

## POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT

### *The Survival of Diverse Opinions within Communication Networks*

Not only is political disagreement widespread within the communication networks of ordinary citizens, but political diversity within these networks is entirely consistent with a theory of democratic politics built on the importance of individual interdependence. Contrary to commonly held theoretical expectations, the persistence of political diversity and disagreement does not imply that political interdependence is absent among citizens or that political influence is lacking. This book's analysis makes a number of contributions. The authors demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of political disagreement, even within the networks and contexts that comprise the micro-environments of democratic citizens. They show that communication and influence within dyads is autoregressive – that the consequences of dyadic interactions depend on the distribution of opinions within larger networks of communication. They argue that the autoregressive nature of political influence serves to sustain disagreement within patterns of social interaction, as it restores the broader political relevance of social communication and influence.

Robert Huckfeldt is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Davis. His interests lie in the areas of elections, public opinion, political communication, urban politics, and, more generally, in the relationships among groups and individuals in politics.

Paul E. Johnson is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. His work includes applications of game theory, social choice theory, and complexity theory. He currently has an avid interest in the development of tools for agent-based modeling and computer simulation in the social sciences, and he is an active contributor to the development of the Swarm Simulation System.

Professor John Sprague has written on voting and elections, the history of socialist voting, voting patterns in the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers in politics, and crime, including homicide. His academic career has been wholly at Washington University in St. Louis, where he has served as the Sidney W. Souers Professor in Political Science, as well as chair of the Department of Political Science.

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Cambridge University Press  
978-0-521-83430-8 — Political Disagreement  
Robert Huckfeldt , Paul E. Johnson , John Sprague  
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*The Survival of Diverse Opinions within  
Communication Networks*

ROBERT HUCKFELDT

*University of California, Davis*

PAUL E. JOHNSON

*University of Kansas*

JOHN SPRAGUE

*Washington University in St. Louis*



Cambridge University Press  
 978-0-521-83430-8 — Political Disagreement  
 Robert Huckfeldt, Paul E. Johnson, John Sprague  
 Frontmatter  
[More Information](#)

## CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom  
 One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA  
 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia  
 314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi - 110025, India  
 79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

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[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9780521834308](http://www.cambridge.org/9780521834308)

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First published 2004

*A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data*

Huckfeldt, R. Robert.

Political disagreement : the survival of diverse opinions within communication networks / Robert Huckfeldt, Paul E. Johnson and John Sprague.

p. cm. — (Cambridge studies in political psychology and public opinion)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-521-83430-9 (hb) — ISBN 0-521-54223-5 (pb)

1. Communication in politics. 2. Political participation. 3. Consensus (Social sciences) 4. Public opinion. 5. Democracy. I. Johnson, P. E. (Paul E.) II. Sprague, John D. III. Title. IV. Series.

JA85.H83 2004

320.01'4—dc22 2003067589

ISBN 978-0-521-83430-8 Hardback

ISBN 978-0-521-54223-4 Paperback

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*For  
Sharon, Carolyn, and Carol*

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Cambridge University Press  
978-0-521-83430-8 — Political Disagreement  
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Cambridge University Press  
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## *Acknowledgments*

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Turning a question on its head sometimes ends up being a productive exercise. Arthur Conan Doyle took advantage of this fact when he led Holmes to wonder why the dog had failed to bark. For us, the original motivating question was, what are the sources and consequences of agreement and homogeneity within political communication networks? We do not apologize for the question. Quite to the contrary, we think it continues to raise important issues and yield fundamental insights regarding the nature of groups and individuals in politics.

At the same time, the structure of any question is self-limiting, as it excludes important observations that do not qualify as answers. By turning the original question on its head, we thus open up a new set of possibilities, asking, if individuals are interdependent, what are the circumstances that make it possible for disagreement to survive? We kept bumping up against this question in various settings: when we encountered empirical evidence pointing to the persistence of disagreement within the context of influential communication processes; when we studied racial polarization in politics – a situation in which political heterogeneity within racial groups *has* come close to disappearing far too often; when we realized the imperfect fit between the classic literature on small group influence and the typical contexts of political persuasion.

