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0521819563 - The Politics of Quasi-Government: Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics
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Jonathan G S Koppell
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THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT

Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control

Hybrid organizations, governmental entities that mix characteristics of private and public sector organizations, are increasingly popular mechanisms for implementing public policy. Koppell assesses the performance of the growing quasi-government in terms of accountability and control. Comparing hybrids to traditional government agencies in three policy domains – export promotion, housing and international development – Koppell argues that hybrid organizations are more difficult to control, largely due to the fact that hybrids behave like regulated organizations rather than extensions of administrative agencies. Providing a rich conception of the bureaucratic control problem, Koppell also argues that hybrid organizations are intrinsically less responsive to the political preferences of their political masters and suggests that as policy tools they are inappropriate for some tasks. This book provides a timely study of an important administrative and political phenomenon.

JONATHAN G S KOPPELL is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

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In Memory of
Harold Seidman,
scholar and public servant

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Acknowledgments

In the summer of 1993, I didn't know the difference between Fannie Mae, the government-sponsored enterprise, and Fannie May, the purveyor of chocolates. Nevertheless, Aida Alvarez, director of a new, obscure federal agency called the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), hired me as employee no. 8. For that, I am grateful.

The experience opened my eyes to the peculiar world of quasi-government. OFHEO is a government agency created to ensure that other governmental organizations are doing what they are supposed to do. Very odd. More surprising, I found this type of arrangement is actually quite common. Intrigued, I took my newfound interest in "quasi-government" with me to the University of California.

Many people in the Berkeley Department of Political Science deserve my gratitude. In particular, Judy Gruber was a marvelous advisor. Her careful reading, thoughtful comments and encouragement were invaluable. The Institute of Governmental Studies (IGS) provided my campus home and family. IGS directors Nelson Polsby and Bruce Cain have been vital as critics and advisors. Thanks also to Todd LaPorte, John Ellwood and the IGS Library staff, a group united by their helpfulness.

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The transformation of my doctoral dissertation into this spellbinding volume was accomplished at my current institutional home, the Yale School of Management. My colleagues, in particular Doug Rae and Ted Marmor, have been incredibly supportive, offering advice and encouragement. Series editor Bob Goodin was a reliable source of sound suggestions and good cheer.

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Acronyms

CBO	Congressional Budget Office
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EF	Enterprise Fund
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ExIm	Export-Import Bank of the United States
FCA	Farm Credit Administration
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FEC	Federal Election Commission
FHA	Federal Housing Administration
FHEFSSA	Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act
FHFB	Federal Housing Finance Board
FHLMC	Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (also known as “Freddie Mac”)
FNMA	Federal National Mortgage Association (also known as “Fannie Mae”)
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCCA	Government Corporation Control Act
GNMA	Government National Mortgage Association (also known as “Ginnie Mae”)
GPRA	Government Performance Results Act
GSE	Government-Sponsored Enterprise
HAEF	Hungarian American Enterprise Fund
HUD	US Department of Housing and Urban Development

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ACRONYMS

IF	Investment Fund
ITA	International Trade Administration
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
OFHEO	Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAEF	Polish American Enterprise Fund
PTO	Patent and Trademark Office
RFP	Request for Proposals
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SEED	Support Eastern European Democracy Act
TDA	Trade and Development Agency
TPCC	Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USTR	United States Trade Representative
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs