objectives 141
- summary 149
- marketing case study (value of farm financial records) 149–154, 186–190
- benefits of farm record keeping 149–150
- conclusions 152–154
- data and methods 150–151
- instructions for financial records auction 186–190
- results 151–152, 153
- marketing experts, use of information on people’s values 1–2
- mixed logit models 4–5
- money-metric utility 110
- more is preferred to less (theory) 249–250
- multiple good valuation 76–80
- negative values, effects of 92–94
- non-expected utility behavior 41–43
- non-market goods
- valuation in experimental auctions 3–4
- value elicitation 1–2
- n*th price auctions 19–20, 69
- non-expected utility preferences 24–25
- see also* random *n*th price auctions
- off-the-margin bidders
- and auction mechanism (case study) 202, 206–208, 209
- effects of tournament auction (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
- orthogonal design 49–51
- panel data regression with auction bids 103–106
- individual-specific model 88, 105–106
- one-way fixed and random effects models 104–105
- random coefficients model 106
- two-way fixed and random effects models 105
- parallel-forms reliability 253–254, 255
- participants
- affiliation of values in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
- avoiding misperceptions in 62–65
- create common expectation 53
- explanation of weakly dominant strategy 33
- influenced by being watched 60
- learning in repeated bidding rounds 80–88, 90, 92
- negative values 92–94
- training and practice 62–65
- use of students as subjects 46–47
- policymakers, eliciting values for non-market goods 1 *see also* informing policy case studies
- prediction markets 277–278

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

302 Index

- preference learning for unfamiliar goods (case study) 196–199
- preference reversals 263–265
 - case study 217–222, 223, 224, 225
- preferences
 - construction 218
 - fixed or fungible (case study) 217–222, 223, 224, 225
 - stability (case study) 217–222, 223, 224, 225
- price discrimination models, effects of
 - valuation heterogeneity 5
- psychologists, use of information on people's values 1–2
- public policy, determination of welfare effects
 - 5 *see also* informing policy case studies
- purchase decisions, comparison with auction bids 258–260
- quantile regression with auction
 - bids 100–102, 103
 - censoring 101, 102
 - comparison with conditional mean regression 100–102
- random *n*th price auctions 17, 19–20, 69, 70
 - demand revealing performance 27–28, 30–32, 33
 - see also* *n*th price auctions
- random parameter models 4–5
- randomization 52
- rank-dependent expected utility theory 24–25, 42
- reliability
 - consistency across context 254–255
 - consistency across repeated rounds 253
 - definition 252
 - of experimental auction measurements 252–255
 - parallel-forms reliability 253–254, 255
 - relation to validity 252
 - test-retest 252–253
- repeated bidding round auctions 80–88, 90, 92
 - affiliation of values 80–88, 90, 92
 - consistency across rounds 253
 - learning in 80–88, 90, 92
- replication of treatments 51–52
- revealed preference methods, implicit values 2–3
- risk, definition 37
- risk aversion 39–41
- risk perception 39–41
- risk preference 39–41
- risk premium (WTP to avoid a risky good) 40
- sample size determination 55–57
 - comparison of means from two independent samples 55–56
 - distribution of a valuation in the population 56–57
- second price auctions 16–17, 19–20, 69
 - demand revealing performance 27–32, 33
 - non-expected utility preferences 24–25
 - see also* Vickrey's second price auction
- second price auction tournaments (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
- sellers, willingness to accept 1
- share of preference model 111
- stated preference methods 2–3
 - unreliability of values elicited 3
- students, use as subjects 46–47
- study objectives 46–47
- study setting and context (field versus laboratory) 57–60
 - participants influenced by being watched 60
- substitute availability, effects on
 - demand 79–80, 250
- taste tests, comparison with auction
 - bids 255–256
- test-retest reliability 252–253
- Tobit model 97–100
- tournament auction
 - comparison with standard auction (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
 - demand revelation (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
 - effects on insincere bidding (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
- unengaged bidders
 - and auction mechanism (case study) 202, 206–208, 209
 - effects of tournament auction (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
- unfamiliar goods, preference learning (case study) 196–199
- validity
 - definition 247
 - external 235, 261
- validity of experimental auctions 247–248
 - anomalies 261–267
 - auction bids and economic theory 248–252
 - coherent arbitrariness 265–267
 - convergent validity 235, 255–261
 - endowment effect 262–263
 - measurement of homegrown values 247–248
 - object of measurement 247–248

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-85516-7 - Experimental Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

Jayson L. Lusk and Jason F. Shogren

Index

[More information](#)

Index

303

- preference reversals 263–265
- reliability of measurements 252–255
- WTP versus WTA disparity 262–263
- valuation
 - assumption that economic value does exist 34
 - WTA (willingness to accept) 34
 - WTP (willingness to pay) 34
- valuation case studies
 - balance between control and context 174–175
 - controversial goods I (demand for GM food in three countries) 154–161, 163, 191–195
 - controversial goods II (irradiation of food) 163–169
 - controversial goods III (food from animals treated with growth hormones) 169–174
 - informing policy I (beef tenderness grading system) 113–121, 175–186
 - informing policy II (valuing safer food) 121–127, 128, 129
 - informing policy III (tolerance for GM food) 129–137
 - marketing I (forecasting market share of a new product) 119, 137–141, 175–186
 - marketing II (fresh food with multiple quality attributes) 141–149
 - marketing III (value of farm financial records) 149–154, 186–190
- valuation case studies (appendices)
 - instructions for beef steak auction experiments 175–186
 - instructions for financial records auction 186–190
 - instructions for GM food auction 191–195
- valuation heterogeneity, need to understand 4–5
- valuation in a dynamic environment with uncertainty, limited information and irreversibility
 - commitment costs 43–44
 - dynamic WTA 44
 - dynamic WTP 43–44
- valuation under certainty 34–37
 - producer profit maximization 36
 - WTA (willingness to accept) 34–35, 36–37
 - WTP (willingness to pay) 34–36
- valuation under uncertainty 37–43
 - cumulative prospect theory 42–43
 - effects of new information 38–39
 - non-expected utility behavior 41–43
 - rank-dependent expected utility theory 42
 - risk (definition) 37
 - risk aversion 39–41
 - risk perception 39–41
 - risk preference 39–41
 - risk premium 40
 - threats with low-probability and high damage 41–43
 - WTA (willingness to accept) 38
 - WTP (willingness to pay) 37–38
 - WTP to avoid a risky outcome 40
 - WTP to obtain a risky good 39–40
- value elicitation
 - applications for information 1–2
 - non-market goods 1–2
 - WTA (willingness to accept) 34
 - WTP (willingness to pay) 34
- value elicitation methods
 - revealed preference 2–3
 - stated preference 2–3
- value measures, comparison with auction bids 258–260
- values theory, rise (fall) with positive (negative) information 250–251
- valuing safer food (case study) 121–127, 128, 129
 - conclusions 129
 - experiment 124–125
 - prevalence of food-borne diseases 121–122
 - results 126–127, 128, 129
 - study objectives 122–124
- variables
 - control of 47–51
 - extraneous 52–54
- Vickrey, William 16–17, 19
- Vickrey's *n*th price auction 17
- Vickrey's second price auction 16–17, 19–20
 - comparison with first price auction 23–24
 - demonstration of incentive compatibility 20–23
 - formal utility maximization framework 20–21
 - intuitive, heuristic framework 21–23
 - tournaments (case study) 209–214, 215, 217
 - see also* second price auctions
- weakly dominant strategy
 - explanation to participants 33
 - in incentive compatible auctions 19–20
 - in second price auctions 16–17
- willingness to accept *see* WTA
- willingness to pay *see* WTP
- within-subject design 48, 52–53

304 Index

- WTA (willingness to accept) 1, 38
 - dynamic 44
 - valuation under certainty 34–35, 36–37
 - value measure 34
 - when to use 34–35
- WTP (willingness to pay) 1, 37–38
 - determination of 4
 - dynamic 43–44
 - overstatement in hypothetical bidding (case study) 229–239
 - to avoid a risky good (risk premium) 40
 - to obtain a risky good 39–40
 - valuation under certainty 34–36
 - value measure 34
 - when to use 34–35
- WTP and WTA
 - disparity 262–263
 - factors affecting 251–252
 - gap and the auction mechanism (case study) 199–204, 205, 208, 209