RESTRUCTURING
POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA

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The essays in this volume originate from papers presented at a conference at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 2001 to honor the career of Theodore H. Friedgut, a scholar whose research on the Soviet system was characterized by a scrupulous attention to detail and a willingness to treat Soviet citizens as real people with interests and views of their own, still capable of making choices and exerting some human influence within the rigid and oppressive political system that entrapped them. A concern with the human impact of politics and a willingness to look beyond the facade to study the ways in which politics really works are excellent principles with which to investigate the regimes that have sprung up in the wake of the Soviet collapse.

The end of state socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was a defining moment of the twentieth century. The experience was strikingly different in the various component regions of the Soviet bloc, however. In Central and Eastern Europe the experience was, for the most part, one of liberation. People were swept up by a surge of optimism and a sense that the future would be better than the past – and better than the present. In the former Yugoslavia, the situation degenerated into violence and slaughter on a scale that few could have imagined. In the countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union, the political breakdown produced a socioeconomic collapse with few parallels in modern history. As Theodore H. Friedgut documents in his contribution to this volume, post-Soviet Russia has seen rising mortality rates, declining birth rates, and an explosion of symptoms of societal breakdown – from a doubling in the murder rate to the return of previously conquered infectious diseases such as syphilis and drug-resistant tuberculosis. Male life expectancy of 58 means that “a 20-year-old in Russia stands only a 50 percent chance of reaching age 60.” The projected loss of population for Russia in a single generation is thus between 10–20 million persons, a demographic shock reminiscent of the catastrophe of
World War II, from which Russia has never fully recovered, even after two generations.”

Friedgut notes that the roots of these social strains lie deep in the Soviet era. The crash modernization program saw a surge in urban population from 64 million in 1960 to 110 million in 1991. This headlong growth outpaced the urban infrastructure of housing, communications, and real employment opportunities required to sustain this urban population for the long term (especially in the remote climes in which many of these new cities were located).

Echoing Friedgut, Marshall Goldman’s contribution to this volume shows how the implosion of the planned economy produced an economic vacuum that will take a generation or more for market forces to rebuild. With only a dozen years passed since 1991, it is still too early to say how these profound social and economic effects, the “collateral damage” from the “End of History,” will work their way into the political regimes, which will eventually stabilize in the countries of the region. But who would dare predict the future when the recent past has been so unpredictable?

The collapse of the Soviet Union came as a great surprise to the majority of social scientists, who had grown accustomed to the existence of the USSR as an integral part of the modern world as they understood it. Political theorists typically focused on the competition between liberalism and Marxism, with Soviet socialism being the dominant example of the latter. Students of international relations had taken the Cold War as a given for 40 years. Courses in comparative politics and comparative economic systems saw the Soviet-style, one-party system as a viable, even successful alternative path to modernity – one that was being taken, it seemed, by an increasing number of countries even as late as the 1970s, with the projection of Soviet influence into Africa under Leonid Brezhnev. Although many scholars had pointed to the inefficiencies of the Soviet system, and some were adamant that it was doomed to collapse, no one predicted the speed or manner of its demise.

It will not be easy to shake off these analytical frameworks and habits and it will probably take a generation or more for a lasting new perspective to emerge from the rubble of the Soviet collapse. The chapters in this book examine the developments since 1991 and represent a preliminary report based on the evidence currently available. The approach is inductive rather than deductive: the authors seek to establish facts, to extricate trends, and to look for patterns among the data that are now being gathered. It is too early to launch grand theories based on deductive categories. The main framework hitherto used for such efforts at generalization is of “transition” – the assumption that the political events of
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the past decade are best understood as a movement toward systems of liberal democracy and a market economy. Such a teleological approach is easy to grasp and comforting in its implicit assumption that current troubles are but stumbling blocks on the road to a brighter future. This approach, however, has triggered fierce objections from analysts who denied that events on the ground conformed to such a transition trajectory and who denied that we can know the parameters of the end-state toward which these countries are allegedly headed. Not least of the problems was the fact that half of the countries involved did not seem to be discernably in transition to the anticipated future: they are obstinately mired in an unattractive present, if not regressing toward an even less desirable state of affairs.

What, then, are the lessons of the post-Soviet period? The triumphalist rhetoric with which the collapse of Soviet socialism was greeted in the West has gradually given way to a weary acceptance that these societies are still somehow structurally different. Nevertheless, the developments of the 1990s are probably more positive than negative for most of the countries of the region. The scariest, worst-case scenarios failed to materialize. There was no return to communism in Russia. Irresponsible nationalists did not take power in Moscow, as feared by the “Weimar Russia” school.1 There was no resurrection of the Soviet empire inside or beyond the boundaries of the former USSR. Few would have predicted, say, in 1989, that places such as Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan would emerge as sovereign nations within a few years. But so they did—and they have become, for all intents and purposes, permanent fixtures of the international landscape. Civil wars were confined to the flash points that erupted in 1988–92 and did not spread elsewhere. There was no significant leakage of nuclear weapons from the colossal Soviet stockpile, thanks in large part to the fact that they were removed from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.2

This book focuses on developments in Russia, both specifically and in comparative perspective, a choice that reflects Russia’s size and importance relative to the other component parts of the Soviet Union. It also reflects a persisting bias in the way academics cover the region. It is easier to collate information from a single location, and the typical starting point for such research is inevitably Moscow. At the same time, a striking and most welcome development of the past decade has been the

2 This is cited as the major achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the decade by former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002).
emergence of a group of indigenous Russian scholars and observers who have gradually displaced Western commentators as the main source of information and analysis on developments inside Russia. Their grasp of the facts on the ground is matched by their analytical rigor and creativity, and – even more surprisingly – by their objectivity and ability to present their findings for a Western audience. A clutch of such scholars is represented in the pages of this volume.

Regrettably, equivalent teams of researchers have been slower to emerge in the other states of the former Soviet Union. This partly reflects the fact that the Soviet Union concentrated academic talent and resources in Moscow. It also indicates how tough life is for independent scholars in most of the non-Russian republics. Economic opportunities to sustain their work are few, and the political and personal costs of publishing material critical of the status quo can be severe. Scholarship in these countries has become heavily polarized between defenders and opponents of the incumbent regime, with precious few observers able to occupy the middle ground.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The countries of the former Soviet Union have experienced a dramatic and disorienting political transformation over the past decade. Powerful institutions that had ruled people’s lives for decades disappeared almost overnight – not only state structures such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Gosplan, but also institutions that shaped social behavior down to its roots, such as the Young Pioneers or the practice of queuing for goods. Some feisty if unstable new institutions sprang up in their place: an elected parliament and president, a burgeoning capitalist class, markets, a free press, and even (perhaps) a free citizenry.

But not all the old institutions vanished. For all the debate about Russia as a fledgling democracy, it is important to bear in mind that two central pillars of the Soviet regime – the security services and the military – remain virtually unreconstructed as crucial pillars of the new political order.

The secret police (reborn in Russia as the Federal Security Service, or FSB) managed to preserve itself and carve out a niche in the new democratic market economy. Their information-gathering skills were handy in political campaigns and boardroom battles, and their access to legal (and not so legal) means of violence made them powerful competitors for mafia gangs in the burgeoning market for security services.3

Especially since the accession to the presidency in December 1999 of Vladimir Putin, for 17 years a member of the State Security Committee (KGB), it has been even more obvious that the FSB is one of the main instruments of the new political regime in Russia.

Another Soviet legacy institution, the Russian army, saw its budget slashed and was forced to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe. But the military slogs on, unreformed, as evidenced by the continuing horror of the two-year draft despite the repeated promises of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin to introduce a professional army. This unreformed military is another of the main pillars of the contemporary political regime. The army put Boris Yeltsin into power by refusing to back the August 1991 coup and kept him in power by agreeing to crush the parliamentary insurrection in October 1993. (Yeltsin “rewarded” the generals for their loyalty by turning a blind eye to their corruption and by allowing them to invade Chechnya in December 1994.) The army was unleashed against Chechnya for a second time in the fall of 1999, and this was the single most important factor ensuring Putin’s accession to the presidency.

