This book is a study of the second-edition version of the 'Transcendental Deduction' (the so-called 'B-Deduction'), which is one of the most important and obscure sections of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. By way of a close analysis of the B-Deduction, A. B. Dickerson makes the distinctive claim that the Deduction is crucially concerned with the problem of making intelligible the unity possessed by complex representations – a problem that is the representationalist parallel of the semantic problem of the unity of the proposition. Along the way he discusses most of the key themes in Kant's theory of knowledge, including the nature of thought and representation, the notion of objectivity, and the way in which the mind structures our experience of the world.

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For M.
So stellt der Satz den Sachverhalt gleichsam auf eigene Faust dar.

In this way the proposition presents the situation – as it were off its own bat.

Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, 5 November 1914

Nur kann man noch hinzufügen, wie kann ein Inbegriff, Complexus der Vorstellungen vorgestellt werden? Nicht durch das Bewußtsein, daß er uns gegeben sei; denn ein Inbegriff erfordert Zusammensetzen (synthesis) des Mannigfaltigen. Er muß also (als Inbegriff) gemacht werden.

But one may also ask, how can a content that is a complex of representations be represented? Not just through the awareness that it is given to us; for such a content requires a combining (synthesis) of the manifold. It must thus (qua content) be made.

Kant, letter to J. S. Beck, 20 January 1792
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Note on the text

References to Kant’s works are made in parentheses in the body of the text. The Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter, simply the Critique) is referred to using the standard A and B notation. The Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique is usually referred to simply as the ‘B-Deduction’. Other works by Kant are referred to by Akademie volume and page number. Where available, I have used (with occasional modifications) the translations of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Interpolations in square brackets are mine, and emphasis is as in the original unless otherwise noted.