1 **Introduction**

Celebrated by some and dismissed or even regarded as dangerous by others, constructivism has acquired considerable significance in International Relations.[1] Whilst judgements on the value and validity of constructivism differ widely, it seems all but impossible not to have an opinion. As a consequence, it is important to provide a critique that engages the claims of constructivism in detail. However, there is debate not only about whether constructivism is good for us but also, given the intellectual diversity of work labelled constructivist, about what it is in the first place. This poses a serious problem for the possibility of critique. This book focuses on the work of three key scholars; it does not aim to explore the whole range of constructivist work. And yet my critique is, I will argue, relevant to constructivism more broadly.

My critique works through careful readings of the work of Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf, which are, in each case, related to the shift of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) towards using the military instrument in the international realm after the end of the Cold War. This allows me to offer a critique that is of relevance to experts in the area, but is at the same time accessible to those with only a passing familiarity with the matter at issue. In order to contextualise my argument, the introduction starts by visiting the literature on what constructivism is and why it matters. The second section of the chapter introduces the work of Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf and the third provides some background knowledge on German military involvement abroad. Different readers may find that they wish to skip one or other of these sections, which chiefly aim to provide an introduction to the material

---

[1] In this book, International Relations or IR refers to the discipline, and international relations to what is construed as its empirical subject matter.

1

used throughout the book. The final section of the introduction provides a plan of the book together with a brief preview of the overall argument.

Constructivism in International Relations

The significance of constructivism is established more easily than its identity. Constructivism as a phenomenon has become inescapable. Conference panels concerning the social construction of concepts involved in the study of international relations and of actors involved in their making proliferate. A growing number of scholars claim to be studying international phenomena in a constructivist vein.[2] Workshops are even held to discuss the merits of constructivism for the study of international issues as such.[3] The significance of constructivism within IR is underlined by the claim, made repeatedly, that 'the debate' between rationalists and constructivists either currently is, or is about to become, the most significant one in the discipline.[4] In an alternative representation, constructivism is thought to occupy 'the middle ground' between rationalism and more radical approaches, often called reflectivist or relativist. It is no surprise, then, that the field has been described as undergoing or having undergone a 'constructivist turn'.[5] Interestingly, in

[2] See, for example, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument', *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995), 491–517; Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark (eds.), *Constituting International Political Economy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[3] See Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), *The Aarhus–Norsminde Papers: Constructivism, International Relations and European Studies* (Aarhus University, 1997).
[4] Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (1998), 263; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen Krasner, '*International Organization* and the Study of World Politics', *International Organization* 52 (1998), 646; John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 4; K. M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, 'Introduction', in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation* (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 3.
[5] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics* 50 (1998), 324–48; Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?', 263; Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 2nd edn (Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 279.

2

terms of indicating an increasing acceptance of the approach, construc-tivism has ceased to be a matter only for the theoretically minded scholar. Textbooks targeted at undergraduate students introduce the approach at least in passing[6] and we are informed by a journal aimed at an audi-ence beyond academia that constructivism is one of the three standard ways of analysing international politics.[7] A 'constructivist turn' could therefore be said to have occurred beyond the confines of theoretical debate.

Despite this unmistakable surge of constructivism, it remains difficult to identify its key claims uncontroversially. Thus I start by exploring the different assessments of constructivism's position in the discipline, which are based on different understandings of what constructivism is. In the first view, which opposes constructivism to rationalism, tradi-tional or 'mainstream' approaches, such as Neorealism and Neoliber-alism, are construed as rationalist. Although so-called rationalists typ-ically share a range of assumptions about the nature of international politics, such as the notion that state actors are unitary and rational, their attitude towards what counts as reliable knowledge is key.[8] Rationalists subscribe to the tenets of what Steve Smith outlines as positivism. They believe that social phenomena may be explained in the same way as the natural world and that facts and values may be clearly separated. Their goal is to uncover regularities. Scientific enquiry, in their view, must rely on empirical validation or falsification.[9] The upshot of the rational-ist position is therefore that actors and concepts are exogenously given. Actors act in this pregiven world according to the demands of instru-mental reason. This assumption of instrumental rationality is crucial,[10] hence the term 'rationalism'.

