INTRODUCTION

On 30 September 1399, Richard II was deposed in favour of his cousin, Henry Bolingbroke. Although the deposition of Edward II seventy years before had created a precedent for the removal of the king, Edward had been replaced by his son and heir, Edward III, whose claim to the throne was unquestionable and unquestioned.[1] By contrast Richard II had no son and heir, although in 1399 there were at least two candidates descended from Edward III, Henry Bolingbroke and Edmund Mortimer. Bolingbroke's claim was the only one pressed with vigour, however, since Mortimer was a minor.[2] Unlike Edward III's experience, Henry's hold on the throne was soon challenged: first by a rebellion in Richard II's name in early 1400 and then by two uprisings led by the Percys in 1403 and 1405, whose aim was to replace Bolingbroke with Mortimer.[3] The difference between contemporary attitudes to the respective claims to the throne of Edward III and Bolingbroke is clear, yet it is significant that, despite the equivocal nature of Henry's claim in 1399, the capture and deposition of Richard II were contemplated and completed with remarkable ease.[4] In other words, although in 1399 those involved must have been aware that the deposition of their anointed king without the safeguard of an obvious heir to replace him was both unprecedented and dangerous, nevertheless they were willing to support Henry's challenge to Richard. What had Richard done to deserve such desperate action?

Historians' explanations of Richard's rule and fall have been multifarious, reflecting the difficulties of interpreting the politics of the period. Widely differing analyses have pointed either to Richard's insanity or to his

[1] McKisack, *Fourteenth Century*, pp. 71–104; N. Fryde, *The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 195–200.
[2] Tuck, *Richard II*, pp. 220–4.
[3] J. H. Wylie, *The History of England under Henry IV* (4 vols., London, 1884–98), I, pp. 98–104; J. L. Kirby, *Henry IV of England* (London, 1970), pp. 86–8, 152–8, 182–8.
[4] McKisack, *Fourteenth Century*, pp. 494–6.

I

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lucid attempts at autocracy. More recent revisionism has argued for a much
more favourable interpretation of Richard II's reign, suggesting that his
fall was accidental rather than the natural corollary of his tyrannical rule.[5]
This benign interpretation raises in turn some important questions about
current assumptions concerning the workings of the fourteenth-century
polity. These questions have become particularly pressing in the light of
recent research on the fifteenth-century polity, the findings of which have
created an interpretational dichotomy between the historiographies of the
two centuries. This dichotomy needs to be resolved. The main purpose of
this Introduction will be to review the existing research on the period and
to delineate a new framework within which Richard's rule can be assessed.
It will be particularly important to establish whether he had a consistent
or coherent policy towards his rule. This is necessary because, whilst the
earliest analyses of the reign interpreted Richard's policies as a sustained
attempt to defy or destroy the existing framework of government, more
recent interpretations have emphasised the seemingly contrasting nature
of the two 'halves' of his reign. The latter argue that there was little to
unite these two halves with regard to either royal policy or the context for
opposition to his rule. To understand the period, therefore, it is necessary
both to comprehend how these divergent interpretations have emerged
and to consider whether they can be sustained.

Stubbs, the first modern historian of the reign, considered the period
to be both morally and politically bankrupt. The political crises of the
period were, for Stubbs, the result of struggles between rival parties driven
merely by ambition, not by the 'great causes' of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries.[6] The reason for Stubbs' dislike of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries was rooted in the Whig interpretation of history, which saw
progress in terms of the growth and triumph of parliament over royal
power.[7] Within this framework, however, Stubbs had an interesting view
of Richard's reign. He argued that Richard was imbued with a 'high sense
of prerogative' at an early age, and that this led him to attempt to rule
despotically. His first attempt was thwarted by the Appellants in 1387–8,
which led to a bout of 'constitutional' rule in the early 1390s.[8] This gave
way to another attempt at absolutism in which Richard 'resolutely …
challenged the constitution', which, for Stubbs, meant that he was trying

[5] See below, pp. 10–13, for a more detailed discussion of these views.
[6] W. H. Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England* (3 vols., 3rd edn, Oxford, 1887), II, pp. 319–20.
See also C. Plummer, Introduction to J. Fortescue, *The Governance of England* (Oxford, 1885), esp.
pp. 15–16.
[7] Stubbs, *Constitutional History* II, pp. 521–2. These developments have been discussed most fully
in: M. C. Carpenter, 'Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane', in R. H.
Britnell and A. J. Pollard (eds.), *The McFarlane Legacy* (Stroud, 1995), pp. 177–80.
[8] Stubbs, *Constitutional History* II, pp. 486–7, 500–2.

