The Challenge of E Pluribus Unum

What does the ethnic diversity of the United States imply for its national identity? This question has been asked repeatedly since America’s founding, but the ongoing demographic transformation of the country gives it renewed significance. What are the implications of this increased cultural diversity for e pluribus unum, the creation of one out of many in a nation of immigrants? Has it unleashed unmanageable centrifugal forces? Does the country need new psychological glue to hold a multiethnic polity together in the twenty-first century? In this chapter, we contrast the solutions for managing America’s diversity given by three normative perspectives: cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism. We concentrate on how these conceptions strike the balance between group and national identities, how they view the role of the state in responding to the demands of a new array of minorities, and how the implications of their proposed policies may affect national solidarity.

THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS AND ITS CRITICS

Almost seventy years ago, a united nation emerged victorious from a great war. Commitment to a common culture seemed to be taken for granted. No political movement then seriously challenged the ideal of e pluribus unum symbolized by the image of the melting pot.¹ Published in 1955, Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America provided the dominant scholarly interpretation of American political culture for years to come.² This normative view, which we label cosmopolitan liberalism, emphasized that America’s core identity is ideological, not ethnic, not limited to a particular people. For Hartz, as for de

Tocqueville and many other commentators, Americanism is a civil religion, a creed comprising belief in the values of democracy, individualism, liberty, equality, and property rights. Hartz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others also argued that the firm grip of this liberal tradition helps explain the exceptionalism of the country’s politics – the lack of a strong socialist party, the weakness of the labor movement, the acceptance of economic inequality, and the boundaries on government action that limited the development of the welfare state. But the creedal definition of American identity implicitly was inclusive: anyone could belong to America if he or she embraced the civil religion, spoken in English.

In the past several decades, however, the idea of cultural unity in American politics has come under sustained attack. Looking backward, Rogers Smith holds that Hartz’s characterization of a uniform, individualist American political culture is incomplete. He argues that a rival ethnocultural tradition long had widespread support, sustaining a racial hierarchy through Jim Crow laws and discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies. Whereas Tocqueville and Hartz implied that adherence to the liberal American creed would be sufficiently strong cement to unify the country’s diverse population, John Higham showed that nativism, an ethnocentric response that held new waves of new-comers as unqualified to be true Americans, was a recurring response to nineteenth-century immigration. Nativism repudiated the inclusiveness of cosmopolitan liberalism in favor of a conception of American identity that limited full membership in the national community to white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Smith concluded that this response to non-British immigrants, buttressed by restrictive laws, along with enslavement of blacks and eradication and segregation of Native Americans, belied the claim that cosmopolitan liberalism was hegemonic. Instead, it highlighted the coexistence of a potent inegalitarian tradition.

Looking forward from Hartz, recent work from across the political spectrum projects an image of America as a splintering society.
wars, and party polarization are recurring catchwords in accounts of today’s politics, drowning out depictions of national solidarity based on a consensual creed. Accounts of the centrifugal forces challenging an overarching sense of American national identity often begin, ironically, by pointing to the aftermath of the civil rights movement’s successes. To distill the argument, the end of legal segregation failed to eliminate the wide racial gap in economic and social circumstances, prompting support for cultural nationalism among some black activists in the late 1960s. Almost forty years after Hartz’s assertion of liberal consensus, Andrew Hacker’s review of the racial landscape was titled, *Two Nations, Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal.*

At the same time, the example of the civil rights movement catalyzed demands for greater equality by other groups, including ethnic minority groups enlarged by immigration, women, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Increased assertiveness about such subnational identities fueled a style of thinking that judges public policies principally by how they affect the prestige, welfare, and survival of one’s particular group rather than the country as a whole. Multiculturalism – in its political rather than demographic incarnation – emerged as an ideological defense of institutionalizing rights for minority groups, partly aiming to redistribute resources through group-conscious allocations but also to shore up the capacity of minority cultural norms and practices to survive the pressures of assimilation. Multiculturalist thinkers gave greater weight to the significance of group identities than did Hartz and his followers. Compared to both cosmopolitan liberalism and nativism, multiculturalism places the ideal of *e pluribus unum* on the back burner, a less important goal than the representation and protection of minorities.