While political institutions were dying, adapting, or being created anew, a similar radical transformation was under way among the individual persons who made up the political and economic elite. It is difficult to calibrate whether the rate of social transition was faster or slower than the rate of institutional transformation. In Russia itself, the top stratum of the political elite was discredited by its involvement in the August 1991 coup and promptly left the political stage. (Most of them were anyway far past retirement age, given the gerontocratic structure of the Brezhnev era bureaucracies.) According to the careful calculations of David Lane and Cameron Ross, about one-third of the post-1991 Russian elite held some sort of position in pre-1991 elite institutions. Is the glass of elite transformation half empty or half full? Is two-thirds turnover a lot or a little? Surely having two-thirds of elite posts held by newcomers represents a tremendous break from the closed, stagnant elite of Soviet times. On the other hand, it remains true that most of Russia’s current leaders were raised, trained, and selected through the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) or organizations closely monitored by it, such as the Komsomol or the Academy of Sciences. The Soviet elite quickly learned the new rules of the electoral game (and rewrote some of them to their advantage). As Nikolai Petrov notes (this volume), “The results of the first (1989) and second

4 They examined the biographical data on about 800 officials from the 1991–5 political and economic elite and interviewed 116 of them. David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999).
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(1990) elections profoundly affected the Soviet nomenklatura, leading, however, to its modification rather than its demise."

Comparable studies of elite turnover have not yet been done, to my knowledge, in the other ex-Soviet states. Looking at the presidential ranks in Central Asia and the Caucasus, one sees that in nearly all cases the incumbent in 2003 is the last top leader from the Soviet era. Armenia is the only exception in not having a post-independence president with a CPSU background. Azerbaijan and Georgia each had a brief (and disastrous) interregnum under a post-communist nationalist leader. Belarus certainly breaks the pattern, with a former collective farm chairman catapulted to the presidency, in the person of the erratic and dictatorial Alyaksandr Lukashenka. (This should serve to remind us that change is not necessarily a good thing.)

THE PHANTOM OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy has been the central organizing concept for the political evolution of the former socialist regimes – and the world in general – over the past decade. Yet it has proved to be maddeningly elastic and nuanced. As Alexander J. Motyl notes in his chapter “Communist Legacies and Post-Communist Trajectories,” applying the Freedom House criteria of civil and political liberties produces three broad groupings of countries: those that are unequivocally democracies, those that are not, and those in the middle. Unfortunately, that middle group includes the largest countries in the region: Russia and Ukraine. These two states are five to ten times larger than their neighbors in the former Soviet Union, so the gravitational pull of their political, economic, and military policies on other countries of the region is considerable.

Is Russia a democracy? There is no simple answer to this question. 5 The consensus view in Washington is to duck the question: no one in U.S. government circles seems prepared to answer with an explicit yes or no. Thus, for example, Michael McFaul suggests that Russia as of 1996 was as democratic as it could reasonably be expected to be. 6 Tom Bjorkman, the former top Russia analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, argues that Russia under Putin is ready for a new wave of democratic reforms

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to engage a population that Bjorkman claims is committed to democratic values.7

At one level, Russia has on paper met the formal criteria of democracy. Its president, parliament, and regional leaders are subject to popular elections involving more than one candidate and with results that are not a foregone conclusion. However, when one digs deeper, one realizes that the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 involved the legitimation of an incumbent and not the freely contested selection of a leader from a range of alternatives. And the parliamentary elections, while regular, lively, and contested, do not really count because the parliament does not form the government and is limited in its capacity to hold the president and government accountable.

This leaves only the regional elections as a forum in which leaders with real power may be removed from office through the ballot box. Nikolai Petrov’s exhaustive data on Russian electoral history reveal that, indeed, in the 1995–7 period, fully half of the incumbent governors who ran for reelection were defeated. However, in the 1999–2001 cycle, two-thirds of governors won reelection. Moreover, once in power, these regional bosses faced few constraints on their power from regional legislatures or elected municipal officials.

One important potential source of pluralism in Russia is the federal structure it inherited from the Soviet Union. However, Oksana Oracheva (this volume) shows that federalism has failed to serve as a buttress for nascent democracy in Russia. The reforms that Putin introduced soon after taking office in 2000, ostensibly aimed at creating a more rationally structured federalism, turned out to be more narrowly focused on boosting the power of the center. Putin backed off from challenging authoritarian leaders in the regions, a shift confirmed by the July 2002 Constitutional Court decision allowing regional leaders to run for more than two terms. With such leaders left in place and allowed to flout or undermine federal laws on their own turf, there is no point talking about a law-based division of powers between center and periphery. Equally depressing for democrats has been the ill-defined and constantly shifting structure and role of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament that is supposed to represent the views of Russia’s diverse regions. Under both Yeltsin and Putin, building democratic institutions took second place to political maneuverings aimed at consolidating the power of the president.

