Introduction

This is a book about Spinoza, one of the greatest philosophers of the seventeenth century, or of any time. He is also a particularly controversial philosopher and particularly difficult to understand. The controversies primarily stem from the fact that Spinoza's two best-known works, the *Ethics* and the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, contain forceful criticisms of some of the central pillars of revealed religion. As an alternative to revealed religion, Spinoza offered a rigorous and powerful philosophy – most notably a metaphysics that demonstrated the necessity in and eternity of nature and equated nature with God – that, he argued, underlay whatever truths could be found in religion and philosophical theology.[1]

Consequently, Spinoza was viewed by many of his contemporaries as a dangerous and nearly Satanic figure. Dutch Calvinists, liberal Hobbesians, and many key Enlightened figures of the scientific revolution all united in vigorously attacking the *TTP* and the *Ethics*.[2] Furthermore, these attacks

[1] Spinoza's main disagreement with his friend Lodewijk Meyer on this issue draws out Spinoza's position on the relation between and distinctness of philosophy and religion. Whereas the Lutheran Meyer (like Maimonides) thought that there was philosophy in Scripture, and that Scripture ought to be understood as expressing the truths of philosophy, Spinoza thought that Scripture contained no philosophy, a few moral truths, and a great deal of history of brutal and primitive desert nomads. Spinoza did not think philosophy could or would replace religion, but rather that the truth of philosophical theology lies in any proximity it bears to the truth of the metaphysics and epistemology that he argues for. The rest is history, politics, and stubborn superstition. Given that one cannot get rid of religion, the problem is how to control it in such a way as to allow for freedom of thought – see *TTP* XX. See also J. Samuel Preus, *Spinoza and Irrelevance of Biblical Authority* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[2] As examples of the attacks on him by contemporaries who differed on many other substantive issues: the Calvinist Blijenburgh attacked Spinoza in letters and publications, the powerful liberal Hobbesian Lambertus Velthuysen, whose favor Spinoza wished to curry, was horrified by the *TTP* and wrote a book against it, and the great ideologist of early modern science Robert Boyle both attacked Spinoza in his publications and left a bequest to set up a series of lectures – the Boyle lectures – combating the sort of "atheism" represented by Spinoza.

did not subside with Spinoza's death in 1677, but rather continued for centuries.[3]

Spinoza's philosophy was also admired by many free-thinkers and *philosophes*.[4] In the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century Spinoza even became the secular saint of a kind of mystical pantheist deism for authors like Goethe, Schelling, and Coleridge. In the twentieth century Spinoza has been credited with, among many other things, a founding role in modern empirical psychology, psychoanalysis, Marxism, Nietzscheanism, liberalism, the modern Jewish secular identity, and too many other -isms and -ologies to mention.

This brings up the issue of the difficulties that all readers have understanding Spinoza. A quick look at the very truncated list above of -isms and -ologies with which Spinoza has been credited reveals that there is little that holds them together other than a general agreement on Spinoza's importance. This is a function of the difficulty of Spinoza's texts, so daunting that some of Spinoza's most virulent detractors hardly read his works at all! In the eighteenth century even those who did read Spinoza often relied on popular presentations of his philosophy, most influentially Pierre Bayle's entry "Spinoza" in the *Dictionnaire*. Accordingly Spinoza has sometimes seemed to function less as a philosopher than as a sort of cipher of Enlightenment aspirations, a Rorschach test through which to read heterodoxy, reason, mysticism, and whatever else one might like.

Who was this philosopher who elicited such responses: contemptuous, devoted, confused, yet persistent and powerful? He was born in 1632 – the same year as John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, and Richard Cumberland (and Defoe's Robinson Crusoe). He belonged to the first generation of philosophers to look back at the anarchic religious war of the late sixteenth and early and mid-seventeenth centuries from a comparatively stable polity periodically erupting in spasms of violence.[5] He was born into the fairly conservative Jewish community of Amsterdam. Amsterdam was one of the

[3] Nearly one hundred years later the scandal attached to Spinoza was still profound enough that Lessing's reported and disputed deathbed announcement to Jacobi that he (Lessing) was a Spinozist resulted in the greatest scandal of the German Enlightenment.

