

Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation

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I

Contemporary Challenges and Historical Reflections on the Study of Militaries, States, and Politics

Diane E. Davis

War-Making in the New Millennium

The post-Cold War era ushered in a new wave of optimism about an end to world wars and a possible reduction in global-scale violence. As the new millennium loomed large, heightened expectations about world peace and global political stability captured the imagination of those who scarcely a decade earlier concerned themselves primarily with war-making among superpowers and their satellites. Shifting rhetorics and rising expectations were further fueled by the so-called third wave of democracy that continued materializing in the post-1989 world. As democratization and globalization reached ever further corners of the globe, long-standing claims of political scientists that democracies do not fight each other took on greater significance. For many security analysts, new forms of regional and international economic cooperation between countries committed to a common project of liberalization also promised to reduce the likelihood of widespread global conflict.

But now, from the vantage point of a new millennium, and in a post-9/11 world, initial optimism seems muted. Few would counsel that the threat of armed conflict is on the wane, at least insofar as violence and armed coercion still continue as facts of life. Even as a tentative peace settles in among previously contending geopolitical superpowers struggling over spheres of influence, those countries and regions that lay in the interstices of this larger power structure – and whose fates not that long ago seemed overdetermined by the economic or political competition between Cold War antagonists – are beginning to implode with greater frequency. This is especially the case in countries where liberalization of the economy has proceeded more rapidly than the expansion of citizenship rights and the consolidation of newly democratic institutions. In those places with particularly vulnerable political and economic conditions, the strong arm of the state is directed inwardly as much as outwardly, as is increasingly evident

in Central and East Europe, Latin America, Africa, Central and East Asia, and the Middle East. In many of these locations, specialized paramilitary forces and police now replace the national military on the front lines of violent conflict, while citizens arm themselves both offensively and defensively as vigilante groups, militias, terrorists, and even mafia organizations seeking to counteract or bypass the state's claim on a monopoly of legitimate force. These developments not only suggest that further study of the origins and larger political impacts of these new patterns of armed force might take us far in explaining the potential obstacles to world peace, and even the erosion of democracy and citizenship rights in the contemporary era; they also shed light on a potential paradox that few were prepared to consider during the celebratory dawn of the initial post-Cold War euphoria: as the probability of world war diminishes, the likelihood of "internal" war and subnational violence may be increasing, at least for certain countries of the world.

What seems to have changed, in short, is not the likelihood of militarized coercion and armed conflict so much as its character and scope. In those regions of the world where violence seems most prevalent, the predominant forms of war-making and the means of coercion appear markedly different than in the immediate past; and with the terrain of experience shifting so dramatically, old theories and long-standing analytic points of entry must be called into question, even if the persistence of conflict is not. Today we see a large number of armed conflicts in which the main protagonists comprise not nationally conscripted standing armies waging war in the name of sovereign nations but states acting against their own peoples. We also see popularly constituted or clandestine armed forces who frequently act on behalf of subnational groups (often defined in terms of ethnicity, language, region, or religion) and whose claims to national sovereignty themselves are problematic. What seems to be most under contention, then, are not the interstate hegemonies or globally contested geopolitical balances of power that led to large-scale wars in previous decades, but the legitimacy, power, and reach of national states, especially as seen from the point of view of those populations contained within their own territorial jurisdictions.

The stakes and terms of these conflicts also are different than they were when nations primarily fought each other. Many of these more "irregular" armed forces – ranging in form from paramilitaries and the police to vigilantes, terrorists, and militias – derive their charge and calling from civil society; and if they do answer to the state in some fashion, it is generally not to the national executive or the military defense establishment but to locally organized law enforcement agencies (as in the case of police) or more clandestine security apparatuses (as with specialized paramilitary forces). These latter agencies may be closely articulated with the national executive and national defense ministries, to be sure. But historically, police, militias, and paramilitary personnel have operated under different organizational,

political, and disciplinary dynamics than have conventional armed forces. Moreover, to the extent that many of these alternative armed forces comprise previous military personnel, especially in the context of the transition from authoritarian rule, they may carry with them traditions, techniques, and networks (not to mention arms) that still link them to national defense ministries although they are formally separate from national armed forces. As such, their relationships to the military, the state, and even civil society may differ in ways that are not well articulated in the conventional literature on armed forces.

The military as a key national institution is not about to disappear; nor in all probability will the nation-state and interstate or international conflicts, including those in which nations cooperate regionally or globally to fight against particular regimes. But developments in recent years, especially when compared to the period starting with World War I to the end of the Cold War in 1989, do suggest a fundamental transformation in what we have generally considered war-making, and in the types of coercive violence being deployed by citizens and the state.¹ To the extent that so many different forms and agents of internally directed violence now seem to proliferate, it is time to reexamine conventional views about warfare, armed force, and their larger implications. We must be prepared to consider the possibility that nation-states, in addition to losing their monopoly over the means of coercion, may also be in the position of losing the incentives, will, or means to establish universal social contracts with their own peoples, as occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when national governments conscripted citizens to fight on their behalf.²

Reconsidering the War-Making–State-Making Nexus

Our collective aim in this volume is to examine alternative or “irregular”³ agents of militarized coercion and armed struggle, to consider the extent to which their activities – both in form and impact – parallel those of conventional armed forces, and to assess the theoretical and practical implications of this knowledge for the study of national politics and state formation. Among the issues that concern us here are whether the apparent pervasiveness of irregular armed force in the contemporary period necessarily entails a rethinking of the literature on war-making, especially the relationship between war-making and state-making or national political development. Should we assume that the predominance of armed veteran groups, police, militia, paramilitary, and a variety of other subnational forces in the front lines of violent coercion is really as new as it may appear, both in given countries or across the board? Or, is it just that methodological blinders and prevailing theoretical frameworks – as opposed to substantively “real” transformations – have discouraged us from examining them with a sharpened comparative and historical eye?

