Almost ninety years since its conclusion, the battle of Verdun is still little understood. *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun* is the first detailed English-language examination of this seminal battle to be based on research conducted in archives long thought lost. Material returned to Germany from the former Soviet Union has allowed for a reinterpretation of Erich von Falkenhayn’s overall strategy for the war and of the development of German operational and tactical concepts to fit this new strategy of attrition. By taking a long view of the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun* also gives much-needed context to Falkenhayn’s ideas and the course of one of the greatest battles of attrition the world has ever known.

Robert T. Foley is Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. He is the editor and translator of *Alfred von Schlieffen’s Military Writings*, 2002.
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German Strategy and the Path to Verdun

Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916

Robert T. Foley
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## Ranks

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<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Leutnant</em></td>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oberleutnant/Premierleutnant</em></td>
<td>1st Lieutenant/Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hauptmann/Rittmeister</em></td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Major</em></td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oberstleutnant</em></td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td><em>Oberst</em></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Generalmajor</em></td>
<td>Brigadier General/Brigadier</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>General der Kavallerie</em></td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Generaloberst</em></td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Generalfeldmarschall</em></td>
<td>General of the Army/Field Marshal</td>
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