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to rule without parliament.[9] Thus, Stubbs argued that Richard main-
tained a consistent theory of absolutism, which he attempted to put into
practice on two separate occasions. The eventual result of Richard's pol-
icies was his deposition; his rule, which was 'quite incompatible with the
actual current of political history', was only tolerated until a new leader
appeared to replace him.[10]

The next significant interpretation of the politics of the late fourteenth
century can be found in the work of Tout. Superficially, Tout's work was
a reaction against Stubbs' framework in that he denied the constitutional
significance with which Stubbs had vested parliament. Instead, Tout con-
centrated on the great offices of state which, unlike parliament, operated
continuously. But, despite this shift in emphasis, much of Stubbs' frame-
work remained intact in Tout's work. He retained the Stubbsian idea of
competing political 'parties' which he defined as 'court' and the 'aristo-
cratic opposition'. Tout simply moved the scene of the struggle for power
between the king/court and nobility from parliament to the great offices
of state and the royal household.[11]

Like Stubbs, Tout viewed Richard as an absolutist monarch. His par-
ticular argument was based on the assumption that, as the great offices
of state went 'out of court', they became simultaneously less easy for the
king to control and also targets ripe for those who wished to restrict
the king's power. As a result, Tout interpreted royal policy in the 1380s
as a deliberate attempt to reverse this draining of the king's executive
power. The method was twofold: first, the expansion of the chamber
as 'a special preserve of the court party', accompanied by the increas-
ing use of the signet seal as an instrument of the prerogative. Second,
the 'court' successfully 'captured' the great offices of state through the
nomination of ministers acceptable to the king.[12] After the reaction of
1386–8, however, Tout agrees with Stubbs that Richard ruled in a more
'constitutional' manner whilst retaining a high notion of the royal pre-
rogative.[13] Tout thought that it was Richard's experiences of wielding
unlimited power in Ireland in 1394–5 that persuaded him to put his
theories of kingship into practice. Unlike Stubbs, however, Tout did not
see Richard's policies as essentially alien to the development of medie-
val government; rather, he argued that Richard failed because his style
of kingship was merely 'premature' rather than completely at odds with
long-term political developments. This interpretation of Richard's style

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[9] Ibid., pp. 506–7, 513–15, 521–2.   [10] Ibid., pp. 486–7, 524–5, 533–6.
[11] T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England* (6 vols., Manchester, 1920–33),
    III, pp. 327, 390; Carpenter, 'Before and After McFarlane', pp. 180–3.
[12] Tout, *Administrative History* III, pp. 402, 404–5.
[13] Ibid., III, pp. 468–9; IV, p. 31. Stubbs, *Constitutional History* II, pp. 506–7.

of kingship as an early precursor of successful Tudor rule has become an increasingly widely held belief in recent writing on the period, if on rather different grounds.[14]

Although Steel's Freudian analysis of Richard II, which appeared in 1941, seemed to signal a very different methodology in interpreting Richard's motives, the Stubbs–Tout framework still remained in place and was later reiterated by Jones, who argued that Richard was consistently attempting to implement in his policies his own theories of royal absolutism.[15] Jones' book did not appear until 1968 and it is curiously unsynchronised with the general McFarlane-led trend of historiography of the time.[16] Like Stubbs and Tout, Jones envisaged a monarchy which was increasingly at the mercy of its 'predatory' subjects, especially the powerful magnates. Richard's policy was justified by Jones as a monarchical reaction to this situation with an attempt to restore the balance of power. Like Tout, Jones also argued that Richard's attempts at absolutism were revived successfully under the Tudors.[17]

The Victorian framework was overturned in the work of McFarlane, who reversed the assumed power structures which had been inherent in both Stubbs' and Tout's interpretations. Instead of the weak king powerless in the face of 'overmighty subjects', McFarlane emphasised that executive authority lay ultimately with the monarch:

> It is clear that members of the nobility … had often very definite … views on policy … But the king governed. He took or rejected advice; he appointed servants to obey his orders. But even the greatest of his subjects were councillors, not aspirants to office.[18]

McFarlane argued that if it was the king who was responsible for the ultimate smooth functioning of government, then political crises were also the result of monarchical misrule, not of the essentially ungovernable disposition of his subjects. Famously commenting that historians had

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[14] Tout, *Administrative History* III, p. 495; IV, pp. 1–6, 32–3, 68; J. Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988), p. 165; below, pp. 10–13.