Scholars have been slow to tackle these questions or to examine conscientiously the relationship between irregular armed force, state-building, and national political development. For decades, the most popular theoretical guides to war-making and state-making among political scientists, sociologists, and historians analyzed the relationship between standing armies and the development of state structures and capacities, with the actions of conscripted military personnel whose role is to defend national sovereignty vis-à-vis foreign or external aggressors serving as the main empirical point of departure. Most of this literature identified the nation-state as the key unit of analysis, while conventional organizations for warfare were considered the primary mode of militarized conflict. These assumptions were evident not just in the seminal writings of historians and sociologists like Charles Tilly (1990) and Michael Mann (1988), who constructed many of their arguments about military power and state formation on the basis of propositions about militaries and states drawn from classic works by Max Weber, who himself was most interested in the rise of national states and interstate conflict during the early modern era. The failure to transcend the confines of the nation-state or to examine nonconventional military forces also held true in most of the political science literature, in which scholars crafted arguments about the relationships between militaries and national states for the purposes of supplanting larger claims about international systems of states, Cold War balances of power, and the likelihood of democracy or authoritarianism (with a leading concern in the latter studies being the extent to which the state is subject to civilian or military rule) in Africa, Latin America, and East Asia as their nations sought to modernize both politically and economically.

To be sure, despite their firm theoretical grounding in the early modern experience of mainly European nation-states, most of the originating arguments about military power and states were judged to be so powerful and compelling that they also enjoyed much contemporary regard, and were frequently utilized to explain late twentieth-century forms of political development in a variety of comparative contexts. As such, it is not that scholars have completely failed to think comparatively and historically about armed force and national politics or state formation. Writings by Charles Tilly (in *Bringing the State Back In*, 1985) and Peter Evans (*Embedded Autonomy*, 1995) are exemplary in these regards, as is recent work by Robert Bates (2001). While the former authors are well known among sociologists for developing the notion of protection rackets and focusing on predatory states that exploit their own peoples through military rule and other coercive techniques, Bates has posed new and intriguing questions about the impact of the global political economy on late-developing states' predatory relationships vis-à-vis their own populations. In the process he has raised the possibility that recent transformations in the global political economy may have fundamentally altered the long-standing connections between war-making,

state-making, and the rise of democratic institutions that prevailed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in no small part by reinforcing warlord-type politics in regions of the world like Africa. In these regards, he comes close to suggesting a historical convergence between the premodern and postmodern eras or, perhaps better said, between early and late developers.

Despite their application to a more contemporary period, however, and the comparative-historical advances contained in these studies, most writings on the present period still tended to use conventional armed force as their key frame of reference, looking for the ways that patterns of political and economic development might disrupt their dynamics rather than vice versa, as we do here. It is no real surprise, then, that much of the available literature on the topic does not easily transfer to the globalized, early twenty-first-century world where the nation-state is ever more called into question and where violence and armed coercion continue even in the face of democratic inroads. One of our aims here is to continue with Bates's formulation and to analyze what is similar and what is different across these comparative and historical contexts. To what extent do the models that emerged out of close examination of much earlier historical experiences hold up in new or different contexts? What modifications might be necessary to account for new patterns of internally as well as externally directed warfare and the wide range of armed forces now active in regions and nations around the world? And what are the implications of any such modifications for our theoretical and practical understanding of politics and coercive forces in both the past and the present?

To be entirely fair, a focus on nonconventional militaries organized locally, as mercenaries or other forms of paramilitary armed brigands, is not completely absent in the literature. Charles Tilly, whose own contribution in the first section of this volume sets the framework for the studies that follow, has underscored elsewhere that most of the original writings about war-making and state-making were built on the assumption that subnational coercion and the use of "irregular" armed force were necessary to the consolidation of national states in the first place. He and others have shown that the putative national states of the early modern era used irregular forces to reinforce conscription patterns, to form standing armies, to continue interstate war-making, and thus to further extend and reinforce citizenship rights, all in ways that buttressed national state institutions and capacities. But this narrative is generally reproduced in the context of conventional war-making-state-making dynamics, with a focus on the militarized conditions under which national states form, expand their institutional reach, and become legitimate, and with an analytical focus on the outcome of these processes. One consequence is that nation-states and conventional war-making organizations have remained the central subject of study in the literature, while the focus on irregular forces, generally speaking, as well as subnational domains of political organization, has dropped out of the