[4] For example Toland, Boulanvillier, Bayle, Lessing, Diderot, and La Mettrie (as discussed in Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment* (Oxford University Press, 2001)).

[5] This state of stability was a long and ongoing process: the Peace of Augsburg and Westphalia and the conclusion of the English Civil War were gradually followed by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Glorious Revolution, and the end of the Dutch conflicts between the Gomarists and Remonstrants, as well as the Orthodox and Republicans like Jan de Witt. Still Spinoza, like Locke, Pufendorf, and Cumberland, and unlike Hobbes and Descartes (much less the philosophers of the preceding generations like Lipsius and Bodin), was trying to make sense of the end of violence.

most economically, politically, artistically, and intellectually vibrant cities in Europe, although still caught in religious and political struggles which rose and ebbed over the course of Spinoza's brief life.

His father Michael was a merchant. Spinoza worked with him until his death, and then briefly and unsuccessfully attempted to run the family business with his brother. At some point, likely in the early to mid 1650s, Spinoza began to drift away from the Jewish community and into various free-thinking circles centered around Franciscus Van den Enden.[6] Whatever caused him to drift away probably also eventually resulted in his excommunication in 1656, although we cannot be sure.

By 1656 Spinoza had already set a drastically different intellectual course from most of the other Jews of Amsterdam.[7] But expulsion from the Jewish community meant an inability to communicate and thus to financially interact with other Jews. Consequently, Spinoza had to pursue a different means of making a living, and so he became a lens grinder. We have a tendency sometimes to view early modern science through the writings of the great theorists, but it was an intellectual world centered on observation, scientific instruments, and experiments. Spinoza was respected for the quality and precision of his lenses, and the excellence of his work placed him within the experimental circles at the cutting edge of early modern science, even if he was far more notorious – from the early 1660s onward – for his heterodox teachings and works.

I consider relevant details of Spinoza's biography over the course of this book. But rather than give more of the particular details of Spinoza's life I will provide a broad sense of Spinoza's intellectual milieu. The spheres in which Spinoza circulated were unusual for an early modern philosopher, although the Dutch rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel (who was perhaps one of Spinoza's teachers) engaged with a similar variety of intellectual circles, as did a few others. I would like quickly to sketch the variety of these intellectual and social spheres by considering a contingent fact about Spinoza: his first name and the many languages into which it was rendered. Through this device we can get a synoptic view of the many milieus through and in which he circulated.[8]

[6] These biographical remarks are taken from Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life* (Cambridge University Press, 1999) and supplemented by Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*.

[7] There were other excommunications, though, and there are some parallels between Spinoza's relatively happy life and the far sadder tale of Uriel da Costa. See Carl Gebhardt (ed.), *Die Schriften des Uriel da Costa* (Amsterdam: Hertzberger, 1922).

[8] On the issue of the complexity of signification for Spinoza see Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics* (Princeton University Press, 1989), vol. 1. Much of the following is indebted to his discussion.

In Latin Spinoza's name was Benedictus or Benedict. Latin was the language of most of Spinoza's philosophical writings and correspondence. It was the common language of European intellectuals that bridged their many linguistic and political rifts. It was the language of erudition and learning, the language in which Spinoza and the students of Franciscus Van den Enden performed Roman dramas, including works by Spinoza's beloved Terence. It was the language of Spinoza's major ancient influences: Seneca, Tacitus, Cicero, and Lucretius. Spinoza used Latin to communicate with intellectuals like Leibniz, Huygens, Oldenburg, Tschirnhaus, and many others. Latin was the language of science and thus was integral to his economic pursuits. Latin is the main language through which we know Spinoza the philosopher.

In Hebrew, Spinoza's first name was Baruch. It was the language of Scripture and religious observance in the community in which he was raised.[9] Hebrew was the religious language of the community he was eventually excommunicated from, and the language of the theologians he coolly criticized in the *TTP*. Spinoza knew the language intimately and even wrote a Hebrew grammar (although he probably wrote it for the use of radical Gentiles in understanding Scripture as a historical document).