Constructivism, as the supposedly polar opposite in this debating constellation, challenges the assumptions of rationalism, particularly

---

[6] Charles W. Kegley jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 7th edn (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), p. 39; Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, 3rd edn (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), pp. 217–18 and 429–30; more substantially John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 183–7 and 204–5.

[7] Stephen M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign Policy* 110 (1998), 38.

[8] Steve Smith, 'The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2 (2000), 382–3. Checkel claims the opposite: that the constructivists' debate with the mainstream is about on-tology (Checkel, 'Constructivist Turn', 327).

[9] Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16.

[10] Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, '*International Organization*', 679.

3

Introduction

the notion of an unchanging reality of international politics. Anarchy is not an unavoidable feature of international reality; it is, in Wendt's famous words, 'what states make of it' (A). As a result of recognising that practice influences outcome, the social world is seen as constructed, not given. States may be self-interested but they continuously (re)define what that means. Their identities may change. Norms help define situations and hence influence international practice in a significant way. In order to appreciate this influence of identities and/or norms it is necessary to explore intersubjective meaning. Thus the positivist conception of the social world and knowledge about it is challenged. Interpreting meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice, rather than empirically validating explanations of independent mechanisms, become central. Thus constructivism is seen as pitched against rationalism. This debate is then the main site of contention in IR theory.

This notion of the rationalist–constructivist debate is problematic. For a start, whilst German scholars have indeed discussed the merits of rational choice versus constructivist approaches at length,[11] there is little evidence of a *debate* in the Anglo-Saxon context. In surveys of the state of the discipline in general and of constructivism in particular we are told time and again that this debate is happening and that it is crucially important. And yet we do not find exchanges between rationalist and

[11] Harald Müller, 'Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln. Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorien', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 1 (1994), 15–44; Harald Müller, 'Spielen hilft nicht immer. Die Grenzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes und der Platz der Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns in der Analyse internationaler Beziehungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 2 (1995), 371–91; Gerald Schneider, 'Rational Choice und kommunikatives Handeln. Eine Replik auf Harald Müller', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 1 (1994), 357–66; Otto Keck, 'Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in den internationalen Beziehungen. Ist eine Verbindung von Rational-Choice-Theorie und Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns möglich?', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 2 (1995), 5–48; Otto Keck, 'Zur sozialen Konstruktion des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes. Einige Klarstellungen zur Rationalismus-Konstruktivismus-Debatte', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 4 (1997), 139–51; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Reden ist nicht billig. Zur Debatte um Kommunikation und Rationalität', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 2 (1995), 171–84; Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, 'Die Theorie kommunikativen Handelns – eine Flaschenpost? Anmerkungen zur jüngsten Debatte in den internationalen Beziehungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 2 (1995), 347–70; Volker von Prittwitz, 'Verständigung über die Verständigung. Anmerkungen und Ergänzungen zur Debatte über Rationalität und Kommunikation in den Internationalen Beziehungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (1996), 133–47; Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn, 'Argumentatives Handeln bei internationalen Verhandlungen. Moderate Anmerkungen zur post-realistischen Debatte', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (1996), 341–66; Michael Müller, 'Vom Dissensrisiko zur Ordnung der internationalen Staatenwelt. Zum Projekt einer normativ gehaltvollen Theorie', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (1996), 367–79.

constructivist scholars in key journals. However, the emphasis on this non-existent debate is interesting in itself; for the idea of the rationalist–constructivist debate as a crucial site for cutting-edge IR theory establishes not only the importance of constructivism but also the continued significance of rationalism.

