Why Women Protest

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN CHILE

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TIPPING, TIMING, AND FRAMING

The socialist government of President Salvador Allende (1970–3) and the military government of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–90) represented two of the most divisive periods in the recent history of Chile. These two regimes differed in almost every respect. The Allende government attempted to pave a "peaceful road to socialism," implementing Marxist reforms within a democratic framework. Allende nationalized industries, accelerated the process of agrarian reform, and incorporated peasants and workers into the political system on a massive scale. When the military took power in a coup in 1973, the Pinochet regime put a decisive end to Chile's experiment with socialism, not only undoing Allende's reforms but implementing a new order altogether. Pinochet's efforts to reconstruct the country extended far beyond replacing civilian leaders with military officials. He opened the economy to the free market and built Chile's political institutions to establish order and stability. A fierce campaign of repression limited the expression of public opposition to these policies.

Despite the stark differences between these two regimes, they shared an important, even remarkable feature in a patriarchal culture such as Chile's: the mobilization of women. In both of these tumultuous periods, women mobilized to bring down the government in power and demanded a role in the new political order. The anti-Allende women organized the famous "March of the Empty Pots" and pressured the military to heed women's call for intervention. During the Pinochet regime, women organized around the slogan "Democracy in the Country and in the Home," punctuating the pro-democracy movement with demands for human rights, economic justice, and women's equality.

To be sure, the two cases of mobilization differed in fundamental ways. Activists mobilized in very different political contexts and espoused

radically distinct interests. The anti-Allende women protested against a democratically elected government and supported a military coup, while the anti-Pinochet women mobilized in the midst of a repressive military dictatorship and sought to restore democratic rule. These movements represent two opposing sides of a deep and enduring conflict in Chilean politics, one that centers on the legacies of the Allende government and the military regime. In one version of Chile's history, the Allende government epitomized the triumph of the Chilean *pueblo* over the bourgeoisie, and the military government represented a fascist dictatorship that systematically violated the basic human rights of its own citizens. This view characterizes the women who organized the March of the Empty Pots as the shrill harpies of the upper class, who complained about food shortages while hoarding goods and making profits on the black market. According to the other view of Chilean history, the Allende government unleashed a period of chaos, violence, and Marxist arrogance that threatened to destroy the entire nation, while the military government restored order, established economic prosperity, and vanquished the enemy in an internal war against subversion. From this vantage point, the women who protested against Pinochet emerge as communists in Gramscian disguise.[1]

Given these differences, drawing comparisons between these two movements may not seem appropriate; it may even be anathema to those who sympathize with one movement over the other. Yet striking similarities between them warrant explanation. The two closely resembled one another in terms of the timing of women's protest and the way in which women framed their demands. In each case, women mobilized amid a context of partisan realignment, as the political parties of the opposition formed a new coalition against the regime in power. Women perceived moments of realignment as uniquely gendered opportunities. Women framed their mobilization in terms of their status as political outsiders, in response to what they perceived as men's characteristic inability to overcome narrow partisan concerns. The groups that predominated within each movement argued that women "do politics" differently from men. Activists maintained that women possess a unique ability to transcend con-

[1] Chilean conservatives appear to have read quite a bit of Gramsci. Many of the conservative women I interviewed for this project described Gramscian theory as the current embodiment of the Marxist threat. As one woman explained to me, "It is another way of getting to Marxism, but by way of education. . . . People are calmer now, that the [Berlin] wall has fallen and Communism destroyed itself, but – watch out! (*Ojo!*) – even some of Aylwin's ministers are declared Gramscians" (Maturana 1993).

flict and forge unity within a male-dominated political order. Women organized across party lines in the hopes of setting an example for male politicians, who had been unable to coordinate their actions against the government. Both movements sought to forward the concerns of women in the context of more general demands for regime change. At the same time, women in both movements lobbied for the incorporation of their own issues and concerns on partisan agendas, with varying degrees of success.

Why did these two conditions – partisan realignment and gendered framing – lead to the emergence of mass mobilization among women? The decision of female political entrepreneurs to frame their actions in terms of women's status as political outsiders resonated within a broad spectrum of women, activists and nonactivists alike. Even women actively engaged in partisan politics framed their participation in these terms. Framing women's demands in terms of women's status as political outsiders allowed diverse groups to coalesce in a movement. Claims about the nonpartisan status of women distinguished them from numerous other movements active at the time (e.g., among workers, students, and peasants) and brought women to the forefront of the opposition struggle in each case.

The timing and framing of women's demands also appealed to male politicians. At periods of realignment, politicians try to portray their actions as a response to the will of the people, rather than as a bold effort to gain political power. Women's protests provided a way for male party leaders to recast their goals in credibly nonpartisan terms, as a response to the concerns expressed by female activists. This explains why male politicians acknowledged the emergence of women's mobilization and encouraged its development.

The parallels between these two "most different" cases raise important questions about women's mobilization more generally. Why do women protest? Under what conditions do women protest as women, on the basis of their gender identity? What prompts female political entrepreneurs to perceive certain situations in gendered terms? In what context will decisions made by a diverse array of women coalesce into a collective response, thus sparking the formation of a movement?

By raising these questions in the context of the two Chilean movements, I am focusing on points of similarity across women's movements rather than differences among them. To that extent, this book diverges significantly from most studies of women's movements, for which acknowledgment of the diversity of interests that women's movements represent has

proven fundamentally important. Studies of women's movements show that women have mobilized in diverse political environments. Recent research has emphasized national and regional differences across women's organizing (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994; Basu 1995; Marsh 1996; Threlfall 1996; Buckley, M. 1997; Buckley, S. 1997; Chatty and Rabo 1997; Kaplan 1997; Stephen 1997; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rodríguez 1998; Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999; Sperling 1999; Young 1999), as well as transnational mobilization among women (Rupp 1997; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998; Clark 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Women have mobilized within diverse political contexts, including stable democracies (Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; Black 1989; Gelb 1989; Bashevkin 1998), revolutions (Tétreault 1994; Gilmartin 1995), nationalist movements (Ackelsberg 1991; Kaplan 1992; West 1997), fascism (Koonz 1987; De Grazia 1992), and transitions to democracy (Alvarez 1990; Jelín 1991; Feijoo 1994; Jaquette 1994; Friedman 2000) as well as around a diverse set of substantive interests, from suffrage (Hahner 1990; Lavrín 1995; Banaszak 1996; Marilley 1997; Marshall 1997; Terborg-Penn 1998) to peace (Kaplan 1997) to economic justice (West and Blumberg 1990). Even the term *feminist movement* encompasses tremendous diversity. Recent studies affirm that feminist movements come in various forms – liberal; radical; socialist; African-American; Chicana; Latina; lesbian; third-world; multicultural; nationalist; indigenous; pan-Asian; or first-, second-, or third-wave (Jayawardena 1986; Mohanty, Russo et al. 1991; Cohen, Jones et al. 1997). As Sonia Alvarez (1990: 23) observes,

> When one considers that women span all social classes, ethnicities, religions, nationalities, political ideologies and so on, then an infinite array of interests could be construed as women's interests. Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual preference and other social characteristics determine women's social positioning and shape women's interests.

In the effort to highlight difference, however, scholars have neglected the question of what women's movements have in common. A focus on diversity across and within women's movements provides little leverage on the question of why women mobilize as *women*. This book argues that all women's movements share the decision to mobilize as women, on the basis of what I maintain are widely held norms about female identity. These norms constitute a set of understandings that reflect women's widespread exclusion from political power. At certain historical moments, women have bridged myriad differences among them to stage mass demonstrations that

have set in motion profound transformations both in women's lives and within the political system overall. If women represent so many different interests, then what prompts them to mobilize on the basis of a shared identity that allows them to transcend those differences? Under what conditions are women likely to protest as women?

This book forwards a general theoretical framework to address these questions. I explain why women protest in terms of three theoretical concepts: tipping, timing, and framing. I rely on the concept of tipping to identify the dependent variable in this study, which I define as the point at which diverse organizations converge to form a women's movement. Tipping, a cascade of mobilization among women, is the main object of study. Timing and framing constitute the main independent variables in this study. I argue that two conditions must be in place in order for widespread mobilization to emerge among women: partisan realignment, understood as the formation of new coalitions among political parties, and women's decision to frame realignment in terms of widely held cultural norms about gender difference. At moments of realignment among political elites, women have mobilized around the idea that the male political elites care more about preserving their power than addressing pressing substantive issues.

Tipping

This study focuses on the precise point at which social movements coalesce as movements. I aim to identify the moment when diverse groups and individuals join together under a common rubric to challenge the status quo. Scholars of social movements have long recognized the importance of particular protests that change the course of future events in profound ways – the civil-rights march on Selma, the first protest of the Berkeley Free Speech movement, and the student protests at Tienanmen Square, for example. Yet people tend to talk about such protests in somewhat metaphysical terms. Numerous firsthand accounts of protests such as these attest to the existence of transcendental moments in the evolution of protest, or a point during which everything seems possible and after which "nothing remains the same." These "moments of madness," as Aristide Zolberg (1972) calls them, mark the point at which disparate organizations and individuals converge to forge a common identity and to confront a common opponent. Such moments catalyze the formation of a social movement. As I shall show, the conditions that shape a movement's

emergence also constrain its evolution and outcomes in significant, although not determinant, ways.

The tipping model describes movement emergence in analytically tractable terms. Mobilization among women emerges as the result of a tipping process in which participation in protest activities starts out small, builds gradually as more people become involved, and then suddenly reaches a critical mass of momentum. A tip occurs when political entrepreneurs frame the need for mobilization in terms that resonate with an array of people, at a particular point in time.

In a tipping model, the probability that any given individual will participate depends on the likelihood that a person thinks others will participate (Schelling 1978). Whether individual actions reach a critical mass and tip or cascade toward a collective outcome, in other words, depends on a particular individual's perceptions of what others appear ready to do. A tip occurs when a sufficiently large number of people believe that other people will also participate. In the strongest case, a tip will occur when people come to believe that their participation becomes necessary or even required (Chong 1991; Laitin 1998). Tips occur as the result of individual decisions made by activists and members of the general population about whether or not to participate in a protest. The tipping model explains mobilization in terms of how people respond to each other, rather than how they respond to selective incentives, or some kind of material benefit. Whether someone participates does not hinge on thinking "what do I get out of it?" but "what will you think of me if I don't participate?" In other words, your decision to participate in an act of protest hinges on your beliefs about what others are likely to do.

The tipping model thus points to cognition and perception as the triggers that set off the process of mobilization. An appeal to common knowledge or widely held cultural norms often sets the tipping process in motion. Movement entrepreneurs can draw upon these norms in a variety of contexts (Taylor 1987; Chai 1997; Laitin 1998; Petersen 2001). *Cultural norms*, defined as sets of common beliefs and practices in a particular society, can provide the kinds of focal points that trigger collective action. Mobilizing as women entails framing activism in terms of readily understood cultural norms about female behavior.

Yet entrepreneurs cannot expect to issue a call to women any old time and expect tens of thousands to take to the streets. A rhetorical appeal will trigger a collective response only under certain conditions. My approach focuses on the macroconditions under which tipping is likely to occur, and

thus differs from studies that employ the tipping model to explain the microfoundations of protest, that is, to illustrate the process by which individual decisions are coordinated into collective outcomes (Chong 1991; Lohmann 1994; Parikh and Cameron 1999). My study explains the conditions that set off mobilizational cascades among women in particular and identifies the conditions that activate this process, or cause it to be "switched on," to use Jon Elster's terminology (Elster 1989). I argue that two conditions – timing and framing – evoke a desire to participate, and evince participation from a particular group of people, setting the tipping process in motion.

Timing

The timing of women's mobilization can be explained in terms of partisan realignment. Women's movements emerge in response to a realignment, understood here as the formation of new coalitions among political parties. Political scientists have tended to define partisan realignment as enduring shifts in partisan attachments *within the electorate* (Sundquist 1983; Gates 1987; Kawato 1987; Hurley 1991; Nardulli 1995; for a review see Brady, Ferejohn et al. 2000). Yet defining realignment in terms of voting behavior need not be the only way to identify realignment. I define *realignment* as fundamental changes in the issues that political parties represent, similar to the approach followed by Robert Rohrschneider (1993). In multiparty political systems, the formation of a new coalition among political parties also constitutes a realignment. New coalitions indicate evidence of a realignment even in cases (such as Chile) where voting behavior for particular political parties remains fairly stable over time (but see Valenzuela and Scully 1997). In addition, most studies assert that realignments must be long-lasting in order to count as legitimate realignments, rather than temporary blips in voting behavior. I would argue that the temporal dimension of this definition is unnecessary. A long-term pattern may be appropriate for stable democracies such as the United States, but realignments have occurred with far greater frequency in Latin American countries. The short duration of cleavage patterns in Latin America should not mean that they are any less significant.

At moments of realignment, political parties establish a new political agenda. They also cast about for new bases of popular support and seek to legitimate their actions in the public eye. To do so, they often seek to portray their new alliance as representing national interests over sectarian

ones. This strategy often involves masking partisan interests in appeals to unity, nonpartisanship, and the spirit of cooperation – precisely the characteristics commonly associated with cultural norms about women. Political elites frequently look to women as a quintessentially "neutral" constituency to lend legitimacy to the new coalition. In many cases, women do not represent the only organized groups mobilizing at these moments; other groups may be trying to gain concessions from political leaders at the same time. Nonetheless, women's appeal to their status as political outsiders makes them a particularly desirable constituency for parties negotiating the terms of alliance with one another. Gender cuts across all other political cleavages and enhances the degree to which a coalition can be seen as representing national rather than narrow, partisan interests. Thus, partisan realignment provides a political opportunity that is uniquely propitious for the mobilization of women.

This focus on realignment as a necessary condition for the emergence of women's movements links claims within the literature on social movements to predictions about elite behavior drawn from the literature on political institutions. Social movement scholars concur that movements rise and fall in part in response to changes within the political arena, known as changes in political opportunities (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Gelb 1989; Costain 1992; Tarrow 1994; Hipsher 1997). The political opportunities approach points, correctly so, to the state as the central interlocutor of collective action in many cases. Recent scholarship has sought to narrow the concept of political opportunities in order to increase the possibilities for generating predictions about future outcomes (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 1996). Tarrow (1994: 86), for example, focuses specifically on realignment as a key variable. My approach builds on this perspective by not only identifying what political opportunities are relevant, but explaining when we might expect them to emerge.

The approach I have described uses the insights of the literature on political institutions to explain when political opportunities emerge and to explain *why* certain conditions are more favorable for protest than others. The formal rules of political engagement shape the incentives of political actors and define the points at which elites become vulnerable to challenges issued by activists. Divisions among political elites arise somewhat predictably as a consequence of the rules that structure their behavior. An institutional explanation can identify when a political system is ripe for realignment.

Tipping, Timing, and Framing

Institutional arrangements are sets of rules, both formal and informal, that structure social interactions in predictable ways (Knight 1992). Formal political institutions such as constitutions, laws, and electoral systems shape the range of possible outcomes in a given situation. Institutions facilitate coordination among political actors because they shape people's expectations about the future in ways that people can anticipate, by providing a common frame of reference. The "establishment of clear mutual expectations" makes institutions binding, even when they generate outcomes that run counter to the interests of those who abide by them (Carey 2000: 13, see also Levi 1988; Hardin 1989; North 1990). Recent literature on political institutions has focused primarily on the actions of presumably rational elites who pursue their interests within the formal political arena, particularly the courts, legislatures, and the executive branch (for a review of this literature see Carey 2000). Some recent work examines how formal institutions structure strategic interaction among voters (Cox 1997; Harvey 1998; Lyne 2000). My study extends this research by determining how the design of formal political institutions affects decisions made by groups within civil society.

The Chilean Institutional Context

In the past, the institutional design of the Chilean political system created (regular) opportunities for "outsider" appeals by those who criticized the extent to which negotiations for power within a particular coalition prevented the parties from uniting around national interests. Prior to the 1973 coup, Chile was governed by a moderately strong presidential system characterized by two contradictory tendencies. The formal rules that structured engagement among political elites led them in two conflicting directions. On the one hand, the electoral system for congressional elections fostered the development of strong, ideologically distinct parties, rather than "catchall" parties that encompassed a broad spectrum of issues. On the other hand, the political system required the parties to form coalitions with one another in order to win control of the powerful executive branch. For presidential elections, institutional rules favored the formation of broad cross-partisan coalitions (Valenzuela 1978; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Realignment in this kind of environment sometimes proved to be a tricky business, as it occasionally required parties to enter into coalitions with those who previously had been sworn enemies. These

contradictory tendencies required parties to engage in competition on two fronts simultaneously: to enhance their own base of support in order to establish dominance within a particular coalition and to elicit support for the coalition as a whole in order to beat their opponents. This feature made the Chilean parties persistently vulnerable to realignment.

As I discuss in the chapters that follow, women's movements formed at three precise moments over the course of the twentieth century: the women's suffrage movement (1935), the anti-Allende women's movement (1971), and the anti-Pinochet women's movement (1983). The formation of these movements corresponds with major realignments among the political parties of the opposition: the formation of the Popular Front, an alliance of center-left parties (1935); the formation of the Democratic Confederation (CODE), an alliance of center-right parties (1971); and the Democratic Alliance (AD), a coalition of center-left parties (1983).[2] The parallels among these instances in terms of timing provides suggestive evidence for a correlation between the emergence of women's movements and partisan realignment. But an important question remains: why did women perceive these institutional moments in gendered terms?

Framing

It is not enough to identify the conditions under which protest occurs, even if we can anticipate those conditions with some precision. The third component of my argument explains why women *perceive* these conditions as opportunities, why they perceive them *in gendered terms*, and why they perceive these conditions as *requiring them to take action*. Social movement scholars refer to this as cultural framing (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow 1992; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996). Rational-choice theorists would argue that women's movements engage in what William Riker termed *heresthetics*, the rhetorical restructuring of political situations in ways that change the possible outcomes (Riker 1986; Riker, Calvert et al. 1996). The term *heresthetic* remains obscure, but Riker (1986: ix) provides a straightforward definition:

[2] The Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática) formed the basis of what would later become the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia), the coalition that would defeat the pro-military candidate in the 1989 presidential elections and has controlled the executive branch in three consecutive administrations since then.

Tipping, Timing, and Framing

> [People] win because they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to join them – or will feel forced by circumstances to join them – even without any persuasion at all. And this is what heresthetic is about: structuring the world so you can win.

In a successful heresthetic move, political actors achieve their goals not by superior resources, but by introducing a new dimension that reframes a particular issue to their advantage.

A women's movement will emerge during partisan realignment if female political entrepreneurs respond to such moments in gendered terms, particularly in terms of women's exclusion from political decision making. I argue that they will do so in response to the exclusion of women and women's interests during moments of realignment by framing their activities in terms of cultural norms that portray women as political outsiders. Framing realignment in terms of gender appeals to one characteristic that all women share. Appeals to gender identity bridge women's different and sometimes contradictory interests: exclusion from political power. No matter what specific agenda women's organizations wish to pursue, they cannot pursue it efficiently without political access. This frame permits a diverse array of women's groups to organize under a common rubric.

The prior existence of networks of women's organizations constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a women's movement, consistent with the prediction of a resource mobilization approach to social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Zald and McCarthy 1979; McCarthy and Zald 1987). In other words, my argument rests on an assumption that women's organizations already exist. It is beyond the scope of the present work to identify the general conditions that foster the creation of such networks. In the Chilean case, however, I demonstrate the specific conditions that led to the formation of various kinds of women's organizations, including support from the Catholic Church, the media, and international organizations. Nonetheless, these factors occupy a secondary role in the overall theory presented in this book. My main focus is to explain what happens in order for women's organizations to coalesce and act in a coordinated way.

Gender functions as a source of collective identity in ways that are similar to other sources of identity, such as race, ethnicity, or nationality. Nonetheless, gender differs from other categories in at least one important way. Most societies have defined women's roles in terms of the domestic or household sphere, as mothers and housewives (Rosaldo, Bamberger

et al. 1974). Gender norms tend to define women as political outsiders, as inherently *nonpolitical* or *apolitical*. Mobilizing as women, therefore, politicizes a source of identity that by definition has no place in the political arena. Although seemingly a contradiction in terms, this dynamic holds central importance in understanding the conditions and consequences of mobilization among women.

At the same time, cultural norms about gender are not static or eternal; people continuously reconstruct and resignify them. The very term *gender*, as opposed to the term *sex*, reflects the idea that differences between men and women are not biologically determined but socially constructed (Scott 1988; Lorber 1997). What it means to be male and female, in other words, differs in different societies, and varies over time (Kessler and McKenna 1978). Yet part of the appeal and persuasiveness of *woman* as a category centers on its appearance of being universal. Dichotomous gender differences permeate most societies and the two categories *feminine* and *masculine* still constitute meaningful, universally recognized categories of identity in most contexts. They function like two containers that people fill up with different contents.

The way in which cultural norms about gender are defined varies according to context. In Latin America, long-standing gender norms have portrayed men as *macho*, dominant and sexually aggressive, and women as weak, submissive, and requiring men's protection. In Chile, gender norms portray women primarily as political outsiders. Whether women are seen as mothers, as housewives, as feminists, or as saints, they are all considered to belong appropriately outside the arena of politics. These norms have been continuously present in public discourse throughout Chile's history as a nation, since the Wars of Independence in the early 1800s. Despite the significant ideological and political differences between the movements examined in this study, activists in both of them appealed to the same set of norms about the role of women. While these stereotypes appear to be eternal and unchanging, however, they are actually continuously reconstituted and redefined, both by political elites and by ordinary men and women.

Women's Movements and Women's Interests

Conventional wisdom suggests that women organize around shared interests such as the right to vote, equal pay, or concern for the safety of their children. I suggest, however, that focusing on women's specific, policy-

oriented interests leads us *away* from understanding why women protest as women – that is, on the basis of their gender identity. I argue that all women's movements invoke their identity as women in order to emphasize two things: their uniqueness in relation to men and their interest in having greater access to decision making. Women mobilize on the basis of their gender identity in the hopes of influencing political outcomes determined primarily by male elites. Framing their concerns in terms of gender difference proves more successful at some points than at others. I develop this perspective through an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of two other approaches that explain women's mobilization in terms of interests – structural models and accounts that highlight the differences between *feminine* and *feminist* movements.

Studies of women's movements often begin with an account of how structural change shapes women's interests. Structural explanations account for the emergence of mobilization in terms of broad socioeconomic, material conditions – "big-picture" variables such as demographic change, economic distribution, and class conflict (Davies 1962; Smelser 1963; Gurr 1970).[3] The correlations suggested by structural studies of women's movements make intuitive sense: the impact of structural changes that occurred during the past century on women's lives proves impossible to ignore. Increased access to education, higher rates of participation in the workforce, and the availability of new technologies (such as the washing machine and the birth control pill) have transformed the status of many of the world's women. The widespread emergence of mass-based struggles for women's emancipation cannot be imagined without these advances. Studies of feminist movements, however, seldom consider the possibility that the same changes in women's status that prompted the emergence of feminism may also have fueled activism among conservative or nonfeminist women. Structural explanations tend to presume a causal relationship between structural change and *progressive* movements. Yet conservative or reactionary women may also organize in response to the same kinds of structural changes as their progressive counterparts. As Rebecca Klatch suggests in *A Generation Divided* (1999), a study of the new Right and new Left in the United States, not all the activists in the 1960s could be considered hippies.

[3] Social scientists have used the term *structure* in a variety of ways. Theda Skocpol (1979; 1994) uses the term *structural* to identify state-centered approaches to revolution. I categorize state-centric approaches as institutional.

Scholars have also conceived of the relationship between gender interests and women's movements in terms of feminine or feminist movements, a dichotomy that categorizes movements according to whether activists seek to preserve the status quo or aim to change it. This perspective emphasizes the goals that women pursue. Feminine movements mobilize on the basis of women's traditional roles in the domestic sphere, usually as mothers and wives, while feminist movements explicitly challenge conventional gender roles (Alvarez 1990; Jaquette 1994). Others have described the same dichotomy in terms of practical or strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985), maternalist movements (Jetter, Orleck et al. 1997), or movements that embody female consciousness (Kaplan 1982).

The feminine/feminist distinction highlights the differences between gender and other collective categories, such as race, ethnicity, or class. Standard approaches to the study of women in politics (i.e., those that do not take gender ideology into account) often fail to "get at" the sources of gender discrimination and do not problematize the sexist nature of political institutions (Jónasdóttir and Jones 1988). Drawing a distinction between feminine and feminist mobilization also acknowledges that not all women organize along feminist lines and thus legitimates the contributions of women who do not necessarily or explicitly support gender equality.

To be fair, the distinction between feminine and feminist movements has been forwarded more as a mode of classification than as an *explanation* for why women protest. But this typology implies that women protest in response to their interests as women, either to defend "traditional" interests centering on children and the family or to promote women's interests in achieving equality. In reducing women's interests to two categories, however, this approach obscures more than it explains. Many movements do not fit easily into either category. Some are feminine and feminist at the same time (Kaplan 1997; Stephen 1997). Studies of conservative and reactionary women have convincingly demonstrated that women's political participation cannot necessarily be explained simply in terms of women's adherence to or defense of traditional gender roles (Luker 1984; Klatch 1987; Koonz 1987; Blee 1991; De Grazia 1992; Power 1996; Blee 1998; Klatch 1999; Kampwirth and Gonzalez 2001). Women who participated in the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, for example, formed a unique ideology that joined racism, motherhood, and support for women's rights (Blee 1991). More importantly, *feminine* mobilization presents a contradiction in terms: *if women acted in accord with traditional views of women's*

roles, they would not mobilize at all. We might expect truly feminine-minded women to stay home. Linking female identity with a particular set of interests more often than not leads us to portray women's interests inaccurately and makes them susceptible to the charge of false consciousness, in the sense of attributing interests to women that they do not actually hold.

So what interests do women share in common? What unites women is their exclusion from the political process and their collective status as political outsiders. There are important individual exceptions, but they do not challenge the existence of widespread patterns of marginalization among women (Williams 1998). Mobilizing as women provides a rhetorical frame that permits women with diverse substantive interests to engage in collective action to pursue their ends under the rubric of having access to political decision making. Whatever women's specific concerns may be, they cannot pursue them if they lack the ability to voice their concerns and have them taken seriously in the political arena. Women protest as women not necessarily because they share mutual interests (although they may) but because mobilizing as women frames their actions in a way that facilitates coordination among them.

While women's movements diverge widely in terms of substantive concerns, they share an appeal to "women" as a source of collective identity. In any particular context, and to a certain extent universally, the term *woman* conveys a set of shared meanings and readily understood norms about behavior. Gender is constructed, but it is constructed in ways that are more or less readily understood in any given society at any given point in time. When women mobilize as women, they tap into common knowledge about gender norms that portray men and women as categorically different.

Using norms strategically may or may not be consistent with activists' "real" beliefs, and may or may not result from a conscious decision-making process in which other strategies are explicitly suggested, considered, and rejected. Women do not inevitably mobilize on the basis of their identity as women simply because they are women. Framing mobilization in terms of conventional gender roles may seem to be an obvious or inevitable move, especially for women in Latin America, where *machismo* and *marianismo* (the cult of the Virgin Mary) run deep and appear to constitute an essential component of the culture. But women have choices about how to frame their actions. Women may also mobilize as students, workers, members of a socioeconomic class, or any one of a host of nongender-specific categories. Women comprised a significant percentage of activists

in the Polish Solidarity movement, for example, but they did not raise gender-specific demands until well into Poland's transition to democracy (Bernhard 1993). Moreover, of the numerous women who participated in the New Left movement in the United States, a relatively small percentage joined women's liberation (Klatch 1999). Even if activists consider mobilizing as women to be the obvious choice in a given situation, however, there are some conditions in which it makes more sense to do so than others. There are some situations in which mobilizing on the basis of gender identity will prove more persuasive and more successful than others, in terms of generating popular support or eliciting a response from political authorities.

When women do mobilize as women, they often use gender roles *strategically* to further certain political goals. When activists in a particular movement engage in practices associated with women's traditional roles, such as banging on empty pots and pans, they may in fact be exploiting conventional gender norms in the service of strategic political goals. Women's appeal to motherhood as the basis for mobilization does not necessarily evolve because society literally relegates women to the domestic realm. Women do rely upon conventional gender roles as the basis for mobilization, and they do so for a number of different reasons. In some situations, women's decision to articulate their demands in terms of motherhood may prove politically advantageous, because motherhood affords women a political space not available to men. Karen Beckwith (1996: 1055) maintains, for example, that "where women's standing emphasize[s] their relationships as mothers and wives, it serve[s] as a resource that protects them against certain kinds of reprisals" and enables women to do things that would be "unimaginable" for other groups to undertake. In this sense, one might say that activists in women's movements *perform* gender identity (Butler 1990). When women mobilize as women, they appeal to a certain set of expectations about women's behavior and tap into widely held and commonly recognized cultural norms about women's status in society. Yet they do so in order to highlight women's shared experience of exclusion from political power.

Conclusion

My study predicts that women's movements will emerge under two conditions: partisan realignment and framing conflict in terms of widely held cultural norms about gender difference. Women's movements are most

likely to generate a tip, in terms of winning popular support and influencing political outcomes, when their mobilization coincides with the formation of new coalitions and when they frame their mobilization in terms of their status as political outsiders. The conditions under which political realignment occurs can be determined by examining the institutional rules that structure engagement among political elites. Understanding institutional design in a particular context not only helps to clarify the conditions under which these outcomes are likely to occur, but also explains why they occur. Women's proclivity to perceive these conditions in gendered terms, and their likelihood to take action in response to them, stems from the way in which differences between men and women become salient in the political arena. Convergence between the precise institutional moment when particular protests occurred and the way in which women framed their actions set in process a series of events that changed the entire political landscape – for the women in the movement as well as for political actors outside the movement. Once the movement coalesces, politicians are likely to address its concerns in their efforts to build popular support for their new coalition.

The argument presented here about why women protest joins "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches to the study of social movements. That is, this book accounts for the role that individual people play in initiating mobilization, as well as the broad conditions under which they do so. Karl Marx (1987) expressed this idea in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* when he wrote "men [*sic*] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Collective political outcomes must be explained in terms of individual actions, on what some have called a "microfoundational" level. I start from this assumption, which is a central premise of rational choice theory, not only because I find it logically persuasive, but also because it acknowledges the potential for human agency and creativity. At the same time, people make choices and take action within a particular context, or set of "macrolevel" conditions, that limits them in significant and, to a certain extent, identifiable ways.

The three general concepts presented in this book – tipping, timing, and framing – constitute a general framework from which to understand why women protest. In and of themselves, however, these concepts do not constitute an explanation. In order to employ these concepts to generate predictive explanations, they must be linked to empirical details from

specific cases. The precise parameters of these variables will be defined differently from case to case, depending on the institutional design and historical details of a particular political system. Thus the remaining chapters in this book delve deep into the substantive details of Chilean history. Ultimately, as I suggest in the final chapter, the generalizability of the claims I make here merits examination across an array of different cases.