picture unless the premodern period remains of interest. A second consequence is that scholars armed with this framework tend to gravitate toward the study of times and places most likely to parallel conditions present in the early modern era that inspired the argument in the first place. This explains the preoccupation with Western Europe and the study of interstate rivalries in this part of the globe during the period of the world wars, as well as the continued focus on those countries of the world not yet considered “modern,” like Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Our practical aim in this edited volume is to reintroduce studies of irregular or nonconventional armed forces to the literature on politics and state formation, to do so with an expanded focus that includes countries and time periods routinely ignored in this literature, and to do so with an eye to subnational as well as transnational politics and coercive actors. The collection comprises both historical and contemporary case studies as well as theoretically informed essays that examine a wide variety of experiences in which armed forces other than national militaries representing sovereign national powers in interstate conflicts are the subject of study. In presenting these cases and theorizing their implications, we stand on the shoulders of several recent authors in the fields of political science and sociology who have made significant gains in these regards already. In addition to Robert Bates, whose *Prosperity and Violence* (2001) has been noted earlier, they include Margaret Levi (1997) and Mark Osiel (1999), whose recent books have taken the field in entirely new directions by focusing on how preparation for war, either in the form of conscription or military training, establishes and sometimes transforms the social contract between the governing and the governed. We also turn for inspiration to Theda Skocpol’s pioneering work, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (1992), whose focus on post-war dynamics sustained a larger argument about the impact of veterans organizations and claims for veterans’ pensions on the formation of the U.S. welfare state. In this edited volume we continue in the spirit of innovation embodied in these leading works, but we try to expand our framework and analytic scope even more to include a far wider set of countries, armed forces, and historical time periods in the mix. We accomplish this in four specific ways.

First, we include essays that analyze the interaction between war-making and state-making in countries where the coercive arm of the state and the activities of national militaries are internally as well as externally directed, such that agents of the state search for enemies within their own borders and/or repressively police their own populations. Second, we showcase the work of authors who focus their attention on a variety of armed personnel, including militias, paramilitaries, and police, as well as demobilized militaries, including veterans. Third, rather than focusing only on the nation-state as the principal source of coercive capacity, both regular and irregular, internally directed or not, we also examine armed forces active or

convened on behalf of local states and imperial states, seeking to understand the ways that the activities of locally or globally constituted armed forces also contribute to national state formation and political developments, both domestic and international. Last, we make a deliberate effort to transcend the constraining assumptions drawn from work on authoritarian versus democratic regime types by rejecting the popular epistemological premise that irregular armed forces and internally directed coercive agents are analytically or theoretically relevant only in authoritarian countries. As such, we include studies of irregular armed forces across a variety of comparative and historical contexts, democratic or not.

Given the book's originating concern with the present period, it may seem counterintuitive to be raising questions and offering case studies that span the centuries and all parts of the globe, as we do here. The essays in this book focus on countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia as well as France, Greece, Japan, and the United States, and they treat periods as early as the fourteenth century and as late as the newly crowned twenty-first century. Yet the selection of these widely divergent cases and sweeping time periods is purposeful and grounded in careful attention to the importance of history and method. It allows us to ask similar questions about earlier historical cases and the present, and to look for parallels or differences either in terms of the nature of the armed forces involved or the domains in which these conflicts have unfolded. Together, this methodological framing should provide the tools and materials to understand the dynamics of militarized coercion and politics in the contemporary world, even as they may also shed new practical and theoretical light on the past.

Transcending Past Assumptions

What guides do we use to recast our understanding of the relationships between militaries, state formation, and national politics as well as to establish our own comparative and historical points of entry? Perhaps the best point of departure is the literature itself, which can be evaluated for its internal logic as well as for its capacity to account for contemporary and historical developments in the world of states and wars. In addition to the classic literature on war-making and state formation by Tilly and Mann and to the newest variations on these themes in the work of Bates, Skocpol, Levi, and Osiel, noted earlier, there exists a substantial body of literature on the military, state power, and national political development formulated by political scientists, historians, and strategic defense specialists of the Cold War era that must be considered. Its authors have paid considerable attention to the ways that levels of economic development, the organizational power of the national state, and the absence of democracy can affect a country's capacity institutionally to subordinate the military to civilian rulers, and vice versa (see, e.g., Huntington 1959: esp. 80–85; Vagts 1973;

Rouquié 1987; Remmer 1989). To the extent that this literature laid much of the groundwork for contemporary knowledge of the relationship between armed forces and political development, it is worth reviewing here in order to assess what must be salvaged or discarded to make sense of the present.

Historically, this field developed around three “generations” of scholars, each attentive to pressing contemporary questions, but all preoccupied with the relationships between militaries and democracy or regime type more than state formation. The first generation of scholarship was organized in the 1960s around modernization theory. Its authors were concerned with how former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America could achieve political “development,” and they identified military professionalization and civilian control of the military as essential to the modern democratic project. In the 1970s, a second generation of scholars, reacting to the wave of military regimes that appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, replaced the optimistic teleology of modernization theory. These social scientists were divided into two camps. One camp applauded military intervention, seeing the military as a middle-class institution that could control popular “disorder” and usher in political modernization; the other condemned military intervention, attributing it to dependent capitalist development and super-power clientelism reflecting Cold War antagonisms. Most recently, a third generation, responding to the collapse or negotiated transition of many military-based authoritarian regimes, sought to explain why such political transitions occurred, and what role militaries should play if new democracies are to be consolidated.