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At the national level, one wonders whether Russia really has competitive elections in any meaningful sense, if one adopts the minimalist, Schumpeterian definition of elections as a chance to change one’s rulers. Russia’s elections, even though they are formally competitive, serve to disempower and disenchant the electorate. Andrey Ryabov (this volume) goes a step further, provocatively suggesting that a “negative consensus” exists between elite and society around the principle of mutual noninterference. Ordinary citizens accept whatever leader the elite comes up with and agree not to disrupt or attempt to overthrow the political regime; in return, the state does not expect them to obey laws or pay taxes.

The party system – or lack thereof – adds to the confusion in society. Parties form and reform between elections, while individual deputies switch sides in a constant Brownian motion, leaving voters confused as to who stands for what. Russia does not have a party system as such despite having regular elections and formal freedoms of speech and association.

Ryabov sees the potential for a party system to emerge from the existence of three broad ideological positions among the Russian electorate: the friends of Western-style reform, the opponents of change, and a third bloc of “traditionalists” who reject both the first two alternatives. Putin has skillfully tapped into this third group, transcending the polarity of reformers versus reactionaries, which had been Yeltsin’s main political gambit in 1996. The crucial problem, however, is that decisive power rests in the hands of the president, and neither Boris Yeltsin nor his anointed successor Vladimir Putin was willing to connect himself to a specific political party. Rather, they preferred to adopt the stance of a head of state who is “above politics.” This was not an irrational whim on their part: both men feared that forming such a party might constrain their power and prevent them from achieving their personal agenda for Russia. For both men this agenda was broadly similar: forcing the country to take the tough steps necessary to remain a competitive state in the new post–Cold War world.

The situation is only slightly better in Ukraine. As Ilya Prizel shows in his essay “Ukraine’s Hollow Decade,” Ukraine had certain advantages back in 1991: no burden of foreign debt, no cities in the far north to be subsidized, and no violent ethnic conflict such as Chechnya. Yet an entrenched elite determined to cling to power has squandered the opportunity to build a new polity. Ukraine, like Russia, is ruled by a super-president, Leonid Kuchma, who puts himself above party politics, although unlike in Russia there was a competitive turnover of power in 1994. The Ukrainian party system is more robust, with nationalists
as well as communists and Westernizers. The pro-reform bloc is more unified and has charismatic leaders (Yulia Timoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko) who have a reasonable chance of electoral victory in a fair contest. In the other post-Soviet countries, the quality of democracy is even more strained. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, civil society was even weaker than in Russia or Ukraine, and the economies of those regions post-1991 have been hit hard by warfare and geographic isolation.

The gap between the presence of competitive elections and the absence of real democracy is not unique to Russia. As Fareed Zakaria noted in his book *The Future of Freedom*, an increasing number of countries around the world have introduced the formal institutions of democracy, such as periodic elections, without having created the political and social conditions that turn such institutions from a facade into a functioning reality. Why did this gap between superficial democracy and actual democracy open up in Russia and elsewhere? The answer, presumably, is that after the collapse of communism, countries around the world felt that recognition by the international community required at least the pretense of democratic elections. The problem— for liberal democrats and human rights activists— is that this is typically all the international community requires.

There may be other factors at work, beyond prevailing international norms, in encouraging rulers to adopt a facade of democracy. It is important to broaden the discussion beyond the decisions of the individual president (powerful though he is) to include the broader elite through which he governs and in which he is embedded. Perhaps phony democracy is the best vehicle for elites who want to cling to or rise to power. Elections may enable elites to identify and neutralize opposition leaders (by repression or cooption) while fooling the masses with the illusion of involvement. If this cynical interpretation of democracy is correct, then the political advisers who crafted Russia’s “managed democracy” may have learned their lessons a little too well.

Pseudo-democracy may also be useful for elites (national and global) that want to introduce a capitalist market economy. Anatoly Khazanov argues that in Russia the elite decided to abandon communism before the old regime was toppled by the events of late 1991 (this volume). He unearths a “virtually unnoticed” memorandum published in *Vek XX i mir* in 1990 that lays out a Pinochet-style agenda for the transition to capitalism. Its authors included Anatolii Chubais, who went on to

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design and execute Yeltsin’s controversial privatization program. Khazanov surmises, “It seems that at least some of the liberal economic reformers, even before their incorporation into the ruling elite, already had in mind an authoritarian scenario for their country.”