In another popular representation constructivism can 'build a bridge'[12] between different approaches, provide a 'via media'[13] or occupy 'the middle ground'.[14] This is again as interesting as it is problematic. As I argue in chapter 2, it is not clear that the so-called middle ground is possible. Even if it is, the notion of 'middle ground' envisages constructivists as situated between, and able to engage in conversation with, rationalists and those deemed more radical than the constructivists. The emphasis on the constructivist–rationalist debate as the centre of attention, however, is more appropriate insofar as constructivists seem markedly more interested in conducting a conversation with one side than the other. Contrast the superficial and often caricatured treatment of other 'reflectivists' and their claims[15] with the careful reasoning vis-à-vis Realists and other rationalists.[16] Jeffrey Checkel even wants to 'synthesize' constructivism and rationalism, as does Wendt in the final pages of his *Social Theory of International Politics*.[17] In that sense, the invention of the rationalist–constructivist debate as the centre of action in IR theory underlines that the so-called middle ground is much closer to rationalism than to the other side.

Interestingly, the rhetoric of the middle has normative overtones which are not addressed.[18] It is portrayed, at least implicitly, as more reasonable than the position of those who, as they are not in the middle ground, must be on the fringe. Paradoxically, this implication is again underscored by the description revolving around a rationalist–constructivist

[12] A 394; Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (1997), 323.

[13] Steve Smith, 'New Approaches to International Theory', in Baylis and Smith, *Globalization of World Politics*, p. 188.

[14] Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground'; Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, p. 217.

[15] For example, Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 321 and 332–4.

[16] For example, *STIP passim*.

[17] Jeffrey Checkel, 'International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist–Constructivist Divide', *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (1997), 488; *STIP* 367. See also Alexander Wendt, 'On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics', *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000), 179–80.

[18] See Zangl and Zürn, 'Argumentatives Handeln', esp. 343–4, who promote a 'moderate constructivism' occupying a 'middle position' without explaining why this is desirable. See also Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 348.

Introduction

debate. In this representation any approach that challenges the ratio-
nalist assumption of unchanging facts is subsumed under the category
of constructivism. This covers a range of approaches and therefore the
constructivist category is then often subdivided, for example into mod-
ernist and postmodern, or conventional, critical and postmodern. Of
these, only the modernist or conventional variant is really understood
to be in debate with rationalism. Hence, even in the representation that
appears to include all critical approaches under the constructivist label,
only the 'middle-ground' constructivists are proper constructivists. In
contrast, so-called postmodernists are beyond the pale, as they are seen
to consider social science impossible and to lack the willingness to de-
bate rationalists in a scholarly way.[19] Hence, Nalini Persram objects to
what she calls the 'strategic use of social constructivism',[20] which is part
and parcel of the acceptance of constructivism. Representing it as the
most significant 'radical' approach makes an engagement with (other)
critical approaches seem superfluous and thus effectively marginalises
them. This is confirmed by portrayals of the theoretical landscape which
see Realism at one end of the spectrum and constructivism at the other,[21]
leaving no room for (other) critical thinking. Either it will be subsumed
under the constructivist label or it will be entirely dismissed. In both
cases it disappears from sight, and thinking space is closed down. Thus
constructivism is significant not only because it is considered central
but also because of the possibility of deploying it strategically to ex-
clude more radical perspectives from consideration. This in particular
makes critique necessary.

Thus, constructivism is clearly significant to IR (theory) and its future
development. However, we still lack clarity on what constructivism is.
Critique usually starts with a clear delineation of its target. Although
constructivism has been defined, explained, assessed and positioned,[22]
there is little agreement about what it is. Some subsume any non-
mainstream and hence non-rationalist approach under the construc-
tivist label, whilst others want to reserve the term more specifically for

[19] Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, '*International Organization*', 677.
[20] Nalini Persram, 'Coda: Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Strategy', in Jenny Edkins, Nalini
Persram and Véronique Pin-Fat (eds.), *Sovereignty and Subjectivity* (Boulder and
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 164.
[21] For example, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical
Perspective', in Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p. 10.
[22] Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground'; Checkel, 'Constructivist Turn'; Ted Hopf, 'The
Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security* 23
(1998), 171–200; Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?'