Spinoza's first name in Portuguese was Bento. Portuguese was the language of his home and family, the language of the country from which his family had emigrated to Amsterdam. It was also the workaday language of the Jewish community that he grew up in and of the business he shared with his brother upon his father's death: "Bento y Gabriel d'Espinosa."[10] This language was, like Hebrew, intertwined with his Jewish roots. In the *TTP* Spinoza notes that, since the King of Spain granted civic rights and privileges to Spanish Jews who had been forced to convert to Christianity, the *converso* families quickly forgot their identity. But, as the King of Portugal denied the Portuguese Jews any social or political status, they held fast to the Judaism that had been taken away from them even after their forced conversion. Why not? For, despite their professions of Christian faith, they were still treated like Jews (*TTP* III, III/42). The Portuguese community in which Spinoza grew up, with its traditional culture and languages and insular nature, was likely viewed by Spinoza the philosopher as

[9] It is notable that Spinoza equates one of the lower forms of knowledge with the calculations of merchants (*IIP40S2*). This is also the sort of knowledge on which theocratic authority is based.

[10] See W. G. Van der Tak, "The Firm of Bento and Gabriel de Spinoza," *Studia Rosenthaliana* 16 (1982), 178–89.

pathological. At the same time Portuguese, and Spanish, clearly always had an appeal for Spinoza, and he owned a number of literary works including the novels of Cervantes. Portuguese was literally his mother tongue, the language of his mother Hanna and probably the language of his lullabies.

Spinoza, of course, spoke a fourth language: Dutch. Dutch was the language of everyday life once he left the Jewish community, the language of his discussion circles, and the language of politics. It was also the language of important Dutch radical texts like his friend Adriaan Koerbagh's *Een Blomhofvan allerley Lieflijkheyd sonder verdriet*, influential political works like Pieter De La Court's *Politike Discoursen*, as well as religious polemics like William van Blijenburgh's *De waerheyt van de christelijcke godst-dienst* (against Spinoza). One of Spinoza's works, the *KV*, has been handed down to us in Dutch, although it was probably translated from a lost Latin original. Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma* was translated into Dutch immediately upon his death as *De Nagelate Schriften* (*CW* x), showing that Spinoza's circle wished to expand his philosophy from highbrow Latin to the more colloquial but extraordinarily intellectually rich Dutch language.

Benedict, Baruch, and Bento all mean the same thing, blessed or blessing. Spinoza's goal in his most important work, the *Ethics*, was to lead readers, who were capable, to their own blessedness, or more accurately to help them lead themselves. In his writings Spinoza used the Latin word "beatitudo" for blessedness (wisely he did not use his own name), which he described as "our greatest happiness" consisting "in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and morality advise" (II49s). But the many translations of his name and many words for blessedness point toward the difficulty intrinsic to his undertaking. Spinoza straddled numerous communities with different cultures and needs and had many influences arising from his engagements with these different communities. How to show those who were capable the way to blessedness? How to help them to recognize their power and to understand God and nature? How to show them that the desire for blessedness underlaid their many tongues, and their many ways of speaking, even when they did not know this? How to show them that blessedness arose from understanding the metaphysical underpinnings of an apparently chaotic world, underpinnings which showed much that we take for granted to be either false or so many expressions of a unified God or nature? And, not the least, how to show that which he wished to show them was true?

Spinoza tried numerous tactics to get these points across in his different works, but the *Ethics* is clearly his ultimate statement on blessedness.[11] To this end, Spinoza employed a particular method, different from many of the other ways in which he had presented his philosophy over the course of his intellectual career. This book is concerned with exploring Spinoza's method, and seeing how the method bears on and is related to the goals of the *Ethics*.

"*IN MORE GEOMETRICO*" – SPINOZA'S GEOMETRICAL METHOD

Philosophical interest in method, interest in the best way to access and to express truths about morals, God, nature, mathematics, and reality as such, is as old as philosophy itself. This is not surprising. If all men, or at least all philosophically disposed men, desire to know, some obvious questions arise quite immediately and naturally: "Can we know at all?" "If we can, what can we know?" "What is the best way to know and to access the most important truths?" These have not turned out to be the easiest philosophical questions, but they are some of the most fruitful, witness Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*, Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, Locke's *Essay*, Hume's *Treatise*, and many other of the greatest works of philosophy ancient, modern, and contemporary.