Multiculturalism is not without its critics, even on the left. A prominent example is Todd Gitlin, who worried that the political elevation of ethnic and gender identities has dimmed the prospects for “common dreams” and class-based redistribution. In a similar vein, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. predicted the “disuniting of America” if identity politics made incursions into a common culture by fragmenting the content of public education. Which groups deserve special protection, which policies should advance their interests, and whether group rights can override universal individual rights are questions about which policy makers in the United States and elsewhere differ. This book does not review the full array of demands for group rights, bypassing, for example, those

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9 Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal*.
10 To this list, we might add advocates for the rights of the disabled, elderly, children, and animals.
11 Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams*.
12 Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America*.
on behalf of women, the elderly, workers, and the deaf and disabled. Instead, we focus on what we regard as the most important challenges to *e pluribus unum*, the enduring racial divide and the demographic transformation resulting from the opening of the door to non-European immigrants when Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, sometimes known as the Hart-Celler Act.

The size and composition of the new wave of immigrants were unanticipated, but so too perhaps were the anxieties it aroused. The resulting influx of Hispanics and Asians raised alarms about the threat to a common sense of American nationhood similar to those expressed by the nineteenth-century nativists. In a widely publicized and controversial statement, Samuel Huntington asserted that “the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico.” Huntington believed that the sheer extent of immigration and high birth rates among Mexican migrants who share a language and are concentrated in a region of the United States close to their country of origin means that they will fail to acculturate like their European predecessors or Asian contemporaries. Whereas Hacker viewed race as the dividing line between two separate and hostile nations, Huntington’s worst-case scenario for the future is that the United States will split into two language-based nations: an English-speaking “Anglo-America” and a Spanish-speaking “Mexamerica” that, like Quebec in Canada, regards itself as a distinct society deserving political autonomy.

Huntington’s response to the confluence of identity politics and Hispanic immigration rejected multiculturalism’s support for cultural differences and called for the reinvigoration of American identity built on Anglo-American Protestant values. In his 1993 book *American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony*, Huntington invoked the Tocquevillian civic creed as the core of Americanism. A decade later, he deemed a commitment to political principles neither strong nor unique enough to bind a nation together and added a healthy dollop of the English language, work ethic, patriotism, and religiosity to comprise American identity. Accusations of nativism followed, but in principle one could envisage people of any national origin acculturating to these norms.

Many critics dismissed the vision of America breaking apart under the pressure of Hispanic immigration. From an empirical perspective, Alba and Nee, Barone, and Citrin et al. cite evidence showing that today’s immigrants, including Hispanics, are following the same trajectory of incorporation taken by their

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14 Iris M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), is the most prominent proponent of guaranteed representation for these groups in most important social roles, but others also write of multiculturalism without culture being the sole criterion for assigning group rights.


16 For a more complete statement, see Huntington, *Who Are We?*
European predecessors. Predicting the future is a fool’s game, perhaps, but the optimistic account of contemporary immigration is that newcomers from all over the globe generally choose to embrace America’s democratic creed, learn English, and live its dream of hard work rewarded. They add complex flavors to the stew bubbling in the American melting pot without causing its main ingredients, the English language and self-reliance, to boil away. America “morphs newly arrived Koreans into NASCAR fans, transmogrifies Hmong into country and western addicts, and allows the children of illegal aliens to become PhD’s, electrical engineers, and newspaper columnists.”

And, from a normative point of view, many liberals and multiculturalists alike reject Huntington’s recommendation that immigrants should Americanize by embracing Anglo-American Protestant values. They regard the maintenance of diverse ethnic traditions as both morally valid and quite compatible with America’s sense of itself. Here, we examine evidence for the claim that ethnic diversity and cultural division gnaw from within at an overarching sense of attachment to the nation.

Not all possible threats to a common national identity come from within. A potential external threat to a strong sense of national identity is globalization. By this we mean a set of processes that boost the salience of larger transnational contacts and identifications. Economic interdependence has diminished the sovereignty of even the American superpower, fraying the connections between citizenship and personal welfare and increasing cosmopolitan commitment to international legal norms. Self-interest in the global marketplace pushes American corporations to downgrade their “national” character. And the web of international travel communications fosters a growing similarity in cultural expression. Theorists of globalization argue that the concept of citizenship no longer must be wedded to membership in a nation-state. The development of a cosmopolitan morality embedded in international law and the pervasiveness of migration give birth to notions of multinational, transnational, and postnational citizenship.

18 Victor Davis Hanson, Between War and Peace: Lessons from Afghanistan to Iraq (New York: Random House, 2004), 170.
Among the multiple layers of belonging, identification with the nation is receding in importance according to some theorists. But others emphasize the staying power of national attachment at an almost unconscious level. As Michael Billig puts it, in established states, identification with the nation becomes banal through daily reminders: seeing the national flag on public buildings, using the national coins and currency, celebrating national holidays, driving on streets named for political and military heroes, and even reading about international sporting competitions.  

