

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

---

*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences  
in Basic Outline*

Part I: Science of Logic

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Contents*

Preface to the first edition	<i>page</i> 5
Preface to the second edition	8
Foreword to the third edition	22
Introduction §§ 1–18	28
PART I: SCIENCE OF LOGIC §§ 19–244	47
Preliminary conception §§ 19–83	47
A. First position of thought towards objectivity: Metaphysics §§ 26–36	67
B. Second position of thought towards objectivity §§ 37–60	78
I. Empiricism § 37	78
II. Critical philosophy § 40	82
C. Third position of thought towards objectivity: Immediate knowing §§ 61–78	109
More detailed conception and division of the Logic §§ 79–83	125
First subdivision of the Logic: The doctrine of being §§ 84–111	135
A. Quality § 86	136
a. Being § 86	136
b. Existence § 89	144
c. Being-for-itself § 96	152
B. Quantity § 99	157
a. Pure quantity § 99	157
b. Quantum § 101	160
c. Degree § 103	162
C. Measure § 107	168
Second subdivision of the Logic: The doctrine of essence §§ 112–159	173
A. The essence as ground of concrete existence § 115	177
a. The pure determinations of reflection § 115	177

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

4

*The Encyclopedia*

α. Identity § 115	177
β. Difference § 116	179
γ. Ground § 121	186
b. Concrete existence § 123	190
c. The thing § 125	192
B. Appearance § 131	197
a. The world of appearance § 132	199
b. Content and form § 133	200
c. The relationship § 135	202
C. Actuality § 142	211
a. The relationship of substantiality § 150	223
b. The relationship of causality § 153	225
c. Reciprocity § 155	228

## Third subdivision of the Logic: The doctrine of the concept

§§ 160–244	233
A. The subjective concept § 163	236
a. The concept as such § 163	236
b. The judgment § 166	240
α. Qualitative judgment § 172	246
β. The judgment of reflection § 174	248
γ. Judgment of necessity § 177	250
δ. The judgment of the concept § 178	252
c. The syllogism § 181	253
α. Qualitative syllogism § 183	256
β. Syllogism of reflection § 190	261
γ. Syllogism of necessity § 191	263
B. The object § 194	268
a. Mechanism § 195	270
b. Chemism § 200	274
c. Teleology § 204	276
C. The idea § 213	282
a. Life § 216	287
b. Knowing [ <i>Das Erkennen</i> ] § 223	290
α. Knowing § 226	292
β. Willing § 233	297
c. The absolute idea § 236	299

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## *Preface to the first edition*

The need to provide my listeners with a guide to my philosophical lectures first prompted me to let this overview of the entire scope of the philosophy come to light earlier than I would have otherwise thought appropriate.

The nature of an outline not only excludes a more exhaustive elaboration of the ideas in terms of their *content*, but also restricts in particular the elaboration of their systematic derivation, a derivation that must contain what is otherwise understood as a *proof* and that is indispensable for a scientific philosophy. The title was supposed to indicate the scope of the whole as well as the intention to reserve the details for the oral presentation.

In the case of an outline where the aim is to present an already presupposed and familiar content in a deliberately succinct manner, more consideration is given simply to the *external purposefulness* of the ordering and arrangement. The present exposition is not in this position. Instead it sets up a new reworking of philosophy according to a method that will some day be recognized, I hope, as the only true method, identical with the content. For this reason, I would have considered it more advantageous for the exposition, as far as the public is concerned, if circumstances would have allowed me to have a more elaborate work about the other parts of the philosophy precede it, a work of the same sort as I provided the public in regard to the first part of the whole, the Logic. Moreover, although it was necessary in the present exposition to limit the side of the content that lies closer to *representation* and empirical familiarity, I believe that, in regard to the transitions (which can be nothing other than a mediation effected by means of the *concept*), I have made this much evident: that the methodical character of the progression is sufficiently distinct from the merely *external order* that the other sciences look for, as well as from a *mannerism* that has become customary in treating philosophical objects. This mannerism *presupposes a schema* and in the process sets up parallels among the materials just as externally as – and even more arbitrarily than – the first way does [i.e. the way of the other sciences]. Through the most peculiar

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

misunderstanding, this mannerist method claims to have done justice to the necessity of the concept with contingent and arbitrary connections.

We have seen the same arbitrariness also seize control of philosophy's content, setting out on the adventures of thought and imposing itself for a while on sincere and honest striving, but otherwise taken, too, to be a foolishness that had risen to the point of madness. Yet instead of being imposing or mad, its basic content more readily and more often displayed quite familiar trivialities, just as the form displayed the sheer mannerism of a deliberate, methodical, and easily procured witticism involving baroque connections and a forced eccentricity, just as generally, behind the visage of seriousness, it displayed deception towards itself and the public. By contrast, on the other side, we have seen the sort of shallowness that stamps its *lack of thoughts* as a scepticism that regards itself as clever, and a critical position that is modest about reason's prospects, a shallowness whose arrogance and vanity mount in tandem with the emptiness of its ideas. – For some time these two directions of the spirit have simulated German earnestness, wearied its deeper philosophical need and brought about an indifference to the science of philosophy – indeed, even a scorn for the latter – with the result that now a self-styled humbleness even thinks itself entitled to enter the discussion and pass judgment on the profoundest dimension of philosophy and to deny it the rational knowledge whose form used to be conceived in terms of *proofs*.

The first of the phenomena touched on can be regarded, in part, as the youthful pleasure of the new epoch that has blossomed both in the realm of science and in the political realm. If this pleasure greeted the dawn of the rejuvenated spirit giddily and went straight for the enjoyment of the idea without deeper work, revelling for a time in the hopes and prospects that the idea presented, then this pleasure reconciles us all the more easily with its excesses, because a strong core underlies this pleasure and the fog of superficiality that it poured out around that core dissipates necessarily on its own. The other phenomenon is, however, more adverse [to the idea] since it reveals fatigue and febleness and strives to cover them up with an arrogance that finds fault with the philosophical spirits of every century, mistaking them all, and, most of all itself, in the process.

Yet it is all the more gratifying to perceive and to mention in conclusion how the philosophical interest and the earnest love of *higher knowledge* have maintained themselves, impartially and without conceit, against both of these orientations. If this interest now and then thrusts itself more into the form of an *immediate knowing* and *feeling*, it attests, on the other hand, to the inner drive of a rational insight that goes further and alone

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

---

*The Encyclopedia*

7

gives human beings their dignity, and attests to it, above all, by the fact that that standpoint comes about for it [that interest] only as the *result* of philosophical knowledge [*Wissen*], so that what it seems to despise is at least recognized as a *condition* by it.

To this interest in *knowing the truth* I dedicate this attempt to provide an introduction or contribution to satisfying this interest; may such a purpose procure it a favourable reception.

Heidelberg, May 1817

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## *Preface to the second edition*

In this new edition, the reader (if he is motivated to look for such things) will find several parts reworked and developed into more precise determinations. I was concerned in this edition with moderating and lessening the formal character of the presentation by, among other things, using more expansive, exoteric remarks to bring the abstract concepts closer to ordinary understanding and a more concrete representation of them. Yet the condensed brevity made necessary by an outline, in matters that are abstruse anyway, leaves this second edition in the same role as the first, to serve as a text for the lectures [*Vorlesebuch*] in need of the requisite elucidation by the oral presentation. To be sure, the title of an *encyclopedia* ought to leave room for a less rigorous scientific method and for assembling items based upon external considerations. However, the nature of the matter entails that the logical connection had to remain the foundation.

There are, it would seem, more than enough promptings and incentives on hand that seem to make it compulsory for me to explain the position of my philosophizing towards what lies beyond it, namely, the bustling concerns of contemporary culture, some of which are full of spirit, some devoid of it. This is the sort of thing that can only happen in an exoteric manner, as in a preface. For, although these concerns link themselves to philosophy, they do not engage with it scientifically and thus bar themselves from philosophy altogether, conducting their palaver outside of philosophy and remaining external to it. It is unpleasant and even awkward to enter ground so alien to science, for this sort of explaining and discussing does not advance the very understanding that can alone be the concern of genuine knowledge. Yet it may be useful, even necessary, to discuss some of these phenomena.

In general, in my philosophical endeavours, what I have worked towards and continue to work towards is the scientific knowledge of the truth. It is the most difficult path but the only path that can be of interest and value for the spirit, once the latter has entered upon the path of thought

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

and, once it is on that path, has not fallen prey to vanity but instead has preserved the will and the courage for the truth. That spirit soon finds that the method alone can tame thought, bring it to the basic matter at hand, and keep it there. Inasmuch as the spirit initially strove to venture beyond this absolute content and placed itself above it, such a procedure proves to be nothing other than the restoration of that content – but a restoration in the most distinctive, freest element of the spirit.

It is not yet very long ago that the innocent and, by all appearances, fortunate condition obtained when philosophy proceeded hand in hand with the sciences and with culture, when enlightenment of the understanding was moderate and satisfied at once with the need for insight [*Einsicht*] and with religion, when a natural law was likewise in accord with the state and politics, and empirical physics bore the name of ‘natural philosophy’. The peace, however, was rather superficial and, in particular, that insight stood in internal contradiction to religion just as that natural law stood in fact in contradiction to the state. The split then ensued, the contradiction developed itself. In philosophy, however, the spirit celebrated its reconciliation with itself, so that this science is in contradiction only with that contradiction itself and the effort to whitewash it. It is a pernicious prejudice that philosophy finds itself in opposition to knowledge gained from sensory experience, to the rational actuality of what is right as well as to an innocent religion and piety. These figures are recognized, indeed even justified, by philosophy. Far from opposing them, the thoughtful mind enters deeply into their content, and learns and strengthens itself in their midst as in the midst of the great discernments of nature, history, and art. For this solid content, insofar as it is thought, is the speculative idea itself. The collision with philosophy enters only insofar as this ground takes leave of its own distinctive character and its content is supposed to be grasped in categories and made dependent upon them, without leading the categories to the concept and completing them in the idea.