A number of recent works in the history of philosophy have emphasized that many disparate sorts of philosophers – from Plato, Plotinus, and the Stoics to Locke, Hume, and Smith to Wittgenstein – share the idea that the purpose of a philosophical method is not just to offer a series of valid propositions or claims, but rather in some way to transform or change readers, to allow them to look at themselves in the world in a different way. What this different way is varies from philosopher to philosopher, but one constant is that a method must be constructed in such a manner as to allow readers to see the ways that the philosophy impacts them and their lives, and to learn to look at the world from a different perspective than they might otherwise.

The issue of the transformative purpose of method is interrelated with the questions of whether we can know, what we can know, and how best to know. Many of the best-known philosophers prior to the twentieth century were not primarily interested in providing ingenious arguments in response to outstanding problems or questions, but wanted to change

[11] The *TP* was written after the *Ethics* and was at least fairly complete, so one might claim it is the final word, but, as the *TP* is incomplete, and as it does not discuss metaphysics or mind, the *Ethics* still has pride of place.

readers, dialogue partners, or listeners, or to allow them to change themselves, in such a way that they might become happier and wiser. Philosophy was not only viewed in terms of the solving of problems, but was also considered worth pursuing insofar as it was edifying and therapeutic; and these two goals clearly ought not be mutually exclusive. Clarifying a philosophical problem or better understanding an important issue are also sorts of self-clarification, clearing up our heads and making us think a little straighter. This sort of procedure of clarification also might make us happy and wise, or at least not so sad and stupid.

Much of what I will say about Spinoza in the following chapters will respond to and follow from this basic point: that Spinoza's philosophy is a kind of self-clarificatory therapy for those capable of self-clarification; that this self-clarification arises not just from reflection but also from other sorts of knowing; and finally that the choice of the method by which to establish appropriate knowledge and the vehicle or means by which to present it, as a consequence, is absolutely central.

Now I hope you are thinking: "That is an interesting, if somewhat fuzzy, way of presenting Spinoza and some of the motivations for his philosophy. But I have looked a bit at the *Ethics*, and no work of philosophy seems more ill-suited for such therapy. Spinoza's *Ethics* is an exemplar of a sort of philosophical formalism that places validity of argument far above the needs of the reader. The *Ethics* is a geometrical method, a philosophy bound by the laws of mathematical deduction. If this is a philosophical therapy, it seems to be a philosophical analogue of the Polar Bear's Club – the best therapy is to jump into freezing cold water, only in this case into the iciest and least human reaches of reason."

This is a fair objection. I will try to respond to it in the chapters that follow, but first we need to know something about Spinoza's method and its historical context. In the *Ethics* Spinoza derived a sequence of numbered propositions from definitions and axioms – much as Euclid did in the *Elements* – building each link in the expanding chain on the definitions, axioms, and propositions prior to it. Euclid derived the celebrated Proposition 47 of Book I of the *Elements* – the claim that "in right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle" – from prior and apparently far more obvious propositions about parallelograms (I.41) and angles (I.14).[12] In a

[12] John Aubrey described Hobbes as converting to the geometrical method while reading Euclid's *Elements* I.47. Hobbes was astonished by the content of Euclid's proposition while at the same time recognizing the necessity by which I.47 had been derived from far more obvious propositions. See Aubrey's "Life of Hobbes," III [1] and IV [8], in Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. and intro. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), lxiv and lvi–lxvii.

similar manner Spinoza drew dramatic metaphysical and ethical results such as that "God is an extended thing" (IIP3) from prior and apparently more obvious propositions.[13] Spinoza called the Euclidean manner in which he presented his philosophy the *ordo geometricus* or *mos geometricus*[14] – the geometrical order or manner or way. To present a philosophy in a geometrical manner was to write *in ordine geometrico* or *in more geometrico*.