[15] A. Steel, *Richard II* (Cambridge, 1941); R. H. Jones, *The Royal Policy of Richard II: Absolutism in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 6–8, chs. 10–12. Harvey also follows Jones' emphasis on a consistent royal policy, and argues that Richard began his plans to enhance his power from as early as 1387; however, Harvey sees this not as revenge for the Appellants' actions, but as in a positive light as a 'self-conscious and highly sophisticated attempt by a medieval king of outstanding intellect and sensibility to achieve real power': J. H. Harvey, 'Richard II and York', in F. R. H. du Boulay and C. M. Barron (eds.), *The Reign of Richard II: Essays in Honour of May McKisack* (London, 1971), pp. 203–4.

[16] Below, pp. 7–10.

[17] Jones, *Royal Policy of Richard II*, pp. 182–4; quotation from p. 178. See also pp. 1–6, 176–85, esp. p. 182. But note also his comment that: 'It was his [Richard's] behaviour which had forced the deposition': p. 1.

[18] K. B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 119–20.

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been too much the 'king's friends', McFarlane focused his research on
the estates, functions and interests of the nobility.[19] Significantly for this
study, McFarlane used the Beauchamps as a typical example of the role of
the nobility in politics and governance. In general, the family had a long
and distinguished record of service to the crown. The only blots on the
family escutcheon were the respective involvements of Guy and Thomas
Beauchamp in the opposition to Edward II and Richard II, the two kings
whose rule ended in disaster and who were characterised as wayward or
dangerous by contemporaries and historians alike.[20] If noble rebellion
was neither a normal nor a frequent part of medieval politics, McFarlane
argued, then typical relations between the king and his subjects must
have rested on a very different footing. Instead of mutual antagonism
and mistrust, he suggested that normally both the king and his subjects
had the same aims: defence of the realm and the maintenance of good
order. Whilst monarchy remained both hereditary and personal, there
was always the risk of an incompetent or downright dangerous king,
such as Edward II, Richard II or Henry VI, but it was always possible for
a reasonably active, competent and adult king to rule without attracting
demands for his deposition. Rebellions and depositions such as those
witnessed under Richard II were aberrations caused by royal inability to
meet even the basic requirements of rule, not by the machinations of his
ambitious and fundamentally disloyal subjects.[21]

Despite McFarlane's emphasis on the essentially co-operative nature
of relations between king and magnates, subsequent work on the reign,
although inspired by his ideas, has tended to revert to a version of the
Victorian view of the 'overmighty subject' and the 'undermighty king'.
This tendency has reached fruition in the most recent research on the
period by Given-Wilson, Saul and Barron.[22] There is, however, an impor-
tant difference between the Stubbsian and modern versions of the reign.
Whilst Stubbs' interpretation of Richard's rule emphasised that his policies
could never work within the context of contemporary political develop-
ment (although for the wrong reasons), recent revisionism has portrayed
Richard's rule as a 'sensible and successful' attempt to solve the perceived
problems faced by medieval kings in controlling their subjects.[23] At the
same time, interpretations of the reign have become rather fractured;
increasingly, it is argued that Richard's rule in the 1380s bore little resem-
blance to that of the 1390s. Although Stubbs and Tout portrayed the early

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[19] Ibid., pp. 1–18, quotation from p. 2. Note also his comment that 'the apologists for monarchy are
far more royalist than Richard II': p. 3.
[20] Ibid., pp. 187–210, esp. p. 193.   [21] Ibid., pp. 119–21.   [22] Below, pp. 10–13.
[23] Above, pp. 2–3; quotation from C. Given-Wilson, 'The King and the Gentry in Fourteenth-
Century England', *TRHS*, 5th ser., 37 (1987), p. 95.