Khazanov also notes that in democratic transitions in Latin America or southern Europe, opposition movements openly debated the relative merits of concessions versus confrontation as the best strategy for removing incumbent elites. The consensus was that it makes more sense to bribe them, not fight them out of office. A similar debate took place in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which focused on the question of “ilustration” – banning former communist leaders from high office in the new democracy and organizing tribunals to name secret police collaborators. The debate was of much less practical importance than in Latin America, however, because the communist elites had abandoned political power so quickly during the chaotic years of 1989–91. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, no such debate took place. In contrast to Latin America or Central Europe, opposition movements were either too weak to be in a position to debate whether to confront or bribe the old political elite, or they were themselves members of that elite.

THE CONUNDRUM OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Most of the countries that sprang from the Soviet Union had never before experienced sovereign statehood, and this challenge provided a goal and purpose for their new leaders and a framework through which they could appeal for popular and international support.

Valerie Bunce (this volume) reminds us that 22 out of 27 states in post-socialist Eurasia are new entities with no prior existence as sovereign states. Thus the dominant experience for most people of the region is one of the fragmentation of sovereignty and the fragility of new institutions. Yet given the exigencies of the international system, the region’s rulers have to pretend that they are in charge of sovereign states, with full control over their territories and equipped with functioning institutions of rule. Bunce makes the intriguing point that one of the side effects of this fragmentation experience is that the erosion of central state sovereignty frees more liberal regions such as Moscow for more rapid socioeconomic transition. This widens the gap between successful and ailing regions and increases social inequality (which is bad). Yet, the emergence of dynamic regions like Moscow is one of the most important drivers of change in the post-socialist transition.

Ironically, it was Russia itself – the most powerful state in the region – that was also the one most troubled by the challenge of nation-building.
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As Vera Tolz shows in her chapter, Russia’s identity as a proto-nation was inextricably connected with and submerged beneath its identity as the leading force in the tsarist empire and subsequent Soviet state. With the successive disappearance of those two multinational polities, Russia is neither a civic nor an ethnic nation. Nor is it clear that its leaders, or its people, even want it to be one.

Tolz argues convincingly that Russia is still drifting between European and Eurasian identities, while trying to select from and blend its tsarist and Soviet legacies in constructing a new national identity. For his Western audiences, Putin has been emphatic in stressing Russia’s core identity as a European country. Yet, when he was attending a meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders meeting in Brunei in November 2000, Putin embraced the language of the Eurasianists—a prolific intellectual current that insists Russia is a unique hybrid of European and Asian identities.10

Russia’s troubled quest for identity is also tied up with its ambivalent attitude toward the West—wanting to join yet also viewing it with suspicion and envy.

Tolz argues, with support from opinion surveys, that there is a real chance that some sort of Slavic Union, however improbable to Western eyes, might yet form the core of a new Russian nation-state. Russia’s current policies toward Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the “near abroad” suggest that this is not an empty possibility. Russia continues to express concern over the status of the 20-million-strong ethnic Russian diaspora and seeks closer political, economic, and military ties with the former Soviet states, although this quest is now conducted through bilateral deals rather than through vapid multinational organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Rajan Menon (this volume) shares Tolz’s skepticism and challenges the complacent view that Russia has now taken its place in the Western family of nations. He argues that Russia is wounded but “not a spent force.” “Russia cannot be counted on to become a partner—nor because it is somehow untrustworthy, but because of its historical predicament” (that is, as the largest remnant of the Soviet empire). “Only by distorting the past and the present can one assume that Russia has chosen the West. In fact, Russia has always been ambivalent about the values that typify the West.” It will take Russia many years yet to disentangle itself from the legacy of empire. In the process it faces threats of domestic instability, the risk of losing the Russian Far East to China, and the need to project power over Central Asia without getting entangled in other people’s

10 See the Putin text cited by Tolz, which appeared on www.strana.ru on November 13, 2000, “Russia always considered itself a Eurasian country.”
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wars. In geostrategic terms, the next half century will be dominated by the rise of China, so Menon suggests that we should not rule out the possibility of a balancing counterbloc of Russia, Japan, India, and maybe Vietnam.

IN CONCLUSION

Reflecting Russia’s size and heft in the region that until recently it so strongly dominated, the essays in this volume, and the discussion in this introductory chapter, focus on the Russian case.