The *mos geometricus* is a striking way of arranging propositions, but what is most arresting is the way the arrangement affects readers of the *Ethics*. Gilles Deleuze opens his book *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* with a quote from Bernard Malamud's *The Fixer*. One of Malamud's characters comments about his experience reading Spinoza's *Ethics*: "I read through a few pages and kept on going as though there were a whirlwind at my back. As I say, I didn't understand every word but when you're dealing with such ideas you feel as though you were taking a witch's ride. After that I wasn't the same man."[15] Although the character is not describing the geometrical method, it is certainly a crucial part of the "witch's ride," the (apparently) strict necessity by which the reader and all things great and small, from God to the lowliest worm, are pushed forward, necessarily in a universe without end. The reader of the *Ethics* feels rather as if he or she plunged into a world of necessary reason where metaphysical principles, human actions, and appetites are treated – just as if it were a "Question of lines, planes, and bodies" (III "Preface," II/138).

[13] Where Spinoza derived his propositions primarily from axioms and definitions, Euclid employed a third category of "postulates" or rules of construction. Spinoza employed postulates in the "physics" after IIP13, but not in the main demonstrations of the *Ethics*. I will discuss this difference in chapter 5.

[14] Piet Steenbakkers distinguishes between Spinoza's method and the geometrical form or external order in which Spinoza presented a number of his works. See *Spinoza's Ethica from Manuscript to Print: Studies on Text, Form and Related Topics* (Aachen: Van Gorcum, 1994). This is quite proper as the subtitle of the *Ethics* reads *ordine geometrico demonstrata*, not *in more geometrico*, and as the logic textbooks of the seventeenth century commonly distinguished between method and order, following on the famous Renaissance controversy between Jacobo Zabarella and Francisco Piccolomini. See "De Doctrina Ordine Apologiae" (1584) in Jacobo Zabarella, *Opera Logica* (Cologne: Zetzneri, 1597), 3rd edn. In a crucial passage in the "Preface" to *Ethics* III, Spinoza claimed that for those who prefer to curse or laugh at the affections "it will doubtless seem strange that I should undertake to treat men's vices and absurdities in the *more geometrico*." Here Spinoza explicitly treats geometry as a *mos*, an essentially untranslatable term, meaning "way" or "manner" but also "custom" and, in the genitive plural, morals, character, and so on (and thus similar to *ethica*). *Mos* [I will leave the word untranslated as *mos* (singular) or *mores* (plural)] also usually signals a method and not just a mere ordering. I will argue that the *mos geometricus* is both a form or ordering and a method. But I certainly agree with Steenbakkers that this would be untenable if we construed the *mos* as a linear deduction from premise to consequence. See the excellent discussion in Steenbakkers, *Spinoza's Ethica From Manuscript to Print*.

[15] Quoted in Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 1. See also Thomas Cook, "A Whirlwind at my Back . . . Spinozistic Themes in Bernard Malamud's *The Fixer*," *Studia Spinoziana* 5 (1989), 5–28.

There is an important difference in the uses made by Spinoza and Euclid of the geometrical method. Unlike Euclid's theorems, the propositions that Spinoza derived geometrically were not about secants and quadrilaterals, but rather concerned metaphysical first principles, minds, and that which is advantageous to human life and makes us happy and free. In Spinoza's hands the method applies to all beings, not just geometrical figures, and it applies with equal necessity. Thus, in the *Ethics* Spinoza brought one of the most formal and rigorous mathematical methods to bear on philosophy and on our shared world.

Spinoza was far from unique in presenting his philosophy in a geometrical manner. Writing *in more geometrico* was relatively common in the early and mid-seventeenth century. Such familiar philosophers as Pufendorf, Hobbes, and Descartes[16] presented some of their works or sections of their works in a geometrical manner, as did less-known figures like Cumberland, Arnold Geulincx, Jean-Baptiste Morin, and Erhard Weigel.[17] Well after Spinoza's death Locke argued for a deductive science of morals (although not necessarily a geometrical science of morals) as did Samuel Clarke. And many who never wrote in a geometrical manner, like Francis Bacon, emphasized the utility of geometry (and pure mathematics generally) in remedying defects of the intellect and teaching men to avoid miring themselves in the senses.[18] Bacon also built his own philosophy on axioms and definitions – although not arranged in a geometrical order.

