Moral Repair
Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing

Moral Repair examines the ethics and moral psychology of responses to wrongdoing. Explaining the emotional bonds and normative expectations that keep human beings responsive to moral standards and responsible to each other, Margaret Urban Walker uses realistic examples of both personal betrayal and political violence to analyze how moral bonds are damaged by serious wrongs and what must be done to repair the damage. Focusing on victims of wrong, their right to validation, and their sense of justice, Walker presents a unified and detailed philosophical account of hope, trust, resentment, forgiveness, and making amends – the emotions and practices that sustain moral relations. Moral Repair joins a multidisciplinary literature concerned with transitional and restorative justice, reparations, and restoring individual dignity and mutual trust in the wake of serious wrongs.

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To Hilde and Robin
Contents

Acknowledgments page ix

1 What Is Moral Repair? 1
2 Hope’s Value 40
3 Damages to Trust 72
4 Resentment and Assurance 110
5 Forgiving 151
6 Making Amends 191

Bibliography 231
Index 245
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