to mid 1390s as the most peaceful or 'constitutional' portion of the reign, they did so with the proviso that Richard continued to harbour aspirations to autocracy. McFarlane is perhaps the only historian to have cast serious doubt on the 'constitutional' period of the reign by arguing that Richard was dissembling in order to secure revenge on his former opponents.[24] This interpretation has not achieved widespread acceptance, however, since it has been assumed that Richard could not have dissembled so successfully for so long.[25] Indeed, the question of whether his revenge was not a secret at all, but openly expressed in his policies, has never been addressed. In fact, far from considering how or whether the events and policies of the 1380s might have relevance to the interpretation of the 1390s, it has become increasingly common to portray the period of 1389 to 1397 as 'harmonious'.[26] But this has led to a new set of interpretational problems. If Richard's rule was as peaceful and as successful as some historians now perceive it to be, why did it apparently break down so dramatically and suddenly in 1397, and why was he deposed in 1399? Furthermore, can this interpretational shift in favour of Richard be sustained within the context of his reign and late medieval politics in general? The answer to these questions can be found in the background to these developments.

Part of this background is the way in which elements of McFarlane's work, in particular his interest in the world of 'private' connections, have been understood and used in the late medieval historiography which he inspired. McFarlane had taken the idea of using these connections as a means of analysing and understanding politics and the role of magnate affinities from the work of Namier on the parliamentary connections of the eighteenth century. Initially, McFarlane's use of this device led him to conclusions in some ways reminiscent of Stubbs':

> There was the same element of voluntary interdependence [as in the eighteenth century], the same competition for 'place' and the same absence of any separate fund of political principle. Held together by little else than the hope of gain, these affinities swelled with success and dwindled in adversity.[27]

[24] K. B. McFarlane, *Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 36–42.

[25] Saul has recently argued this: Saul, *Richard II*, pp. 201–2.

[26] Given-Wilson, 'King and the Gentry', p. 95; Saul, *Richard II*, ch. 11 and pp. 366–8. However, the work of Fletcher has begun to move away from this view: C. Fletcher, *Richard II: Manhood, Youth and Politics, 1377–99* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 43–4, 249–58. Fletcher argues for a new interpretational framework based on the tension between Richard's attempts to assert his 'manly' authority, especially in the field of foreign campaigns, and those who sought to restrain him and control royal financial excesses.

[27] K. B. McFarlane, 'Parliament and "Bastard Feudalism"', in *England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays* (London, 1981), p. 19. This essay was originally published in 1944. Compare this with Stubbs' comments, quoted on p. 2. For Namier's influence on McFarlane, see Carpenter, 'Before and After McFarlane', pp. 186–90.

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However, as McFarlane's research into these 'private' connections con-
tinued, his views on how medieval politics worked became increasingly
complex. As a result, he began to allow that there was also a place for
principles such as good lordship, worship and service in the politics of
late medieval England. Moreover, he realised that whilst the network
of private interests and the role of 'good lordship' which were intrin-
sic to stability may have created a certain amount of 'corruption and
wire-pulling', actual bodily violence was much rarer.[28] It is certainly
true that McFarlane developed and adapted Namier's idea of patron-
age, which McFarlane saw as an essential part of 'good lordship', in ways
which might suggest a lack of principle. A lord offered his client protec-
tion through his influence. In turn, the client's support gave the lord the
influence and 'worship' he needed in order to carry out his duties. The
arrangement was both convenient and mutually reinforcing.[29] The king,
meanwhile, was the head of the greatest affinity of them all, and had
access to a greater store of 'patronage' than any other lord.[30] But, crucially,
McFarlane was also careful to state that 'I am not suggesting that there
were no politics save jobbery.' The king and nobility also had important
parts to play in the formulation and control of policy which went far
beyond the distribution of patronage and competition for place.[31] This
proviso notwithstanding, McFarlane's successors have tended to seize on
this 'private' aspect to such an extent that medieval politics have come
to be interpreted almost entirely in terms of 'patronage', to the neglect
of other, more 'public' areas of government. As a result, although work
in the late 1960s and early 1970s suggested promising lines of inquiry for
a better understanding of Ricardian politics, this has tended to be sub-
verted by the continuing fashion for the use of 'patronage' as the domin-
ant interpretative tool to explicate late medieval politics.[32]

The flurry of publications on Richard II in the late 1960s and early
1970s marked the McFarlane-inspired revival of interest in the politics
of the late fourteenth century. In general, this new research expanded
on McFarlane's idea that rebellion did not come naturally to the
nobility, and, in innovative and interesting ways, it began to develop
the idea of Richard as a 'despotic' king. Barron's important study of
Richard's tyranny showed that the charges levelled against Richard at
his deposition were largely substantiated by the governmental records
of the period and could be placed firmly within the structures of

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[28] McFarlane, *Nobility*, pp. 102–21; quotation from p. 115.
[29] Ibid., pp. 113–16.   [30] Ibid., p. 119.
[31] Ibid., pp. 119–20; the quotation is from p. 119.
[32] Carpenter, 'Before and After McFarlane', pp. 190–3.