a group of closely related approaches. The first classification usually involves identifying several different strands of constructivism, such as conventional, critical and postmodern.[23] This is in tension with those who offer a specific definition of constructivism, such as Adler who informs us that constructivism 'is the view that *the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world*'.[24] Such attempts at definition draw attention to an interesting point, the role of the material world in social construction, but they cannot obscure the intellectual diversity of constructivist work and the resulting lack of agreement on what constructivism is. Some reserve the term exclusively to label Wendt's approach.[25] More usually, however, constructivism is thought to include a range of distinct varieties.[26] Thus, one could say that constructivism provides the 'general rubric' under which a range of approaches are subsumed.[27]

The definitional problem of what constructivism is is not just a matter of whether different scholars claiming the constructivist label are engaged in the same project, of how diverse the constructivist camp is. It is very much about who is in it in the first place. For example, some argue for the need clearly to distinguish constructivism from poststructuralism or postmodernism.[28] Others, however, include a postmodernist variant.[29] Poststructuralists, such as Roxanne Lynn Doty and David Campbell, are sometimes mentioned in references to constructivism.[30]

[23] See Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, '*International Organization*', 675.
[24] Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 322. All italics in quotations are as in the original unless otherwise noted.
[25] Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 188; also Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 39.
[26] See, for example, Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 335–6; Hans-Martin Jaeger, 'Konstruktionsfehler des Konstruktivismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3 (1996), 315; *STIP* 1; and Knutsen, *History of IR Theory*, p. 279.
[27] Thomas U. Berger, 'The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy', *German Politics* 6 (1997), 43.
[28] Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 320–1; Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities', p. 12; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, '*International Organization*', 648 and 677–8; Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, 'Constructing Constructivism', in Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 4.
[29] Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, p. 35; Price and Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons?', 269; Knutsen, *History of IR Theory*, p. 280.
[30] Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, 'Preface: Towards Critical Security Studies', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997), p. xxi, n. 10; *STIP* 4.

Introduction

Yet they are likely to reject any inclusion into the constructivist camp,[31] especially when it comes together with a definition of the position, such as Adler's, that excludes them intellectually.

Quite apart from the argument over whose work is appropriately classified as constructivist, there is also discussion about whether constructivism is properly to be seen as a theory of IR or rather as a philosophical category, a meta-theory or a method for empirical research, or whether it is indeed an approach relevant at several levels.[32] Despite all this, one would assume there to be minimum requirements for being a member of the club. In this context, Kratochwil's assertion that the 'issue is not whether somebody says or believes that she or he is a constructivist, but whether or not such a (self-)identification makes sense in view of some of the tenets defining constructivism'[33] is relevant, but he fails to spell out the tenets he has in mind.[34]

Even if the application of the label 'constructivist' is limited to those who claim it themselves, there is still a tremendous variety of work left. Some are interested in the significance of norms and identity for the construction of reality.[35] Others make norms defined as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour central to their argument.[36] There are contributions to the question of community building in relation to security issues,[37] explorations of the construction of national interests,[38]

[31] See David Campbell, 'Epilogue: The Disciplinary Politics of Theorizing Identity', in David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, revised edn (Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 218–21; David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 24–5; Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North–South Relations* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 163–71.

[32] See Knud Erik Jørgensen, 'Four Levels and a Discipline', in Fierke and Jørgensen, *Constructing International Relations*, pp. 36–53; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study', in Fierke and Jørgensen, *Constructing International Relations*, pp. 13–35; Checkel, 'Constructivist Turn', 325.

[33] Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's "Social Theory of International Politics" and the Constructivist Challenge', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2000), 89.

[34] He is somewhat more explicit in Kratochwil, 'Constructivism as an Approach', esp. pp. 16–19.

[35] Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*.