The result of this exercise is the recognition that persistent disagreement and diversity within communication networks does not necessarily constitute evidence of individual independence. In some contexts, heterogeneity may indeed be a consequence of individual independence. At the same time, and in other contexts, agreement *and* disagreement may *both* be understood within the context of influential patterns of political communication among citizens.

This book represents a continuing preoccupation for all three of us. We have pursued these themes individually as well as collectively for some time, and none of us has any intention of stopping any time soon.

### Acknowledgments

This may be mixed news for the colleagues and friends who so generously put up with our questions and arguments and requests! (But so it goes.) In anticipation, we thank them all, as well as singling out several for special attention: Brady Baybeck, Bob Boynton, Ted Carmines, Mike Craw, Russ Fazio, Ron Francisco, Charles Franklin, Erik Herron, Carol Kohfeld, Ken'ichi Ikeda, Bob Jackman, Ron Lake, Howie Lavine, Jan Leighley, Milton Lodge, Jeff Mondak, Diana Mutz, Franz Pappi, Bob Salisbury, Gina Sapiro, Mark Schneider, Randy Siverson, Paul Sniderman, and Walt Stone.

We are also grateful to the Political Psychology series editors at Cambridge University Press, Jim Kuklinski and Dennis Chong, as well as to the Political Science editor, Lew Bateman. A number of colleagues have provided us with valuable opportunities to present the project on their campuses: Barry Ames, Larry Bartels, Frank Baumgartner, Kevin Corder, Bob Erikson, Susan Herbst, Jan Leighley, Tali Mendelberg, Peter Nardulli, and Alan Zuckerman. Peter Mohler, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, and colleagues at the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen in Mannheim have, over a number of years, provided a particularly fertile environment for many of the ideas in this manuscript to develop. Several collaborators – Jeff Levine, Jeanette Morehouse, and Tracy Osborn – made fundamental contributions to parts of the manuscript.

We are also grateful to several journal publishers and editors, first for publishing our work, and then for giving us the permission to incorporate the work into this book. Cambridge University Press gave permission to employ work in Chapter 4 that was previously published as: R. Huckfeldt, J. Levine, and J. Sprague. 2000. "The Dynamics of Collective Deliberation in the 1996 Election: Campaign Effects on Accessibility, Certainty, and Accuracy." *American Political Science Review* 94 (3): 641–51. An earlier version of Chapter 5 was published by Blackwell Publishing as: R. Huckfeldt, P. E. Johnson, and J. Sprague. 2002. "Political Environments, Political Dynamics, and the Survival of Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 64: 1–21. And an earlier version of Chapter 8 was published by Blackwell Publishing as: R. Huckfeldt, J. Morehouse Mendez, and T. Osborn. 2004. "Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks," *Political Psychology* 25: 65–96.

The Center for Survey Research at Indiana University in Bloomington was our collaborator in the Indianapolis–St. Louis Project. We are particularly grateful to the director, John Kennedy, as well as to the assistant directors, Nancy Bannister and Kevin Tharp. When we came up with seemingly bizarre ideas, they never blinked. Indeed, they shared our enthusiasm. Their professionalism, expertise, dedication, and creativity were indispensable to the project.



### *Acknowledgments*

The computer model that we developed for this project was a beneficiary of many useful pieces of advice as well as several improvements in the Swarm libraries themselves. The members of the Swarm Development Group as well as the larger Swarm community supplied valuable help at many stages through the Swarm-support e-mail list. In particular, we received great advice from Marcus Daniels of the Santa Fe Institute, Rick Riolo of the University of Michigan, and Lars Erik Cederman, then at UCLA, now at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.

We are also indebted to the National Science Foundation for support provided through grant SBR-9515314 to Huckfeldt and Sprague and grant SBR-9709404 to Johnson.

Finally, we dedicate this effort to our truly significant others – Sharon, Carolyn, and Carol.