We find three blind spots in this literature, each of which sustains our current effort to seek a new analytic framework. The first blind spot, alluded to already, results from the use of broadly defined regime type as the central axis of comparison, a strategy that has meant that most scholars have failed to examine commonalities across political systems or differences within them. All three generations of scholars have assumed that significant differences in military actions and power are best captured in a regime-type trichotomy (democracy-authoritarianism-totalitarianism). Within this formulation, democracies are characterized by civilian control of the military, which authoritarian regimes lack (Finer 1982; Perlmutter 1982; Wolpin 1986; Maniruzzaman 1987; Lopez and Stohl 1989). In democracies, for example, the military is assumed to be institutionally subordinated to the state, and thus is neither a significant nor a threatening political actor in government and society. In authoritarian regimes, in contrast, the military often shares power with the state, which means it can politically influence state actions and oppress civil society, although perhaps not completely. In totalitarian regimes, the military is assumed to dominate the state and terrorize society in despotic ways that limit political opposition and curtail political freedom on all levels.

Armed with this framework, scholars interested in the military's role and impact on society, politics, or state power turned most of their attention to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Again, their studies have specified the features that distinguish these types of regimes from each other and from democracies, rather than the historically produced commonalities across them. Most important, perhaps, owing to these assumptions scholars failed to explore systematically those variations in the military's character and political capacity that occurred even within democracies, because in this regime type the "problem" of the military was assumed to be nonexistent. To be sure, some scholars have questioned both the assumption that the military's power and political influence in the state correlate strictly with regime type and the extent to which the military's role or influence in democracies is politically unproblematic. This approach is perhaps best demonstrated by recent studies on the varying forms of military power within countries now shedding authoritarianism and embracing democracy (Stepan 1988; Aguero 1992; McSherry 1992; Zaverucha 1993; Acuña and Smulovitz 1996; Pion-Berlin 1997). Nevertheless, even these newer studies are based on the assumption that once democratization is formally on the political agenda, formerly authoritarian countries will institutionalize an effective separation of military and state power, and thus the "military question" is no longer problematic. It is presumed that once such a separation is implemented, discussion of political stability or democratic consolidation can move on to other concerns.

A closer look at the evidence, however, as well as the articles presented in this book, suggests that it is important to examine the historically constituted differences in the nature of the military or other armed forces and their popular legitimacy among similar regime types, even and especially within democracies. Much is lost in the study of both new and old democracies, for example, if we fail to recognize that countries may have had similar or dissimilar histories of military autonomy and development, and that these historical patterns have had important impacts on the institutional and ideological contours of democratic states and their national politics. In this volume, this point is made in Susan Browne's examination of the postcolonial United States, Richard Bense's discussion of the post-Civil War era, and Elizabeth Zack's discussion of the Third Republic in France. All three articles underscore that even in old democracies like France and the United States what we call militarized forces – ranging from militias to veterans to police – possess varying degrees of popular legitimacy and, as such, have differentially affected internal political developments.

A second assumption in the existing literature on the military and politics is that the military is a relatively centralized and homogeneous national institution established in the service of the national state (Huntington 1962; Finer 1982; Perlmutter 1982; Clapham and Philip 1985; Maniruzzaman 1987; Im 1987). In contrast, we argue the importance of seeing military

forces as networks of persons in different institutional and regional loci, which furthermore can be crosscut by transnational, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other local or individual pressures. To be sure, we are not the first to identify heterogeneity within the military. Yet most studies of divisions within the military have generally been limited to political ideology, as in discussions of hard-liners and soft-liners, anticommunists, nationalists, and so on (see, e.g., Loveman and Davies 1978; Handelman and Sanders 1981; Potash and Lewis 1983; Stepan 1988). Obviously there are exceptions, for example, in studies of tribal conflict within African militaries (Luckman 1971) and in those which examine the impact of transnational relations on domestic militaries (Powell 1965; Fitch 1979; Petras 1987; Tilly 1990). Still, even in these writings national borders are taken as fixed and the potential problem of disintegration of either national states or their militaries has not been well theorized, perhaps because it has happened only rarely until recently.

As some of the cases presented in this book demonstrate, however, there may be internal divisions within militaries. In Bensel's discussion of the post-Civil War era in the United States, internal divisions were based on regional allegiance. They may also be based on consciously formulated distinctions between formal and "irregular" armies, as Achilles Batalas shows in his study of Greece. There may even be divisions in terms of the jurisdictional levels on which military personnel are formally organized or substantively active (i.e., the city or the region or the subnational state versus the nation). All of these can both result from and influence long-term patterns of national politics and state formation. The latter point is made especially clear in Laura Kalmanowiecki's discussion of the military-police nexus in Argentina, and the ways the expansion of relatively repressive police forces across Argentine national territory results from an articulation with the national military and the federal government, a dynamic that in turn helped sustain military rule in the nation as a whole.

Just as it is necessary to look at intranational overlaps and distinctions in the military and between the military and other coercive forces like the police or militias, it is also important to examine the military as an institution comprising individuals whose routine practices and social relations can transcend state borders even when not engaged in active war-making. William Reno's discussion of warlords in Africa and their capacities to sustain state power violently rests on an understanding of the cross-border relations they establish with other warlord and tribal constituencies as much as the alliances they establish with forces contained within their own formal territorial boundaries. In a similar vein, Anne Raffin's discussion of the transnational linkages between military-led youth activities in France and Indochina also shows that common military practices joined youth populations together even across national borders and in ways that buttressed colonial power in the short-term even as

they sustained anticolonial practices in the long-term. Her study is particularly compelling because it also shows how certain military practices were used to transcend key ethnic and linguistic differences even within Indochina, a finding that stands in stark contrast to the conventional way of analyzing ethnicity and militarization, in which militarized action or armed forces are invoked in the service of protecting or preserving ethnic difference.

The third limitation in most of the existing literature on militaries, states, and politics stems from the widely accepted notion that the military is first and foremost an elite-led institution, the main *raison d'être* of which is to guarantee *external* security and whose character and contours are the product of elite bargaining at the national political level. Yet the military's power and activities as well as its impact on politics are not merely products of elite negotiations and bargains, nor are they solely associated with the active war projects of the national armed forces convened for the purpose of fighting external wars. Indeed, the Mexican government's decision to use the military for civilian policing in its capital city and the Colombian government's announcement that it would "subcontract" units of its armed forces to private oil companies seeking protection for their property both suggest that militaries can be transformed within their statutory roles and in articulation with civil society in ways that most earlier studies have not considered. It is important to challenge the elite-centrism of studies of the military and politics, however, not just because it blinds us to the wide range of activities in which military personnel can be involved, but also because it fuels the tendency for most scholars to focus on the national armed forces, their high-ranking officers, and their centralized and elite-led infrastructure (chain of command, defense ministries, military academies). One unfortunate by-product is that scholars often fail to examine the ways in which the military rank and file may articulate (or not) with the rest of civil society rather than the military leadership. This possibility is further raised in Susan Browne's discussion of Shays's rebels, who as veterans forged common ties with other family farmers that often distanced them from the military leadership. It also plays a role in Ian Roxborough's study of the contemporary U.S. military rank and file, whose estrangement from the rest of civil society is suggested to have an impact on both the strategies of the military leadership and their potential impact on national politics.

An equally distorting by-product of the elite-centered emphasis on a centralized military leadership answerable to national defense ministries is that scholars rarely examine the wide variety of diverse social and political and even economic institutions in which military personnel or other "armed forces" play a part. These include intelligence agencies, militia, paramilitary forces, police, and even veterans associations; and they often entail an understanding of the ways that these forces contribute to the

development of welfare-state programs and policies, a point introduced by both Alec Campbell in his comparative-historical study of veterans and Eiko Ikegami in her examination of the Japanese military's role in the transformation of proprietary relationships and the state-market nexus. In order to understand the role and larger significance of armed forces, then, "unpacking" the military as an institution is absolutely necessary. In this book we do so by examining a broad range of professional activities and institutions – including police, militias, and paramilitaries – that have come to articulate with or be dominated by the military and military personnel. As we shift our focus beyond regime type, the military elite, and the major military institutions, and examine conditions internal as much as external to the nation-state, we are able to identify several social, cultural, and economic articulations that affect positively or negatively the likelihood that the military or other equally significant armed forces will be actively involved in politics, even as they influence the form and character of the state as well as vice versa. Among the factors that have been particularly significant in the essays in this volume are: the extent of popularity (or distrust) of certain military personnel and institutions, perceptions that are often historically constructed, sometimes imposed by defeat or victory in war; the ways that military personnel are (or are not) integrated into the economy, party politics, and social relations, both before and after formal demilitarization or demobilization; and the ways in which military personnel articulate (or not) with other "armed forces," mainly paramilitaries, militias, and police, often to the point of competing to control the means of violence, often in ways that threaten the viability if not the legitimacy of the national state.

Notes on Terminology

In a book that seeks to move beyond the constraining grammar of regime type and analyze the relationship between armed forces and state formation and political developments more broadly understood, a few words about definitions and an explanation of terminology are in order before moving on to the contents of the volume. After all, in many ways there is great elective affinity between all three of the terms we use as we assess the relationship between armed forces and politics: regime type, state forms, political development. In fact, regime type is considered by many to represent a particular state form, and both state form and regime type can tell us much about long-*durée* patterns of political development. Rather than laying out an overly formalized or rigid definition of these terms a priori, however, it is preferable to elucidate what is at stake in emphasizing one set of terms over another, and to do so by sharing the historical and analytic logic behind this book's emphasis on state formation and political development rather than regime type.

Much of the originating concern with regime type in the fields of political science and sociology owes its origins to discussions about the social construction of political systems that dominated these two academic disciplines in the immediate post-World War II period in the modern West, before the preoccupation with the late industrializing, so-called Third World captured attention. Starting in the 1950s, social and political theorists as diverse as Hannah Arendt (1948), Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), and Barrington Moore (1966) were all concerned with democracies and dictatorships, be they communist or fascist. Although they may have disagreed about the origins of these different political regime types, or even the key features that distinguished them from each other, most shared the idea that political systems could be understood in terms of democratic versus non-democratic ideologies and institutions (i.e., guaranteeing private property rights and forms of political participation in the case of democracies). The popularity of modernization theory reinforced the disciplinary preoccupation with democracies and the conditions that made them more likely, although the emphasis shifted as much to individual characteristics and levels of income as to the stability of political institutions and the coercive power of states as prefiguring the democratic option over others.

All this began to change in the 1970s, however, in part because of Theda Skocpol. Her *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) was conceived in part as a theoretical and methodological repudiation of Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966); and she not only challenged his emphasis on class relations as opposed to state actions and geopolitical military relations, but also his efforts to methodologically distinguish among regime types in political terms. For Skocpol, what was most interesting was not that France, Russia, and China may have taken different political routes to the modern world (i.e., democratic versus communist), as Moore contended, but that out of each ideologically distinct revolution came relatively common state structures – that is, similar patterns of state formation. And with Skocpol's critique, analysis of state formation and the common organizational and institutional features of modern states began to preoccupy scholars as much as regime type. Concurrent work by Charles Tilly on European state formation (1975; 1990) reinforced this trend and the growing concern with explaining how and why the modern state emerged in the centralized form and character that it did, such that even now, scholars are still debating state formation.

This is not to say that, after Tilly and Skocpol, scholars totally ignored questions about the social construction of democracies or that they abandoned all their inquiries into regime types. Recent scholarship on transitions from authoritarian rule, by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986), among numerous others, has preoccupied political scientists and sociologists for more than a decade now. But much of this work has concerned itself with problems inherent in state forms and

political systems, having to do with the delegitimization of party politics and the overbureaucratization of the state, and not with the ideological content of the regime. Yet even for those modernization theorists or political-economic scholars of the newly industrializing world for whom the presence or absence of democracy was still a larger concern, the study of state forms and state structures gained popularity, and these themes soon began to challenge the overwhelming concern with questions about democracy or its absence that had dominated the writings of political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s. As one example, Guillermo O'Donnell's own seminal book, *Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (1973), made some headway in these regards, moving both political scientists and sociologists away from their preoccupation with classifying countries in terms of the formally democratic workings of their political systems or the political ideology of governance, and examining instead the centralized structure and power of the state itself.

Of course, O'Donnell's study of bureaucratic authoritarianism was also informed by a concern with flawed democracies and their replacement by military regimes even as it did turn greater attention to states and not just regime types. In his recent writings on the (un)rule of law in Latin America, O'Donnell and his associates have carried this concern even further, arguing that changes of regime types, even from authoritarian to democratic, have failed to solve the fundamental problems of weak Latin American states. As a result, over the past decade or two we have started to see scholars in various disciplines ranging from sociology to political science to anthropology concerning themselves with state formation and with the ways in which existent *structures* of political participation and state decision making are as central as ideology or democratic-nondemocratic regime type to the fate and nature of contemporary political development. This trend has been all but set in stone with the global popularity of political liberalization, because most scholars now work under the assumption that there is widespread civilian commitment to democratic ideals. Indeed, even scholars whose main concern has long been the study of democratization or democratic transition have found themselves increasingly distanced from the concepts and categories that prevailed when regime type was the principal analytic point of entry. If anything, their starting point seems to be the ways in which formal democracy (read regime type) fails to engender substantive democracy, and the concern is less with the advent or consolidation of democratic regimes and more with the institutional and legal practices that make democracy work on the ground. Accordingly, the research questions now most in play in both political science and sociology have to do with which other social, cultural, geographic, or even economic patterns or practices, independent of citizens' normative allegiance to democracy, will most color the nature and charac-

ter of modern states, most of which are now formally democratic but only some of which have extended the citizenship rights, legal guarantees, and participatory political practices anticipated by citizens living within their borders. It is in the context of these paradigm shifts and real-world political transformations, then, that we pose our questions about armed forces and politics without linking them to regime type.

To be sure, in recent years many, many scholars have moved away from studying states and have instead cast their eyes on civil society and the growing importance of citizens in politics. Recent writings by Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, especially their book *Civil Society and Political Theory* (1992), as well as the growing popularity of recent works by internationally eminent scholars like Jürgen Habermas and Alain Touraine, were significant in contributing to this shift in emphasis, which is linked in no small part to a normative assessment of the state as a negative force that colonizes civil society. With this new analytic point of entry fully entrenched in the academic horizon, we see considerable preoccupation with so-called new ways of doing politics, generally exemplified through social movement activism and the reinvigoration of civil society. Yet precisely because this shift in emphasis is so pervasive scholars have been less likely to raise questions about regime type per se (because social movements have been active in democratic and nondemocratic regimes), or even about state formation (because social movements have been as likely to emerge in countries with centralized as opposed to decentralized states), and more likely to concern themselves with general claims about political development, broadly understood. Accordingly, at least from our vantage point, even the newfound emphasis on civil society in many of the social sciences is quite consistent with our larger concern with political developments that are not necessarily reducible to regime types or the formal presence or absence of democracy.

Granted, the notion of political development is less specific as a subject of study than regime type or even state form; and in that sense we may court the disaster of imprecision if explaining political development, so to speak, is our sole aim. Still, our equal concern with state formation, a term that refers broadly to the development of state institutions and the variation in the specific institutional forms of the state (i.e., centralized versus decentralized) or its capacities, as well as the different ways in which parties or interest groups articulate with states, attests to our aims to achieve a more exacting understanding of political trajectories among states. Thus, if we consider political development and even state forms as terms that help us move beyond the constraining assumptions about military behavior associated with certain political ideologies or predefined political regime types, and look at the structure and character of state institutions as well as civil society in understanding the actions and impacts of armed forces, then this

terminology may in fact liberate us from overly restrictive assumptions about when, how, and why armed forces matter even as it leads us to new hypotheses and a new analytic framing of the problem. That, essentially, is our aim.

Analytic Structure and Theoretical Aims of the Book

This book is divided into three main sections, organized in terms of their focused treatment of different dimensions of the relationship between armed forces and political development. Overall, the argument is that irregular armed forces have been central protagonists in processes of state formation and political development in a wide variety of countries, modern or not, democratic or otherwise; but that the paths taken differ with respect to (1) how they articulate with conventional armed forces; (2) at what level of the state (local, regional, national, or transnational) these armed forces are most salient; and (3) in combination with which class or social forces in civil society they most wield their power or articulate their aims.

