Much recent philosophy of mind has fallen for a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgements and those of natural science, and has thus overlooked the centrality of the fact that other people are not just objects we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate.

In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then considers the implications of this account for such questions as how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first-person authority.

This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.

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Mind, Reason and Imagination

Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language

JANE HEAL

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Preface

This collection assembles a number of papers published over the past fifteen years which deal with interrelated topics in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. In two cases (4 and 8) it seemed worthwhile to incorporate some second thoughts into the papers themselves, since the revisions were self-contained and not lengthy. Otherwise the papers appear very much in their original form, except for some minor stylistic tidying.

The papers were written to be self-standing but they dovetail in various ways. Themes touched on in earlier pieces reappear for further treatment later. Ideas developed in some detail at one point are, at other places, merely summarised as the basis for further explorations. These overlaps are, I hope, not excessive and I have not tried to remove them. The Introduction sums up the themes of the various pieces and tries to indicate how they fit together.

The papers have benefited in many ways from discussions with colleagues and from their comments. In particular, I would like to thank Martin Davies, whose invitation to contribute to a collection he was assembling got me thinking about “mental simulation” again in 1994. The paper which was the most direct outcome of his suggestion (Heal 1994) is not included here, since doing so would have increased the amount of repetition. But without the spur presented by that initial invitation, and other encouragement and comment, this collection would not exist. Others whom I would like to thank for invitations to talk, comments, criticism, discussion or encouragement include Kent Bach, Peter Carruthers, Jonathan Cohen, Guy Deutscher, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Chris Hill, Jennifer Hornsby, Denis
McManus, Adam Morton, Barry Smith, Stephen Stich, Tim Williamson and anonymous referees for *Mind, Mind and Language* and *Philosophical Quarterly*.

Jane Heal
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