Suppose there is no God. Would the implication be that human life is meaningless, that the notions of right and wrong, virtue and vice, good and evil have no place, and that there are no moral obligations – hence people can do whatever they want? Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be utterly mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. Naturally, the author sees virtue in a Godless universe as significantly different from virtue in a Christian universe, and he develops naturalistic accounts of humility, charity, and hope. The moral landscape in a Godless universe is different from the moral landscape in a Christian universe, but it does indeed exist. Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe is a tour of some of the central landmarks of this underexplored territory.

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VALUE AND VIRTUE IN A GODLESS UNIVERSE

ERIK J. WIELENBERG
DePauw University
For Margaret,

a group number one person
“Many a man has borne himself proudly on the scaffold; surely the same pride should teach us to think truly about man’s place in the world.”

– Bertrand Russell, *What I Believe* (1925)
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Plainfield, Indiana
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