The understanding of the universal, scientific culture finds itself with an important negative result, namely, that no mediation with the truth is possible on the path of the finite concept. This result tends to have a consequence that is the very opposite of what lies immediately in it. That conviction has nullified [*aufgehoben*] the interest in the investigation of the categories and superseded, too, attentiveness and caution in the application of them, instead of working to eliminate finite connections from knowing. The use of categories has only become all the more unabashed, devoid of consciousness, and uncritical, as in a state of despair. The notion that the insufficiency of finite categories for truth entails the



Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

impossibility of objective knowledge is based upon a misunderstanding, from which the legitimacy of addressing and rejecting [matters] on the basis of feeling and subjective opinion is inferred. Replacing proofs are assurances and narratives of facts found in the consciousness that is held to be all the purer, the more uncritical it is. On so barren a category as *immediacy* – and without investigating it further – the highest needs of the spirit are to be based and to be decided by means of it. Particularly where religious objects are treated, one can find that philosophizing has been explicitly put aside, as if by this means one had banned every evil and attained assurance against error and deception. The investigation of truth is then staged on the basis of presuppositions drawn from anywhere and through rationalization [*Räsonnement*], i.e. through the use of the usual determinations of thought such as essence and appearance, ground and consequence, cause and effect, and so forth, and through the usual ways of inferring according to these and the other finite connections. ‘Free of the evil one though they are, the evils remain’,<sup>1</sup> and the evil is nine times worse than before because trust is placed in it without any suspicion and critique, as if that evil held at bay, namely, philosophy, were something other than the investigation of the truth – conscious of the nature and the value of the relationships in thinking that link and determine all content.

Philosophy itself, meanwhile, experiences its worst fate at the hands of those same individuals when they make it their business to meddle in philosophy, construing it and judging it [on their own terms]. The *fact* [*Faktum*] of physical or spiritual, in particular also religious vitality, is distorted by a reflection incapable of grasping it. Yet, as far as it is concerned, this way of construing the fact has the sense of initially elevating it to the level of something known [*Gewusste*] and the difficulty lies in this transition from the basic matter to knowledge, a transition that is the work of deliberating on the matter. In the science itself, this difficulty is no longer on hand. For the fact of philosophy is knowledge that has already been prepared and, with this, the process of construing the matter would be a thinking over [*Nachdenken*] only in the sense of thinking *that follows after the fact* [*nachfolgendes Denken*]. It is only [the act of] evaluating that would demand a thinking over in the usual meaning of the term. But that uncritical understanding demonstrates itself to be equally unfaithful in the naked construal of the idea that has been articulated in a determinate

<sup>1</sup> Moldenhauer–Michel: *Faust*, first part, The witches’ kitchen, V. 2509: ‘Den Bösen sind sie los, die Bösen sind geblieben’ (‘They got rid of the Evil One, the evil ones remain’).

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82914-4 - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline

Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Excerpt

[More information](#)

manner; it has so little suspicion or doubt of the fixed presuppositions contained within it that it is even incapable of repeating the bare fact of the philosophical idea. Miraculously, this understanding combines the following double-barrelled approach [*das Gedoppelte*] within itself. It is evident to this understanding that in the idea there is a complete departure from and even explicit contradiction of its use of categories – and at the same time no suspicion dawns on it that another way of thinking than its own is present and employed and that its thinking would have to behave differently here than usual. In this manner it happens that the idea of speculative philosophy is fixed upon immediately in terms of its abstract definition, on the supposition that a definition would of itself necessarily appear clear and settled and that it would have its regulating mechanism and criterion in presupposed representations alone, at least without knowing [*in der Unwissenheit*] that the sense of the definition like its necessary proof lies solely in its development and in the way the definition proceeds from the latter as a result. More precisely, since the idea in general is the *concrete, spiritual* unity but the understanding consists in construing conceptual determinations only in *abstraction* and thus in their one-sidedness and finitude, that unity is made into an abstract identity, devoid of spirit, an identity in which difference is not on hand but instead *everything is one*; even good and evil, among other things, are one and the same. Hence, the name ‘*system of identity*’, ‘*philosophy of identity*’ has already come to be a received name for speculative philosophy. If someone were to make his profession of faith as follows: ‘I believe in God the Father, the Creator of heaven and earth’, it would be surprising if someone else were to conclude from this first part that the person professing his faith believed in God, the creator of heaven, and *therefore* considered the earth to be uncreated and matter to be eternal. The fact is correct that in his profession of faith that person has declared that he believes in God, the creator of heaven, and yet the fact, as others have construed it, is completely false; so much so that this example must be regarded as incredible and trivial. And yet this violent bifurcation takes place in the way the philosophical idea is construed, such that, in order to make it impossible to misunderstand how the identity (which is, we are assured, the principle of speculative philosophy) is constituted, the explicit instruction and respective refutation ensue to the effect that, for instance, the subject is *different* [*verschieden*] from the object [*Objekt*], likewise the finite from the infinite, and so forth, as if the concrete, spiritual unity were in itself devoid of any determinateness and did not *in itself contain* the difference, as if someone did not know [*nicht wüßte*] that subject and object [*Objekt*] or the infinite and the finite were different from one another, or as