The book begins in Part I with a section titled “The Basic Framework and Beyond: Mobilization, Demobilization, and National State Formation,” which includes four essays by leading scholars of state formation and/or militaries who collectively lay out the general analytic contours of the book, albeit with focused arguments. Unlike the contributions in the following two parts of the book, which are primarily case studies that examine one or two countries in a single time period, each of these initial essays takes a broad comparative and/or historical sweep, examining numerous countries or spanning multiple time periods. The section begins with a chapter by Charles Tilly prepared especially for this volume, titled “Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650.” Tilly is considered by many to be the foremost living theorist of the relationship between war-making and state-making, as well as a scholar whose knowledge and expertise in European studies of the subject is matched by no other. In this essay, Tilly offers an overview of his seminal argument about war-making and state-making, drawn partially from his book on the subject, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (1990), but also supplemented by more recent research on a stunning array of times and places through which he has added several new dimensions to his argument, including a concern with shifting regimes and even their democratic potential in the early modern era. It may be somewhat paradoxical that as many of the rest of the volume’s contributors purposely move away from discussing democracy or regime type per se and focus instead on state formation, Tilly himself finds it valuable to reintroduce questions about regimes and their characteristics in his work, especially in the context of a historical framing known best for the attention paid just to state forms. The result, we hope, is not only to establish the analytic and theoretical importance of the interrela-

tionship between patterns of state formation and regime types, but also to consider the latter not as an ideological shorthand for a state's democratic or nondemocratic character, as was the case in most of the literature up until now, but as a more precise way of studying state forms, which Tilly identifies as ranging from sovereign city-states to confederated provinces, free cities, peripheral provinces, territories or principalities, autocratic monarchies, and constitutional monarchies.

The next chapter, "Limited War and Limited States" by Miguel Centeno, takes long-standing arguments about war-making and state-making formulated by Tilly and others and applies them to a region of the world underexamined in this literature, Latin America, where external war-making has been neither as frequent nor as comprehensive as in Europe, the context for much of this theorizing. Centeno's piece draws impressively on the study of a wide variety of Latin American countries, compares this region with other parts of the world, and assesses the patterns of war-making in these divergent contexts to arrive at some generalizations about the predominant character and extent of war-making in the Latin American continent. By raising questions about the predominance of what he calls partial war, and theorizing that certain patterns of "limited" war-making impacted state formation in Latin America to produce a slightly different pattern than is evident in Europe, Centeno establishes the analytic importance of acknowledging but also recasting the original literature on war-making and state-making, the defining theme and aim of the book. His chapter is followed by Alec Campbell's "Where Do All the Soldiers Go? Veterans and the Politics of Demobilization," which carries the revisionist sentiment one step further by introducing the importance of looking not just at war-making and mobilization for war but also at demobilization and the aftermath of war, much as did Skocpol in *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, only in a much wider comparative and historical framing. One of the key challenges that any state faces, Campbell argues, is what to do with soldiers who have been armed and trained, but now must return to civilian life. Through analysis of contexts as diverse as the ancient Roman Republic, nineteenth-century Europe, and twentieth-century Europe and the United States, Campbell argues that the ways in which states manage demobilization establishes a wide variety of political outcomes, ranging from the granting of citizenship rights to the formation of welfare states. War, in short, is not just something to be made; it also has to be ended. And, in modern times at least, when strong and centralized state apparatuses have already been relatively well established, it may be at the home front that the longer-range political implications of ending wars may be most influential and most deeply cast.

Eiko Ikegami's "Military Mobilization and the Transformation of Property Relationships: Wars That Defined the Japanese Style of Capitalism" builds on the contributions of all three of the preceding chapters by

examining both mobilization *and* demobilization as well as by looking at the economics and the politics of war. With respect to the latter, in fact, Ikegami's essay inverts the originating concerns that Tilly established in *Coercion, Capital, and European States* by examining how mobilization and demobilization for war affected capitalism and proprietary relations, and not just vice versa. In analytical terms, then, Ikegami forges new theoretical ground that is left relatively unexplored in the contributions by Tilly, Centeno, and Campbell, although it is nonetheless marshaled for the purposes of answering similar questions about war-making and state-making. Through detailed historical analysis of several centuries of Japanese history, starting with the Tokugawa shogunate and extending up through the post-1945 period, her article demonstrates the ways that mobilizing for war and accommodating the end of war significantly altered what Ikegami terms property relationships, or the access to and control of various "possessive" resources, including the skills, legitimacy, and social identities associated with being able to pay for and fight in wars. Her quintessentially historical argument is that war transformed these property relationships sequentially, in ways that not only affected later prospects of waging and mobilizing for war but also contributed to the formation of certain patterns of state-market interaction. As such, while one of the explicit objectives of this article is to link war-making to the formation of a peculiarly Japanese form of capitalism, Ikegami's emphasis on state-market relations in the constitution of this unique form of capitalism also makes this an argument about the militarized origins of what might be considered the Japanese welfare state.