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contemporary political thought.[33] Goodman's McFarlanesque study
of the five Appellants was an important preliminary analysis of their
careers, lands, affinities and motives for rebelling. This was the first time
that the aristocratic rebels of the period had been examined in their
own right, and the results were both revealing and tantalising, particu-
larly for the period leading up to the crisis of 1386–8. By examining the
interests of the Appellants, Goodman was able to suggest that Richard's
policies in the 1380s may have threatened the local dominance of these
lords, who, in the case of the three senior Appellants at least, all had
long, if not exactly glorious, records of service to the crown prior to
their rebellion. This seems to confirm McFarlane's argument that rebel-
lion was not a natural or obvious resort for the magnates. Indeed, the
title which Goodman chose for his book, *The Loyal Conspiracy*, makes
it clear that he perceived the Appellants' actions to be driven by their
loyalty to the king, not by their innate antipathy to monarchical rule.[34]
By contrast, his analysis of the politics of the 1390s is generally less
convincing, and marks the beginning of the fracturing of the coher-
ent framework which had bound together previous interpretations of
the reign. It is particularly noticeable that Goodman found Richard's
coup of 1397 to be 'puzzling'.[35] This puzzlement at Richard's actions in
1397–9 has become increasingly common and is a direct result of the
loss of an interpretative framework which could be applied consistently
to late fourteenth-century politics.

The disjointedness of post-McFarlane interpretations of Richard's
reign is amply demonstrated in the work of Tuck. He developed the idea
of a 'system of patronage', which he used to explain the success or fail-
ure of a king. This system was based on the Namier/McFarlane-inspired
concepts of the twin motives of profit and promotion which drove the
engine of politics. Tuck argued that the nobility needed easy access to
the king and his patronage in order to secure grants for their local fol-
lowers. If a magnate failed in this, either because he could not reach
the king and his supply of favour, or because the king distributed his
patronage amongst a too narrow or undeserving a group of men, then
the result would be that the magnate's followers would leave his service
in order to secure the promotions and profits which they sought. As a
result, the magnate would lose influence locally. Tuck argued that, in the
1380s, Richard's patronage was aimed at an overly narrow and possibly

[33] C. M. Barron, 'The Tyranny of Richard II', *BIHR*, 41 (1968), 1–18.

[34] Goodman, *Loyal Conspiracy*, pp. 1–15, 104, 108, 113.

[35] Ibid., pp. 5–72; quotation from p. 65. For a similar conclusion, see also J. Taylor, 'Richard II's Views on Kingship', *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society*, 15.5 (1971), pp. 199–200.

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unsuitable group of men.[36] Tuck also elaborated on Goodman's sugges-
tion that Richard was using his control of patronage to build up the
regional power of his friends to the detriment of established magnates,
who were unable to compete for gentry loyalty. Thus, the earl of Arundel
was threatened by the rapid consolidation of power in the hands of men
such as de Vere and Burley in the Welsh Marches. Similarly, Tuck argued
that the rapid promotion of John Beauchamp of Holt and the concomi-
tant grants he received in Worcestershire may have created a rival for
power in the earl of Warwick's traditional sphere of influence.[37] Like
Tout, Tuck thought that Richard used the machinery of the chamber
and signet seal as a conduit for his patronage in order to circumvent the
other offices of state over which he had less control. At the same time,
Richard also made sure that 'his' men were nominated to positions of
influence within these offices.[38] Tuck's analysis of the politics of the 1380s
is tantalising. Was Richard attempting to intrude royal power into the
localities in an unprecedented manner, and did this policy contribute to
the backlash against him? Unfortunately, both the nature and direction
of recent research on the period has meant that these questions have
not only gone unanswered, but also unasked. Because Tuck concentrated
solely on the ability of the nobility to acquire royal patronage for their
men, the geo-political impact of Richard's policy has not been explored.
As recent work on the fifteenth century is now showing, the key to local
influence was not the ability to gain access to such grants, but rather how
the redistribution of lands and offices might affect the balance of landed
power in a region.[39]