[36] Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; Audie Klotz, 'Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and US Sanctions Against South Africa', *International Organization* 49 (1995), 451–78; Klotz, *Norms in International Relations.*

[37] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

[38] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (1996), 275–318; Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

analyses of language games.[39] This diversity is not merely about putting different concepts at the centre of the analysis but stems from relying on different intellectual traditions, ranging from various strands of sociology to Wittgensteinian thought. The intellectual diverseness of work that is represented as constructivist, either by its author or by others, makes it difficult to critique the approach at all, as it is not clear that there are claims and assumptions which are shared across the spectrum.

It is not surprising, then, that a sustained critical engagement with constructivist claims is lacking in the literature. Those who fashion themselves as constructivists have preferred to get on with empirical work and sometimes to explain to the uninitiated what constructivism is really all about. On the other hand, those who are critical of the approach understandably do not want to go beyond a discussion of constructivist assumptions with which they disagree from the start.[40] Hence, for all the hype surrounding it, it is tempting to argue that constructivism has not been taken seriously, either by its supporters or by its critics.

The impossibility of precisely delineating 'the' constructivist position must not mean, however, that we may only speechlessly watch the spectacle of the constructivist 'success story',[41] unable to pin it down for long enough to offer a well-founded critique. The significance of constructivism in IR, especially in its role as critical but acceptable alternative to the mainstream,[42] is such that critique is necessary. Its possibility is a more complex matter due to the lack of agreement on what this constructivism, which is thought to have such an impact on the discipline, actually is. To make the necessary critique possible, my strategy is to confine my critique to the work of three key constructivist scholars, Wendt, Kratochwil and Onuf, who have all had a part in making constructivism, and to draw wider conclusions only after having considered their arguments in detail. The next section will introduce their work to provide the background for an analysis that integrates theoretical arguments and empirical material. Beforehand, it is useful briefly to outline key elements of my approach.

[39] K. M. Fierke, 'Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction of Western Action in Bosnia', *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (1996), 467–97; K. M. Fierke, *Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security* (Manchester University Press, 1998).
[40] For example, Campbell, 'Epilogue'; Persram, 'Coda'.
[41] Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000), 147.
[42] See Guzzini, 'Reconstruction', 147–8.

Introduction

Although there is no agreed definition of constructivism, and I do not offer one, my analysis throughout the book will show that the constructivisms under consideration agree on the assumption of limited construction. That is, when their constructivist analysis starts, some reality has already been made and is taken as given. Constructivist work stresses the significance of meaning but assumes, at the same time, the existence of an *a priori* reality. This places it, intentionally or not, in a middle-ground position which is problematic but central to constructivism. Wendt's, Kratochwil's and Onuf's work thus reflect different ways in which the middle ground can be taken.

My argument is inspired by Jacques Derrida's thought, although it is not written only for those steeped in Continental philosophy. The Derridean commitment, which is laid out in detail in chapter 5, is significant for my analysis from the start. Accordingly, it seeks to reveal not what the constructivists in question *intend* to do, but what their theories do do, that is, how their own assumptions undermine their stated purpose and make their theories unravel. In the same spirit, the 'application' of the different theories to the case of German military involvement abroad, deliberately often using the same material and indeed the same quotations in the different theoretical contexts, does not aim to test the theories by holding them up against a supposed reality, but clarifies and illustrates how each theory's assumptions undermine it, make it 'deconstruct'. This strategy of bringing together without distinction what are called theoretical arguments and what is seen as empirical material is based on my interpretation of Derrida's claim that 'there is nothing outside of the text' presented in chapter 5. The crucial point for the moment is that it is the interplay between 'theory' and 'empirical material' which is relevant. Before my analytical strategy and its implications can be explained more fully in the final section of this introduction, it is necessary to outline the three constructivisms and the issues involved in the FRG's shift towards participation in international military operations.

Three constructivisms

Onuf first introduced the term 'constructivism' to IR and both Kratochwil and Wendt refer to this fact.[43] With *World of Our Making*,

[43] *WOM*; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System', *International Organization* 48 (1994), 216, n. 3; A 393; and *STIP* 1.