The European Parliament and Supranational Party System

This book examines the impact of increased legislative power and political authority on the internal development of the European Parliament and the supranational party group system. This is done through an analysis of changes in the hierarchical structures that regulate the internal organization of both the EP as a whole and the individual party groups. In addition, the changing pattern of coalition formation between party groups across time and legislative procedure is analyzed. The trends of internal development examined suggest that the increases in EP power that have occurred since the creation of the cooperation procedure by the Single European Act in 1987 have caused a fundamental shift in the character of the European Parliament as a legislative institution. Prior to 1987 the European Parliament, despite direct elections and several small attempts to increase its powers, served primarily as a chamber of debate where much more was discussed than accomplished. Since 1987 the EP has evolved into an effective and influential legislative body with the power to delay, amend, and veto EU legislation.

Dr. Amie Kreppel is an Assistant Professor at the University of Florida. She teaches in the fields of comparative politics, comparative political institutions, and formal theory, including specifically courses on the political institutions of Western Europe and the politics and institutions of the European Union. Her research focuses on the development of political parties and parliaments in Europe and the United States. She has published articles in numerous journals, including Comparative Political Studies, the Journal of Common Market Studies, the European Journal of Political Research, and the British Journal of Political Studies. She was recently a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
This book is gratefully dedicated to my mother
for believing that I could do it,
to George for showing me the path,
and to Zach for keeping me company along the way.
The European Parliament and Supranational Party System

A STUDY IN
INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

AMIE KREPPEL
University of Florida, Gainesville
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Acknowledgments

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