In the mid- to late 1990s, U.S. government officials were, in private, much taken with the discussion of what might happen if Russia “goes bad” – meaning what happens if a virulently anti-Western leader takes power, or if the country descends into civil war. Inside Russia, the debate started from a different premise – the “bad” things had already happened: the Soviet collapse, the economic disintegration. Now, perhaps, the two debates are converging. Russia is what it is, it will not “go bad,” nor will it turn overnight into a Madisonian democracy. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian prime minister from 1992–8, is not among the more profound political thinkers of the twentieth century. But he came up with a pithy epithet that bears repeating: “We hoped for the best, but we ended up with the usual.”

POSTSCRIPT

My chapter “What comes after socialism?” was written in the summer of 2003. Now, half a year on, two dramatic developments in Russia have severely undermined the hopes that Russia is in transition to a Western-style “market democracy.” President Vladimir Putin ordered, or acquiesced in, the imprisonment of Russia’s top businessman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and he used this popular move to reinforce the victory of the pro-presidential United Russia party in the elections to the State Duma on December 7.

These two events – the Yukos affair and the Duma elections – have arguably transformed the character of the Russian political landscape, leaving Putin the undisputed master of the field. They have made it clear that Putin is not merely a transitional figure, a place-holder for Boris Yeltsin’s “Family,” but a canny politician who has pursued a consistent policy of centralizing power while restoring Russia’s international influence.

The Yukos affair began in June 2003 when the state launched a criminal investigation of the leaders of Russia’s largest oil company. Initially, the
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accusations focused on an alleged fraud committed during a privatization deal in 1994, but they then widened to include money laundering and tax evasion to the tune of $5 billion. The head of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, refused to concede defeat and flee the country, as did previous oligarchs who had fallen foul of the Kremlin. As a result, on 25 October, he was arrested, denied bail, and slapped with charges that could keep him behind bars for 10 years.

The arrest of Russia’s richest man (Khodorkovsky’s wealth at the time was estimated at $8 billion) attracted the attention of Western observers, who feared that Russia was turning its back on the market economy. For his part, Putin tried to assure Western investors that the Yukos case was not a prelude to a mass reversal of the privatization program of the 1990s.

Khodorkovsky was singled out for attack precisely because he was the most successful and ambitious of the oligarchs. His company had brought its accounting practices up to Western standards and was in the process of merging with Russia’s fifth largest oil company, Sibneft. A subsequent merger with a Western oil major, probably Exxon, was also in the planning stage. Khodorkovsky was even promoting a new pipeline to China that would break the state-owned Transneft corporation’s monopoly on Russia’s oil exports. Finally, Khodorkovsky made no secret of his political ambitions. He was generously funding political parties across the political spectrum, from the liberal Yabloko to the communists. Experts speculated that Yukos could end up controlling one-third of the seats in the State Duma that was due to be elected in December 2003.

Putin decided to remove this political rival from the scene by unleashing an anticorruption campaign, which simultaneously provided a popular theme for the pro-presidential party, United Russia, in the Duma election campaign. To general surprise, United Russia swept the board. They received 37.6 percent of the popular vote and ended up with 300 seats in the 450-seat assembly. (They won 120 seats on the party list vote and 126 seats in single-mandate votes. After the election, 54 independents who had won in single-seat races joined United Russia.) This number not only provides United Russia a comfortable working majority, but also the two-third majority required to change the constitution – for example, to prolong Putin’s presidency beyond a second term.

The election shattered the tripartite structure of Russia’s political system (liberals, communists, and traditionalists) that Andrey Ryabov has described here. Rather than a “managed democracy” with a carefully constrained opposition, it could well be that the election has effectively transformed Russia into a one-party system.
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The two liberal parties, Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces, each failed to clear the 5-percent threshold required to win seats in the party list half of the election, scoring 4.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively. Between them they won only seven seats in the single-mandate races, which provides them with their only presence in the new Duma, down from a total of 47 seats in the outgoing legislature. Prior to the election, the leader of Yabloko, Grigory Yavlinsky, petulantly rebuffed merger proposals from the Union of Rightist Forces, a step that would have guaranteed the liberals a significant representation in the Duma. Aside from the merger issue, the liberals had clearly lost their sense of direction under Putin. They were divided over whether to support or oppose the president, and their criticism of the Kremlin’s anti-“oligarch” campaign lost them votes.

