Making Sense of Heritability

In this book, Neven Sesardic defends the view that it is both possible and useful to measure the separate contributions of heredity and environment to the explanation of human psychological differences. He critically examines the view – very widely accepted by scientists, social scientists and philosophers of science – that heritability estimates have no causal implications and are devoid of any interest. In a series of clearly written chapters he introduces the reader to the problems and subjects the arguments to close philosophical scrutiny. His conclusion is that anti-heritability arguments are based on conceptual confusions and misunderstandings of behavior genetics. His book is a fresh, original, and compelling intervention in a very contentious debate.

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Making Sense of Heritability

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The denial of genetically based psychological differences is the kind of sophisticated error normally accessible only to persons having Ph.D. degrees.

David Lykken
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