But whatever the normative merits of global citizenship and a generalized love of humanity, the humanitarian ideal of “one world, one family” at present seems too thin an emotional gruel to satisfy most publics. For example, the banal habits of national attachment are among the many obstacles to the development of a strong sense of European identity despite the efforts of the institutions of the European Union. Indeed, perhaps because of the very diversity of the American population, patriotic rituals such as flying the flag in homes and stores, playing the national anthem at sporting events, and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance were more pervasive in the United States than in other countries well before September 11, 2001. But we show that despite political polarization and public divisions over important cultural issues, the national attachment of Americans remains pervasive and strong.

EARLIER DEBATES OVER NATIONAL IDENTITY

At the moment of American independence, a majority of the colonists were from Britain, but the population also included people from other European countries, African slaves, and native tribes. Early commentators held mixed views about the presence of variety. John Jay considered the hegemony of English or Anglo-American culture as the foundation of national progress, writing in The Federalist papers that “Providence had been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their customs and manners.”  

Benjamin Franklin was more explicit in demanding cultural uniformity, worrying that the influx of Germans into Anglicized Pennsylvania would result in “their” language and customs driving out “ours.”  

Against this, Jean de Crevecoeur famously described America as a place where “individuals of all nations are blended into a new race of men.”

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Almost two centuries later, John Steinbeck repeated the proclamation, including California Chinese and Alabama Negroes as well as Boston Irish and Wisconsin Germans as part of an interwoven new breed—Americans—who have “more in common than they have apart.”

The implication, for cosmopolitan liberals at least, was that anyone could become an American simply by accepting the country’s fundamental ideals of liberty, democracy, and economic self-reliance; by learning English; and, above all, by proclaiming loyalty to their new nation rather than to their country of origin. Emphasizing common values rather than shared ancestry as the foundation of American nationality had several strategic advantages. Because the cultural homogeneity of the United States was taken for granted, this formula for nationhood facilitated the psychic separation from their mother country among the citizens who were of British descent. Moreover, affirming that American identity was based on universal values rather than ancestry ultimately made it easier to incorporate immigrants of varying origins without fundamentally altering the nation’s self-concept.

The inclusionary potential of the founders’ civic credo was not realized in early practice. In fact, throughout American history one reaction to diversity has been to deem some groups—American Indians, blacks, Asians, and some European immigrants—biologically, intellectually, or culturally unqualified for full membership in the “circle of we.” Notwithstanding egalitarian rhetoric, a racial hierarchy was the first American model for handling groups different from the settlers of British ancestry. Skin color was the ultimate dividing line between full members of the national community and people outside or on the fringe. The native tribes and blacks were excluded from the outset. As early as 1835, de Tocqueville was convinced that the cultural survival of the Indian nations was doomed and prophesied that blacks would remain a subordinate and separate group.

Viewed as savages, Native Americans were eradicated, segregated, or “civilized” through forced assimilation. The treatment of blacks was different. Forcibly imported to provide cheap labor, slaves were exploited and abused long after the Declaration of Independence proclaimed the equality of all men. And although the Civil War and Emancipation represented a victory for universal ideals, Jim Crow laws in the South and less formal modes of exclusion elsewhere long sustained the subordination of blacks. However, a formal racial and religious hierarchy was morally discredited and then legally outlawed by developments after World War II, so it is no longer a viable model for defining American nationality or managing the conflicts arising from ethnic diversity.

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26 Quoted in Salins, Assimilation, American Style, 43, emphasis in original.
27 Ibid.
A more relevant and culturally resonant model is the experience of nineteenth-century European immigrants over time. Beginning in the 1840s, the arrival of massive numbers of non-English and non-Protestant immigrants triggered a nativist movement demanding a more restrictive definition of national identity on the grounds that only Anglo-Saxons possessed the moral and intellectual qualities required for democratic citizenship, the hallmark of “true” Americanism. At first, the nativist movement targeted Irish and German Catholics whose presumed obedience to the pope would prevent their being fully loyal to their new country. Then, after the Civil War, Asians were targeted as being an “inferior” race. Later, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe took the brunt of nativist rejection, on the grounds that their radicalism and uncouth manners made them unsuitable for democratic citizenship.

Confronting this wave of new immigration stretching from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, nativists sought to limit and then to subject those who did enter the country to a rigorous process of “Americanization.” Buttressed by the rise of Social Darwinism in intellectual circles, nativists argued that since natural selection within the human species had produced a superior Anglo-Saxon culture, the laws of evolution validated banning the immigration of Chinese, denying essential rights to blacks, and limiting the use of languages other than English in schools.