In the second part of the book, titled "Deconstructing Armed Forces: From Militaries to Militias, Paramilitaries, Police, and Veterans," we turn more directly to focused case studies, although the main purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to a wide variety of irregular armed forces that have existed over time and place, to examine similarities and differences in their manner of operation, and to focus on the ways in which these different kinds of armed forces have fundamentally contributed to patterns of state formation and trajectories of national politics. In this section themes of both mobilization and demobilization continue to be relevant, with the articles examining a variety of circumstances in which veterans, militias, paramilitaries, and police – sometimes employed by the state and sometimes acting against it, sometimes connected to the military and sometimes not – have affected state formation and national politics.

Using cases as diverse as the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Greece in the twentieth century, war-torn Columbia in the present period, and Argentina during the initial period of its modern state formation in the early twentieth century, the authors included in Part II collectively make the case that it would be difficult to understand national patterns of politics or state formation if conventional armed forces were the only point of departure. In so doing, these chapters offer a somewhat

different accounting for the relationship between armed forces and state formation not just because they highlight the ways in which militia, paramilitary, police, and veteran activities were absolutely central in determining the actual form and reach of the state, whether that form be centralized (Argentina), decentralized (the United States), or some contested combination of elements that fundamentally limited state power (Greece) or produced total state breakdown (Colombia). These chapters are also significant to the larger aims of the volume because many of them conceptualize irregular armed forces as linked to civil society and its concerns as much as to the state. This becomes theoretically significant when, in comparing across the chapters in Part II, it is made evident that those irregular armed forces whose principal point of reference is civil society and not the state – as in the U.S. case – were those most likely to sustain the development of decentralized rather than centralized state forms.

The discussion begins with a chapter by Achilles Batalas, “Send a Thief to Catch a Thief: State-Building and the Employment of Irregular Military Formations in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Greece,” which examines the Greek state’s reliance on a nonprofessional military force in its efforts to wage war. In his examination of these “irregular” forces, understood primarily as brigands or bandits, Batalas argues that Greek state formation can be characterized as a case of “inverse racketeering,” to the extent the state became the client and not the supplier of protection against internal and external adversaries. By turning Tilly’s argument upside down, so to speak, Batalas opens a new line of analysis into the ways that irregular armed forces may have participated in similar activities organized around similar aims as the professional military of the Greek state but whose distinct and relatively independent location in civil society significantly altered the character of their relationship to the state and their impact on state formation. Questions of demobilization also figure as central in this account, particularly to the extent that the demands for employment advanced by these irregular forces became a key political liability for the Greek state. One by-product was the development of new forms of paramilitary organizations; another was the imposition of new forms of taxation to pay for sustained demobilization. Both processes strengthened the state, even as they never resolved the state’s incapacity to eliminate irregular troops and thus maintain a full monopoly over the means of coercion.

Mauricio Romero’s “Reform and Reaction: Paramilitary Groups in Contemporary Colombia” gives evidence of similar dynamics at play in the contemporary Colombian case, where paramilitary forces linked to regional elites have become central protagonists in a protracted armed struggle that has undermined the Colombian state’s capacity to monopolize the means of coercion. In contrast to Batalas’s chapter, which focuses on irregular armed forces as a distinct social group, in Romero’s chapter the analytic point of departure is regional elites who deploy paramilitary forces against

the central state in an effort to protect their own economic and political interests. One by-product is a state of near civil war in Colombia, where no single (or centralized) state authority has acquired the legitimate claim to rule the entire national territory. Complicating matters for the central government is the fact that the country appears divided into three distinct regions where elites and their paramilitaries fight between themselves, with guerrilla armies, and with the national state, creating an environment of intense conflict and everyday violence that threatens to undermine both regime stability and the nation's democratic prospects. What makes the Romero chapter particularly striking – if not paradoxical – is his claim that recent efforts at state-political decentralization implemented in the late 1980s precisely to facilitate Colombia's democratic transition toward a more liberalized state and economy have contributed to the regional violence and the internal breakdown of the state, by unleashing broader competition for local offices and thus increasing elites' interests in maintaining coercive forces at the subnational level.

The next chapter, Laura Kalmanowiecki's "Policing the People, Building the State: The Police-Military Nexus in Argentina, 1880–1945," also examines Latin America but focuses on a different case in a much earlier time period. In many ways, the story Kalmanowiecki tells for Argentina also sheds light on the contemporary problems in Colombia, to the extent that it demonstrates what made it possible to consolidate successfully the process of modern state-building in such a way that the same point of anarchy would not be reached as occurred in Colombia. Kalmanowiecki shows that in Argentina the state relied on the police to reach down into civil society deeply enough to control local populations who threatened the federal government's plans for a centralized national state. The police, acting as a coercive force with formal autonomy from the military but not from the national state, and with a "legitimate" institutional mandate to operate in cities and localities across the provinces throughout the country, slowly expanded its reach across national territory. Through an examination of the ways that police activities developed and were organized for the purposes of fighting an "internal war" against radicals and communists defined as enemies of the state, ultimately in collaboration with the military, Kalmanowiecki builds on many of the insights about war-making and state-making offered by Tilly as well as on Centeno's argument about the weakness of the Latin American state in the absence of massive or more "total" external war-making. Yet it is by virtue of her recognition that it takes different types of armed forces to fight internal as opposed to external wars that Kalmanowiecki links the activities of the Argentine police to a highly contested process of state formation.

The problem of expanding the territorial or institutional reach of the national state and the extent to which this is violently contested by both regular and irregular armed forces also are at the heart of the subsequent