Overview of the Book

This chapter provides a general framework from which to understand mobilization among women, one that points toward institutional dynamics and cultural norms as the key variables. The balance of the book examines these theoretical claims against empirical detail drawn from Chile. Chapter Two provides a historical overview of women's participation in the Chilean political process. It begins by explaining the women's suffrage in terms of tipping. In the 1930s, a diverse array of women's organizations united around the demand for suffrage in the context of partisan realignment: the formation of the center-left coalition known as the Popular Front. They framed their demands in terms of women's status outside the parties, but the movement collapsed when women's claims to transcend party politics proved unsustainable. The second half of the chapter shows how the Cold War politics of the 1960s shaped the reemergence of women's protest in the 1970s and 1980s.

I present the two main cases in separate parts. The three chapters in each part examine three distinct phases of women's mobilization: failed efforts to coalesce; successful efforts to coalesce; and the consequences of mobilization in each case. Chapter Three charts the initial efforts of female party leaders to mobilize Chilean women against the socialist government of President Allende – a failed tip. Conservative women began to protest just after the 1970 presidential election in the hopes of fomenting a mass women's movement against the new leftist government but they did not succeed. The female protesters framed their actions in terms of women's unique ability to transcend male partisanship. They believed that the opposition parties were poised to form a new alliance with one another, but this anticipated realignment did not occur and the protests failed to achieve their immediate objective. Nonetheless, these efforts established the tone for later demonstrations. Chapter Three also illustrates how

political conditions changed over the course of Allende's first year in office. Gradually, the parties within the opposition began to converge and a realignment did occur, setting the stage for a women's movement to emerge.

Chapter Four examines the March of the Empty Pots, an example of successful mobilization that I identify as the tipping point for the anti-Allende movement. By November 1971, a climate of instability had prompted the opposition parties to join forces against the Allende government. Female opposition leaders responded by convening a mass demonstration of women against the government, an event that erupted in street violence and chaos. The March of the Empty Pots ignited women's mobilization because of the moment at which it occurred and the way in which the organizers framed women's actions. These two conditions – a realignment of the center right against the leftist Allende government, and an emphasis on women's status as political outsiders – triggered sustained mobilization among women. These events definitively shaped the events that occurred during the course of the remaining two years of the Allende government and influenced the Pinochet regime as well.

Chapter Five illustrates the lasting significance of the March of the Empty Pots – for women, for the opposition as a whole, for the Allende government, and for the military regime that followed it. Various constituencies within the opposition fought to monopolize the symbol of the empty pot. Chapter Five also illustrates the ways in which the military government of General Augusto Pinochet adopted the anti-Allende women's movement to serve its own purposes. When the armed forces seized power on September 11, 1973, they credited "the women of Chile" with liberating Chile from Marxism. Women became one of the military government's most important constituencies. Pinochet and his wife, Lucía Hiriart, continuously invoked women's opposition to Allende and incorporated hundreds of thousands of women into government-sponsored volunteer programs.

Part Two analyzes women's organizing against the Pinochet regime. Chapter Six traces the origins of a diverse array of women's organizations opposed to the military, beginning just after the coup and leading up to 1983. During this period, women formed groups centered on human rights, economic survival, and women's rights – the organizational base upon which a new women's movement would emerge. Most of this activity remained isolated and underground because of the fierce campaign

against subversion being waged by the military. The few protests that women staged during this period tended to be small and easily repressed.

Chapter Seven illustrates how changes in the political context precipitated a mass women's movement. In 1983, the loose networks of women's organizations coalesced to produce a new movement of women opposed to Pinochet. The movement emerged in response to the formation of two competing crosspartisan coalitions within the opposition. These coalitions proved unable to agree on how best to bring about a return to civilian rule. Women representing the entire spectrum of the opposition came together in this setting, triggering the formation of a united women's movement. They framed the need to unite in terms of women's ability to transcend party politicking in the face of a dire political crisis. Their efforts emphasized women's defense of life against the "culture of death" represented by the military.

Chapter Eight evaluates the impact of the women's movement on the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Chile. Women's movement organizations played a critical role in the transition to democracy between 1987 and 1989, amidst a period of intense competition to monopolize women's electoral power. The second part of Chapter Eight focuses on the fate of the women's movement since the return of civilian rule in 1989.

Chapter Nine concludes by examining the extent to which the theoretical framework developed in this book can be used to explain other cases. I consider the "tipping, timing, framing" perspective in light of evidence drawn from three other countries that underwent transitions to democracy: Brazil, Russia, and the former East Germany.