In fact, the generation of philosophers born in 1632, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Locke, and Cumberland all at one time or another either tried to mathematize (if not always geometrize) morals or present morals as a deductive system. The reason why they all did this can best be seen through the example

[16] I will discuss Hobbes and Descartes at length below. For Pufendorf see Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (ed.), *Elementa jurisprudentiae universalis* in Thomas Behme (ed.), *Samuel Pufendorf: Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).

[17] Arnold Geulincx, *Ethica* (1665) in J. P. N. Land (ed.), *Opera Philosophica* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1893), III, 1–271; Jean-Baptiste Morin, "Quod Deus Sit" (1635), translated in Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell (eds.), *Descartes' Meditations: Background Source Materials* (Cambridge University Press, 1998, 230–51); Erhard Weigel, *Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta* (Jena, 1659). There is some question as to whether these authors influenced Spinoza. I believe Geulincx's work appeared too late to be an influence on Spinoza's *mos geometricus*, however Bernard Rousset argues that Spinoza's choice of the title *Ethica* and other particulars of Spinoza's "ethical" and political doctrines can be understood in relation to Geulincx in *Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999). It is hard to chart any direct influence between Morin and Spinoza. Weigel is the most underexplored connection. He was an important influence on Leibniz (cf. Konrad Moll, *Der Junge Leibniz* (Stuttgart: Fromman Verlag, 1978), vol. 1.), and on Pufendorf, and was well known in Protestant countries for *Euclid Restituta* which attempted to reconcile Aristotle and the moderns via geometry.

[18] Bacon describes pure mathematics as a kind of gymnastic or tennis for the mind in *Of the Advancement of Learning* (III. 360).

of Richard Cumberland. In his influential *De Legibus Naturae* Cumberland set out to combat Hobbes by presenting an alternative theory of natural law emphasizing man's fundamentally benevolent character. Cumberland argued that in order to do this we need to render moral and political philosophy as a mathematical calculus. Cumberland – like Pufendorf, Locke, and Spinoza – was dramatically impacted by Hobbes' *De Cive*. *De Cive* was published in 1642, a month after the beginning of the English Civil War. Hobbes intended it to be the third work in a trilogy called *Elementa Philosophiae*, the first part of which was *De Corpore*, Hobbes' physics and methodology (not published until 1655 but existing in manuscript long before) and the second part *De Homine* (not published until 1658 but also long in manuscript) Hobbes' theory of perception and his psychology of the passions. Even without the rest of the *Elementa*, *De Cive* had an enormous impact on European intellectuals. In it Hobbes proposed that man was fundamentally self-interested, that morals was an artificial structure imposed on the passions by authority, and that these were harsh realities and harsh solutions that had to be taken into account in helping men to lead relatively happy lives in the chaos of early modern Europe.

In the "Epistle Dedicatory" to *De Cive* Hobbes made a remarkable assertion:

> *Philosophy is divided into as many branches as there are areas where human reason has a place, and takes the different names which the difference of subject matter requires, In treating of figures it is called* Geometry, *of motion* Physics, of *natural law*, Morals, *but it is all* Philosophy; *just as the sea is here called British, there Atlantic, elsewhere Indian, so called from its particular shores, but it is all Ocean. The Geometers have managed their province outstandingly. For whatever benefit comes to human life from observation of the stars, from mapping out of lands, from reckoning of time, and from long-distance navigation*; *whatever is beautiful in buildings*, *strong in defence-works and marvelous in machines, whatever in short distinguishes the modern world from the barbarity of the past, is almost wholly the gift of* Geometry; *for what we owe to* Physics, Physics *owes to* Geometry.[19]

This claim about the centrality of geometry, that it distinguishes the ancients from the moderns and that the moderns owe all their successes to it, is startling. Philosophers like Cumberland – who saw themselves as responding to Hobbes – also accepted Hobbes' elevation of geometry and attempted to use it against the "Monster of Malmesbury" as Hobbes was sometimes called. If Hobbes was correct, then philosophy could be

[19] Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed., trans. & intro. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4–5. On the history and import of *De Cive* see Richard Tuck's excellent introduction to this volume, viii–lii.