Like Goodman, Tuck did not find any cohesive or coherent link
between the politics of the 1380s and those of the 1390s. In Tuck's case,
this is because what he cited as the main political issue of the 1380s, con-
troversy over the distribution of patronage, seemed to be missing from
the politics of the 1390s. Like most historians before him, with the excep-
tion of McFarlane, Tuck saw Richard's rule in the early 1390s as largely
successful, with Richard bowing to a form of conciliar restriction on his
patronage, and avoiding the controversial promotions and grants which
had attracted such opprobrium in the 1380s.[40] However, if the 1390s were
much more peaceful than the 1380s, the crisis of 1397–9 still had to be
explained. Goodman had been unable to do this, but Tuck emphasised
the essentially fragile nature of the harmony between the king and his

[36] J. A. Tuck, 'Richard II's System of Patronage', in du Boulay and Barron (eds.), *Reign of Richard II*,
pp. 1–5, 15–20; Tuck, *Richard II*, pp. 70–86.
[37] Tuck, *Richard II*, pp. 62, 73–5.
[38] Tout, *Administrative History* III, pp. 404–5; Tuck, *Richard II*, pp. 58–71; above, p. 3.
[39] Below, pp. 13–17.   [40] Tuck, *Richard II*, pp. 137–55, esp. pp. 139–40.

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former opponents, which, he argued, was shattered from *c.* 1394 by new disagreements arising from Richard's attempts to secure a permanent peace with France. This interpretation does provide an explanation for Richard's actions in July 1397. Tuck argued that Richard feared a new noble rebellion, and that the arrests of Warwick, Arundel and Gloucester were a pre-emptive strike.[41] After this, his insecurity drove him to rule in an increasingly tyrannical manner, which could not be sustained, but which could only be controlled by his removal from power. Thus, in keeping with McFarlane's ideas, Tuck argued that the crises of the reign were precipitated not through any weakness in royal power, but because if a king chose to exercise his authority irresponsibly, there was very little his subjects could do to stop him other than to depose him.[42]

Whereas Tuck saw Richard's deposition as inevitable, the revisionism of Given-Wilson's, Saul's and Barron's more recent writing has imposed a new interpretative structure on the period which has been more favourable to Richard. Given-Wilson's work has been particularly crucial in this respect, since he sees Richard's introduction of a royal affinity into the political structure of the country as a logical and necessary progression in the extension of royal power into the localities.[43] Given-Wilson argues that a royal affinity was a necessary adjunct to the king's power because without it he was unable to exert sufficient coercive force to resist the military might of his noble opponents. This, he suggests, was Richard's problem in 1386–7.[44] By the time Richard attempted to rectify this deficiency by retaining members of the leading local gentry into his affinity, it was too late. The implication is that the crisis was caused *because* Richard lacked an affinity, rather than because his rule had precipitated the rebellion. From the time of Richard's return to executive power in 1389, Given-Wilson argues, he tried to ensure his own security by building up support amongst the gentry through the recruitment of a magnate-style affinity. Thus, Richard was not driven by any proactive policy towards ruling. Instead, his rule was dictated by his need to react to the problems he faced in exerting his power. Although Given-Wilson admits that Richard alienated part of his new-found support network through his unholy fascination with the Cheshiremen, he argues that,

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[41] Ibid., pp. 155–70, 178–86. Tuck's argument concerning foreign policy is discussed below, pp. 139–43.

[42] Ibid., ch. 7, esp. pp. 224–5: 'The nobility could not make their will prevail for long if the king was determined not to co-operate, and in the end the only effective alternative was to remove the king … the two depositions of the fourteenth century suggest not the weakness but the strength of the English medieval monarchy.' Note also that on p. 225, Tuck does draw comparisons between Richard's rule in 1397–9 and in the 1380s. For McFarlane: above, pp. 4–7.

[43] Given-Wilson, 'King and the Gentry', pp. 93–5, 100–2; Given-Wilson, *Royal Household*, pp. 264–7.

[44] Given-Wilson, *Royal Household*, pp. 213–15.