The communist opposition was also severely mauled, seeing its support halved from the 22 percent that it had won in 1999. In its place, one saw a resurgence of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia headed by the veteran maverick, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, and a new party, Motherland, created by the Kremlin just three months before the elections. But both Zhirinovskii’s party and Motherland (which won 11.5 and 9.0 percent of the vote, respectively) are more or less loyal to Putin. Their nationalist slogans serve to add spice for the benefit of the domestic audience but are not likely to determine the course of governmental policy.

The victory of United Russia was in large part due to its mobilization of the state’s “administrative resources.” They received generous coverage from the national television networks, with Putin having closed down the independent stations (NTV and TV6) in preceding years, and the last such station, TVS, in June 2003. Ironically, the “party of power” ran as the party of “antipolitics,” disdaining to take part in the organized television debates with the representatives of the “minor” parties. United Russia persuaded nearly all the regional leaders to support its campaign, with 30 governors signing up as candidates on the United Russia party list. In return, the Kremlin toned down its criticism of wayward regional bosses. The Central Election Commission operated as an Orwellian “Ministry of Elections,” imposing ridiculous limits on media coverage and striking down troublesome candidates for the most footling of reasons.

As of now, the elections appear to have left Russia with a reconstructed authoritarian political system. The best that Russians (and the West) can hope for is that it will prove to be an enlightened authoritarianism. There are, however, several reasons for doubting that this authoritarianism will be so benign. Most important is the fact that, in constructing his new system, Putin has relied heavily, as noted earlier, on cadres drawn
What comes after socialism?

from the security services. The siloviki (“men of power”), who make up at least one-quarter of the governmental apparatus, have only a shallow understanding of and commitment to the institutions of democracy and to a market economy. Whatever Putin’s agenda for modernizing Russia, these men, on the contrary, have their own: the grim pursuit of the war in Chechnya, the projection of Russian power in the “near abroad,” and – perhaps – a challenge to U.S. hegemony.

Second, there is the question of what happens in 2008. Putin’s re-election as president in March 2004 was not in doubt. The constitution, however, bars a third term, and Putin has repeatedly stated that he does not want to alter the constitution. Yet, Putin’s personality is vital to the stability of the political system that he has created. None of the other figures in his government or in the leadership of United Russia is capable of balancing the competing views of the economic managers and power ministries in the government while maintaining popular support. Thus most Russians – of the left and of the right – consider it all but inevitable that the constitution will be changed to lengthen Putin’s term in office. The alternative would be a return to the feuding and instability of the early 1990s.

Are there, nonetheless, any grounds for optimism? Perhaps there are. First, beginning in 1999, the Russian economy has grown at 6 percent a year for five years in a row. This has transformed the face of the city of Moscow, and some of the wealth has trickled down into the provinces, in the form of low inflation and the prompt payment of wages and pensions.

Second, although Putin’s democratic credentials are threadbare, his understanding of and commitment to market economics still appears to be relatively robust. He has introduced a series of legal and tax reforms that do, in principle at least, lay the foundations for a competitive market economy. With a compliant Duma, it is reasonable to suppose that the reform process will continue, especially with regard to the huge, and hugely troubled, utilities sector.

Finally, there are some signs that a civil society is gradually taking shape in Russia. Nongovernmental organizations, successful businesspeople, and new educational institutions are making their presence felt. For most of the 1990s, these developments took place outside, and in contempt, of state political institutions – wisely so, given that the Yukos affair has demonstrated what can happen when one of these social forces tries to enter the political realm. In the future, it is not unrealistic to expect a more fruitful and balanced interaction between the state and civil society. The alternative, a return to a Soviet-style crushing of civil society, is obviously not impossible, but it is far from inevitable.
Grounds for optimism on this score came from an unlikely source at the close of 2003. Georgia experienced civil war and economic collapse throughout the 1990s, but in November 2003, after a rigged parliamentary election, people took to the streets of Tbilisi and toppled the long-time incumbent president, Eduard Shevardnadze. This bloodless “revolution of roses” was the first display of “people power” in the former Soviet Union since 1991, and it sent a warning signal to dictators from Minsk to Tashkent.

The events of 2003 have almost certainly put paid to Western hopes that Russia is in the process of becoming a “normal” country with European-style institutions of government. Its deviations from the acceptable standards of democratic behavior can no longer be attributed to the birth pains of a new democratic society. Rather, it is becoming clear that the infant political system that was born some dozen years previously is congenitally deformed. What form that deformation will take over the coming years, how far it will go, and how dangerous it proves to be at home and abroad, only the future will tell.