Theodore Roosevelt’s thinking provides a good example of the nativist version of absorbing newcomers. Roosevelt accepted European immigration and even acknowledged that new blood could add to the nation’s vitality, although he drew the line at nonwhites. Nonetheless, in his eyes a single standard of conduct was required to complete the process of nation building, so immigrants would have to shed their original customs and “must learn to talk and think and be United States.” Citizenship required total identification with America itself: there was no room in his nation for hyphenated Americans or loyalty to any flag but one.

Dedicated to Roosevelt, Israel Zangwill’s 1909 play The Melting Pot presented an optimistic, even romantic picture of the relations among diverse cultural groups in America. But as historian Philip Gleason has shown, there are two variants of the metaphor of the melting pot for the acculturation of immigrants. The nativists viewed assimilation as a process of cleansing, the melting-down of native customs to attain Anglo-conformity. Zangwill’s own interpretation hearkened back to earlier predictions that the blending of

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30 Higham, *Strangers in the Land*.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Philip Gleason, “American Identity and Americanization.”
diverse groups would create a new, vital, distinctively American race. New immigrants would learn English and adopt America’s democratic political creed without much outside intervention. Yet they could retain elements of their original heritage, and this would help create a new and enriched common culture.

Cultural pluralists like Horace Kallen, a precursor of contemporary multiculturalists, rejected the idea of the melting pot in either incarnation. Kallen called on immigrants to preserve their languages and traditions. He described the United States not as one nation but as a voluntary union of many (European) nations, each of which should have equal status. America should be an orchestra in which each cultural instrument would have a permanent place. For Kallen, pluralism would result in a beautiful symphony; for his critics, the coexistence of many languages and traditions conjured up the biblical Tower of Babel.

One-way assimilation became the dominant approach of policy makers once World War I intensified concerns about national unity and insistence on Americanization. In 1921 and 1924, new legislation both restricted the total number of immigrants and established a system of visa preferences favoring people from northern Europe. Without replenishment, immigrants from other stocks could assimilate more readily. Their status improved through economic advancement, political involvement, and the decline of prejudice against them.

Earlier classifications of some Europeans as “Nordic and light” and others as “Mediterranean and dark” vanished. In Michael Lind’s words, between the Civil War and World War II the country was slowly transformed from white “Anglo-America” into white “Euro-America.” As World War II loomed, the assimilation model was the consensual explanation for the creation of a unified nation built on heterodox ethnic foundations.

This conception of assimilation refers to processes resulting in greater similarity among all the country’s ethnic groups, whites included. In Assimilation in American Life, Milton Gordon distinguished between structural assimilation, involving the large-scale entry of minorities and immigrants into the economic, social, and political institutions of the host society and ultimately leading to intermarriage, and cultural assimilation, involving the adoption of dominant

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37 Ibid.
40 Nathan Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 96.
values and customs constituting the “American way of life.” Gordon believed that structural assimilation would inevitably lead to cultural unity. The power of assimilation would, over time, weaken ethnic identity, making it a largely symbolic, optional attachment. If this is so, then assimilation indeed is the antithesis of multiculturalism’s emphasis on the importance of preserving cultural differences and strong ethnic attachments.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE ASSIMILATION MODEL

We accept that European immigrants to the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely have assimilated – structurally, politically, and culturally. The big exception to this pattern of ethnic changes continued to be the lot of African Americans, the descendants of slaves, with most continuing to live under the oppressive Jim Crow system after legal emancipation. At the dawning of the twentieth century, W. E. B. Du Bois wrote that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, and of the ’double consciousness’ of blacks: they had no other country but America, yet had a distinct collective fate.” Indeed, in that era, a century ago, almost all white Americans would probably now be regarded as holding “racist” ideologies.

The fight against the Nazis and then the Cold War competition for the allegiance of decolonized new nations in Asia and Africa made racism less tenable in opinion and policy. During the years following World War II, moreover, the economic and political mobilization of black Americans accelerated, and the movement to end racial segregation strengthened. Support for the ethnocultural and racist versions of national identity began to dissolve. Martin Luther King Jr. dreamed of integration fueled by common American ideals. The chant “Jim Crow Must Go!” was a call for civic inclusion. Through the convulsive social changes precipitated by the civil rights movement, blacks gradually garnered the rights of full citizens. Despite dogged resistance in the South, predominantly white elites in America moved to extend equal rights to blacks and other minority groups. Legal embodiments of these rights, such as Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, constituted a proclamation of equality for African Americans, a belated Declaration of Independence.

Those civil rights laws of the 1960s removed the final legal vestiges of racial segregation and provided voting rights to blacks throughout the country. Still, despite substantial economic and political progress in the last half of the twentieth century, the residues of slavery and discrimination are